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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis examines the impact of Edward Said’s influential work Orientalism and its 
legacy in respect of contemporary reading and writing across cultures. It also questions the 
legitimacy of Said’s retrospective stereotyping of early examples of cross-cultural 
representation in literature as uncompromisingly “orientalist”. 
 
It is well known that the release of Edward Said’s Orientalism in 1978 was responsible for 
the rise of a range of cultural and critical theories from multiculturalism to postcolonialism. 
It was a study that not only polarized critics and forced scholars to re-examine orientalist 
archives, but persuaded creative writers to re-think their ethnographic positions when it 
came to the literary representations of cultures other than their own. Without detracting 
from the enormous impact of Said, this thesis isolates gaps and silences in Said that need 
correcting. Furthermore, there is an element of intransigence, an uncompromising refusal to 
fine-tune what is essentially a binary discourse of the West and its other in Said’s work, that 
encourages the continued interrogation of power relations but which, because of its very 
boldness, paradoxically disallows the extent to which the conflict of cultures indeed 
produced new, hybrid social and cultural formations.  
   ii
In an attempt to challenge the severity of Said’s claim that “every European, in what he 
could say about the Orient, was consequently a racist, an imperialist, and almost totally 
ethnocentric”, the thesis examines a number of different discursive contexts in which such a 
presumption is challenged. Thus while the second chapter discusses the ‘traditional’ 
profession-based orientalism of nineteenth-century E. G. Browne, the third considers the 
anti-imperialism of colonial administrator Leonard Woolf. The fourth chapter provides a 
reflection on the difficulties of diasporic “orientalism” through the works of Michael 
Ondaatje while chapter five demonstrates the effects of the dialogism used by Amitav 
Ghosh as a defence against “orientalism”. The thesis concludes with an examination of 
contemporary writing by Andrea Levy that appositely illustrates the legacy of Said’s 
influence. 
 
While the restrictive parameters of Said’s work make it difficult to mount a thorough-going 
critique of Said, this thesis shows that, indeed, it is within the restraints of these parameters 
and in the very discourse that Said employs that he traps himself. This study claims that 
even Said is susceptible to “orientalist” criticism in that he is as much an “orientalist” as 
those at whom he directs his polemic.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF BEING  
 
OTHER THAN “ORIENTALIST”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An Englishman acts out a boyhood dream when he travels on horseback through Persia in  
the late-nineteenth century. He writes: 
We sat for a while by the seven graves from which the place takes its name, 
and drank tea, which was brought to us by the kindly inmates. A venerable 
old dervish entered into conversation with us, and even walked with us as 
far as the gate of the city. He was one of those dervishes who inspires one 
with respect for a name which serves but too often to shelter idleness, sloth, 
and even vice. Too often it is the case that the traveller, judging only by the 
opium-eating, hashish-smoking mendicant, who, with matted hair, glassy 
eyes, and harsh, raucous voice, importunes the passers-by for alms, 
condemns all dervishes as a blemish and a bane to their country. Yet in 
truth this is far from being a correct view. Nowhere are men to be met with 
so enlightened, so intelligent, so tolerant, so well-informed, and so simple-
minded as amongst the ranks of the dervishes.
1  
 
An English cadet in the Ceylon Civil Service describes his feelings on his promotion to 
assistant government agent for the district of Hambantota: 
I fell in love with the country, the people, and the way of life which were 
entirely different from everything in London and Cambridge to which I had 
been born and bred. To understand the people and the way they lived in the 
villages of West Giruwa Pattu and the jungles of Magampattu became a 
passion with me. . . . in Hambantota, it is almost true to say, I worked all   2
day from the moment I got up in the morning until the moment I went to 
bed at night, for I rarely thought of anything else except the district and the 
people, to increase their prosperity, diminish the poverty and disease, start 
irrigation works, open schools. There was no sentimentality about this; I did 
not idealize or romanticize the people or the country: I just liked them 
aesthetically and humanly and socially.
2  
 
An Indian ethnographer ends a period of field trials in village Egypt in confrontation with 
Egyptian authority. He describes this incident: 
“I didn’t know Sidi Abu-Hasira was a Jewish saint,” I said at last. “In the 
countryside I heard that everyone went to visit the tomb.” 
 
“You shouldn’t have believed it,” he said. “In the villages, as you must 
know, there is a lot of ignorance and superstition; the fellaheen talk about 
miracles for no reason at all. You’re an educated man, you should know 
better than to believe the fellaheen on questions of religion.” 
 
“But the fellaheen are very religious,” I said. “Many amongst them are very 
strict in religious matters.” 
 
“Is it religion to believe in saints and miracles?’ he said scornfully. ‘These 
beliefs have nothing to do with true religion. They are mere superstitions, 
contrary to Islam and they will disappear with development and progress.”
3  
 
An expatriate Sri Lankan living in Canada traces his Sinhalese genealogy. In a “notebook” 
he captures images gathered in a visit to his homeland: 
To jungles and gravestones. . . . Reading torn 100-year-old newspaper 
clippings that come apart in your hands like wet sand, information tough as 
plastic dolls. Watched leopards sip slowly, watched the crow sitting restless 
on his branch peering about with his beak open. Have seen the outline of a 
large fish caught and thrown in the curl of a wave, been where nobody 
wears socks, where you wash your feet before you go to bed, where I watch 
my sister who alternatively reminds me of my father, mother and brother. 
Driven through rainstorms that flood the streets for an hour and suddenly 
evaporate, where sweat falls in the path of this ballpoint, where the jak [sic] 
fruit rolls across your feet in the back of the jeep, where there are eighteen 
ways of describing the smell of a durian, where bullocks hold up traffic and 
steam after the rains.
4    
 
An author in exile contemplates: 
The Indian writer, looking back at India, does so through guilt-tinted 
spectacles. (I am of course, once more, talking about myself.) I am speaking 
now of those of us who emigrated . . . and I suspect that there are times 
when the move seems wrong to us all, when we seem, to ourselves, post-
lapsarian men and women. We are Hindus who have crossed the black   3
water; we are Muslims who eat pork. And as a result—as my use of the 
Christian notion of the Fall indicates—we are now partly of the West. Our 
identity is at once plural and partial. Sometimes we feel that we straddle 
two cultures; at other times, that we fall between two stools. But however 
ambiguous and shifting this ground may be, it is not an infertile territory for 
a writer to occupy.
5 
 
 
An English Orientalist, a British colonial administrator, an Indian ethnographer, writers in 
the diaspora . . . labels all . . . through and by which we typecast ourselves and each other. 
But not one of these writers is accurately described by this method of identification. They 
were born in England, Ceylon and India, but that is the only part of the representation that 
contains any accuracy at all. Each has travelled, studied, worked or lived in many countries 
of the world. Beyond a generation or two, their genealogical backgrounds are not of their 
countries of birth. Nor is it any more satisfactory to hunt for their identity in other 
categories—as ‘world citizens’ or ‘transnationals’, for example—neither grouping is 
particularly useful in offering a greater insight into the people themselves. Rather it 
encourages a further generic lapse into an equally superficial homogeneity. On the other 
hand, how useful is nationality anyway in describing or ascribing identity? In searching for 
a way in—a way to describe these writers apart from the now dated modernist terms of 
nationhood—the term ‘displaced’ comes to mind. That is the one certainty that remains to 
us in the postcolonial and postmodern environment: the lack of a place to call home is a 
central experience of many. But aside from the slightly pathetic connotations of 
homelessness the word ‘displaced’ evokes, is it merely another reductive label? In terms of 
bestowing identity, how useful is it?  
 
It is these concerns and their relation to the literature that emanates from these 
‘shadowlands’—the diaspora, the borderland, the margin—that underlie my thesis. My 
primary objective is to demonstrate the extent to which issues of culture, identity and   4
displacement dictate the way in which a writer—specifically a writer from one culture 
writing on another—reflects, actively constructs or re-presents a certain world view for 
readers. This gives rise to a number of questions. I need to ask, for example, what sort of 
agendas operate? How subtle is the distortion that results? How powerful is the effect of that 
distortion? How fine is the line between misrepresentation and re-presentation. And, finally, 
I am interested in attempting to determine the extent of the influence of powerful 
postcolonial scholars like Edward Said on twenty-first-century writing across cultures. 
 
Before I discuss a thesis that is concerned with an exploration of the agencies implicated in 
writing and reading across cultures and which situates theory alongside social reality, I 
would like to add a word of explanation with regard to the political position I occupy. The 
intellectual background from which I come—and for which the responsibility for my 
argument must lie—is one of critical relativism and of slight detachment in that I was not 
personally implicated in the issues of empire.
6 This means that I occupy a middle ground 
with regard to the dynamics in the transaction between reader and text. I cannot read a text 
and make the involuntary assumption that it is politically innocent. Conversely, neither can I 
read deceit or conscious manipulation into every narrative slippage. But now, even if I 
claim a distancing from my subject using some literary device—as in Conrad’s use of 
Marlow as narrator for example—this thesis has declared a background which can be used 
to locate private sentiments and affiliations hidden in the text and which will, inevitably, 
have a bearing on the conclusions drawn.  
 
The case of Leonard Woolf is exemplary here. Although he is a well-known opponent of 
imperialism, Woolf is criticized because the strength of the sentiments expressed in his   5
autobiographical works can be ‘proven’ by arbitrary selection of detail not to be replicated 
in his fictional work.
7 And further, that his novel—specifically The Village in the Jungle—
indicates “an affiliation with a deep-seated and seemingly inherent imperialist ideology and 
cannot, therefore, be cited as . . . benevolent to the colonized native” (De Silva, 5). In other 
words, despite all the evidence to the contrary, it is still possible to establish that Woolf had 
an underlying agenda, which despite its benign and compassionate exterior, had a malignant 
centre.  
 
While in any literary work, there are bound to be instances where an unconscious view is 
expressed, it seems to me that something is not quite right with a critical discourse that casts 
insults where insults are not due. These people are no longer here to defend themselves, 
their writings or their viewpoints. If part of the work of postcolonial theory is to foreground 
the wrongs of the colonial past, there are more deserving figures than Woolf or Kipling or 
Forster on which to concentrate.
8 
 
While it is simplistic and reductive to suggest that a text is necessarily or only a vehicle for 
an author’s viewpoint, to state the opposite merely to support a theoretical position becomes 
equally puerile. Woolf was a political personage and his texts expressed not only his 
political position, but also a social and cultural awareness that showed as much love as it did 
compassion for the people he administered. This is as clear in his fictional texts as it is in his 
autobiographical works and diaries. However, since this thesis concerns itself both with 
postcolonial critical literature and with the cross-cultural literary works written during the 
colonial era, in determining the “extralinguistic truth value” of texts, there are certain issues 
of representation that must be addressed.
9    6
 
Literature inevitably arises from a melee of conflicting interests. It cannot be discussed 
separately from historical and political movements and events any more than it can be 
disassociated from the social and cultural milieu and interests of its creator. Inevitably, these 
‘events’ shape the literary canon with which we work. And because—whether as writer, 
reader or critic—we are all participants in the archives we inherit, these are the narratives 
that shape our thinking, and those that I discuss here.  
 
Thus the position from which I write this thesis is as a critic of postcolonial discourse who 
is, at the same time, not unsympathetic to the grounds—that is, the issues behind the 
concerns and resentment—that gave rise to such a discourse in the first place. I therefore 
attempt to dig beneath the rhetoric to arrive at some sort of actuality or notion of 
“extralinguistic truth” with regard to those writers who attempt a representation of a culture 
other than their own. Since postcolonial theory quite clearly and inclusively labels such 
writers and their works “orientalist”, it is on this branch of theory that I concentrate.
10 
Consequently, the focus of my argument is located in the well-known thesis of Edward 
Said, the gist of which is contained in his first “definition” of “orientalism”: “Anyone who 
teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient—and this applies whether the person is an 
anthropologist, sociologist, historian, or philologist—either in its specific or its general 
aspects, is an Orientalist, and what he or she does is Orientalism”.
11  
 
I contend that it is under this political re-inscription of a term traditionally used to describe 
the profession of a person “versed in oriental languages and literature” that the level of 
engagement with culture becomes a lot more complicated than Said allows.
12 If this   7
definition has any currency at all—and Said retreats only marginally from this extreme 
position—then it becomes almost impossible for any teacher, writer or researcher not to be 
an “orientalist”. This means that all theorists and researchers pointing retrospective fingers 
of blame at figures such as Woolf, Kipling and Conrad become themselves “orientalists”, 
taking on the attendant connotations of racist, imperialist, dominant and chauvinistic 
behaviours now embedded in the word. As a result, in this particular area of postcolonial 
theory, every writer in the English language whose subject matter is the “East” is to some 
extent “orientalist”. All of us who teach, write, travel, promote and attempt to ‘represent’ 
anywhere other than our own (very often hybrid) culture or country of origin are 
“orientalists” and, in fact, even if we ‘represent’ our own country of origin, as I show in my 
discussion of Michael Ondaatje and his literary works, we can still be considered 
“orientalist”. Depending on the degree of accuracy inherent in Said’s statement we are all—
in one way or another, to greater or lesser extents—subject to censure as “orientalists”, 
Edward Said included. 
 
Thus it follows that the critical works that most concern me here are those of Edward Said, 
in particular Orientalism, which remains his most-discussed book and provides the 
inspiration for this thesis. What many scholars have missed in their criticism of Said is that 
his book was a polemic and, as such, deliberately designed to penetrate to the very core of 
postcolonial anxiety: namely, the jingoism responsible for the creation of colonies and the 
way in which they were administered from, and dominated by, the metropolis. The literary 
texts that I examine will be analysed in content and form in respect to the theories of Said as 
well as a number of other theoretical disciplines, including post-structuralism, cultural 
studies, psychoanalytic criticism and Marxism. In particular, leading theorists in some of   8
these schools who have influenced my reading include Homi Bhabha, Mikhail Bakhtin, 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Slavoj Žižek, historian Thomas H. Trautmann and 
ethnologist James Clifford. An examination of some of their philosophies appears in chapter 
one along with my critique of Orientalism and at appropriate places throughout the thesis. 
 
This work is designed not so much as a progression of argument but more as a process of 
refinement that becomes a reiteration of the argument in different discursive contexts. My 
thesis—the impossibility of being other than “orientalist”—is formulated in the first chapter 
together with a discussion of Said’s “orientalism” and some of the enquiries I put forward 
provide for connections between the texts of Bhabha and Said. Each of the subsequent 
chapters will, while reinforcing the thesis, shed light on a new discursive perspective by 
discussing the selected works of a particular writer. In a more general sense, the chapters are 
close readings or practical criticisms of these texts.  
 
Thus while chapter one provides a critical overview of the dynamic structure of 
“orientalism”, chapter two traces the ‘representations’ of the Orient by the Orientalists 
themselves. The key figure in this chapter is Edward Granville Browne, a leading 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century Orientalist. Browne was an Englishman who became a 
dedicated scholar and lecturer of Middle Eastern languages as well as a writer and 
researcher devoted to a culture not his own. In the light of Said’s argument, he is included 
here for his representation of Persia and the Persian people. Partly because Browne is less 
well known than the other figures I discuss, but particularly because of his standing among 
the Orientalists of his day, his biographical details assume greater spatial importance here 
than those of the other writers.   9
 
Chapter three asks how Leonard Woolf negotiates this concept of “orientalism”. Woolf was 
a colonial administrator in the early twentieth century. His experiences in what was then 
Ceylon resulted in the publication of a fictional book on his return to England—The Village 
in the Jungle—and several decades later provided the material for the second volume of his 
five-part autobiography. As conscious an imperialist as Woolf undoubtedly was, he is still a 
person of one culture writing about the people and customs of another and as such, in 
Saidian terms, an “orientalist”. Despite his well-known antipathy to imperialism, I show 
how impossible it is to extricate Woolf from charges of “orientalism”. 
 
Moving to contemporary writers at the other end of the twentieth-century in an endeavour to 
show a post-Orientalism awareness of cultural representation, in chapter four I reflect on a 
form of diasporic “orientalism” through the works of Michael Ondaatje. In discussing 
Ondaatje’s “exteriority”, I ask to what extent his Running in the Family “re-creates” the 
Ceylon of the past and how he locates himself with respect to this text. Does his 
indigenousness give him an intrinsic right to “write the Orient” and, in so doing, excuse the 
indisputably ‘exotic’ within his writing? One of the key issues I address in this chapter is to 
what extent Ondaatje’s work presents an example of the ‘other’ as ‘native informant’.  
 
A reading of Amitav Ghosh’s In an Antique Land in chapter five questions whether even the 
self-reflexive writings of a text that tries very hard to be polyphonic can still be regarded as 
“orientalist”. In line with the latest ethnographic practices and with awareness of novelistic 
conventions and Bakhtinian dialogic, Ghosh allows the voices of his characters to be heard 
alongside his own, and it becomes difficult to see how he can be condemned. However,   10
invoking the work of James Clifford, the question still remains as to whether, in writing 
about another culture and in foregrounding what he believes to be the concerns of that 
culture, he is nevertheless committing a type of cultural pillage. 
 
I conclude this study with an exploration of the postcolonial sentiments foregrounded in 
Andrea Levy’s latest novel A Small Island and strive for an understanding of where 
someone who describes herself as a “bastard child of Empire” locates herself in terms of an 
identity and its impact on the notions that arise in her work.
13 
 
This thesis locates itself as an exploration of cross-cultural literature in an attempt to assert 
the impossibility of classifying such writing and its writers as anything other than 
“orientalist”.  If this can be satisfactorily proven, it disassociates the “imperialist” practice 
of empire from “orientalist” tradition and shifts again the meaning of this slippery word.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   11
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Chapter one 
 
 
 
 
 
SAID, BHABHA AND THE DYNAMICS OF ORIENTALISM 
 
 
 
 
. . . perhaps we can now suggest that  
transnational histories of migrants,  
the colonized, or political refugees— 
these border and frontier conditions— 
may be the terrains of world literature. 
 
Homi K. Bhabha
1 
 
 
Culture is a deeply compromised idea  
I cannot yet do without. 
 
 James Clifford
2 
 
 
 
 
A full quarter-century after the publication of Said’s controversial Orientalism, the attention 
he drew to the inequities of empire has extended beyond the boundaries of academic debate 
to literature in the public domain, a state of affairs appositely demonstrated by the level of 
acclaim meted out to Small Island—the latest novel of black British writer Andrea Levy—a 
pertinent example of the status of non-academic postcolonial discourse. As well-written as it 
undoubtedly is, the content of Levy’s book raises questions significant to the cultural and 
political perspectives of what is essentially a literary thesis. Among the questions such a 
book raises are those that interrogate the very premise of postcolonialism. For example: 
How insidious is this refusal not only to let go of the past, but to recast it as almost entirely   13
nefarious? Is it a consequence of personal grievance or is it a victim of the same hegemonic 
and economic rationalism that accompanied its colonial antecedent? Or, to come at the 
problem from its opposite perspective: What repercussions for the future lie in wait if the 
lessons of the past are not absorbed and acted upon? As Simon Gikandi argues, is the neo-
colonialism we observe today actually the survival of colonialism within a postcolonial 
structure?
3 I propose to start my discussion with an overview of Gikandi’s argument since 
writing as he does from the lived experience of the colonized I consider his opinion critical 
to my own thesis.
4 
 
In setting out to write Maps of Englishness, Gikandi’s aim was to trace “a narrative or 
discursive moment that could be considered to represent the break from colonial to 
postcolonial narratives” (xiii), but he was to find at the end of his research that in fact there 
was no rupture but instead a blurring and continuing linkage between the two. In 
formulating his position, he states: “Colonial culture is as much about the figuration of the 
metropolis in the imagination of the colonized themselves as it is about the representation of 
the colonized in the dominant discourses of the imperial center” (20).  
I invoke the post to describe a condition in which colonial culture 
dominates the scene of cultural production but one in which its face has 
been changed by both its appropriation by the colonized and the theoretical 
oppositionality it faces in the decolonized polis . . . thus . . . the argument 
that colonialism has been transcended is patently false; but so is the 
insistence that, in the former colonies, the culture of colonialism continues 
to have the same power and presence it had before decolonization. (14) 
 
Hence he suggests that the term “postcolonialism” is instead a “code for the state of 
undecidability in which the culture of colonialism continues to resonate in what was 
supposed to be its negation . . . [It is a] term for a state of transition and cultural instability”. 
He argues that in the state of flux within which culture exists at the present moment    14
 
 
“postcoloniality is a term for a state that does not exist, that postcolonial theory is one way 
of recognizing how decolonized situations are marked by the trace of the imperial pasts they 
try to disavow . . .” (14-5).  
 
The thrust of Gikandi’s main argument claims that colonialism as a project was never 
complete and that it was due to this very lack of closure that the narratives of postcoloniality 
were produced. He argues that although the colonized writers he cites appeared to   
 
. . . position themselves squarely within colonial Englishness and to affiliate 
themselves with a set of identities and values that were considered to be the 
very condition of existence of colonialism itself . . . [at] the same time . . . 
these writers took their local histories and traditions for granted and 
assumed that whatever Englishness had brought to the colonized had not 
supplemented such histories and traditions; indeed, they assumed that what 
made their cultural moments and identities unique was the simple act of 
social hybridity. . . . If many of them saw their destiny as a variation on the 
culture inherited by colonialism, it was because they also assumed that they 
had been instrumental both in the making of this culture and in its 
redefinition. (xiv-xv) 
 
To Gikandi, the effect of this “redefinition” was reciprocal. He argues that the character of 
Britain was so powerfully linked to the areas it administered during its era of empire that the 
independence of its colonies was not only synonymous with its own decline, but the 
underlying reason for its subsequent demise and loss of power.  
 
I began to ponder on ways in which cultures produced on the margins of a 
dominant discourse might actually have the authority not only to subvert the 
dominant but also to transform its central notions. I wanted to be able to 
argue that colonial cultures had been central in the transformation of 
English identities without discarding the claim that colonialism was, as a 
system of power and authority, responsible for the radical displacement of 
the colonial world and its narratives. How could a space in which traditional    15
 
authority had been relegated to the margins of the dominant ever have the 
authority to transform the centre?” (xv) 
 
Out of this conflict and confusion emerged corruptions of the original cultures of both 
colonized and colonizer of “mutual imbrication and contamination” (xviii). If at first this 
line of reasoning appears to be opposite to Homi Bhabha’s concepts of hybridity, ostensibly 
leaning towards notions of homogeneity and integration, in fact the two notions turn out to 
be not only congruent but mutually supportive. Gikandi’s argument produces a variation on 
the “interstices” which is neither one of assimilation nor of the superimposition of 
Englishness over the ‘other’. Instead he asserts the existence of a “colonial space”, 
maintaining that “the colonized cannot continue to be conceived as victims of a triumphant 
Englishness imposing its rule and civility on its radical other; on the contrary, the colonial 
space was to reconstitute itself in response to the imposition of Englishness; in inventing 
itself, the colonial space would also reinvent the structure and meaning of the core terms of 
Englishness . . . ” (xviii). This relationship, he claims, has led to a measure of self-
reflexivity within the metropolis in that if imperialism is viewed as a battleground for a play 
of power between the British Empire and its colonies, the English did not come off 
unchanged or undamaged in the encounter. In other words,“the reconfiguration of identities 
was not a one-way street” (34). 
 
I return now to my earlier suggestion that while Gikandi’s argument locates itself at the 
opposite end of the spectrum from that of Said, it has a curious resonance with much of the 
densely woven theory of Homi Bhabha.
5 What I would first like to consider here is the  
 
   16
 
criticism leveled at Bhabha from many postcolonialists for “re-presenting the colonial 
encounter as a process of complicities”, a notion that for many theorists is frankly disturbing 
(Parry, 17).
 Benita Parry speaks for more than one critic when she says, “The implications 
of rewriting a historical project of invasion, expropriation and exploitation in the 
indeterminate and always deferred terms Bhabha proposes and implements, are immense, 
and for me immensely troubling, since his elaborations dispense with the notions of 
conflict” (6).
6 The “always deferred” to which Parry alludes is the space or the moment in 
which Bhabha locates his discussion of what for Gikandi is postcolonialism, for other critics 
post-postcolonialism or to invoke writer Toni Morrison, a place “beyond”. Hence, for 
Bhabha, the “contingent and the liminal become the times and the spaces for the historical 
representation of the subjects of cultural difference in a postcolonial criticism” (179). 
Because Bhabha’s well-known aversion to any “binary structure of opposition” disallows 
the oppositional inference in the term “cultural difference”, this then becomes a “contour of 
difference [which] is agonistic, shifting, splitting, rather like Freud’s description of the 
system of consciousness which occupies a position in space lying on the borderline between 
outside and inside” (my emphasis, 110). It seems to me that what concerns Parry most lies 
right here in Bhabha’s replacement of an historical antagonism with an agonism located in 
psychoanalytic theory which he represents as being a space that recalls borderline notions of 
displacement and diaspora. Thus while Parry acknowledges Bhabha’s re-inflection of the 
thought processes of colonized and colonizer, it is the presentation, or re-presentation, of 
those processes as compliance or collusion between cultures—the removal of “notions of 
conflict—in what she regards as “radical rewriting of agency” to which she objects (Parry, 
17). Since this concern at Bhabha’s “rewriting of agency” appears to be most strongly   17
directed at his premise that “‘the effect of colonial power” can be seen as “the production of 
hybridization rather than the noisy command of colonialist authority or the silent repression 
of native traditions’”, I would like to pause right here and ask what it is that Bhabha means 
by these words (11). Firstly, I suggest that by not citing the complete sentence, Parry 
changes the essence, indeed inverts the sense, of what Bhabha is saying here.
7 However, 
Parry’s essay raises a number of questions. For instance, by locating his discussion in the 
shadowland of the “liminal” is Bhabha indeed indulging himself in “a theoretical ruse to 
establish a neutral, ideology-free zone” (Parry, 15)? Is Bhabha denying that the colonies 
were contested spaces?  Is he actually presenting colonialism as “transactional rather than 
conflictual”? Parry raises some very valid points. These are questions that aptly illustrate 
the complexity of a situation that cannot be ignored and which emanate from the heart of 
postcolonial criticism. Instead of attempting to reply on behalf of Homi Bhabha, I propose 
to acknowledge that the troubling nature of these enquiries should, for a moment, be 
regarded as rhetorical and that more light can be directed at the issue from a different angle. 
Accordingly, in all fairness, I believe the first step must be to question the agency that lies at 
the core of Bhabha’s own rhetoric, to uncover a rationale that underpins a line of reasoning 
which would appear to run counter to the ideas of Parry et al. An acute understanding of 
Bhabha’s overarching philosophy is probably best arrived at by the deconstruction of a 
range of his notions, but space restrictions preclude an in-depth examination of his work. 
Therefore, I propose to examine those sections of Bhabha’s argument that are critical to my 
own concerns with regard to cross-cultural representation in literature, an important passage 
of which reads:   
When this [the concept of the world of literature] is placed alongside his 
[Goethe’s] idea that the cultural life of the nation is “unconsciously” lived, 
then there may be a sense in which world literature could be an emergent, 
prefigurative category that is concerned with a form of cultural dissensus 
and alterity, where non-consensual terms of affiliation may be established   18
on the grounds of historical trauma. The study of world literature may be 
the study of the way in which cultures recognize themselves through their 
projections of ‘otherness’ [my emphasis]. Where once the transmission of 
national traditions was the major theme of a world literature, perhaps we 
can now suggest that transnational histories of migrants, the colonized, or 
political refugees—these border and frontier conditions—may be the terrain 
of world literature. The centre of such a study would neither be the 
‘sovereignty’ of national cultures, nor the universalism of human culture, 
but a focus on . . . ‘freak social and cultural displacements’ . . . the critical 
act that attempts to grasp the sleight of hand with which literature conjures 
with historical specificity, using the medium of psychic uncertainty, 
aesthetic distancing, or the obscure signs of the spirit-world, the sublime 
and the subliminal. As literary creatures and political animals we ought to 
concern ourselves with the understanding of human action and the social 
world as a moment when something is beyond control, but not beyond 
accommodation . . .  [taking responsibility for] the unspoken, unrepresented 
pasts that haunt the historical present. (12)
8 
 
It is clear I think that for a moment Bhabha steps outside the purely theoretical to pursue a 
vision of a new literature concerned with and constituted by the diaspora.
9 He is suggesting 
that while human actions—those actions that give rise to the colonized, migrants, 
refugees—cannot always be controlled, they can and indeed “ought” to be adjusted in line 
with the lessons from the past. Although the passage above signals what some scholars have 
perceived as anomalies within Bhabha’s work that need clarification, frequently seeming 
inconsistencies dissolve in comparison with other segments of his work.
10 Consider, for 
example, the strange contradiction to the passage above presented by the language and 
implications in another of his essays, “Signs taken for wonders: Questions of ambivalence 
and authority under a tree outside Delhi, May 1817” in which the phrase “signs taken for 
wonders” refers to the “emblem of the English book . . . as an insignia of colonial authority 
and a signifier of colonial desire and discipline”(102). Further, he maintains that the 
“ideological correlatives” contained in the master discourses “create a revisionary narrative 
that sustains the discipline of Commonwealth history and its epigone, Commonwealth 
literature” and reflect that “conflictual moment” when “colonialist intervention is turned 
into that constitutive discourse of exemplum and imitation”(105). But it is important to   19
note, he continues, that while the English book “glorifies the permanence of European 
dominance”, it concomitantly acts as a symbol of ambivalence from which position the 
“colonial text emerges uncertainly” but which actually empowers the colonized subject with 
a mode of resistance against imperial oppression and aggression (107). When read alongside 
his suggestion that the “study of world literature may be the study of the way in which 
cultures recognize themselves through their projections of ‘otherness’” this apparent 
ambivalence, or seeming contradiction, within Bhabha’s own argument is only amplified. It 
is important to note, however, that the situation changes completely when this area of 
ambivalence or contradiction is reinscribed as a third space, a “site of negotiation”. I would 
therefore suggest that—although a paradox in itself—the contradiction actually supports 
Bhabha’s argument and cannot be read separately from his notions on the negotiability of 
space or hybridity.
11 The text, in this case the English book, is “reinscribed and 
transvalued”, and becomes now a site of negotiation, of “cultural production”.
12  
 
There are echoes of Gikandi in Bhabha’s suggestion that a discourse that travels beyond the 
boundaries of postcolonialism into this space of “cultural production” contains murmurs 
that would suggest that, viewed retrospectively, colonialism was not just “a one-way street”, 
that as well as taking it left behind something of value within the cultures from which it also 
undoubtedly took, that the resulting “contour of difference”, though unstable was 
“agonistic” and not necessarily “antagonistic”.
13 For Bhabha, “the effect of colonial power” 
created a situation which was “beyond control, but . . . not beyond accommodation” (12). In 
other words, while colonization must assume responsibility for the production of the spirits 
that lurk in the dark corners of the past and return to haunt the present, now those spirits 
speak their own truths “in a complex on-going negotiation” (2). It seems to me that there is   20
a healing present in this collapsing of the present into the beyond which opens up a 
productive political site in this third space, the “interstitial passage . . . that opens up the 
possibility of a cultural hybridity that entertains difference without an assumed or imposed 
hierarchy” (4). And this is where I think Homi Bhabha locates much of his argument: in this 
“reconjugating” and “recontexualising” that allows for a progressive renegotiation of 
authority that will permit society to release its angers and move forwards.
14  
 
Understandably, Parry, like Arun Mukherjee in my later discussion of her reaction to 
Michael Ondaatje’s work, fears a glossing of the inequities of the past, the arrival of a point 
of “forgetfulness”. But I feel that in her otherwise excellent critique of Bhabha’s theory, she 
tends to overlook the need for a mediating discourse that will take those “unrepresented 
pasts” and move them beyond a postcolonial perspective trapped in a circular discourse 
which is fast becoming repetitive. Can colonizer and colonized find some middle ground to 
celebrate difference in a “reformulation that can provide a language for the slippage of 
trauma from apocalypse into narrative”?
15 Or is the reality to be found in Said’s premise 
which implies that the “ontological distinctions” between east and west are rooted in “the 
violence inherent in the imperial contest—[which] for all its occasional profit or pleasure—
is an impoverishment for both sides” (Culture and Imperialism, 348)? Does the statement 
that “aggression and supremacy are indeed carved into the colonial archive” gain truth in 
the repeated telling?
16 
 
There is a need for Bhabha’s substitution of the “antagonistic” with the “agonistic” which 
might propel the discourse forward out of conflict into mediation or sites of negotiation. 
Once society’s present concept of culture is dislocated, Bhabha’s notions of hybridity may   21
well reach beyond theory to become actuality. Perhaps this will prove to be the moment at 
which academics like Simon Gikandi acknowledge a movement into a postcolonial space 
and time, a space which no longer recognises a “fixed tablet of tradition”; a step outside 
agency, too, where walls will either crumble or become consciously demolished (Bhabha, 
2). 
 
Thus the process of interpretation becomes a matter of crossing the divide—the gap 
between what Bhabha calls “the I and the You”, between the reader and the writer or 
between one moment and another—which he designates as a “Third Space”. To quote: “The 
pact of interpretation is never simply an act of communication between the I and the You 
designated in the statement. The production of meaning requires that these two places be 
mobilized in the passage through a Third Space, which represents both the general 
conditions of language and the specific implication of the utterance in a performative and 
institutional strategy of which it cannot ‘in itself’ be conscious. What this unconscious 
relation introduces is an ambivalence in the act of interpretation.  . . .  The meaning of the 
utterance is quite literally neither the one nor the other” (36).  
 
This Third Space is the space of articulation that “destroys this mirror or representation in 
which cultural knowledge is customarily revealed as an integrated, open expanding code” 
effectually displacing the narrative of the Western nation and challenging outdated concepts 
of cultural representation. Instead culture becomes a moving concept, ambivalent, not 
linear, and no longer fixed. “The borderline work of culture demands an encounter with a 
‘newness’ that is not part of the continuum of past and present. It creates a sense of the new 
as an insurgent act of cultural translation . . . it renews the past, refiguring it as a contingent   22
‘in-between’ space, that innovates and interrupts the performance of the present” (7). So 
linear time is collapsed as “the ‘past-present’ becomes part of the necessity, not the 
nostalgia, of living” with the beyond, too, having as much immediacy as the present. 
 
For Homi Bhabha culture exists in the “interstices”—those in-between spaces such as 
bridges, stairwells, the constantly reworked space between sea and shore, the link between 
one moment and the next, between one boundary and another—a concept that he extends to 
any “in-between” space previously expressed in the binary terms that he flatly refuses to 
recognize.
17  
  
In fact the only danger to this vision is one that Bhabha would appear to fear most: that this 
negotiation of cultural identity may result in a mongrelized, homogeneous society, rather 
than the closely controlled and guarded cultural cells, the “isolate flecks” of William Carlos 
Williams that become increasingly precious as national boundaries blur.
18   
  
The juncture at which we stand is one in which the “negotiation of cultural identity involves 
the continual interface and exchange of cultural performances that in turn produce[s] a 
mutual and mutable recognition (or representation) of cultural difference. . . [in] a ‘liminal’ 
space or ‘hybrid’ site that witnesses the production—rather than just the reflection of 
cultural meaning”.
19 
  
My suggestion that the theories of Homi Bhabha may turn out to be more practically 
oriented than those of Said in terms of their applicability to social reality re-surfaces at this 
point.
 There is some evidence for the notion that the model of cultural transformation that   23
Homi Bhabha envisages is already on its way to overcoming the complex process of 
collective social transformation.
20 Homi Bhabha’s work does not stop with the publication 
of his books and his reputation transcends his academic milieu. His regular appearances in 
seminars and workshops the world over lend support to my contention that he has had some 
success in the translation of his theoretical concept from “the place from which something 
begins its presencing” (5), from the boundary—or in this case, the discursive space 
accessible only to academic intellectuals—to a site for consumption on a global basis.
21 One 
example of particular significance in this respect is the “Re-inventing Britain” project, an 
initiative of the British Council.
22 Once traditionally conservative bodies like councils and 
museums start to initiate change, the public sector is never far behind.  
  
Hence I am at a loss to understand why Parry in her essay on Bhabha chooses, quite 
suddenly in her closing words, to turn from her discussion of Bhabha to invoke Derrida and 
his “appeal to the principle of hope animating political action in the interest of constructing 
a different future” (24). It would seem that Bhabha, too, is working towards this end. 
Neither, however, do I agree with Hardt and Negri who assert that Bhabha continues to fight 
a battle already won, that he continues to attack the principles of modern sovereignty, 
seeing that sovereignty as the old enemy, the dominating power—because he remains 
“fixated on attacking an old form of power and propose[s] a strategy of liberation that could 
be effective only on that old terrain”, a “terrain” they claim that is already on the wane, 
completely missing the “novelty of the structures and the logics of power that order the 
contemporary world” (146).  
    24
Cultural studies and its attendant discourse has positioned itself as a powerful discipline in a 
relatively short time. In a global sense, we have arrived at a point in history where 
multiculturalism—with its attempts at assimilation and syncretism—has been tried and 
found wanting and where outdated concepts of nation and culture can no longer describe the 
cosmopolitan experience of today’s metropolis. As the twenty-first century unfolds, 
changing cultural definitions, views and value systems will make the “powerful work” 
Homi Bhabha has produced in “opening up the categories of culture and nation to reveal 
their inner differentiations and disjunctions” increasingly critical (Parry, 7). What the 
studies of Bhabha and Simon Gikandi have made me most aware of is the intrinsic 
instability of culture, the fragility of the term itself and of the space it occupies today. Hence 
the value of Bhabha’s philosophies to my thesis lies precisely in his disassociation of 
culture from outdated cultural paradigms:  
My aim is to get away from a view of culture as an evaluative activity 
concerned primarily with the attribution of identity (individual or 
collective) and the conferral of authenticity (custom, tradition, ritual). This 
perspective returns to us an increasingly sterile and predictable notion of a 
core culture and its others, and the debate invariably becomes divided 
between the majoritarian and the minoritarian perspectives.  
 
Such accounts remain ignorant of the redefinitions of the concepts of 
culture and community that emerge from the hybrid cosmopolitanism of 
contemporary metropolitan life. Culture as an authenticating/identity-
bestowing function expressive of this past tradition, or that customary 
belief, is of limited relevance to the cosmopolitan condition.
23   
 
Bakhtin and Clifford 
Before entering into a discussion on Edward Said, in a close-coupled example of the 
influence of theoretical abstraction on practical application, two other figures whose work 
has a bearing on the literary texts I propose to analyse are the Russian thinker Mikhail 
Bakhtin and ethnographer James Clifford.  
    25
Celebrated only relatively recently as a major theoretician of the novel and as a cultural 
historian, Bakhtinian principles are gradually becoming more familiar. Less well-known, 
however, is that the concept of dialogism was first revealed and published as Problems of 
Dostoevsky’s Art in 1929 in a post-revolutionary Russia torn apart by revolutions, wars and 
famine and that Bakhtin’s enormous output, and ultimate influence, was achieved despite a 
life in which exile, fire and jealous enmity all played a major part.
24 In this seminal work, he 
cites the contemporary critical exegesis, and upbraids the critics for shortsightedness of their 
interpretative processes and lack of comprehension of the Russian writer’s “finalizing 
artistic vision” (The Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 3). He not only credits Dostoevsky 
with the creation of “the polyphonic novel”, but with producing in the process “an 
essentially new novelistic genre” (4) thereby “destroying the established forms of the 
basically  monological (homophobic) European novel” (5). Thus, by their failure to 
understand that the characters are not mere instruments or vehicles for expression of the 
Dostoevsky’s own ideological perspective, Bakhtin sets out to prove that critics misread the 
polyphony present in the work by interpreting it as “a single word, a single voice, a single 
accent” (37) instead of observing it as “the essential plurality of unmerged consciousnesses, 
a deliberate part of the author’s artistic intention” (6) and accordingly part of the aesthetic 
whole. He argues that the essence of this polyphony is that Dostoevsky’s characters, or 
“heroes”, have been constructed as “free people who are capable of standing beside their 
creator, of disagreeing with him, and even of rebelling against him”, sometimes causing a 
collision of wills (4). It is Bakhtin’s contention that this particularity of Dostoevsky’s novels 
allows “a genuine polyphony of full-valued voices” which may, and sometimes does, run 
counter to the author’s own ideological position to create “a plurality of equal   26
consciousnesses” which inevitably lend a greater degree of integrity both to the argument 
and to the work as a whole (4). 
  
Bakhtin called his notion of  polyphony “dialogism” which assumes that “languages [from a 
multitude of differing temporal and socio-economical ideologies and contradictions] do not 
exclude each other, but rather intersect with each other in many different ways” (The 
Dialogic Imagination, 291). In other words, “whatever the principle underlying them and 
making each unique, [these languages] are specific points of view on the world, forms for 
conceptualizing the world in words, specific world views . . . [which can be] juxtaposed to 
one another, mutually supplement one another, contradict one another and be interrelated 
dialogically” (292). Thus language is always politically-charged, “overpopulated” with the 
intentions of others and never neutral or impersonal. By permitting a heteroglot of 
languages to co-exist, or in other words, by foregrounding a juxtaposition of different 
opinions, Dostoevsky allows his characters a “freedom and independence vis-à-vis the 
author . . . in relation to the usual externalizing and finalizing authorial definitions” (9-10). 
In theory, the hero is introduced “as a free man into the strict and calculated plan of the 
whole” and the author refrains from a totalizing role.  
  
I suggest that there are two major areas in which this theoretical model works in practice, 
and in both cases, the principles of dialogism emerge slightly flawed, but in terms of this 
thesis’s argument for an even playing field, both present a step in the right direction. The 
first, of course, emerges in literature, the first examples of which Bakhtin perceives in the 
works of Dostoevsky, but which have implications far beyond what even Bakhtin could 
have envisaged for the postcolonial environment. The theory suggests that the power that   27
hitherto lay with the author in a Foucauldian surveillance and control of his or her 
characters slips sideways to the personalities themselves each of whom are encouraged to 
speak their truths like the spirits in Toni Morrison’s Beloved. Thus, Barthes aside for the 
moment, the author drops a totalizing control and allows each character a voice. 
Accordingly a novel could offer a number of differing viewpoints allowing stories to be told 
or opinions voiced which may be diametrically opposed to each other and placing the 
responsibility for verdict or interpretation with the reader. No theory is perfect and the 
problem I perceive here is that the author is still the creator of the work. In other words, 
although the lights in the panopticon may well be dimmed, the greater freedom of 
expression the characters possess is still suspect; they are not really free in that they owe 
their very existence to the author’s imagination and to the book’s end, they are bounded or 
held captive by the parameters of that vision.
25  
  
The second practical application of dialogism surfaces as a trend in early-twentieth-century 
ethnography where it became popular in a reversal of the more traditional anthropological 
practice that was, in essence, a collection and interpretation of data obtained by residing for 
a period in an indigenous village. The resulting findings were presented as a monologue, 
almost entirely subjective and constrained by an imperialist mindset, which viewed the 
dominating strategies and tactics used in the field as ‘for the good of the natives’.
26 The 
application of Bakhtinian dialogic strategies to ethnographic fieldwork stresses the 
collection of material as dialogue, locating the natives as collaborators and allowing them 
space in which to tell their own stories in their own voices, a system of “polyvocality” 
which has been described as a “compelling ethical model for the representation of 
cultures”.
27 Accordingly, dialogism works as it does in literature in that the ethnographer as   28
the sole authority is removed and instead a range of viewpoints exists alongside each other, 
a system of representation that ethnographer James Clifford claims has risen in response to 
“a pervasive crisis of ethnographic authority”, a “predicament” which has assumed “a more 
than theoretical urgency” (8). Drawing on Bakhtin’s notions of heteroglossia, Clifford 
claims: 
With expanded communication and intercultural influence, people interpret 
others, and themselves, in a bewildering diversity of idioms—a global 
condition of what Mikhail Bakhtin (1953) called ‘heteroglossia’. This 
ambiguous multivocal world makes it increasingly hard to conceive of 
human diversity as inscribed in bounded, independent cultures. . . . [W]hile 
ethnographic writing cannot entirely escape the reductionist use of 
dichotomies and essences, it can at least struggle self-consciously to avoid 
portraying abstract, ahistorical ‘others’. . . . Participant observation obliges 
its practitioners to experience, at a bodily as well as an intellectual level, the 
vicissitudes of translation. (22-4) 
  
 
While this methodology provides the enormous advantage of allowing a “utopia of plural 
authorship that accords to collaborators not merely the status of independent enunciators but 
that of writers [too]”, in practical application this also has its difficulties. In practice, the 
attempt at a multi-faceted authorship raises questions of authority that prove difficult to 
resolve. With no clear indicators of leadership, sense of ownership or responsibility, plural 
authorship has the potential to lead to problems with intellectual property and of 
professional jealousy. Accordingly, without a leader, projects are liable to falter (51).  
This returns me to my earlier suggestion that while the ‘new ethnography’ presents 
significant progress in terms of a more objective, and thus more balanced, representation 
over that of methods employed in earlier practice, it is still in need of refinement. 
 
Therefore, although ethnography is becoming increasingly an area in which “authenticity, 
both personal and cultural, is seen as something constructed vis-à-vis others” and while the   29
way in which opinions, experience and information is translated and transcribed in the 
ethnography of today differs markedly from the practices of twenty years ago, a certain 
amount of “indirect style” on the part of the less-visible author is inevitable (274). 
  
Following through on a statement by Clifford that ethnography is “enmeshed in writing”, at 
its most fundamental what we understand as writing lies in the process of capturing one or 
all of a range of experiences that may include observations, beliefs, feelings or fantasies 
within a textual form. But contemporary literary theory holds that the meaning located 
within a text is as dependent on the creative consciousness of the reader as it is on the 
original intention of the author. Although this theory has its basis in Barthes’ more radical 
notion of the death of the author where “a text’s unity lies not in its origin but in its 
destination”, I would like to think that we have moved on from there. While I acknowledge 
that there is a multiplicity of ways of reading, approaching or extracting information from a 
text, to suggest that a text is not authored in the sense that the responsibility for the content 
of that narrative has been summarily withdrawn from the author, is the removal of an 
accountability that the creator of the work may not wish to give up.
28 
  
What literary theory has made us aware of, however, is that there are more ways than one of 
reading a text and that this notion of interpretative reading inevitably disrupts the authority 
of the text.
29 No longer can either the writer or the reader be considered innocent. Or as 
Bakhtin suggests, language is the material from which narrative is constructed and as such 
“lies on the borderline between oneself and the other. The word in language is half someone 
else’s” (293). This then leads me to ask: Who then drives this controlling discourse? Who 
could be said to control the text?   30
 
As the plethora of twentieth-century attempts to define literature attests, the question of 
ownership of control of a text is not an easy one and perhaps does not have an answer. Even 
Bakhtin’s theories of the ideal novel being the polyphonic text merely shifts the problem 
sideways. Although, as Clifford puts it, “the paradigms of experience and interpretation” 
could be said to have yielded to “discursive paradigms of dialogue and polyphony”, that 
field of multiple discourses is still subject to a selective process by a prime mover: the 
person who writes the narrative, who chooses what to put in and what to leave out, and the 
manner in which, or the degree to which, those discourses will be subordinated or 
privileged.  
 
The implications this has for literature and just how—or indeed whether—the unruly 
cultural or cross-cultural experience implicit within a state of “unsettled negotiation” is able 
to be transformed into an authoritative written account, will be discussed in detail within the 
individual texts. For now, there is no more pertinent example than that provided by Amitav 
Ghosh writing in In an Antique Land since this book emerged as a direct result of a period 
of ethnographic fieldwork in a foreign country. In the writing of this text, Ghosh closely 
followed the principles now emerging in new ethnographic practices by allowing his 
characters a set of strong discourses juxtaposed with his own which are (presumably) 
deliberately designed to present weakly by contrast. This use of polyphony is a deliberate 
construct and from a stylistic perspective it does appear, at times, heavy-handed and 
awkward. The underlying effect, however, is somewhat more subtle. Thus dialogism 
succeeds—to a large extent—in what Ghosh sets out to achieve: not simply to “write” the 
life of village Egypt, but to allow the fellaheen—admittedly in a somewhat limited   31
fashion—to tell their own story. The high degree of self-reflexivity that has gone into this 
construction is unarguable. But there is still a creator of the work: the choice to present the 
narrative in this manner rested with Ghosh himself. Thus there is still—dare I say it?—an 
author and thus an authority.  
 
Perhaps all that can reasonably be agreed at this point is that the novel has evolved over the 
last century to become a site of negotiation, a site with an overseer capable of a healthy 
degree of self-reflexivity that rests in one of Bhabha’s spaces between one moment, or one 
reader, and the next. 
 
Edward Said 
A critical review of “orientalism” from its beginnings to an assessment of how far its 
authority has extended to the mainstream literature of today cannot easily be separated from 
a discussion of its founder Edward Said. Since Said’s thesis plays such a significant role in 
this work, it is pertinent to ask why in this chapter Said follows the other theorists instead of 
the other way round. The answer is that the major part of my discussion to this point 
originated in the argument Said first fashioned in Orientalism: the concept of “orientalism” 
which took place in the early stages of postcolonialism and played a part in shaping—and 
was in turn shaped by—the colonial discourse analysis that followed. The notions that have 
existed in postcolonial discourse over the last twenty-five years can be attributed largely to 
Said’s polemical study. Accordingly, before I discuss the study itself, it is useful to scope 
the critical atmosphere of the last two decades that has arisen largely as a result of that text. 
But before attempting to review a portion of the copious literature on and around Said’s 
work, I propose to pause once again for a glimpse of the nature of a man whose work so 
influenced world academies. Without falling into the trap of essentialism, I want to suggest   32
some possible reasons for the point-of-view that he puts forward. In other words, while this 
is after all a thesis, I believe that I need at least to acknowledge the debt a thesis of this 
nature owes to such a man. 
  
As is well known, Said carried a dissonance at the core of his being derived from the very 
real difficulties of a life lived as an American citizen, a Palestinian, an Arab, a Christian 
and, perhaps both first and last, as “an Oriental”. But, although Said himself reiterated this 
disharmony often enough, the extent of that internal conflict which existed in a crisis of 
belonging and the clash of loyalties that it ultimately provoked, is mentioned seldom in the 
literature on this theorist. To attempt to précis the life and mind of a man like Said is fraught 
with presumption, but I suggest that small gains can be made by attention to his own 
protestations. Consequently, I present two short passages which offer totally different, but 
equally valid, resumés of his life. As can be seen, the sentiments of displacement that flow 
through both passages give the lie to his avowals to the contrary: his assertions that he 
belongs both within and without imperialism are clearly false, but why are they false?
30 
Significant, too, is his claim of the Orient as his homeland when in fact his association with 
it was comparatively brief. Further, there is an anomaly between the belonging and the 
them—a to and a from, a gathering and a distancing within the same sentence—that does 
not persuade me that Said really believed he belonged anywhere. Why else would he have 
titled his autobiography, Out of Place?
31 The validity of these descriptions stems from their 
primary source—Said himself—and each is taken from the introduction of two of his most 
influential books: Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism respectively.
32 
Much of the personal investment in this study derives from my awareness 
of being an ‘Oriental’ as a child growing up in two British colonies. All of 
my education, in those colonies (Palestine and Egypt) and in the United 
States, has been Western, and yet that deep early awareness has persisted. 
In many ways my study of Orientalism has been an attempt to inventory the   33
traces upon me, the Oriental subject, of the culture whose domination has 
been so powerful a factor in the life of all Orientals. . . . [While, in this 
study] I have tried to maintain a critical consciousness, as well as 
employing those instruments of historical, humanistic, and cultural research 
of which my education has made me the fortunate beneficiary. . . in none of 
that, however, have I ever lost hold of the cultural reality of, the personal 
involvement in having been constituted as, “an Oriental”.
33 
 
And again: 
The last point I want to make is that this book is an exile’s book. For 
objective reasons that I had no control over, I grew up as an Arab with a 
Western education. Ever since I can remember I have felt that I belonged to 
both worlds, without being completely of either one or the other. During my 
lifetime, however, the parts of the Arab world that I was most attached to 
either have been changed utterly by civil upheavals and war, or have simply 
ceased to exist. And for long periods of time I have been an outsider in the 
United States, particularly when it went to war against, and was deeply 
opposed to, the (far from perfect) cultures and societies of the Arab world. 
Yet when I say ‘exile’ I do not mean something sad or deprived. On the 
contrary belonging, as it were, to both sides of the imperial divide enables 
you to understand them more easily [my emphases].
34  
 
In these passages, Said’s angst at not possessing a true homeland is potent and obvious. 
There is a real pathos that emerges from the absence of conviction in his sentence: Yet when 
I say “exile” I do not mean something sad or deprived. The lack of control—of power over 
circumstance—that he evidently experiences in his own life as “an Oriental” becomes a 
projection of the victim status he projects on to all Orientals. It also goes a long way 
towards explaining the background and conditioning that led him to produce such a 
vigorous corpus of work, the set of circumstances that produced the rage which drives his 
argument across the pages of Orientalism and further into the arguments he raises in 
defence of that work and beyond. It leads me to question the degree of objectivity within his 
work and to wonder whether this “dialectic of ‘them and us’” only increases the gap within 
the “imperial divide” and actually does a further disservice to those he claims he seeks to 
avenge as well as cementing his stated position as an “outsider”. 
   34
The problematic of exile begs the question, too, as to the validity of claims of an outsider.
35 
There is a relic of the modernist concept of exile that survives in writing of this nature, a 
romanticizing of the term that incorporates conflicting suggestions of both privilege and 
hardship. At the same time, it is reminiscent of claims by both Said and Bhabha that the 
intrinsic nature of the hybridity created by exile gives privileged insights into other nations 
and cultures. The danger here is that the hybrid, or displaced person, is allowed to speak for 
both the dominant race and for the original culture with equal authority and I contend that 
this is where Said’s argument first runs into trouble. In this respect, parallels can be drawn 
here between Said and several other major figures within this thesis. I am thinking primarily 
of two writers: E. G. Browne whose affinity for Persia was such that the single year he spent 
in that country served to cement a life-long association with the Persian people; and 
Michael Ondaatje whose mixed Tamil, Sinhalese and Dutch origins and the majority of a 
life spent in Canada do not prevent him from writing and speaking still with a nostalgia and 
sense of possessiveness of the land of his birth. In both these cases, as in the case of Said 
himself, the fact that they no longer reside in the land of which they are writing causes no 
apparent hesitation in their representation of that land or of its people. Accordingly they 
are—based on Said’s own definition of “orientalism”—committing “orientalist” actions 
which I will discuss in some detail throughout this work. 
 
“Orientalism” today 
Before the publication of Orientalism, the name Edward Said was little known. Said was a 
professor of literature, well-published and well-respected, but not widely celebrated outside 
his own specific academic milieu. Orientalism changed that almost overnight by becoming 
a set text in history units in universities around the world.
36 In searching for possible   35
reasons for Orientalism attracting the attention it indubitably has, I return again and again to 
the opportune timing of its publication just as the works of Gikandi and Bhabha I have just 
discussed benefited from the raising of consciousness that the earlier publication of this 
study provided.
37 In publishing circles, the state and readiness of the world with regards to 
the reception of an idea or an argument is always a major consideration and it is my 
contention that had the book been released either twenty-five years earlier or twenty-five 
years later, it would not have attracted the attention that it did. While the general public is 
not always and not necessarily affected by academic issues, the converse is not true. 
Academia is very much influenced by surrounding circumstances in social, economic and 
political terms. In this case, it could be argued that world conditions had already opened up 
a kind of preparedness for the academy to receive the openly race-based argumentation 
contained within the study. But global readiness was not the only reason for the success of 
the book. The late 1970s and early 80s brought their own challenges to critical modes of 
thinking which quickly became less of an individual act and more of a united movement in 
theories of discourse. Foucault’s formulation, for example, resulted in a major transition 
from “individuals writing discourse to discourse writing histories”.  For the first time, 
cultural studies was foregrounded as a discipline, gradually forming a discourse of its own 
with the “orientalist” arguments of Said at its core.
38 
  
What I want to explore here is a paradox based on the conflicting facts that although Said is 
a well-respected and acknowledged scholar, the passion and fervour that flows through his 
study has produced a book that many academics from both East and West dismiss as 
“unscholarly”.
39 Of his fairly considerable corpus of literary and political work, it is 
Orientalism that has attracted most attention; praised highly by many, it has been variously   36
called a polemic, an attack, a “perversion of language” by others.
40 Said’s choice of 
Foucauldian discourse in which to encase his argument, his apparent disregard for historical 
fact, his changing premises, the lack of breadth within the examples he chooses, have all 
played a part in attracting critics. At the same time, the very failings that render him 
vulnerable to negative criticism produce his most avid supporters. It is not surprising, given 
the provocative nature of his study, that many of the critics and academics who have 
responded to Said are themselves polarized in their opinions. While there is nothing to be 
gained by being drawn into the personal bitterness that this study has unleashed, a brief, 
although admittedly arbitrary, selection of scholarly opinion will serve to further 
contextualise his work as well as establish an overview of both his credentials and of  what 
might considered his areas of weakness in relation to my own thesis. 
  
Negative critiques of Said’s study rest predominantly in two distinguishable areas. Firstly, it 
is claimed that his work lacks scholarship in that: it “reveals a disquieting lack of 
knowledge of what scholars do and what scholarship is about”; it omits other pertinent 
schools of scholarship, particularly the Arabic; and that it reflects his idiosyncratic treatment 
of the facts on which his study seems to be based.
41 Further criticism claims that his 
approach is of an arbitrary nature, that his premises lack a logical conclusion, and that he 
fails to properly justify his own argument. Secondly, historians are plainly contemptuous of 
his attempt to use the device of discourse as an excuse for ignoring historical fact deploring 
“his maltreatment of several centuries of intellectual and general history” and the 
“transmutation of events to fit his thesis”.
42 His re-arrangement of history is arbitrary and 
the dates he quotes frequently erroneous. More specifically, John MacKenzie claims that 
Said is guilty of “occidentalising the West, by ‘essentialising’ . . .  the characteristics of   37
European powers no less than they ‘essentialised’ the East”.
43 It would seem that Said’s 
detractors are unrelenting in their criticism.
44 
  
And yet, for each and every critic who disagrees with his sometimes muddled hypotheses, 
there is one—or more than one—who is equally vocal in not only hailing his work as the 
seminal study it most obviously is, but in wholeheartedly endorsing both the content and the 
methodology of his argumentation.
45 He is praised for contributing “in a major way to the 
process of decolonisation”, for his study’s potential in “worldwide applicability” and for his 
“laying bare Orientalism’s persistent belief that there exists a radical ontological difference 
between the natures of the Orient and the Occident”.
46 
  
However, despite the “tornado of protest” Orientalism drew from the West in the ten years 
following its release, as Magdi Wahba
47 has noted, the Arab world was comparatively silent 
and the “traditionalist or orthodox Islamic writers barely mentioned him, even when he was 
translated into Arabic” (187). It is telling, I think, that this particular essay of Wahba’s is 
itself strangely silent on the subject of Said and “orientalism”, a silence that speaks volumes 
for Arab opinion. Although Wahba bases his introduction on Said’s study, he concentrates 
thereafter on a review of the 1987 reprint of Mahmoud Shakir’s Al-Mutanabbī (first 
published in 1936). Thus the “anger observed” in this essay is not the anger of Said but of 
the deep-seated resentment rife in the Muslim world. An indictment of another kind from 
the Arab quarter is directed at Said’s research strategy and comes from Nadim al-Bītār
48 
who asks how Said can “generalize and claim that Orientalism as a whole is characterized 
by hostility (to Islam). How can he use such absolute terms, neither qualified nor 
relativized, and allege that his generalizations are scientific? Does it mean he read or   38
perused these sixty thousand books and did not find in them anything running counter to 
this discovery about the nature of Orientalism with its view of the innate inferiority of the 
Orient? . . . What makes Said’s claims even more curious is that he drags the writings of 
earlier centuries also into the bargain (Bītār, 157-8). Like John MacKenzie, Syrian 
philosopher Sadiq Jalāl al-’Azm
49 is another who has accused Said of essentialism: “He 
does to (Western) Orientalism what he accuses the latter of doing to the Orient. He 
dichotomizes and essentializes it. . . . While Orientalism creates according to him a 
metaphysical—and deliberately distorted—image of the East . . . Said conjures up a 
metaphysical vision of Orientalism. (East and West), which are nothing but geographical 
and relativist types, are transformed into absolute and primordial propositions” (8-9).  
  
But it is his use of Foucauldian discourse as the most desirable device within which to 
present his views that remains most often questioned by Arabic and Western reviewers alike 
and it is this I return to in my conclusion.  It is claimed by many scholars that this 
methodology only exacerbates the weaknesses in his study, the argument of which—namely 
the political advantage gained in West’s misrepresentation of the Orient—would have 
attracted less contempt and condemnation had he presented his findings in a scholarly 
fashion backed up by well-researched historical fact, but refrained from enclosing them 
within such strict temporal and geographical parameters. Discourse by its very nature 
distorts truth and plays havoc with historical ‘reality’. Aijaz Ahmad presents as clear a 
definition of Said’s use of discourse as any I have come across. 
In the Foucaultian definitions, representations cannot be referred back to 
any truth outside or beyond themselves, nor to the intentionality of the 
representer, because the structure of the representation is already inscribed 
in and always regulated by the Power of discourse. Representation 
corresponds thus not to an external object, a truth, a subjectivity, a purpose, 
a project, but to the discursive regularity only . . . This is very convenient 
for Said, for the following reason.   39
 
The archive of Western knowledge can now be treated as an autonomous 
archive constituted by the Orientalist discourse, with the consequences that 
(a) any statement within this archive which is not an Orientalist statement 
can be breezily consigned to irrelevance, and (b) the autonomous archive 
thus constructed would now be studied in terms of its own properties and 
regularities, for a better representation of this very archive for Western 
readers, with scant scrutiny of that which is represented in it or of the 
extremely complex meanings and significances that this archive has had for 
audiences and intelligentsias in Asia and Africa. This is what Said 
relentlessly does. His ideal reader is the Western reader . . . The non-
Western reader is simply not addressed . . . Thus, this high modernism of 
discursive theories, which speaks only of the representation but never of the 
objects represented, serves to conceal what cultural nationalism would like 
to conceal and leaves the door open for an examined indigenous rage 
against foreigners because they are foreigners. (Macfie, 292-3)  
 
James Clifford is somewhat less harsh: “Said’s general attempt to extend Foucault’s 
conception of a discourse into the area of cultural constructions of the exotic is a promising 
one . . . [but] Foucault is not easily imitated. His writing has been a series of experiments 
and tactical interventions rather than a methodological program” (Predicament of Culture, 
264-5).   
  
In questioning the way in which Said uses Foucault, Sivan asks whether “instead of 
Foucault’s structuralism we have here an example of the old-time and now justifiably 
discredited Ideengeschichte with its vague impressionism and concentration upon a few 
‘landmark authors’ (in this case, a couple of dozen Orientalists), supposedly somehow 
representative of the totality of this intellectual endeavour” (13). Although Aijaz Ahmad 
criticizes Said for the contradiction in the theoretical positions he tries to occupy in saying, 
“Much of the book’s theoretical, methodological and political incoherences come from this 
effort to simultaneously uphold the absolutely contrary traditions of Auerbachian High 
Humanism and Nietzchean anti-Humanism”, he grudgingly admits that it is the use of this 
approach that lends the work its “striking novelty” (Macfie, 286).
50 In a similar vein, James   40
Clifford condemns Said’s approach on the grounds that in line with Foucault’s anti-
humanist theories “a wide range of Western humanist assumptions escape Said’s 
oppositional analysis, as do the discursive alliances of knowledge and power produced by 
anticolonial and particularly nationalist movements” (266). But there is a further danger in 
this notion of colonial discourse analysis in that, as Ahmad suggests, it “radically 
transforms the status of the research archive assembled during the colonial period under 
British administration and mostly by English writers. . . . What is lost sight of in this kind of 
reading is that that archive is a collection neither of truths nor untruths, that it is simply a 
vast historical resource for helping us understand our own past, and that we need to 
approach that archive now with . . . skepticism, respect and scholarly care . . .” (Macfie, 
295). More recently Fred Halliday has argued for a less discourse-oriented and more 
methodological way of understanding the Middle East. But while on the one hand he 
criticises Said for his focus on “discourses about the region, not the societies or politics 
themselves”, on the other he does admit that part of the success of Orientalism lay in Said’s 
choice of approach (“Orientalism and its Critics”, 150).
51 In attaching my own observations 
to those I have parsed above,  I suggest that the tremendous interest generated by Said’s 
argument—the Arab world notwithstanding—proves that his thesis was fresh enough, 
timely and worthy of being presented in its own right. In other words, I contend that he did 
not need a frame of discourse in which to present his case, a claim I will pursue further in 
my conclusion.
52  
  
There is, however, one other point often missed in all this censure of the way in which Said 
tackled Orientalism, but which answers some of the criticism and settles some of my own 
literary concerns with the study, and this is that the book was conceived and written in the   41
nature of a “response”.  It was envisaged by Said in the period following the Arab-Israeli 
wars of 1967 and 1973 and produced as a reaction to the poor quality of both the academic 
and media covering of those wars, the writing of which “intellectually and politically as 
well as from a literary standpoint, struck me as incredibly impoverished and backward”.
53 
As such, it constituted a politically- and ideologically-charged response “to the challenge of 
the West” and was never intended as an example of great literature (32). My point here is 
not to mount a defense of Said’s argument, but to contextualize the spirit in which it was 
written, to suggest that it arose out of a desire to be heard, that it was written in an attempt 
rise above the sentiment of victimisation that Said plainly felt, and that it presented an 
opportunity “to act as an interlocutor rather than as a silent and inert Other” (“Orientalism 
Revisited”, 32). In this respect, it is telling, I think, that it was written so spontaneously that 
its author did not even have a specific target audience in mind, this fairly fundamental 
oversight providing in itself some of the confusion critics have picked up.
54 This goes, I 
think, some way towards explaining the paradox with which I began this exploration of the 
reviews of Said’s book.  
 
Historical Orientalism 
Retreating yet further into the past, I come now to an historical evaluation of Orientalism 
which I see as a necessary antithesis to theoretical evolution and surrounding debate I have 
touched on above. The questions that occupy me in this section are closely tied to Said’s 
reinscription of “orientalism”: namely, before Said, what did orientalism mean and where 
did it originate? As a starting point, I present the very definite geographical sense ascribed 
to its derivations by The Oxford English Dictionary in which orientalism is defined as 
possessing “the characteristics, modes of thought or expression, fashions, etc. of Eastern   42
nations”; oriental scholarship becomes a “knowledge of Eastern languages; and an 
orientalist is either “a member of the Eastern or Greek church” or “one versed in oriental 
languages and literature” (931).
55  
  
The men—and they were almost exclusively male—who were known as Orientalists in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were those skilled in oriental languages, culture and 
literature and who frequently worked or travelled within the East arriving back in the West 
to write about their experiences or impart their knowledge to others less travelled.
56 They 
were an assorted bunch of teachers, writers, painters, public servants, officials, military 
personnel and missionaries, for the most part totally innocent of the part they were to play in 
colonial discourse analysis and the politics of power.
57 The first, and most important, point 
of all to make about historical Orientalism is that it was a product of its time. The reading 
back of contemporary attitudes and prejudices into historical periods is a dangerous act in 
that the conclusions it produces are frequently false and always misleading. Although it was 
inevitable that this Orientalist teaching or writing or painting should emanate from a 
Western viewpoint—and it is a truism that both religion and officialdom were more 
intrusive than useful in most cases and downright dangerous and antagonistic in others—
this does not in itself mean, or even imply that “orientalism” was used only as an 
imperialistic vehicle for power. Neither does it mean that “orientalism” and colonialism are 
necessarily “mutually entailed” as colonial discourse analysis would suggest (Trautmann, 
22).
58 Thus Said’s argument can most gainfully be used to provoke our interest in 
understanding Orientalism “. . . through the language and cultural contexts of its [own] 
times and not ours” (MacKenzie, 215). The discourse needs balancing against the   43
contributions of the Orientalists: those ideas, modernizations, education and infrastructure 
that surely were not all driven by a desire for power and glory.  As John MacKenzie claims:  
“. . . to suggest that they [the West] . . . failed to produce any preservation of lasting value is 
surely a counsel of despair” (214).  
  
There are almost as many opinions on how Orientalism as a profession came about as there 
are reviews on Said and so, for the sake of clarity, I propose to examine only those most 
recognized sources.
59 In this respect, there is probably a no more unbiased and universally 
acknowledged source from both sides of the debate than that of Maxime Rodinson. Not only 
is Rodinson one of the few scholars to gain Edward Said’s approbation, but as well the 
Islamic perspective he applies to his discussion of Orientalism provides a sound basis for 
comparison with Browne’s late nineteenth-century views of Islam, of significance in my 
discussion of A Year Amongst the Persians in chapter two. Other important sources of 
historical information are, however, those of Bernard Lewis and Thomas Trautmann each of 
whom approach Orientalism differently yet again.
60 
  
In his celebrated Europe and the Mystique of Islam, Rodinson claims that the two hundred 
years from the end of the seventeenth century to the end of the nineteenth that it took for the 
West “to move toward a more objective understanding of the Middle East
61 
 . . . [was due to] a number of changing factors: geographical proximity, close political 
relations, increasing economic interactions, the growing number of travelers and 
missionaries who journeyed to the East, and the passing of a unified Christianity in Europe” 
(37).
62 Of most interest to me here is the clear path that the intellectual and religious 
liberation that arose directly from the European Enlightenment in the late seventeenth   44
century provided in terms of a fertile ground for Orientalist specialization.
63 Concurrent 
with this, during the eighteenth century, the decline of the Ottoman Empire left large 
portions of the East as little more than British protectorates and thus vulnerable to 
colonization.
64 If to these factors of burgeoning Orientalist specialization and vulnerable 
territories is added the rapidly increasing sophistication of all forms of infrastructure 
including transport and communications that arose from the Industrial Revolution, it 
becomes clear just how the framework for greater familiarity between East and West was 
laid.   
  
Paradoxically, this increasing pressure to specialize led directly to the problems voiced by 
Said and echoed by Rodinson in that “what amounted to the entire study of Eastern 
civilizations was left to the philologists . . . [who] lacking a theoretical framework of their 
own  . . . could only reflect the common opinions of their own society in their appreciation 
of the social and historical factors” (Rodinson, 62). Thus the construction of the Orient 
through Western eyes began. 
  
However, tracing this path to “objective understanding” on the part of the West suggests 
that post-Renaissance “curiosity about the East had not yet turned into exoticism, that is, the 
thrill of ‘escape,’ that sense of being transported through art or lifestyle without ever leaving 
one’s own culture . . . [and that while the few works that existed] of pure fantasy may have 
thrilled the literary public, no one took them seriously as a source of information about the 
history or character of the Muslim East” (38). But this changed with the arrival of first-hand 
accounts of travellers, diplomats and explorers.
65 “Exoticism broke into art in the 
seventeenth century and swamped it in the eighteenth. Even accurate data about Eastern   45
civilizations . . . became distorted” (39). This growing “fascination with the idea of local 
color” and the accompanying distortion of “fact” is something which is often overlooked 
when discussing exoticism, namely that these facts, this “local color” undergoes distortion 
because of the attempt to integrate it into “an altogether different world vision”. As a result, 
what is considered normative in one culture or civilization becomes curious or extraordinary 
or exotic—and thus striking or interesting—when viewed from the perspective of another 
culture, or when represented from the viewpoint of that other culture. As Said would readily 
agree, an “integration of exotic facts into wholes . . . free of all ethnocentricism . . . [is a 
process that] has not even been achieved in our time”. But if it were the travellers and 
explorers who returned to their home lands with fantastic stories of the East, the actuality of 
the “distortion” or assimilation of the exotic “began with the erosion of the privileged 
position of Christianity in European civilization”. Rodinson claims that the schism that 
appeared in the traditional structure of the Roman Church left room for questioning and 
experiment, a softening of attitudes towards the Muslim East and a growing curiosity about 
Islam. In other words, it allowed for a more objective study of other religions and other 
world views, the Muslim world key among them, and Islam began to be seen as a “rational 
religion, quite remote from those Christian tenets that most opposed reason” (46).
66  
“Objectivity” gradually gave way to admiration as fear of the unknown was replaced by an 
increasing erudition and if Rodinson’s claim that the “eighteenth century saw the Muslim 
East through fraternal and understanding eyes” seems just a little implausible or overly 
optimistic,
67 the liberating effect of scholarly research ensured that there was certainly a 
great deal more acceptance of Islam than previously (48). 
    46
Accounts in both Said’s and Rodinson’s works concur in suggesting that it was the Arabist 
Antoine Galland’s preface to Barthélemy d’Herbelot’s Bibliothèque orientale published in 
1697 that led to the beginning of this European fascination with “the exotic, enchanting 
Muslim East” (Rodinson, 50), an attitude which remained in place until less fanciful works 
began to challenge the viewpoint. But while Said continues by derogating d’Herbelot by 
asserting that it was in “such efforts as d’Herbelot’s [that] Europe discovered its capacities 
for encompassing and Orientalizing the Orient” (Said, 65)—Rodinson moves on by 
describing the path to a broader and more objective understanding brought about by men 
like the Comte de Volney in his claim that Volney’s “Voyage en Égypte et en Syrie (1787) 
is a masterpiece of meticulous research” (Rodinson, 51).   
  
This is where I believe the sentiments implicit in Rodinson’s phrase “objective 
understanding” start to falter. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, aided and abetted 
by the Enlightenment, the three specific concerns Said addresses in Orientalism are also 
identified by Rodinson: “. . . a sense of Western superiority . . . a romantic exoticism 
mesmerized by a magical East . . . and a specialized erudition focused on the great ages of 
the past” (52). Accordingly, no longer can romantic exoticism be regarded as innocent 
fantasy, but instead a fantasy fashioned around, or grafted onto, a known ‘reality’. 
Knowledge begets awareness which, in turn, leads to responsibility. Hence it is inevitable 
that “objective structure” and “subjective restructure” gradually become, as Said asserts, 
“interchangeable” (129).   
  
But moving from the hypothetical to the evidential, clearly writing about the East did not 
exist in a vacuum but as part of the literary trend of the West. At this point in the early   47
1800s, literature was moving away from the classical tradition exemplified in the poetry of 
Milton and Pope to an era that foreshadowed the works of the Romantics. Notwithstanding 
the later works of Goethe and riding on one of the first waves of nationalist fervour, “the 
reaction against classicism” in some parts of Europe had been extreme. In Germany, by 
1800, for example, Friedrich Schlegel had insisted: “It is to the East . . . that we must turn to 
find the ultimate romanticism . . . and following his own advice, he began to study Indian 
civilization” (Rodinson, 54).
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It was at this point that Oriental studies in Europe—specifically in France—became 
formalized, which led inevitably to the gradual popularity of Orientalism as a vocation. 
Among a number of Orientalists of questionable merit, it is the French Silvestre de Sacy 
(1758-1838) who stands out.
69 Although he is highly respected in Rodinson’s account for 
his scholarly approach and meticulous research, ironically—but with a certain amount of 
justification—it is these qualities that lead to his ultimate condemnation in Said’s version of 
events. Said states: “Sacy claims simply to have exerted himself on behalf of his students, to 
make it unnecessary for them to purchase (or read) a grotesquely large library of Oriental 
stuff. In time, the reader forgets the Orientalist’s effort and takes the restructuring of the 
Orient signified by a chrestomathy as the Orient tout court. Objective structure (designation 
of Orient) and subjective restructure (representation of Orient by Orientalist) become 
interchangeable. . . . Sacy’s anthologies not only supplement the Orient; they supply it as 
Oriental presence to the West. Sacy’s work canonizes the Orient; it begets a canon of 
textual objects passed on from one generation of students to the next” (Orientalism, 129). 
  
Although he is criticized for his doctrinal approach, Sacy is nonetheless a vital link in the 
early growth phase of Orientalism as a new discipline. Through Sacy’s work, the École des   48
langues orientales in Paris became the model Orientalist institution; Oriental societies were 
formed in Europe, Britain and America; Russian universities began offering Islamic 
languages; journals soon followed. As a result, Orientalism as a discipline, the particular 
focus of which was the study of the Orient, was born.
70 So far, the path is comparatively 
uncomplicated. 
  
Of course, co-existing with this scholarly focus on the East was the artistic and literary and, 
as already mentioned, this is the point at which Orientalism becomes less objective and 
more subjective. Gradually, artistic licence moved towards Romantic exoticism and the 
resulting characterization of “. . . fierce and lavish scenes . . . harems . . . turquoise domes 
and white minarets . . . springs under palm trees . . . captive women forced into submission 
by their lustful captors . . .”, all of which resulted in an easy gratification of Western 
fantasies and presented colourful and not necessarily accurate opportunities for written and 
artistic works (Rodinson, 59).
71 And, so, along with Said’s criticism of Sacy and scholars of 
his ilk, it is this type of “orientalism”, this fantastical and often lascivious construction on 
the part of Westerners describing the East that adds grist to Said’s polemic. In Thomas 
Trautmann’s phrase, this viewpoint—frequently inseparable from authority and implicitly 
imbued with Foucault’s theories of knowledge and power—of the East has come be to 
known as “Said’s Orientalism”.  Thus  
. . . for Said—and this is a crucial move—Orientalism is not limited to the 
intellectual product of Orientalists. Said’s Orientalism includes as well (as 
we could expect from a literary critic) the Orientalism of poets, and 
painters, and more. Orientalism is the “corporate institution for dealing with 
the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing 
views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, 
Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having an 
authority over it” (1978:3). In the end, for Said, Orientalism is any 
European pronouncement about the Orient that is made with a show of 
authority. [Thus] the Saidian expansionary redefinition of Orientalism   49
unites the productions of Orientalists and non-Orientalists, both of the 
colonial past and of the postcolonial present. (20)
72 
 
This, of course, is the crux of the argument: that Said’s “expansionary redefinition” extends 
to the point where “any pronouncement about the Orient that is made with a show of 
authority” is labelled “orientalist”.
73 Scholars claim this is confusing and clearly has nothing 
to do with the objective principles on which Orientalism as a discipline was based. While it 
could, of course, be argued that this authoritarian positioning on the part of the imperialist 
powers started with Sacy’s philological efforts in terms of a scholarly and language-based 
focus, and gained its absolute power in backing from the arts, this is too simplistic.
74 Such 
an argument would suggest that a handful of scholars and philologists, assisted by their 
literary and artistic peers, effectively created an entire continent. Since this is patently not 
the case, how much closer can we come to re-constructing a ‘reality’? 
  
Let me start with claims by Said’s antagonist Bernard Lewis. Lewis’s academic 
specialization of the Near East leads to his claim that the first uses of the word Orientalism 
were two-fold: that, historically, it was applied both to a school of painting and, more 
usually, a branch of scholarship.
75 In line with its dictionary definition, Lewis claims that 
the word applied to Eastern Europe, the eastern Mediterranean or what we now know as the 
Middle East because at that time “for most Europeans. . . [t]his was the East, and no more 
specific definition was needed, since no other East was known” (Macfie, 252). Along with 
Rodinson, Lewis dates the beginnings of the discipline from the expansion of scholarship 
which took place from the time of the Renaissance onwards. Since these early scholars were 
concerned with the “recovery, study, publication, and interpretation of texts . . . the first and 
most essential task that had to be undertaken [was the study of language before] the serious 
study of such other matters as philosophy, theology, literature, and history became possible”   50
and consequently, he maintains, Schwab’s study of the Orient, this second renaissance, was 
made possible by the philologists who became the first Orientalists.
76 So  fa r,  Sa i d  a nd 
Lewis are in agreement: that the philologists were the first Orientalists.  
  
However, David Kopf and others hold that a third more specific use of the word came about 
in the late-eighteenth century as “an ideology, a movement . . . a set of social institutions” 
known as “modern Orientalism” or in some accounts, the “new Orientalism” (Macfie, 196).  
This movement began in Calcutta in 1784 as a cultural policy conducted by a civil service 
elite known as the British Orientalists led by British General Warren Hastings and ended 
with Governor-General Bentinck’s support of Macaulay’s anti-Orientalist policies some 
fifty years later. Hastings’ aim was to “combat the cultural arrogance and general 
incompetence of Company officials who had served in India from the time of Clive (1750s) 
by inculcating a new set of values . . . [within an] elite competent in Indian languages and 
responsive to Indian traditions” (199-200). An excerpt from the introduction of Charles 
Wilkins’ translation of the Bhagavad-Gita (1785) shows something of Hastings’ nature:  
 
I have seen an extract from a foreign work of great literary credit, in which 
my name is mentioned, with very undeserved applause, for an attempt to 
introduce the knowledge of Hindoo literature into the European world, by 
forcing or corrupting the religious consciences of the Pundits, or professors 
of their sacred doctrines. This reflexion was produced by the publication of 
Mr. Halhed’s translation of the Poottee, or code of Hindoo laws; and is 
totally devoid of foundation. . . . I can declare truly, that if the acquisition 
could not have been obtained but by such means as have been supposed, I 
should never have sought it. It was contributed both cheerfully and 
gratuitously, by men of the most respectable characters for sanctity and 
learning in Bengal . . . (Warren Hastings, Banaris, 4
th October, 1784).
77  
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In that he was more concerned with—and inevitably from his high-governmental position 
manipulated—the social and cultural factors in India, it could well be argued that it was 
Hastings and not Sacy who was the father of modern Orientalism and that, as such, Hastings 
is deserving of more than the hasty mention he gets in Orientalism. 
  
To this point, it is safe to assume that the discipline started with the teaching and learning of 
Oriental languages in order to better understand the texts of the East, and that the societies 
and language schools that erupted all played a part in extending the new discipline beyond 
its incubatory period. If, however, contiguous with all this, some use was made of 
Orientalists in the administrative positions as they became available and those positions 
were positions of power, it cannot be denied that historical Orientalism has moved into an 
area that becomes political. Again, there is agreement with Said in Kopf’s statement that 
“no one would deny Said’s contention that Orientalism was politically motivated and was 
an outgrowth of the British colonialist experience” (199-200), and for that matter, the 
French and German, too. But caution is needed in that this does not in itself mean that all 
Orientalists were politically motivated. The administrative procedures that resulted did 
indeed use Orientalists, but the opposite corollary—that Orientalists used the process for 
their own collective ends—is not automatically entailed. It is however pertinent to question 
whether it was the disjunction that occurred at this point that provoked a debate that began 
by its agreement in first principles before becoming so radically, and sometimes bitterly, 
polarized? 
  
Part of the answer reflects back to the comments made at an earlier stage of this discussion 
which suggest that it is the methodology Said has used to present his argument: the artificial   52
construct of discourse that is responsible for distorting what is generally regarded as 
historical reality. For example, Kopf asserts: “Orientalism as history exists and has existed 
outside of Said’s personal conception of it. Historical Orientalism has a concrete reality, 
was complex, internally diverse, changed over time, and was never monolithic. It was quite 
independent of Said’s “discourse”; its focus and expression varied with time and with place. 
It was certainly not a unified set of propositions, universally accepted by all Westerners 
involved in Oriental administration and scholarship, whose progressive refinement was 
inseparable from the Western powers’ gradual acquisition of much of the world’s real 
estate” (199).  
  
Instead, Kopf argues, it was anti-Orientalist and anti-Oriental individuals such as James 
Mill and, later, Thomas B. Macaulay at whom Said should have directed the brunt of his 
criticism, but Said barely mentions these two men. Macaulay was a leading figure among 
the proto-imperialists of the 1830s who were known as Anglicists because they repudiated 
all Oriental languages in favour of English and openly professed an “intolerance for all 
things Oriental”.
78  Indeed, Kopf maintains, James Mill’s History of British India played a 
major role in “shaping precisely those images of the Orient Said writes about” (203-4). But 
this was not Orientalism. It was anti-Orientalism or Said’s “orientalism”. 
  
Support for Kopf’s historical approach is to be found with Trautmann who concurs in two 
significant respects: firstly, in contending that it was on the Anglicists that Said should have 
focused the ire of his study and, secondly, with regard to the origins of the new Orientalism. 
He maintains that the “formation of the Asiatic Society in 1784 . . . [ensured] that an 
overlapping roster of persons, British and Indian, were jointly engaged in the advancement   53
of Orientalist knowledge, the teaching of Indian languages to servants of the East India 
Company, the operation of the courts administering Hindu and Muslim law, and the 
construction and execution of government policy”. But he goes further than Kopf in making 
the point that the scope of this policy inevitably led to a commitment of “developing and 
controlling knowledge of . . . [the Indians] through knowledge of Indian languages” and 
suggests that “Said would have made his case better by putting India [rather than the Middle 
East] at the center” of his argument (22).
79  
  
Although, semantically, the word Orientalism worked well for nearly two hundred years, it 
became increasingly imprecise. It was formally abolished at the First International Congress 
of Orientalists in Paris in 1973 because, according to Lewis, delegates expressed an 
increasing dissatisfaction with “a term that indicated neither the discipline in which they 
were engaged nor the region with which they were concerned. . . . [a rationale reinforced] 
by scholars from Asian countries who pointed to the absurdity of applying such a term as 
‘Orientalist’ to an Indian studying the history or culture of India” (Macfie, 254). Instead, in 
a wordy but perhaps more politically and geographically-conscious move, the congress 
restyled itself the “International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa”. 
  
It would appear that even before Said came along, the word orientalism had outgrown its 
historical origins. Outside academia, from World War II onwards, there would have been 
few people who would have understood its original meaning.
80 After Said reinscription, the 
meaning of Orientalism changed completely so that it now stands as analogous to 
imperialistic practice overlaid with strong racist allusions. Encasing his argument within the 
(theoretically) unassailable boundaries of discourse, and despite other definitions, briefly   54
stated and largely dismissed, Said [re]defined “orientalism” as a “Western style for 
dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient” (Orientalism, 3). Thus the 
meaning of the term “orientalism” was distorted from the essentially positive where it was 
“the polar opposite of Eurocentric imperialism as viewed by the Asians themselves” to one 
synonymous with abuse and arrogance (Macfie, 205-6). Trautmann returns the debate to 
Said’s choice of terminology: 
There is nothing inherently wrong with such inflationary redefinition of a 
familiar word, which happens all the time. But it creates the problem that 
new and older senses of this word trip up one another in discussions of 
India. Let us tag these two meanings so that we can distinguish them in 
discussion; call them Orientalism 1 (knowledge produced by Orientalists, 
scholars who know Asian languages) and Orientalism 2 (European 
representations of the Orient, whether by Orientalists or others).  In India 
the British Orientalists were by no means a unitary group, but Orientalists 
constituted the core of a distinct policy group who . . . had been dominant 
since the time of Hastings and who had devised the Orientalizing policy. 
This group constituted a faction promoting education in the vernacular 
languages; these “Orientalists” were in opposition to the “Anglicists”, 
Evangelicals, and others who promoted English as a medium of instruction. 
The Anglicists were also involved in the production of knowledge of a kind 
Said calls Orientalism. In this case Orientalism 1 was one party to a dispute 
with Orientalism 2, and Saidian expansion of Orientalism, applied in this 
context, tends to sow confusion where there once was clarity. (23) 
 
 
Somewhat predictably, Lewis puts it in stronger terms: “To find a precedent for such high-
handed treatment of language, one must go back to Humpty Dumpty, who, it will be 
recalled, when challenged on his use of ‘glory’ to mean ‘a nice knock-down argument,’ 
replied: ‘When I use a word . . . it means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor 
less.’ The use of the term Orientalism is clearly a perversion of language. It is, however, 
sadly accurate, since it reflects a by-now wide spread perversion of truth” (Macfie, 251). 
  
It would appear, then, that there is general agreement that it was a poor choice of term on 
Said’s part and that it reflects badly on his understanding of Orientalist history. Rather   55
ironically, his anti-Orientalist stance places him squarely within a band of radical 
nineteenth-century Westerners who were known as anti-Orientalists, but for the opposite 
reason since they were unquestionably anti-Oriental at the same time. Trautmann is right: it 
certainly creates confusion where there once was clarity.           
 
The interesting component of all this negative criticism of Said is that it is so focussed on 
the two aspects I mentioned earlier—the lack of scholarship in Orientalism and his choice 
of methodology—and so little on the main intent of his study which was, after all, to “raise 
questions” about the representation of the East by outsiders. As Trautmann rightly points 
out, Said’s use of the Middle East for the geographical focus of his study was, certainly in 
retrospect, ill-advised. Given the difficulties inherent in defining the parameters of that 
area—the real internal dissention between the Arab states as well as that between that 
region and the West—Said’s use of this area for his analysis complicates an already 
problematic paradigm. In addition, as I mentioned earlier, the problem is further 
compounded by his own self-admitted “outsider” status. Although Said may consider his 
part-Arab status enough to base his study on the Middle East, the Muslim world does not 
appear to agree. Does this not render Said’s work as “orientalist” as those he condemns? 
         
But what does not appear to be acknowledged by his critics is that Said traps himself more 
than once. While there is little doubt that both the terminology he uses and the discourse 
that encloses his argument exacerbates the division between his opponents and disciples, 
discourse for Said becomes a two-edged sword. It could be argued that on the one hand it 
has had the opposite effect to that which was intended in that it has created an unnecessary 
distraction from the effectiveness of the study. His main purpose, after all, in invoking    56
 
Foucault was to equate his own innate sense of colonial injustice with theories of power and 
domination. In Said’s words:  
 
What I was doing [in Orientalism]—this is something that I learned from 
Foucault—was producing things that become a box of utensils for other 
people to use. In anthropology in particular, it raised the question of what it 
means when an entire science is based upon unequal power between two 
cultures. In sociology, in political science, it also raised the question of how 
you talk about areas of the world that are seen not neutrally but as part of 
some political configuration. I wasn’t trying to resolve the question of what 
the Orient is, or what the real Islamic world is, but rather to raise questions. 
(“Orientalism Revisited”, 33)  
 
Does this mean that outside a discourse of this nature the realities of power and domination 
evaporate?             
 
There is another area, too, in which his argument becomes trapped. Any discourse is 
weakened by the number of exceptions it admits. It works by virtue of its block to other 
forms or argument and owes its existence—certainly its success—to its inflexibility in this 
respect. Accordingly, because he is bound to the confines of a postcolonial discourse that he 
himself has largely fashioned, Said’s thesis is restricted by those boundaries. He recognizes 
only two exceptions to his “orientalist” allegations for writers or artists depicting the East, 
namely, a measure of “self-reflexivity”, a pausing to reflect and evaluate one’s actions, and 
later in Culture and Imperialism, the value of the aesthetic in literature becomes an 
allowable trait for “orientalist” writing.
81 As I have shown, it is Said’s adherence to 
discourse that so infuriates his critics because, finally, within the parameters of this form of 
argumentation, his thesis is defensible. But, paradoxically, his difficulties are also  
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exacerbated by the very methodology on which he depends for his argument since—as I 
will show in the following discussions of Orientalists, Indian, Australian and black 
writers—it is this very device that finally renders his theory impossible. 
 
On the other hand, it could also be argued that Said’s book would have not had the impact it 
undoubtedly has had—and continues to have—without the selective use of the stratagems 
inherent within discourse. Because the device of discourse obviates the necessity of 
including any truth that does not directly serve the purpose of that discourse, the argument 
necessarily becomes more concentrated. And while an argument of a less intense and 
provocative nature necessarily provokes less controversy, it also attracts less interest. One 
only has to read Said’s later works in which this device is not used to see the same argument 
presented with less effect.
82 And Orientalism certainly produced a lasting effect.
83 
  
Thus it is my contention that the use of discourse made “orientalism”, both as a book and as 
a late-twentieth-century notion, rupturing all previous uses of the term. Although it is true 
Said did attempt to dilute his strong and selective views in following works like Culture and 
Imperialism and in a number of essays and lectures, Orientalism is the book critics return to 
time and time again. It played a major role in shaping a discourse ripe for the launching and 
it is obvious that Said’s contribution to raising twenty-first-century awareness in the 
escalating discipline of cross-cultural criticism has provided a much-needed stage for 
discussion and constructive debate. It certainly opened channels of communication for men 
such as Homi Bhabha, Dipesh Chakrabarty and Amitav Ghosh by stressing the promotion 
of cultural exchange and healing by releasing, and not cementing or hiding, bitterness. 
Bakhtin’s theory of the dialogic discussed earlier in this chapter foregrounds the importance    58
 
 
of allowing voice and for all Said’s cited lack of scholarship and alleged misrepresentation 
of factual information, the study raises many issues that will not now be allowed to die.  
  
In summary, it is clear that while the work of Said produces much to be admired, it goes too 
far in some directions and not far enough in others.
84 It makes a valuable statement within 
the postcolonial framework now inhabited by theorists like Bhabha and younger academics 
like Gikandi, and offers a position against which the writers and works I have chosen to 
examine will be deconstructed.
85 But there is a danger, too, that it promotes a discourse of 
victimization. In this respect, I quote, for example, from Ernest Wilson:  
 
Orientalism, after all is said and done, is ‘fundamentally a political 
doctrine’ ([Orientalism], 204). It facilitates the daily business of one group 
dominating another. The Orientalist then mixes the fact of domination with 
the fact of differences and concludes that all aspects of the culture are 
inferior. . . . The Black community [of America] has been subjected to a 
kind of internal Orientalism. Its members too have been defined as ‘The 
Other,’ to be feared and controlled; the dark, exotic native son viewed as 
the near mirror image of civilized and respectable white people. (243)
86  
  
The perspective from which Wilson writes returns me to the concerns with which I started 
this chapter, namely, the legitimacy of postcolonialism’s re-presentation of the colonial past 
as almost entirely nefarious. A greater anxiety emerges here, however, in an extension of 
this argument which continues to polarize white and black and, as identified by John 
MacKenzie, the problem now becomes that the discourse itself has taken precedence over 
any reality of “social change or outcomes” (32). It is at this juncture that I see the greatest 
divide—and utmost social danger—between the more practically-oriented theory of Bhabha  
   59
and the discursive position of Said. Despite the respect these two intellectuals hold for one 
another, it should be noted that Said’s primary hypothesis—that of the we/other—is so 
dependent on notions of dichotomy that it collapses under Homi Bhabha’s lack of regard for 
the binary. 
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24 First translated into English as Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics by R. W. Rotsel (np. Ardis, 1973). For a 
short account of Bakhtin’s life, see the introduction to The Dialogic Imagination, tr. Caryl Emerson and 
Michael Holquist (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1981), xv-xxxiv. 
25 Invoking Bhabha: The characters may well exist “beyond” the final pages if their voices are strong enough 
to live on in the reader’s mind. See too James Clifford’s discussion of Williams’ “Elsie”, The Predicament of 
Culture, chapter one, but in particular 6-7. 
26 For more on the development of ethnographic practices from traditional anthropology, see Clifford, 21-54. 
27 See Christopher Miller, Theories of Africans: Francophone Literature and Anthropology in Africa 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 28. 
28 See my discussion of reading theory in chapter four. 
29 There is a difficulty in establishing exactly what we mean when we speak of “modernist” texts. While the 
postmodern is easy enough to establish in that it must obviously be “post”, or set against, another style or body 
of work, and while modernist forms can clearly be seen in art and architecture, in literature there is less clarity. 
A full investigation is not entirely relevant to this thesis, and I propose only to suggest a timeframe for the 
modern, starting with Eliot’s “Prufrock” in 1917 and extending to the 1970s. I suggest that postmodern 
literature embodies a greater degree of self-reflexivity, authorial intervention and less formality than that of 
the modern. 
30 His distaste for imperialism comes across with great clarity I believe. 
31 This issue of displacement and exile exists so frequently with writers, it becomes a condition, cathartic or 
exploitative, of writing for many. See my discussions of Ondaatje, Ghosh and Levy. See also my references to 
Salman Rushdie and V.  S. Naipaul in chapter four. 
32 The impact that Said made with Orientalism which was, admittedly, somewhat mitigated by a dilution of his 
argument in Culture and Imperialism has resulted in a scholarly concentration on these two books which 
almost entirely overlooks the fact that he was the sole author of at least another ten full-length works.    62
                                                                                                                                                       
33 Orientalism (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1991), 25-6. 
34 Culture and Imperialism (London: Chatto and Windus, 1993), xxx.  
35 In particular, see “Orientalism Reconsidered”, in Orientalism: A Reader, ed. A. L. Macfie (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 345-61.  
36 While I respect Fred Halliday’s claim that the “the critique of ‘Orientalism’ long pre-dates the publication of 
Said’s work . . . [which] can be seen as coming at the end of and to a considerable degree negating an earlier 
body of debate and work, much of it stimulated by the war in Vietnam and the broader upheavals of the Third 
World at the time” and his citations of Maxime Rodinson (1972), Bryan Turner (1978) and Anouar Abdel-
Malek (1963) in this respect, this does not change my opinion that it is Said alone who is responsible for the 
re-fashioning of “orientalism” and the force of the subsequent debate (148). See Halliday’s essay 
“‘Orientalism’ and its Critics”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 20.2 (1993): 145-63. 
37 For that matter, the world war climate in which Bakhtin’s work was released produced an opposite set of 
conditions which resulted in a considerable delay in its attracting the critical approbation it deserved. 
38 Thomas R. Trautmann offers another considered reason for the success of Said’s book. In Aryans and 
British India, Berkeley, Los Angeles (London: University of California Press, 1997), he says: “What 
constituted the success of Said’s book was that it exploded the comforting sense of ‘that was then and this is 
now’ and implanted in its place a sense that ‘all academic knowledge about India and Egypt is somehow 
tinged and impressed with, violated by, the gross political fact’ (1978:11). Since the appearance of Said’s 
book, we cannot discuss current knowledge of Asia without a far more acute sense of the relevance to it of the 
colonial conditions under which such knowledge came into being than that which we have held” (19). See 
Said’s interview in New York in 1987 published as “Orientalism Revisited”, Middle East Report 
(January/February 1988): 32-6 for an interesting confirmation of this viewpoint. 
39 Said attributes the “force” with which this work was written to “the emergence of the Palestinian 
movement” in the wake of the Arab-Israeli wars, specifically the Six Day and Yom Kippur wars respectively” 
(“Orientalism Revisited”, 32). 
40 However, a Derridean deconstruction of his work leads me to ask to what extent Said’s study is deliberately 
provocative and how much more results simply from a sincere desire to ‘set the record straight’ as it were. 
Said is himself convincing when he claims that all he was attempting to do in Orientalism was to produce “a 
box of utensils for other people to use . . . to raise questions” (“Orientalism Revisited”, 33). 
41 This quotation from “The Question of Orientalism” by professor of Near Eastern Studies, Bernard Lewis 
(Macfie, 258). In yet another critique, David Kopf suggests somewhat scathingly—and I would suggest that, 
in this case anyway, somewhat inaccurately—that, “Sooner or later, many writers from subordinated cultures 
or groups sublimate their rage into ideologies of restructuring  or revitalizing their own ignored cultures”( 
Macfie, 195). It is only fair to add in respect of Said and Lewis that the ongoing argument between the two 
scholars is fairly deep-seated. They debated this question of “orientalism” in a public forum sponsored by the 
Middle East Studies Association of North America in 1986. See the Journal of Palestine Studies (Winter 
1987) for a transcription of the debate (Middle East Report, 33). 
42 See in particular the works of Bernard Lewis, Sadik Jalal al-‘Azm and Michael Richardson in Macfie’s 
collection of critical material. 
43 Orientalism: History, theory and the arts (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1995), 
5. 
44 As well, there are those critics who partially agree with the thrust of Said’s argument, but who do not agree 
with the way in which it is presented. Take, for example, this statement by David Kopf: “If we can somehow 
overlook his unfortunate choice of the term ‘Orientalism’ to represent a sewer category for all the intellectual 
rubbish Westerners have exercised in the global marketplace of ideas, then surely the book has considerable 
merit” (Macfie, 198). 
45 While most of Said’s reviewers tend to be academics, among his critics there is also a strong core of Middle 
Eastern and Islamic-affairs specialists who “have been jolted into soul-searching” (11). See first Emmanuel 
Sivan’s essay , “Edward Said and his Arab Reviewers”, The Jerusalem Quarterly 35 (Spring 1985): 11-23 and 
then my discussion in the next paragraph for the difficulties specific to the Middle East. 
46 In particular, see Al-‘Azm’s essay, “Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse” (Macfie, 217-38).  
47 Writing as he is for the Arabic world rather than the West, the insights Wahba provides into the “anger and 
suspicion” the Muslim world continues to hold for the West is particularly sobering. See “An Anger 
Observed”, Journal of Arabic Literature 20 (1989): 187-99. See also Sivan, “Edward Said and his Arab 
Reviewers” and Rodinson on Islam. 
48 From The Boundaries of National Identity (Beirut, 1982). Quoted here from Sivan’s essay. 
49 From al-Istishrāq wa-l-Isstishrāq Ma’kūsan (Beirut, 1981). Qtd. from Sivan.   63
                                                                                                                                                       
50 It should be noted that there is yet another band of critics for whom the airing of Said’s concerns appears to 
give permission to voice their own allied polemic, but these do not constructively add to the argument one way 
or another at this point. See in particular the essays of Stuart Schaar and Ernest J. Wilson III in Macfie’s 
collection. 
51 Halliday claims that both Said and Lewis fall into the same trap since for “neither of them does the analysis 
of what actually happens in these societies, as distinct from what people say and write about them, let alone 
the difficulties and choices of emancipatory projects, constitute the primary concern”. In particular, “to a 
considerable degree both fail us in what I have defined as the central intellectual task, namely the analysis of 
the societies in question” (149). Said does try to rectify this by insisting in a later interview, “We are dealing 
with human, and therefore historical, modes of production . . . it is absolutely necessary to be aware that if you 
are dealing with knowledge, and certainly knowledge about the Middle East, you are dealing with it in the 
world”, but his argument presents weakly against the discursive evidence to the contrary (“Orientalism 
Revisited”, 36). 
52 Clifford, in praising Raymond Schwab’s Renaissance orientale (1950) as “the classic history of this 
ensemble”, criticizes Said in the process by claiming: “Said does not attempt to revise or extend Schwab’s 
work, for his approach is not historicist or empirical but deductive and constructivist”, 257. 
53 “My own sense of my history as an Arab and as a Palestinian didn’t seem to bear any relationship to what I 
was reading” (“Orientalism Revisited”, 32). 
54 Although rather a broad category, it could of course be argued as Ahmad and others do that Said’s audience 
was “the West”.   
55 Specifically, The OED cites “1769 Holdsworth, On Virgil 265 ‘There are frequent instances of the very 
same orientalism in Homer’ as an instance of the first use of the word orientalism” (931). 
56 Not only is Said’s “orientalist” discourse largely male-oriented, but the fact that the early Orientalists were 
predominantly of the male sex is indisputable. This does not mean, however, that there were not a significant 
number of women of note who were deserving of the description. I am thinking of women such as the 
novelists Flora Annie Steel and Doris Lessing, travel writers like Isabella Bird and Karen Blixen, and social 
reformers and critics like B. E. Baughan and Oliver Schreiner. See Kumari Jayawardena, The White Woman’s 
Other Burden (Routledge, 1995), Lisa Lowe, Critical Terrains (Cornell University Press, 1991) or Elleke 
Boehmer’s introduction, Empire Writing (Oxford University Press, 1998). See, too, John MacKenzie’s 
discussion of female writer Billie Melman who “roots her writers more clearly in their social context than any 
other scholar of Orientalism and argues that the female discourse reflects pluralities of class, gender and 
period much more than ideological conformity” (23). 
57 It should be noted that this definition does not take into account the new Orientalism, more about which will 
be said later. 
58 In dismissing the Saidian thesis as “vague”, “underdetermined” and “prejudiced” and as more of an attempt 
to prove “that colonialism and Orientalism are mutually entailed”, Trautmann suggests that it becomes a 
circular argument and singularly unhelpful (22). 
59 However, for a painstakingly well-researched documentation of Orientalism in literature, see Husain 
Haddawy, English Arabesque: Orientalism and the Oriental Mode in Eighteenth Century English Literature 
serialized in Ur, 1983-4. 
60 However diverse their angles of approach, scholars are unanimous on one point: that the Western view of 
the Orient in the late-nineteenth century was vastly different from that of the late-seventeenth century. Of the 
major events that occurred in Europe during this period, three in particular—the Enlightenment, the declining 
years of the Ottoman Empire, and the Industrial Revolution—left their own special stamp on this changing 
viewpoint. 
61 Not only the geographical space, but the term ‘Middle East’ is itself loaded with academic, ideological and 
political assumptions. See in particular Fawaz A. Gerges, “The Study of Middle East International Relations: 
A Critique”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 18 (1991): 206-20. 
62 Of all Middle East specialists Maxime Rodinson reaps the most consistent accolades. I quote here from 
Europe and the Mystique of Islam, tr. Roger Veinus  (London: I. B.  Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1988). Halliday cites 
his critique of European writing on the Middle East “as the most measured and erudite of them all” (148). He 
remains one of the few Europeans of whom Said speaks highly in Orientalism, but this praise fades to 
disappointment at Rodinson’s reaction to his own premise: “His [Rodinson’s] view of my critique has been 
very, to put it mildly, mixed. He supports a lot of what I say on political grounds, but he wants to defend 
Orientalist knowledge . . . Why does he do this? In the name of knowledge” (“Orientalism Revisited”, 36). 
63 My own concern with Rodinson’s account is that the phrase “began to move towards a more objective 
understanding” suggests a linearity and thus an objectivity in relation to the West’s portrayal of the East, and   64
                                                                                                                                                       
this was not quite the case. While there is no doubt that a broader understanding encouraged a less fantastical 
and reactionary method of relating to the East in which objectivity played a role, European subjectivity in 
regard to the East over the two hundred years in question was rife. And, for that matter, still is. 
64 Asia had its own internal troubles which would prove to be instrumental in opening the way for colonialism. 
For example, the decline of the Ottoman Empire was cemented by the Greek War of Independence (1821-27) 
when Britain, France and Russia intervened on the side of the Greeks defeating the Turkish-Egyptian fleet in 
1827 which led in turn to the proclamation of an independent Greek state. The following decades were 
plagued with anarchy and uprisings in all their various forms and gradually the two formerly great 
civilizations began to crumble. Rodinson claims that it was at this point that European colonization began in 
earnest. 
65 There were a surprising number of travel books written about the Near and Far East in the nineteenth 
century. Although this list is by no means comprehensive, Percy Sykes’s “List of Authorities” comprises over 
120 texts written primarily from the late-eighteenth century to the early-twentieth century with the vast 
majority being written from the early 1800s to the publication of his own History of Persia, Vol. II, in 1915.   
66 It was also a religion that “approximated the Deism of most Enlightenment philosophers” (47). 
67 I refer back to my mention of the Muslim reaction to Western literature about the East in Wahba’s “An 
Anger Observed”. 
68 Friedrich von Schlegel (1772-1829) is better known as a pioneer of the Romantic Movement in Germany, 
but in that he combined a study of Oriental languages with a writing career, he can be seen as one example of 
the combining of the scholarly with the literary. 
69 Along with his English contemporary Sir William Jones, Sacy was a man regarded as one of the foremost 
pioneers of modern Orientalism. 
70 The OED lists the first use of the term Orientalism in 1769 and of Orientalist in 1779.  
71 See Lynne Thornton, The Orientalists: Painter-Travellers, 1828-1908 (Paris, 1983), a “standard work” 
MacKenzie quotes as examining “no fewer than 148 [artists], by no means an exhaustive collection” (43). See 
MacKenzie’s chapter three “Orientalism in art”, too, for the type of exotic artistic depictions that raise Said’s 
ire. 
72 Both Trautmann and Lewis are in accord in isolating Raymond Schwab’s La Renaissance orientale as a 
factor in progressing their understanding of the origins of Orientalism, but what they get out of it differs. For 
Trautmann this idea “that Europe would undergo a second renaissance through the study of the Orient, 
especially through the study of Sanskrit and the Veda, much as the study of Greek was the cause of the first 
Renaissance” becomes central to his theory that India and Sanskrit were the defining center of a new 
Orientalism . . . the ensuring Indomania gave the Oriental renaissance a new Indian center” (26). For Lewis, 
however, Schwab’s work illuminates Said’s “alternative universe”. He suggests Said’s work and the “ensuring 
wave of anti-Orientalism” it created were “obviously deeply influenced by a reading of Schwab’s book, which 
is frequently and admiringly cited. The otherwise mystifying schema of Arabic studies in the West as seen by 
Mr Said becomes intelligible, though not of course acceptable, when one compares it with Schwab, whose 
framework has been taken over and applied to another region and another purpose” (Macfie, 260). Lewis 
claims that the “change of purpose . . . is debatable, but the change of region [equating the relationship 
between Europe and the Islamic world to that between Europe and India] reduces the argument to absurdity”. 
73 Trautmann used such adjectives as “expansionary” and “inflationary” to qualify Said’s “redefinition” of 
Orientalism, but it is clear that Said took away from the term more than he added in the changing of the 
meaning and thus perhaps ‘reductive’ would be a better descriptive word. 
74 Trautmann, for one, appears to argue in favour of an ethnographic discourse instead of linguistic on the part 
of some of the leading Orientalists. See my note 76. 
75 The word was traditionally used most commonly in two—some historians claim three—separate ways. The 
first use describes a school of painting created by European artists “who visited the Middle East and North 
Africa and depicted what they saw or imagined, sometimes in a rather romantic and extravagant manner . . .” 
The second, rather more common, meaning relates to scholarship, specifically to philological scholarship, and 
dates from the great expansion of scholarship in western Europe from the time of the Renaissance onward 
(Macfie, 251). 
76 In his discussion of Sir William Jones (1746-94) who was one of the earliest Orientalists and founder/first 
president of the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1784, Trautmann argues that Jones’ principal concerns and 
projects were “primarily ethnological” and not philological (40). He quotes Jones: “‘I have ever considered 
languages as the mere instruments of real learning, and think them improperly confounded with learning 
itself,’ although they are indispensable to opening the immense mine of the literatures of Asia (Jones 1807, 
3:7)” (60).   65
                                                                                                                                                       
77 In terms of my thesis, Hastings (Governor-General of India 1773-84) provides an excellent example of yet 
another Orientalist sensitive to the needs of the people he governed who is almost totally ignored by Said. He 
is mentioned in only one sentence in Orientalism, in which Said states that “Warren Hastings had decided that 
Indians were to be ruled by their own laws . . . ” (78) a reference to the “Sanskrit code of laws” which existed 
only in Persian until translated by East India Company official Charles Wilkins. Wilkins went on to translate 
the Bhagavad-Gita (1785) for which Hastings wrote the introduction. 
78 Indeed, it is the high-handedness of such men as Macaulay  who “imposed the British model on the entire 
Indian school system (Rodinson, 52). 
79 Removing the Middle East from the debate would certainly have simplified it. Said:  “The least encouraging 
impact, though, was in Middle East studies. There the reaction was uniformly defensive” (“Orientalism 
Revisited”, 32). 
80 Although it should be noted that it still appears in Webster’s (1981) as “scholarship or learning in oriental 
subjects” (803). 
81 With reference specifically to Kipling’s Kim. 
82 In fact, some scholars are quite damning, going as far as to say  “. . . most of the work that has followed 
[Orientalism] . . . is usually quite academic, far more tame, quite well-behaved, colourless and even at times, 
spineless,” (Ahmad, Macfie, 294). 
83 An analogy from Alvin Toffler’s excellent although now somewhat dated book, Future Shock, is useful 
here. Toffler suggests that change can be likened to an elastic band which when merely stretched and released 
returns to its original size. In order to make any change permanent, he says, heat must be applied. Heat applied 
to the stretched elastic changes its size and shape permanently. Insofar as the debate surrounding Said and his 
brand of “orientalism”, it could be said that Said has certainly applied the heat. “Orientalism” will never again 
be the innocent word of yore. Although it can still be said that the discourse is misleading, contrived and in 
itself a misrepresentation, this does not detract from the fact that Said’s use of discourse has served its 
purpose, if indeed that purpose was primarily to raise awareness. 
84 See my discussion of current cross-cultural writing in the conclusion. 
85 By employing a form of “mutual interrogation”, I propose to examine the respective authors’ hierarchical 
systems of thought-processes (“routine habits of thought”), as well as questions of identity and the 
representation of that identity. I am indebted to Christopher Norris for the clarity he brings to the concept of 
Derrida’s deconstruction processes. See Derrida (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1987), 19. 
86 From “Orientalism: A Black Perspective” (Macfie: 239-48).   76
Turkish soldier . . .  The behaviour of all of them was admirable; they have the instincts of 
gentlemen in the best sense of the word . . . ’” (Browne Papers, Box 9).
25 Other friends were 
from within the Persian community some of whom would visit him in his rooms at 
Cambridge.
26  
  
But Gobineau’s story of the Baha’i lingered in his mind, and Browne still dreamed of 
visiting Persia. To this end he tried repeatedly to find employment in one of the Eastern 
consulates. That this was not destined to be underscores the somewhat haphazard status of 
Orientalism in Britain in the 1890s and provides clear evidence of Britain’s lack of 
organizing—or “orientalising”—intent.
27 At this point, Browne’s efforts culminated in a 
series of disappointments: “The hopes with which I had left Cambridge had been dampened 
by repeated disappointments” in the form of “curt official letters” insisting that the 
languages of Browne’s proficiency—namely Arabic, Persian and Turkish—“were not 
recognized as subjects of examination” (17).
28 Consider the lack of both logic and common 
sense in correspondence that clearly stated that if Browne wished to become a consul in 
Western Asia the qualifications he needed were the languages of German, Greek, Spanish 
and Italian. Change was in the offing, however. Having passed his final examinations at the 
College of Surgeons and the College of Physicians, Browne was considering his next move 
when he found that he had been elected a Fellow of Pembroke College, Cambridge. Thus 
ten years after leaving school, after making efforts in so many different areas, “at last I was 
really to go to Persia” (19). Not only that but, coincidently, the university would soon 
require a resident teacher of Persian and spending the first year of his Fellowship in Persia 
would qualify him even more soundly for the position. 
    77
My representation of Browne to this point has been one that portrays him as oblivious to the 
racist implications of “orientalism”, as one who is apparently unaware of the imperialist and 
colonizing designs of the country of his birth. However, patently this is a case of a man on 
the brink of an Orientalist career that falls clearly within the defining parameters Said 
provides for “orientalism”. Further, although Browne was born just eighteen years before 
that well-known opponent of imperialism, Leonard Woolf, with a life span that overlapped 
Woolf’s by some forty-six years, there is virtually no mention, let alone criticism, of 
Britain’s colonial ventures in Browne’s works, quite the opposite of Woolf. As I have 
pointed out, this was not for want of a political mind and will on the part of Browne, nor a 
reluctance to speak out against what he believed to be wrong.
29  
  
While this difference could, of course, be attributed to dissimilarities in the characters of the 
two men, this fact alone is not sufficient to account for the variance in their approach to the 
epoch of imperialist enterprise in which they lived. Moreover, the similarities were more 
pronounced than otherwise. Both men were of a political turn of mind, both campaigned 
against their own government in support of political causes, both were thinkers and writers. 
Most importantly, both were men who had, to use the phrase MacEion applies to Browne, 
“an inborn affinity” for the East, in Browne’s case “the Persian East” and for Woolf, the 
island of what was then Ceylon. However, Woolf’s lifetime extended beyond that of 
Browne by not only spanning the pinnacle of imperialism but by lasting well into the 
decline and virtual death of the British Empire. This suggests that the death throes of this 
period of decline and the accompanying publicity might be held responsible for a 
burgeoning awareness and self-reflexivity within its citizens, the “self-reflexivity” that Said 
claims as the only basis for exoneration of representation. Certainly Woolf’s work reveals   78
that reflexivity; the extent to which it appears in Browne’s work I will discuss later in this 
chapter. I need first to complete the story of his life, one which takes a scholarly turn on his 
return to Cambridge from Persia. 
  
Although for most of the four decades between his return to Cambridge and his death, 
Browne was consumed by his academic interests, his love affair with his university was 
equalled by his passion for the Persians, an obsession that inevitably led him into politics 
which provided an ideal outlet for his totally unrestrained and fearless views.
30 In 1907, by 
which time he was a severe critic of the British foreign policy towards Persia, his sense of 
injustice was again ignited by his distaste for the agreement the newly elected Liberal 
Government had made with Russia. While Browne insisted that the agreement had been 
made out of Britain’s fear of Russia and that the result had compromised Persia’s newly 
formed constitution, foreign minister Sir Edward Grey saw it somewhat differently. For 
Grey, the offering of British support for the autocratic government in St Petersburg was an 
opportunity to improve the Anglo-Russian rivalry that had been going on with regard to 
Persia for over a century. 
  
But Browne was not one to protest idly.
31 He joined the newly launched Left opposition to 
England’s Liberal party and his anger at British treatment of the Persians was supported by 
articles in some of the more influential local newspapers, in numerous pamphlets and books, 
by public lectures and by the formation of the Persian Committee. He also wrote two 
texts—Short Account of Recent Events in Persia and The Persian Revolution of 1905-09— 
“. . . with the object of explaining to the West that a new spirit of sound nationalism had 
recently been born in that country and that it deserved to be respected and encouraged by   79
the English people” (Inayatulah, 20). Although the struggle was to continue for five years 
until 1912, what amounted to pressure-group protest was eventually successful in reversing 
British policy towards Persia. But it took its toll on Browne. How strongly he felt over the 
entire course of proceedings is borne out by his outpourings in the press and by his 
voluminous correspondence on the matter, feelings which are summed up in a letter he 
wrote to a Persian friend, “‘It is now close upon three years that I have been living in a state 
of agony on account of the affairs of Persia’” (Inayatulah, 22). 
  
Meanwhile, Browne’s domestic life was every bit as successful as his professional career 
and fell into two distinct halves: that of his bachelor days at Pembroke College and his later 
marriage.
32  Although there have been a number of descriptions of these long evenings and 
nights of debate at Cambridge, I will quote from just one, a testimonial written by Professor 
Inayatulah to commemorate the forty-fourth anniversary of Browne’s death. This extract 
gives an insight into the social atmosphere of these gatherings and the esteem with which 
Browne was—and continues to be—held.
33  
It would be hard to imagine a more delightful evening than one which 
began in the Common Room of the College and ended in Browne’s rooms, 
sometimes with the setting of the stars. He had an inexhaustible fund of 
anecdotes and tales, which were mainly drawn either from Oriental 
literature or from the adventures of himself and his friends. There were a 
hundred topics which kept his hearers enthralled for a whole evening. 
Oriental by his temperament, his experiences and his studies, he had made 
up his mind on many issues by the time he was twenty-two, and to these 
determined views he was rigidly faithful. . . . He loved to expatiate on the 
beauties of Eastern poetry, which he quoted profusely either in support of 
his argument or for the benefit of his visitors. The quotation of the original 
Arabic or Persian verses was invariably followed by a fluent rendering into 
English, in which not a point would be missed. (20)
34 
 
 
In the years before his death, Browne continued to attract accolades, both from his Persian 
friends and acquaintances and from scholars of the European community, but it is worth 
noting that on his sixtieth birthday, he was presented with a limited edition Festschrift.
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is a book that consists of a collection of essays contributed by scholars of many countries, 
titled in English A Volume of Oriental Studies and subtitled in Persian ‘Ajab-nama—Book 
of Admiration—the word ‘Ajab being a play on Browne’s initials.
35 Since Browne’s 
background of Persian friends, affiliations and interests would have been almost 
synonymous with his name at that stage of his life, it is surprising that the list of 
contributors to the volume is comprised almost totally of Europeans—among them English, 
German, Danish and French Orientalists—the only Asian being a scholar from Lahore, 
Muhammad Shafi‘. While there is no doubt that the eclectic nature of the collection—the 
contents of which included the etymology of words and the classification of certain works, 
the translation of Arabic poetry into English, an analysis of specific passages of the 
Kur’án—would have appealed to Browne’s intellectualism, and almost certainly Browne 
would have been flattered by the attention and admiration of his peers, pleased, too, that 
they had chosen a Persian subtitle, I wonder how he would have viewed an omission on the 
part of his fellow Orientalists to include Persian contributors? Closer examination of Copy 
No. 238 (A Volume of Oriental Studies) does, I believe, provide an answer. Pasted into the 
very front of this volume—printed on a coated paper of a different stock in another font, but 
placed so carefully it almost forms part of the original volume—is a copy of the Persian 
presentation to Professor Browne. I have no evidence that this was Browne’s action but 
given his attention to detail, his meticulous filing and labelling efforts and his emotive 
connections, I think it is not implausible to suggest that this act of prefacing the Orientalist 
accolade with the Persian presentation was, for him, a way of completing the tribute. 
Perhaps it was his way, too, of alerting later generations of scholars to the original omission. 
In other words, where were the Persian and other Asian scholars?
36 The Persians did, 
however, celebrate Browne’s birthday in their own way. Arberry relates the proffering of an    81
 
“Address” to Browne  “which bore thirty-four signatures including those of three Prime 
Ministers and eight other Cabinet Ministers [and which] read  as follows: ‘On this occasion 
. . . [W]e the undersigned, not only on our own part, but on behalf of our appreciative 
countrymen, offer you our sincere congratulations and heart-felt greetings . . . Your services 
to learning generally, and to the Persian language and literature particularly, are such as 
tongue cannot declare nor pen describe. We now profit by this opportunity to express our 
gratitude for the labours which you have undertaken for us and for our country, whereby 
you have made the Persian nation your eternal debtor . . .’” Other presentations that 
followed the first included a collection of laudatory poetry and a conferring by the Shah of 
Persia of the Order of the Lion and the Sun (189).
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Although Browne was only sixty-four years of age when he died in 1926, in his lifetime he 
accumulated not only professional honours, but esteem and affection, too, given freely by 
both East and West. There could be no more fitting tribute to Browne’s life than this 
obituary by one of his Iranian friends, Mirza Muhammad of Qazwin which reads: 
“‘Browne’s love for the world of Islam in general, and for Iran, and the Iranians in 
particular, had no bounds. There was to be seen in it no material or selfish aim, such as 
position or wealth or political gain for his country. It had no other motive except heartfelt 
emotion and spiritual attraction, that is to say, love for whatever is true and good and fine in 
human life. Indeed, for Iran, the existence of Browne was a God-given blessing 
 . . .’” (Inayatulah, 22). 
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British Orientalism 
My discussion of the foundations of Orientalism in chapter one concluded with the 
acknowledgement that although some use was made of Orientalists by Britain in 
administrative positions as these became available in the “vulnerable territories” created by 
the decline of the Ottoman Empire, little was done to encourage Orientalism as a profession. 
But put so simply this statement does no justice to the actuality of the situation which was 
in itself contentious. In reality the case was not only far more complex, but quite contrary to 
Said’s claim that colonialism and Orientalism were one and the same thing. In fact, far from 
being in a position to instigate a multifarious plot to redefine and conquer Asia, Britain did 
not produce enough Orientalists to meet its own fairly basic needs within its own nation. 
Although within Europe in the late nineteenth century Oriental Studies were becoming 
increasingly organized and widespread, in Britain the situation was somewhat different. The 
truth was that the British government gave little support to the furthering of this discipline. 
               
Some idea of the reality of the situation in late nineteenth-century Britain can be deduced 
from a statement of Browne’s in which he asserts: “[T]he question ‘What first made you 
take up Persian?’ when addressed to an Englishman who is neither engaged in, nor destined 
for, an Eastern career deserves an answer”. This is more than a superficial social comment 
and stands at the beginning of A Year Amongst the Persians as an apt foreshadowing of 
Browne’s looming battles with the English Government and his lack of respect for an 
England that gave so little encouragement to the study of Oriental languages (2).
38 Although 
Browne was still a young man in his twenties at this point, his bitterness drives the tone of  
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this passage in which he quotes the advice of his much respected Arabic professor Dr. 
William Wright:  
 
. . .  if you . . . are obliged to consider how you may earn a livelihood, then 
devote yourself wholly to medicine, and abandon, save as a relaxation for 
your leisure moments, the pursuit of Oriental letters. The posts for which 
such knowledge will fit you are few, and, for the most part, poorly 
endowed, neither can you hope to obtain them till you have worked and 
waited for many years. And from the Government you must look for 
nothing, for it has long shown, and still continues to show, an increasing 
indisposition to offer the slightest encouragement to the study of Eastern 
languages. (3)                                                                                           
             
But it is Browne’s reaction in which I am most interested:  
 
Often I reflect with bitterness that England, though more directly interested 
in the East than any other European country save Russia, not only offers 
less encouragement . . . to engage in the study of Oriental languages than 
any other great European nation, but can find no employment even for those 
few who, notwithstanding every discouragement, are impelled by their own 
inclination to this study, and who, by diligence, zeal, and natural aptitude, 
attain proficiency therein. How different it is in France! . . . May she long 
maintain that position of eminence in science [the science of language] 
which she has so nobly won, and which she so deservedly occupies! And to 
us English, too, may she become, in this respect at least, an exemplar and a 
pattern! (4-5)
39 
              
Browne’s disgust for the priorities of the English government during this period of high 
empire is made abundantly clear in his earliest writings and it is plain that far from being a 
premeditated endeavour to set up a power base, Orientalism was a profession that existed, 
or subsisted, with little support from the British Foreign Office. Had Browne’s interest not 
been diverted to the Persian cause, it is conceivable that he would have focused more on the 
interests of Orientalists within Britain, a situation which in his own time went from the  
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frustrating situation he deplores in the excerpt quoted above to even worse. Or had he lived 
longer, he may have placed his considerable energy and influence behind the sentiments 
that went to the development of the Scarbrough Report, a 200-page document which was to 
become known as the “Charter of Modern Orientalism”.
40  
  
It would, however, have been of great interest to Browne himself to know that it was not 
until the closing years of World War II that the English statesman (later to become prime 
minister) Anthony Eden appointed a commission under the chairmanship of the Earl of 
Scarbrough to examine the facilities offered by British universities and educational 
institutions for Oriental, African, Slavonic and Eastern European studies.
41 Excerpts from 
the report state:  
A significant part of our contribution to world peace is to understand and to 
know our neighbours, both near and distant. Western and Eastern 
civilizations have been brought together by a revolution in communications 
and must not remain separated by superstition and ignorance. The East 
makes great efforts to know and understand the West and our interests and 
our traditions require that among the Western powers we of all people 
should reciprocate. . . . What place should be made, in the post-war life of 
British people, for the study of the languages and cultures of almost all the 
peoples of the world not of Western European origin? . . . it is not only the 
teaching of languages with which we are here concerned; it is, rather, the 
interpretation to the British people of the whole way of life of these peoples. 
How do they live, what is their history, as well as how do they speak, are 
questions which these studies should attempt to answer. (Cited here from 
Arberry, 242-3)  
 
It is significant that recommendations within the document for a sounder and closer 
understanding of other countries were made by men who were, for the most part, not 
academics but who came from diverse walks of life and who “were characterized by an 
equal combination of farsightedness and close attention to the possible and the practicable” 
(245).    85
Just after the war, the report was adopted by Parliament amid much rejoicing by British 
Orientalists but failed almost immediately in the recession that followed with only a 
modicum of the promised funds materializing and was, according to Arberry, quickly 
forgotten. And so it was not surprising that by 1959 the situation had not improved. In a 
pamphlet: “East and West: Towards Mutual Understanding”, UNESCO
42 states:  
But there are other forms of ignorance that can be remedied, especially 
when the sufferers are aware of their state. Such is the ignorance of the men 
and women, young and not so young, who nowadays feel hampered by their 
lack of knowledge when faced with the irritating problem called “the East”. 
They hear it spoken of as an infinitely complex enigma which only 
specialists can attempt to decipher. It seems to be made up of all-too-vast 
continents, unknown seas and enormous nations which used to be little 
heard of, especially as they were often considered merely vague and 
picturesque provinces of empires whose capitals lay in the West. In it live 
an incredible number of extremely varied peoples, speaking an equally 
incredible number of languages . . . When most Westerners were at school, 
all they learned about these [oriental] religions and cultures were the fact of 
their existence, and even this was usually brought in merely as a footnote to 
a chapter of ancient history . . . The history of these peoples? Western 
schoolbooks rarely mention it except in relation to the West. The Arabs, for 
instance, appeared just in time to invade Spain and fight the Crusaders in 
the Holy Land, after which they left the stage and went back into the void. 
India emerged from a long, legendary, fairy-tale night to be exploited from 
the sixteenth to the eighteenth century by two or three trading companies. 
China escaped from its dreary isolation to welcome the “civilizers” of the 
Opium War . . . our ignorance can often be explained or excused. But it can 
no longer be tolerated. (Arberry, 249-50) 
 
I have cited at some length from these two sources because they form part of texts that are 
seldom quoted or discussed in contemporary studies.
43 As well, they proffer a concerted 
and—to my way of thinking—rational point of view in terms of what would appear to be a 
genuine desire for mutual understanding on the part of the West towards the East, a 
celebration of a future time when, in Arberry’s words “it will be considered as normal for an 
undergraduate to study the history of Arab, or Persian, or Indian or Chinese, or Japanese 
civilization as to investigate the ancient and modern civilizations of Europe” (256). 
Although from a distance of some sixty years the language used in these texts could be   86
considered a little ‘quaint’, the sentiments expressed have a surprising resonance with the 
public lectures of Homi Bhabha.
44 Said, of course, does not mention either the Scarbrough 
Report or the UNESCO pamphlet, understandably perhaps, because not only do they run 
counter to his argument but also since they lie outside the temporal parameters of his 
discourse. However, these pleas for a greater understanding of other races and their 
languages return my argument to Thomas B. Macaulay and, as I will show, ultimately to 
Said. It is here, with Macaulay, that the state of affairs that existed in terms of Britain’s 
support for the Orientalists had its inception.  
  
In postcolonial literature, the arrogance embedded in Macaulay’s ridicule of the Indian 
vernaculars is well-known and I do not propose to cite the offending and offensive passages 
again. What is less familiar is the Orientalist response to Governor-General Bentinck’s 
support of the Anglicist Macaulay and the context of the debacle within the Anglicist-
Orientalist controversy mentioned in chapter one. While the Indians were insulted, the 
Orientalists were angered and their response vigorous, but in the end, useless. The result 
was that “the effects of Bentinck’s support of Macaulayism greatly reduced the dynamism 
generated by two generations of Orientalist institutional growth and development” (Kopf, 
Macfie, 205). Under Bentinck’s administration, colleges, schools and societies ‘failed’ or 
were closed and Orientalism as a profession continued to exist in the superficial state that 
Browne found it fifty years on.
45  
  
However, while I am indebted to Kopf for this information and for his quotations and 
citations, I differ from his opinion on one important point. This is that I do not believe that 
the brevity of Said’s references to Macaulay and his passing mention of the infamous   87
Minute on Education proves that Said “misunderstood the nature and function of 
Orientalism” (my emphasis, Kopf, 205). To the contrary, I think Said’s rapid glosses of 
Macaulay occur precisely because ultimately the man and his report do not serve his 
argument. And so, far from a matter of misunderstanding, I suggest that in fact Macaulay 
may have presented Said with somewhat of a dilemma. To clarify: to overlook entirely the 
existence of an imperialist of the order of Macaulay in a work like Orientalism is 
unscholarly. But if Said had been more fulsome in his description of Macaulay, had he, for 
example, cited those sections of the Minute which would so readily support his own 
argument; in fairness, he would also be obliged to cite portions of the Orientalist response 
which was so vehement in its opposition to the anglicization of Indian languages. Finally, 
he would be forced to mention the Anglicist/Orientalist division and dissention which, 
ostensibly at least, he would appear to have carefully avoided. An acknowledgement that 
there were Englishmen—many of whom were the much-maligned philologists on which he 
bases much of the substance of his study—who not only disagreed with the methods of 
imperialist governance but who were prepared to place their careers in jeopardy in support 
of the rights of indigenous people against their own government, renders the basis of Said’s 
argument uncertain to say the least. 
  
Although as I have said, from a postcolonial vantage point, it is understandable that Said 
ignores a lot of the above, it is this obvious lack of encouragement the British government 
offered to those who set out to study Oriental languages that makes Said’s assault on 
Orientalists all the more surprising, an “attack” from within the ranks, as it were. In this 
respect, Trautmann suggests: 
For those whose training was in the Orientalist tradition, the Saidian attack 
was something of a surprise. Does studying the ancient languages of Asia 
hold out the prospect of lucrative careers and an abundance of jobs among   88
which to choose or influence in the formation of government policy? [In 
other words, it could be argued that this is the most direct route to 
knowledge and, thus, power.] If anything, the public image of Orientalism 
before Said was that of Proust, for whom (in his great novel) the Professor 
of Sanskrit alternates with the Professor Tamil as the . . . purveyor of arcane 
knowledge   . . . Scholars are used to such cruel jibes from the great writers, 
but the changed image of Orientalism in Said—from dreamy obscurantiscm 
to the intellectual Foreign Legion of Europe—was a shocking reversal. 
(19)
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Literary works 
My discussion so far has centred on the character and emerging political personage of 
Browne and the Orientalist environment in which he lived and worked. I have spent some 
time on this section because an understanding of the level and nature of Browne’s 
commitment to the Persians is fundamental to my argument. I have endeavoured to show 
the depth of the regard in which Browne held the Persian people and the corresponding 
respect in which he was—and continues to be—held in that country. Correspondingly I 
have shown how little guile there was in the manner in which Browne came to Orientalism 
as a profession and how implausible it would be to attribute any sort of racist agenda—
either implicit or explicit—to his actions in this respect. Clearly, too—although there is no 
doubt that his own country was his comfort zone—he held very little respect for his own 
government and the nationalism he displayed was not cast in the direction of England. 
Accordingly, if imperialism springs from nationalism and connotes power and dominion, he 
was not an imperialist. On all these counts, Browne appears to be exonerated. On the face of 
it, it would appear that the existence of Browne has disproved Said’s argument: “It is 
therefore correct that every European, in what he could say about the Orient, was 
consequently a racist, an imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric”. 
    89
However, it is not quite that simple. Questions still remain as to the degree of interference 
Browne demonstrated in Persian affairs and to what extent his written work can be said to 
exhibit the self-reflexivity that will continue to vindicate him from accusations of 
“orientalism”. In his presentation of some of the more “factual” information on Persia, for 
example, does he—like Sacy before him—present those “facts” as doctrine without 
allowing the Persians their own voice? Or does he allow the Persians to speak for 
themselves? If so, how does he achieve this and is he successful? In an effort to address 
these concerns, I come now to his correspondence and his literary works, to their reception 
and reviews and to detailed examination of selected passages.
47  Since Browne’s chief 
literary preoccupation in the years following his return to England was with the history and 
doctrine of the Baha’i movement and the translation of numerous Baha’i documents and 
texts, these tend to make up the majority of the archive.
48 The work for which he receives 
the most acclaim, however, and one which is considered the greatest of his literary 
achievements is the immense and comprehensive A Literary History of Persia, published in 
four volumes in 1902, 1906, 1920 and 1924 respectively.
49 The information on Browne that 
a close reading of this work offers is an underscoring of his attention to pure scholarship, his 
dedication to translating quotations from both prose and poetry with as much exactitude as 
he can muster, and his obvious dedication to the intellectual thought and history of the 
Persian people. The work itself could be best described more as a history of the nation out 
of which its literature grew rather than an account of Persian poets and writers. It is “a work 
that fully displays Browne’s strengths and weaknesses: broad in scope . . . based almost 
entirely on original sources . . . but also diffuse and at time irrelevant (Volume 1, for 
example, consists largely of prolegomena, though originally intended to comprise the entire 
work)”.
50 Or in Browne’s own words:    90
 
 
For many years I had cherished a desire to write a history of the intellectual 
and literary achievements of the Persians . . . [I]t is strange that so few 
attempts should hitherto have been made to set forth in a comprehensive 
and yet concise and summary form the history of that ancient and most 
interesting kingdom. . . . it was the intellectual history of the Persians which 
I desired to write, and not merely the history of the poets and authors who 
expressed their thoughts through the medium of the Persian language; the 
manifestations of the national genius in the fields of Religion, Philosophy, 
and Science interested me as much as those belonging to the domain of 
Literature in the narrower sense . . . 
51 
  
In the preface to the first volume Browne states that the work is dedicated “. . . most of all to 
that small but growing body of amateurs who, having learned to love the Persian poets in 
translation, desire to know more of the language, literature, history, and thought of one of 
the most ancient, gifted and original peoples in the world” (ix). That this work was 
progressively translated into Arabic, Persian and Urdu in whole or part would have pleased 
Browne immensely. Professor Inayatulah’s praise of Browne’s “great work” is lofty indeed. 
It emphasizes the regard in which Browne is held, but lacks the critical appreciation of 
Wickens’ review of the work. For example, he says, “. . . the lively pages of Browne breathe 
the spirit of a genius. He ranges freely along the paths to which his tastes and predilections 
direct him, but there is a method in his wanderings, and those who accompany him will . . . 
have obtained such a commanding view of Persian literature and thought as they could 
hardly expect within the limits of any other single book. It is, therefore, not surprising to 
find that Browne’s characteristic treatment of his subject has not only informed but inspired 
the work of all subsequent writers in this field, not excluding the scholars of Iran itself” 
(21).
52  
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While that may be so, this is the point at which I would like to examine more closely 
Browne’s motives for his enthusiastic and almost unconditional embrace of the Persian 
people and their culture. Despite the claim by Mirza Muhammad who asserted that there 
was “no other motive” in Browne’s enthusiasm for Persia “except heartfelt emotion and 
spiritual attraction”, this “heartfelt emotion” was retrospective to Browne’s year in Persia. 
In other words, this sentiment was one that grew over the years and which inevitably 
followed an initial interest. I am interested in attempting to assess exactly what it was that 
was at the base of Browne’s original curiosity about Persia? Was it based solely on 
adolescent enthusiasm . . . on a few lines from a book chosen at random by a bored teenager 
from Eton library stacks? Or was there more? And if so, how close was this to Marlow’s 
statement in Heart of Darkness, oft-quoted by postcolonialists as an example of the 
proprietary behaviour of the colonizers: “At that time there were many blank spaces on the 
earth, and when I saw one that looked particularly inviting on a map (but they all look that) 
I would put my finger on it and say, When I grow up I will go there”?
53  
  
The answer lies as much in Browne’s correspondence, in the letters he wrote to the Foreign 
Office and to the press on behalf of the Persians in the early years of the twentieth century, 
as in his published literary work. Browne’s letters, particularly those which express his 
emotions in regard to the British interference in the Persian Constitution, certainly provide 
an insight into his Orientalist mind and leave no doubt as to his ferocious attachment to 
Persian self-rule.
54 But these letters were indicative of a later, more studied and problem-
solving frame of mind. They provide an insight into the thought processes of a man of 
mature years and it is the relatively unformed mind of Browne in his late twenties that I 
wish first to pursue. And although Wickens claims that it is Browne’s four-volume Literary   92
History that exemplifies his “strength and weaknesses”, like his Persian correspondence, 
this too was written throughout the latter half of his life.  
  
However, before I look at Browne’s earlier text, this is an appropriate juncture to investigate 
my previous claim that he is typical of “romantically-inclined Victorians” in terms of his 
upbringing and of his imagination and therefore, it logically follows, in how he represents 
the people and a lifestyle of a culture not his own.  
  
The first point that I want to make here is that there is a significant difference between being 
“romantically-inclined” and the type of romanticism that can be equated with exoticism, 
distortion of fact or the use of setting as a representation in itself. I posed the question above 
as to what extent Browne’s desire to visit Persia echoed Marlow’s “When I grow up I will 
go there” and I think the answer is that a youthful desire for travel and adventure is not 
unusual. There is no doubt that there was a great deal of impending romance and spirit of 
adventure involved in setting sail for a distant land. But to connect this without sufficient 
evidence with the type of romantic representation of the Orient which tends to suffocate 
fact, gloss over the obvious and ultimately lead to distortion and inaccuracy or, in other 
words, the idealistic framing that understandably upsets scholars like Edward Said and 
Chinua Achebe, I think goes too far.
55 Applying twenty-first-century enlightenment to a 
nineteenth-century situation provides a distortion in itself. 
  
My second point concerns the following claims by Abbas Amanat. Although Amanat—
while fiercely defending Browne from allegations of “orientalism”—agrees that in his 
representation of Persia Browne was “acting in a customary manner in sympathy with the   93
era in which he was living . . . [a vision that] was part of the prevailing spirit of his time and 
the way Europe viewed a largely imaginary construct identified as the Orient  . . . ”, he goes 
on to say: “Yet such a romantic bent, accentuated throughout his works by a sense of 
personal experience and an intimate style of writing, was not in any way antagonistic to the 
cultures and the peoples he studied. Nor was his presentation of the subject matter itself 
distorted by his idealism beyond the standards of his time or ours. On the contrary, it may 
be argued that his very romantic aspiration made him seek and discover ‘amongst the 
Persians’ the downtrodden, the dissenters, and those who were branded by the powerful as 
outcasts and undesirables” (XI). 
  
I agree with what Amanat has to say here on two counts. Firstly, that in any reading of any 
of Browne’s texts one would be hard put to find hostility towards the Persians and, besides, 
I have already established that Browne was no racist. Secondly, there is no question that 
Browne was acting and writing in inevitable accordance with his Victorian upbringing. 
However, I suggested at the beginning of this chapter that one might not be “racist”, but still 
be an “orientalist”. In this respect, Amanat misses the crux of Said’s argument. It is much 
less  Said’s concern whether Browne’s account is friendly or hostile to the people he 
describes than it is in how Browne depicts or presents the Persians.
56 It is in this sense that 
“orientalism” becomes inextricably coupled with the issue of representation. In other words, 
does Browne attempt to describe what he finds and how he finds it, even if the situation or 
event seems strange from the inevitably narrow viewpoint of a Victorian youth? Or does he 
romanticize the narrative in order to make it popular reading for a Western audience? In 
Said’s terminology: Does Browne “write the East”, imparting to it a sense of the 
mysterious, the theatrical?   94
  
In order to answer these questions with any degree of accuracy, I need a point of reference 
against which to place Browne’s text. I need to be able to ascertain what constitutes the 
exotic and to ask whether what appears to me to be exotic would be the same if viewed 
from the viewpoint of the culture from which it emanates.
57 Accordingly, this is an 
appropriate juncture to pause for a moment to examine one of the most renowned Oriental 
texts to make its appearance in “Western” literature: The Book of the Thousand and One 
Nights.
58  
 
The Nights 
In a mention of Antoine Galland in my earlier discussion of the ‘exotic’, I pointed out that 
Rodinson echoes Said in contending that it was Galland’s preface to Barthélemy 
d’Herbelot’s  Bibliothèque orientale that led to the Western construct of an “exotic, 
enchanting Muslim East”.
59 But Galland had an even greater responsibility with regard to 
his translation of the Nights. Editor P. H. Newby claims that Galland intended his version 
“to be popular and this he achieved by emphasizing the strange and the miraculous, and 
ignoring much that was characteristic of the original: the very frank treatment of sex and its 
perversions, the more savage stories of brutality and corruption, the historical and semi-
historical anecdotes” (The Book of the Thousand and One Nights, 7).  
  
The very language in which Newby describes Galland’s work makes it abundantly clear that 
in rendering a translation of this nature whereby the new version departs both from the 
intent and the actual tales of the original in order to solicit public appeal, Galland is 
indulging in a form of romanticism. Furthermore, it is not only the language of the   95
translation Galland employs but also the conscious selection of detail—in terms of what he 
leaves out as much as he includes—which romanticizes, or exoticizes, the East. He 
smothers the frankness and highlights the mystery and in so doing provides not only a 
totally different story, but also the methodology that engenders Said’s criticism in Western 
attempts to “write” the East. (Although Said dismisses E. W. Lane’s rather too literal 
translation of the Nights as “uninspired”, perhaps Galland can be taken to account for being 
too inspirational!)   
  
However, in contrast to Galland’s method, when Richard Burton came to translate the 
Nights, he tried to do so “. . . by writing as the Arab would have written in English . . .  I 
have carefully sought out the English equivalent of every Arabic word, however low it may 
be or ‘shocking’ to ears polite; preserving, on the other hand, all possible delicacy where the 
indecency is not intentional; and, as a friend advises me to state, not exaggerating the 
vulgarities and the indecencies which, indeed, can hardly be exaggerated. For the coarseness 
and the crassness are but the shades of a picture which would otherwise be all lights” (11).
60 
Since one of the features of ‘romantic’ writing is that it tends to tamper with the balance 
between light and dark by glossing over unpleasant facts so that the text is “all lights”, it 
could be said, firstly, that in his conscious effort t o avoid t his and, further, i n that the 
selection of tales is unexpurgated, that Burton’s translation errs less on the side of the 
‘exotic’ than Galland’s. In other words, it is probably as good as we are going to get, given 
the inevitable vagaries of transliteration.  
 
 
Here, then, is an example from “The Reeve’s Tale” as translated by Burton: 
 
“If so it be,” he replied, “and needs must I eat of it, I will not do so except I 
wash my hands forty times with soap, forty times with potash and forty 
times with galangale, the total being one hundred and twenty washings.”   96
Thereupon the hospitable host bade his slaves bring water and whatso [sic] 
he required; and the young man washed his hand as afore mentioned. Then 
he sat down, as if disgusted and frightened withal and, dipping his hand in 
the ragout, began eating at the same time showing signs of anger. And we 
wondered at him with extreme wonderment, for his hand trembled and the 
morsel in it shook and we saw his that his thumb had been cut off and he ate 
with four fingers only.  
 
A few sentences later, the frame narrator discontinues his tale and allows the protagonist to 
continue the story by relating the reason for his disfigurement. 
One day, as I sat in my shop, suddenly and unexpectedly there appeared 
before me a young lady, than whom I never saw a fairer, wearing the richest 
raiment and ornaments and riding a she-mule, with one negro slave walking 
before her and another behind her. She drew rein at the head of the 
exchange-bazar [sic] and entered followed by an eunuch who said to her, 
“O my lady come out and away without telling anyone, lest thou light a fire 
which will burn us all up.” . . . Then she unveiled her face, and I saw that 
she was like the moon and I stole a glance at her whose sight caused me a 
thousand sighs, and my heart was captivated with love of her. (143-4)  
 
Certainly, there is no apparent attempt to spare the reader the less savoury facts. The (to our 
ears) quaint language in which the tale is couched is Burton’s attempt to render the effect 
true to the original, remembering that these stories originated in an oral medium. So much 
for the style. But what of the content?  
  
The first passage contains description rich with biblical allusion in the repeated washing of 
the hands. It is followed by descriptions of a torture medieval in effect. The repetition in the 
use of “wonder” both as noun and verb within the same clause encourages manipulation of 
reader senses into this very state of wonder or amazement. And then there is the “negro 
slave”, the Africans of that era belonging to the formula of exotic writing. The ugliness 
implicit in the first passage sits in juxtaposition to the richness and beauty only a paragraph 
later which talks of “richest raiments and ornaments”, of bazaars, of  sheer beauty and a 
palpitating heart, those lush and colourful descriptions that Rodinson speaks of in his   97
discussion of exoticism. These are the sort of tales responsible for entering the imagination 
of many a young Putney boy born and bred within a rainy cloying Victorian England. And 
responsible, too, for the Western picture of the East that Said condemns. 
  
Is this, then, despite Burton’s efforts to remain true to the original, the exoticism that Said 
speaks of when he claims a Westernized re-structuring of the Orient? Are these the tales we 
retrospectively regard as fantastical with twentieth- and twenty-first-century post-Saidian 
awareness? After all, one of Said’s contentions is that Western tales of the East offer 
“[S]ensuality, promise, terror, sublimity, idyllic pleasure, intense energy” . . . all qualities 
present in the passages quoted (Orientalism, 119). 
  
The point here is that these tales are not a Westernised version of the Orient. This text was 
written by the East for the East. The translation from which I have quoted was, even by 
Saidian standards, written by a translator widely acknowledged within both the Western and 
Eastern worlds as sensitive to nuance as well as content. The popularity that Galland sought 
was not one of Burton’s considerations. Given the inevitable difficulties inherent in 
transliteration, he endeavoured to be as consistent to the original as possible. In his 
introduction to Burton’s translation, Newby says: “It may sound odd to recommend The 
Thousand and One Nights as a picture of Arab civilization. It is hard to see how stories of 
such exuberant fancy can bear any relation to reality, but of course they have—a very close 
relation—to the emotional life of the people who created them or coloured them with their 
imagination; and this emotional life is the distinctive feature of any culture” (14).  
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At this stage, two answers emerge. Firstly, despite Burton’s efforts, it is clear that the nature 
of the text is indisputably exotic, certainly in Saidian terms. But this is because it is being 
viewed from “an altogether different world vision”—distanced temporally, geographically 
and culturally—from the one to which it was addressed. It is constructive to bear in mind 
that because Eastern texts tend to conceal less than those of the West, Eastern fantasies can 
appear fairly erotic and far-fetched to the Western mind. Secondly, it is salutary to reflect 
that perhaps it was the way in which the Orient represented itself that caused such 
representations to re-appear in Western texts.  
 
A Year Amongst the Persians 
I return to a discussion of Browne’s work, specifically A Year Amongst the Persians, to 
further illustrate my point as to the manner in which such representations re-appear. Written 
and published within five years of his return to England, before the academic world claimed 
him entirely, its real value to this thesis lies not in what Browne really thinks of Persia and 
the Persians, but in how he represents the Persians, their values and belief systems to the 
West.
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Two examples will suffice before a more general discussion of the text. The first concerns 
Browne’s  description of the poetry of Mírzá Bákir—the eccentric Persian mentioned earlier 
in this chapter—in the manuscript he spent so many evenings editing during his medical 
internship and which was filled with “grass-eating lions, bears, yellow demons, Gog and 
Magog . . .” (13). The question that arises here is whether Browne’s description is a 
Western re-presentation of an Oriental construct or whether Browne was attempting to relay   99
the substance of Mírzá Bákir’s poetry. One further example will provide further 
clarification. 
  
The second is this excerpt from Browne’s re-telling of an incident based on experimentation 
within the occult sciences allegedly related to him by a philosopher from the city of Isfahán: 
“I have tried most of them [most religions],” he said. “I have been in turn 
Musulmán, Súfí, Sheykhí, and even Bábí. At one time of my life I devoted 
myself to the occult sciences, and made an attempt to obtain control over 
the jinnís . . .  [T]he seeker after this power chooses some solitary and 
dismal spot . . . [and remains there] for forty days . . . [and] eats very little 
food . . . [then] on the twenty-first day a lion will appear, and will enter the 
magic circle . . .  if he resists the lion, other terrible forms will come to him 
on subsequent days—tigers, dragons, and the like—which he must similarly 
withstand. . . .  [In my case, I stood my ground until] a most hideous and 
frightful dragon appeared, [at which point] I could no longer control my 
terror, and rushed from the circle, renouncing all further attempts at 
obtaining the mastery over the jinnís. When some time had elapsed after 
this . . .  I came to the conclusion that I had been the victim of 
hallucinations excited by expectation, solitude, hunger, and long vigils . . . ” 
(161-2) 
 
Lions and lion dogs, dragons, tigers and jinnis . . .  On the face of it, this is an exotic 
description of an event in that it is different, mysterious, not part of daily life or 
conditioning. But is the representation misleading? Does it carry “a chameleon-like quality” 
in that it is changeable, elusive, full of withheld promise (Orientalism, 119)?  
 
There are two points to be made here. Firstly, as is widely known, “lion dogs, dragons, 
tigers and jinnis” are a part of Eastern, not Western, lore; and, secondly, it is highly unlikely 
that the imagination of someone as prosaic as Browne would have created such a fantastical 
succession of events. Browne had many eminent qualities, but as I have demonstrated his 
skills lay in the areas of description and faithful translation of what he saw and what he 
read, not in embellishment. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the originator of the 
tale was in fact the Persian philosopher and that the verity of the representation was both   100
enabled and restricted by Browne’s own level of understanding. If the East represents itself 
in this way, it follows that someone with an obvious affinity for the East may well do so in 
like manner. Such writing cannot necessarily be termed “orientalist” and, indeed, only 
becomes romantic or exotic when viewed from a Western perspective. It is part of an 
incontrovertible arrogance on the part of the West—and, ironically, it is impossible not to 
include Said in this category—that assumes the totality of the Western point of view. 
Interestingly, in a note on the representations of the Orient as an “exotic locale”, Said 
himself admits that it is a “too-little-investigated subject” (n.8, Orientalism, 336). This 
returns us to Rodinson’s argument with regard to the diversity of world visions between 
different cultures discussed earlier. 
  
But there are additional extenuating factors which save the relating of this particular 
incident from accusations of gratuitous romanticism. The first is that the story-teller or 
“informant” as Browne calls him is named in the text as one “Amínu’sh-Sharí‘at,  who 
came to Teherán in the company of his friend and patron, the Banánu’l-Mulk, one of the 
chief ministers of the Zillu’s-Sultán” (161). This gives credibility to the account and renders 
it directly experiential in comparison to, say, a tale or yarn. As well, the ending of the 
philosopher’s story is plausible, with a return to reality, lacking the dramatic moral 
sequestered in the dismembering of the lover’s thumbs and toes in “The Reeves’ Tale”. 
  
Before entering into a more general discussion of this text, this is an appropriate juncture to 
discuss Browne’s motives for visiting Persia in the first place, since the notion of ‘motive’ 
is so closely connected with the question of underlying agendas that ranks so highly in 
Orientalism.   101
  
Denis MacEion is of the opinion that the primary reason for Browne’s visit to Persia was 
“above all” one of pilgrimage. To substantiate this claim, he cites Said’s assertion that    “. . 
.  from one end of the nineteenth century to the other . . .  the Orient was a place of 
pilgrimage, and every major work belonging to a genuine if not always to an academic 
Orientalism took its form, style and intention from the idea of pilgrimage there” (A Year 
Amongst the Persians, xi). While I agree that this line of reasoning has considerable merit 
when one considers Browne’s efforts to visit the birthplace of the Báb, his meetings and 
conversations with the Baha’i, and the subsequent scholarship that arose out of these 
beginnings, I believe this rationale for Browne’s trip is too retrospective, deduced from a 
late twentieth-century, post-Saidian viewpoint, and does not arise from within the spirit of 
Browne’s own era and orientation. 
  
Accordingly, as banal as such a notion may seem, I suggest that although the original 
motivating factor behind Browne’s overt enthusiasm to visit Persia may well have grown 
from childhood nostalgia, that it was the culmination of a number of circumstances that 
enabled the trip, key among them the chance to perfect the language in which he had 
invested so much time and effort.
62  
  
And yet there remains a conundrum: Why did Browne never return to the East? If his 
devotion to the Persian people was as whole-hearted and genuine as it appeared to be, and 
since he continued to support the Persian cause to the point of his own exhaustion in his 
later life, why did he never return to the Persia for which he professed such a deep love?  
MacEion expresses this enigma thus, “Yet it must remain a puzzle that Browne never again   102
set foot in Iran nor, apart from his journey to Cyprus and Palestine in 1890, revisited the 
Islamic East. No explanation of this curious fact has ever, to my knowledge been put 
forward, nor do I think any likely to be” (xiii). Why did not Browne return? Finance was not 
an issue and, quite apart from his own obsession with the Persian culture, it is clear that not 
only was he highly respected in Persia, but also that he had many friends in that country. 
  
Because there is no way of knowing for sure, I am going to assume that there are a number 
of different reasons behind what appears at first to be a paradox. Firstly, there is MacEion’s 
insight that Browne’s “European sensibilities” were often shocked by what he saw and 
experienced in the East (viii). For example, there are moments in the text when he quite 
openly expresses surprise or shock, as on this occasion: “Our third day’s march took us 
through . . . the village of Demirjí-súyú, on emerging from which we were confronted and 
stopped by two most evil-looking individuals armed to the teeth with pistols and daggers. 
My first idea was that they were robbers . . . ” (29). This is a passage representative of many 
instances in the text that spell out situations that many young and inexperienced travellers 
come across in one form or another: being overcharged or ‘tricked’, enduring hard or less-
than-clean beds or unusual foodstuffs. But although he had read widely, it is important to 
realize that aside from his brief sojourn in Turkey, Browne had never set foot outside the 
confines of Victorian England at the time of his Persian travel. The Persian culture of its day 
cannot have been more different from English ways and customs and may just have 
presented a surfeit of ‘adventure’ for this not particularly adventurous Orientalist.  
  
Another part of the answer to this paradox may lie in the closing phrase of Browne’s book, 
namely the reference to “toil and fatigue”. Browne was not a man who would ordinarily   103
give recognition to “toil and fatigue”, in terms of fact, word or sentiment. The boundless 
energy for which he is noted is contradicted by this concluding phrase that suggests that his 
year away left him oddly drained. But, significantly, it is with this somewhat negative 
sentiment that he chooses to end his lengthy narrative. When one considers the enormity of 
his feeling for the Persians, which resulted in the rest of a lifetime spent fighting his own 
countrymen on their behalf, the disjuncture between these words and Browne’s energetic 
character becomes all the more marked.  
  
Accordingly, I suggest that implicit in the phrase “toil and fatigue” is that it was the act of 
travel itself that was hard work for Browne, a labour of an incompatible and thus stressful 
nature. Travel for travel’s sake—for the sake of seeing sights—fatigued him a great deal 
more than striking up a conversation with a total stranger in one of any number of the 
foreign languages with which he was familiar. Thus the word “fatigue” would appear to 
reflect this state of mind, a reflective judgement on the travel component of the year he 
spent away. In other words, Browne’s empathy was directed towards the people, and not the 
country itself. Of particular consequence in this respect is the title Browne chose for this 
work, A Year Amongst the Persians and not, for example, A Year in Persia. The subtitle 
elucidates further: Impressions as to the life, character, and thought of the people of Persia. 
It was not Persia that Browne fell in love with; it was the people of that country. He was 
neither a traveller of the ilk of Richard Burton nor a statesman like Curzon. Thus it is my 
contention that it was the act of travelling itself that Browne found particularly wearying, 
and it was this that contributed to the rationale that lay behind his lack of desire to return to 
Persia or to anywhere else for that matter for other than a short visit.
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‘travel’ between Firwood House and Cambridge University suited him well for the major 
part of his adult life.  
  
To unpack the remainder of an answer to this contradiction—that of Browne’s work on 
behalf of the Persians alongside his failure to return to that country—I need to refer once 
again to a diary entry in A Year Amongst the Persians. There is a moment in Browne’s book 
when the decision to leave Persia is uncertain. “I had now no excuse for prolonging my stay 
at Kirmán; yet still I could not summon up resolution to leave it. It seemed as though my 
whole mental horizon had been altered by the atmosphere of mysticism and opium smoke 
which surrounded me. I had almost ceased to think in English, and nothing seemed so good 
in my eyes as to continue the dreamy speculative existence which I was leading, with opium 
for my solace and dervishes for my friends” (583). 
  
I think it is apparent from this passage that it was not indecision, as such, that gripped 
Browne at this time so much as a reluctance to make any decision at all. It is also plain that 
at this point, Browne was not travelling, he was in a stationary mode surrounded by people 
with whom he felt a great deal of compatibility. I suggest that the contentment he felt in this 
“space of life spent among a people and their ideas” was never in doubt; it was the travel 
component that distressed him (MacEion, ix). So happily ensconced was he within Kirmán 
society and so dependent was he on his opium pipe, it is pertinent to ask whether Browne 
might have lived happily amongst the Persians for the rest of his life.
  
  
In fact, it is interesting to speculate on what Browne’s life might have been had he not left 
Persia when he did. The West would have lost a passionate Cambridge academic, an   105
accomplished writer and translator, a devoted husband and father; the East would have lost 
a valuable political activist who spent a large proportion of his life campaigning against 
western interference in Persian affairs. Had he stayed would he have written differently: a 
book of the ilk of Leonard Woolf’s The Village in the Jungle, perhaps? Or, despite the 
heavy silence in his texts on the female sex, would he have married a Persian woman? Or 
would an increasing narcotic addiction have claimed him entirely? One can only surmise, 
but I suggest that although the narcotic haze in which he lived was pleasing to him at the 
time, once clear of it he was intelligent enough to realize its dangers. To realize, too, that he 
had left little in Persia to which to return. He had left no specific love interest behind. He 
had no prospects of employment within Persia. Admittedly while he had friends there, he 
had Persian friends in England as well. Moreover, he had already established Cambridge as 
his comfort zone. On his return, it provided both social and professional solidarity: a 
nucleus of identity he was never to leave, a rootedness clearly shown in the closing 
paragraph of his book which yields no sense of ambivalence, no desire to return. The 
experience for Browne was complete.  
    
Thus another part of the answer, I believe, to the apparent paradox that presents itself 
between Browne’s unquestionable feeling for Persia and the Persians and his failure to 
return to that country lies in the clear and unchallenged sense he possessed of his own 
identity. Further, and most importantly for my thesis, I claim that this sense of identity was 
linked more strongly to his profession than his nationality. Despite parental opposition, he 
had set out on a path—albeit almost by default—that was to lead him to become an 
Orientalist in the best descriptive sense of the term. His affinity for languages led him to   106
study, teach, research, write and translate across a number of Middle Eastern languages, 
chiefly Persian but Arabic and Turkish as well.  
  
Although his visit to Persia was coincidental with the zenith of imperialism with all the 
implications of hegemony, domination and indoctrination that word suggests, I would be 
surprised if Browne, as intellectual as he undoubtedly was, ever really thought in terms of 
empire. His rigorous mind was filled to the brim with poetry and with a love of language; he 
was too keen on the intense debate surrounding religion, too intent on researching the 
history of the Baha’i to be concerned with the dialectic of imperialism. One has only to 
compare A Year Amongst the Persians with Curzon’s Persia and the Persian Question to 
see the truth in this.
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Accordingly, Browne could accept the label “The Persian” without losing any of his 
Englishness in the process precisely because there was little incentive to physically return to 
Persia. But in this, there is a poignant irony. Although there is no doubt that he did more for 
the people of Persia from outside their country than he ever could have done from within, in 
terms of  Said’s “orientalist” argument, by his later “interference” in Persian affairs, he 
excludes and displaces the Persians in their own country. This is an issue deserving of fuller 
discussion towards the end of this chapter. 
  
Turning now to a more detailed discussion of A Year Amongst the Persians, I think it is 
important to note that Browne’s book was in advance of its time both in its lack of genre 
boundaries and its composite nature and a very different text from Persia and the Persian 
Question published the year before.
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as a travel book, even though it describes a journey, nor can it be called an autobiography 
even though it contains autobiographical detail. Neither is it a history even though it 
contains a great deal of historical information about the origins of the Baha’i faith, nor is it a 
religious text, although a large proportion of the text is devoted to religious debate.  
  
Aside from the “introductory” setting out the series of events that led to the realization of an 
adolescent ambition, the work is inserted neatly enough between the events that mark the 
start of Browne’s journey and his subsequent return to England. Central to the story and 
occupying a significant proportion of the book is his quest to visit the home of the Bábís, his 
endeavours to learn as much as possible about the faith, and the episodes that befall him as a 
consequence. Throughout the book are scattered details of conversations or debates on 
metaphysics, religion and mysticism that give some idea of the direction young Browne was 
destined to follow. At the head of each chapter—most of which describe another staging of 
his journey—there is an epigraph. Most often these take the form of quotations excerpted 
from the work of one or more of Browne’s beloved Persian poets or writers, although 
occasionally an epigraph pertinent to the particular chapter and taken from English or 
French literature replaces the Persian. Scattered throughout the book are tracts of Persian 
proverbs or verses where the Persian is set down first followed by the English translation in 
parenthesis.  
  
Since part of my analysis here concerns Said’s notion of “exteriority”, a notion in 
“orientalist” discourse concerning itself more with what lies on the text’s surface than with 
what is hidden, the privileging of the Persian language over the English calls for further 
examination. It not only illustrates a moot issue concerning the difficulties of working   108
within the parameters Said has set, but also provides further evidence for the claim that  
traditional Orientalism and “imperialism” are not interchangeable.
66 Thus while it would be 
natural to assume that the motive in what was obviously a deliberate act on the part of the 
writer in placing the Persian ahead of the English translation was to honour the Persian 
origin in an English-language text, within the discourse of “orientalism” the fact that the 
Persian exists at all beside the English translation becomes questionable because this then 
becomes a device for “mak[ing] the Orient visible, clear, ‘there’” (Orientalism, 22). One 
can acknowledge that both parts of this double bind have merit. In other words, while it is 
clearly an honour to be placed first on the one hand, it is equally obvious that this placement 
then becomes a Western representation of the Orient which constitutes an “orientalist” 
action on the other. But the real problematic of this discourse emerges in a hypothetical 
situation where the placement of the languages is transposed. If the English were placed 
ahead of the Persian, or if there were no translation at all, it could be argued that this is still 
an “orientalist” action of displacement and arrogance. 
  
From a comparison of passages from selected texts of Curzon and Browne, it becomes 
obvious that both of Curzon’s texts from I am about to quote have a totally different aim 
and agency from A Year Amongst the Persians.
67 Witness Curzon’s blatantly imperialistic 
preoccupation, his gamesmanship and declaration of hegemonic intent in the following 
sentences: “Turkestan, Afghanistan, Transcaspia, Persia—to many these names breathe only 
a sense of utter remoteness or a memory of strange vicissitudes and of moribund romance. 
To me, I confess, they are the pieces of a chessboard upon which is being played out a game 
for the dominion of the world” (Quoted from MacEion, ix). Similarly not only the language 
and content, but also the tone of the following dedication from Problems of the Far East   109
published two years later, once again display an unquestionable ‘overriding’ of the Orient: 
“To those who believe that the British Empire is, under providence, the greatest instrument 
for good that the world has seen and who hold, with the writer, that its work in the Far East 
is not yet accomplished this book is inscribed” (vii).
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It is words—and work—like this that gave rise to Said’s “product of rage” and make that 
rage justifiable.
69 But, ironically, it is also the existence of works of this nature juxtaposed 
with the books of such Orientalists as Edward G. Browne and Leonard Woolf that 
underscore the inaccuracies within Said’s catholic approach. To prove that Curzon is an 
imperialist underscores only what we already know: namely, that imperialism existed. To 
prove that there were Orientalists who lived and worked without the hegemonic desires 
declared synonymous with imperialistic practice disproves Said’s argument only because 
the Saidian thesis is all-embracing. Indeed to prove that only one Orientalist existed without 
this fundamental desire to promote imperial domination damages Said’s theory. The 
generalizing nature of his discourse permits few exceptions.  
  
This returns me to a discussion of Browne’s dedication, an exordium that like Curzon’s 
prefaces the work. But here the similarities end as, characteristically, Browne’s dedication is 
directed at “the Persian reader only” and commences with lines and phrases from the 
Kur’án in English translation. An excerpt from the exordium suggests a reason for 
Browne’s visit and in doing so states an epistemological incentive for his trip: 
. . . and how in pursuit of knowledge   I had forgone the calm seclusion of 
college,   and through days warm and weary,   and nights dark and dreary,    
now hungry and now athirst   I had tasted of the best and of the worst . . . 
until I had made an end of toil,   and set my foot upon my native soil;  then, 
wishful to impart the gain   which I had won with labour and harvested with 
pain (for “Travel is travail” say the sages
70),    I resolved to write these   110
pages,   and, taking ink and pen,   to impart to my fellow-men   what I had 
witnessed and understood    of things evil and good. 
71 
 
A close reading of the textual “surface” of this excerpt provides evidence of an extremely 
convoluted treatment. This was no dedication written on the spur of the moment, but a 
carefully crafted piece of writing. For a start, it is composed of rhyming couplets of a 
somewhat uneven rhythm, almost as though it was composed mentally while Browne was 
riding a horse with a game leg. But these couplets not only suggest the somewhat uneven 
rhythm of the time Browne spent in Persia, but also serve to underscore the binary nature of 
the content. In highlighting opposing forces—day/night, best/worst, gain/pain, evil/good—I 
suggest that Browne is describing the ambivalence with which he looks back on the year he 
spent away. Ostensibly, the disparity between Curzon’s texts and that of Browne is 
unquestionable.  
  
However, two contradictory points interest me here. Firstly, Browne’s choice of the term 
“exordium” to introduce this text suggests that this term was chosen specifically to preface a 
work designed or constructed to largely consist of argument. Thus, it could be said that this 
is a book of argumentation as much as it is a book about travel. Since implicit in argument 
is a requirement for two persons or more, this is probably one of the clearest signs that this 
work is couched in a dialogic mode. If indeed this use of the dialogic illuminates Browne’s 
unambiguous self-reflexivity, it also answers in the positive a question posed towards the 
beginning of this chapter as to whether Browne allows the Orientals to speak for 
themselves. Throughout his texts, they are given a voice and that voice is privileged more 
often than not over Browne’s. If, for Edward Said, this demonstration of self-reflexivity is 
enough to exonerate the writer from charges of “orientalist” depiction of the East, it might 
seem as though Browne—despite his obvious idealism and passionate enthusiasm for a   111
culture not his own—is vindicated. But, secondly, the complexity of the construction in the 
passage above is diametrically at odds with the apparent innocence of the content. And so 
the question must be asked: to what “gain” is Browne referring? If, by use of this 
deconstructive technique, I were to make the assumption that the “gain” is the acquisition of 
knowledge of Persia that he wishes to pass on to his ‘fellow’ Englishmen, could this despite 
all ostensible evidence to the contrary be termed an “orientalist” text? 
  
Since it is too early to reach a conclusion of this nature, I move forward to the first chapter. 
Here the ambiguity of purpose mentioned earlier is again evident at the start of the narrative 
where the opening sentence—“So at last I was really to go to Persia”—is written in a tone 
of barely-contained excitement, unequivocal and forward-looking, a disbelief made real. 
But it is the juxtaposition of the following sentence which gives rise to the ambiguity. 
Directly above these ebullient words, the epigraph suggests a contrasting uncertainty in 
style, content and tone:  
      And I know not, when bound for the land of my quest, if my portion shall be 
      The good which I hope for and seek, or the evil that seeketh for me. 
                                                                                        (Al- Muthakkibu’l-‘Abdi)
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It is not until the reader arrives at the end of this lengthy narrative that a balance is achieved 
between the sense of reservation this opening quotation foregrounds and the tidiness and air 
of finality in the final paragraph:  
Thus ended a journey to which, though fraught with fatigues and 
discomforts, and not wholly free from occasional vexations, I look back 
with almost unmixed satisfaction. For such fatigues and discomforts (and 
they were far fewer than might reasonably have been expected) I was amply 
compensated by an enlarged knowledge and experience, and a rich store of 
pleasant memories, which would have been cheaply purchased even at a 
higher price. For without toil and fatigue can nothing be accomplished, 
even as an Arab poet has said:— 
 
Wa man talaba’l-‘ulá min ghayri kaddin   112
Adá‘a’l-‘umra fí talabi’l-muháli.  
 
And he who hopes to scale the heights without enduring pain, 
And toil and strife, but wastes his life in idle quest and vain. (635) 
 
The tone in final piece of text, rising and falling in congruence with the words it 
accompanies, projects in turn messages of relief, disillusionment, weariness, and of a 
satisfaction just out of reach. It provides closure to the feelings of doubt or uncertainty that 
introduced the first chapter and stands in stark contrast to excitement and anticipation in his 
first sentence. 
  
From the analysis so far, it should by now be clear that this is no guidebook, but more 
significantly, it should also be evident that neither is this a book of romantic or exotic 
insights about the East. The Persia of exotic scenes, harems and captive women was 
certainly not Browne’s Persia, for his was a Persia of people: of muleteers and wayfarers, of 
hosts (both British and Persian), of dervishes, of the differences in the peoples he meets 
(Turkish, Armenian and Persian), of gatherings of wine and music, and of the long days and 
nights of theological discussion that so delighted him.
73  
  
Since any discussion of textual representation is incomplete without an exploration of 
viewpoint and perspective, I come now to a discussion about the approach Browne decided 
to take with this book. In this respect, there is no question that matters of structure and style 
loomed large in his decision on how best to manage this text. Presented as it is in the first 
person with characters and events unfolding page by page, it is told in diary form and it is 
this treatment that achieves the type of immediacy and lack of division between reader and 
writer that has a correspondence in journal writing. It would also, however, suggest copious 
and detailed notes written by Browne at each day’s end.
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work of this nature could be considered obtrusive, it is a measure of the attention that 
Browne gave to the text that the choice of viewpoint was not a decision he took lightly. In 
the “introductory” that sets the scene for this account of the year he spent away from his 
homeland, Browne discusses this dilemma: “I have not arrived at this decision [the 
inclusion of an “introductory”] without some hesitation and misgiving, for I do not wish to 
obtrude myself unnecessarily on the attention of my readers, and one can hardly be 
autobiographical without running the risk of being egotistical. . . . It is too late now to turn 
squeamish about the use of the pronoun of the first person. I will be as sparing of its use as I 
can, but use it I must” (1).
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Perhaps the only barrier to an immediate empathy with this work for twenty-first-century 
readers is the quaint but rather antiquated language Browne uses in such phrases as “for I 
had long determined to go” or “ere I set foot in the town”, but this somewhat antiquated 
form of expression is eventually neutralized or diluted by the diarized style of the book. At 
the same time, while Amanat refers to this as Browne’s “intimate style of writing”, I am 
pressed to find anything “intimate” in it. Instead I find it somewhat theatrical and archaic, a 
style that cannot be entirely attributed to the era in which the book was written since it 
sounds dated even beside the books of his peers. I suggest that if intimacy had indeed been 
what Browne had intended that it has the opposite effect of, at least initially, distancing the 
reader. 
  
Contemporary reviews capture his political orientation at the beginning and end of his adult 
life and are as enlightening as to the interests of the British public as they are to the content 
and orientation of A Year Amongst the Persians. For example, The Athenaeum (January 20,   114
1894) published a lengthy and somewhat gushing critique which praises both Browne and 
the book alternately and in equal measure. Of most interest, however, is the final paragraph 
that ostensibly presents a picture of an apolitical Browne but which nevertheless, I suggest, 
hints at a latent political agenda: “. . . if one expects to find in this book any new 
developments of Russian intrigue or stagecraft, or any specimens of political gossip . . . he 
or she will be grievously disappointed. It eschews politics as its writer eschewed the society 
of Europeans generally, and of those native government officials whose business is rather 
the mysticism of diplomacy than that of Omar Khayyam and Hafiz”.
76  In the figure of the 
young Browne, at least, there was no hint of imperialist agenda and no doubt of his empathy 
for the people of Persia. Thus, insofar as his motives were not those of dominion or power, I 
repeat that Browne’s Orientalism was not that of Said.  
  
But to be too certain of Browne’s innocence in this regard risks falling into the trap of 
simplifying a situation that is intrinsically complex. Witness a review of a reprint of the 
same book over thirty years later that focuses almost entirely on Browne’s political 
disposition. Using the release of the 1926 edition of A Year Amongst the Persians as an 
unconcealed excuse to devote almost the entire review to Browne’s political involvement in 
Persia, The Times Literary Supplement ends thus: “Persia was unquestionably his spiritual 
home, and therefore in all things the Persians were necessarily right and the others including 
his own country, necessarily wrong. His boundless admiration for the Persians went so far 
to distort his judgement that when the supreme moment came in 1914 he was among those 
who protested against England taking up the Kaiser’s challenge . . .” (December 16, 1926). 
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Consequently, it is not accurate to assert that Browne’s Orientalism and Said’s 
“orientalism” are contradictory concepts because at a certain juncture there is a collision 
between the two descriptions that forms an inescapable fusion. In spite of Browne’s 
indubitable love for and efforts on behalf of the Persians, despite his attempts to allow—or 
further, encourage—the Persians to represent themselves, despite the reflexivity that he 
brings to his texts, it is unarguable that he still draws a picture of Persia for Western 
consumption. Despite all the positive statements one can make about Browne—and there 
are many—he is still “writing the Orient” and in so doing—based on the argumentation of 
Edward Said—it would appear that scholars like Abbas Amanat are not correct and that 
Browne is, after all, an “orientalist”. 
 
The political Browne 
But before I finally concede this point, I would like to look further at his political career. 
Although, as I mentioned earlier, Browne and his books attracted very little contemporary 
attention, the furore that erupted over his contribution to the Persian cause was an 
exception.
77  While Browne fuelled the fire by bombarding his colleagues, the press, the 
Foreign Office and Sir Edward Grey with letters, as much as he sent out, he received in 
reply, and meticulously labeled and filed.
78  
  
Following the release of his major political work, The Persian Revolution, the press—both 
in Britain and overseas—responded by devoting considerable space to correspondence and 
reviews, some of which were favourable, others openly critical and scornful. This was the 
text that interrupted his work and delayed the appearance of the third volume of his major 
four-volume Literary History, but it was an account of events that in Browne’s view    116
 
demanded to be written. Although correspondence to Browne following the first publication 
of this book in 1910 lists some of the inaccuracies it contained, consideration must be given 
to the fact that it was written under some duress. But significantly, some of these letters and 
reviews illuminate foreign sentiment towards Orientalists in general and Browne in 
particular. In this respect, an interesting juxtaposition of opinion on Browne’s involvement 
is provided between the following excerpt from the Persian daily newspaper Iran-i Nou and 
a review which appeared in The Times of London two weeks later.
79   
  
Iran-i Nou  concluded the last of its series of installments of The Persian Revolution with 
the following statement:  
 
[W]e too end our articles on Professor Browne’s history of the Iranian 
revolution and express our affectionate gratitude to that renowned 
orientalist for composing and publishing such honest [record] of the 
struggles of an unfortunate, oppressed nation . . . particularly at a time when 
the [notorious] David Fraser, former correspondent of The Times in Tehran, 
has written and published a book in defense of [the forces of] reaction and 
the Russian actions in Iran[--] entirely omitting references to the 
circumstances [i.e. origins and motives] of the Iranian revolution[and 
thereby] poisoning public opinion. We are hopeful that [Professor 
Browne’s] history of the Iranian revolution will be shortly translated into 
Persian . . . (December 24, 1910)
80 
  
In reply, The Times launched a line of attack on Browne which would have sounded more 
natural emanating from the text of Edward Said than from one of Browne’s own 
countrymen. The Times claimed: “Professor Browne has a case to prove. He has ardent 
sympathies, a vivid imagination and little practical experience of politics. Persia to him is an 
idealized land, which he sees transfigured by the roseate memories of a single journey made  
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a couple of decades ago . . .  He is saturated by a love of Persian literature, history and 
traditions” (January 5, 1911).
81 
  
However, knowledge of this newspaper’s arch-conservatism and the fact that Browne was at 
that time a founding member of the newly formed Left Opposition to England’s Liberal 
Party provides an understanding of part of the reason for The Times’ rather mocking 
perspective. Further, the David Fraser referred to in Iran-i Nou’s statement (above) was not 
only a former correspondent of The Times’ Tehran bureau, but he had also just published a 
book on Iran, titled Persia and Turkey in Revolt, which was being reviewed jointly with 
Browne’s in the complete version of the extract above. It is important not to overlook the 
fact that far from epitomising the conservative scholar, to the contrary, Browne was noted 
for being outspoken and on no topic was he more so than on the subject of England’s 
interference in Persian government.  
  
It was precisely because The Times was also pro-Foreign Office, that it more often than not 
received the brunt of his bitterness; in the words of the newspaper “ . . . we should be sorry 
to have to compute how often The Times receives his zealous castigation. Rarely has there 
been a more violent example of the professor in politics” (Bonakdarian, LIV). The “violent” 
professor’s “zealous castigation” took the form of letters of this nature printed in The Times 
of September 9, 1909:  
 
. . . need you refuse to recognize the fact that Persia . . . is, after all, capable 
of inspiring that ultimate and unswerving affection which Italy inspired in 
this country in the middle of the last century, and that there are Englishmen 
who regard Taghizada and Sattar Khan somewhat as their fathers regarded 
Mazzini and Garibaldi? And to suggest, as you suggest, that because these 
men hail from Azarbaijan, and . . . Persia they should not be credited with 
their merits, seems to me hardly fairer than the contention one sometimes    118
 
hears that literary talent in England is always associated with Celtic blood, 
or that the leaders of English enterprise are invariably either Scotchmen or 
Jews.
82 
  
While this hardly resembles a “racist” letter, it does expose a disposition to idealism on 
Browne’s part that I have not yet fully addressed, but which has been hinted at by Amanat 
and in some of the reviews from which I have quoted. For instance, in an excerpt from the 
foreword to the 1995 edition of The Persian Revolution, editor Amanat states: “What 
Browne primarily intended to achieve in his book was to allow the voice of the Persian 
people to be heard by his Western audience” (X). However, a little later, he continues: “The 
Persian Revolution was more than a simple record of a revolution, for it influenced the very 
course of events it covered in its pages. Few historians, even those who covered revolutions 
of their own time, afforded, or perhaps wished to afford, such a vantage point . . .” (XII).
83 
 
I would like to examine these two statements alongside each other. On the one hand, 
Browne can be commended for allowing the Persians to be heard, but on the other, if indeed 
his work was so powerful that it influenced the course of the revolution, he was doing more 
than simply giving the Persians a voice in the West.
84 In The Persian Revolution, his was 
the voice purporting to represent “a nation wronged by the abuses of its own government 
and wakened by foreign encroachments” (Amanat, XI). Whatever Browne’s agenda here, 
does not this constitute an open involvement in the affairs of another nation, the very 
interference that Said so condemns, the quintessence of “orientalist” control? There is no 
doubt that Browne was in the grip of a vision for Persia so strong that he was prepared to  
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fight his own government in helping the Persians attain their ideal. But was this “ideal” 
actually “Persia’s ideal” or Browne’s ideal? 
 
Before attempting to answer these questions, one other example of the lengths to which 
Browne was prepared to go in his efforts to shape the Persian Constitution further 
illuminates his idealistic nature. In A Year Amongst the Persians, for example, his attitude 
towards Islam is somewhat ambiguous. He relishes the theological discussions within the 
predominantly Moslem community on an intellectual level, but it is clear that his feelings 
and emotions lie away from mainstream Islam in derivatives of the faith like Bábísm and 
Sufíism. While Browne himself claimed a “Pantheistic idealism” and delighted in all forms 
of philosophical, metaphysical or theological discussion and debate across a number of 
faiths including Sufiism, there is no doubt that his sympathies lay with the Baha’is.
85 
However, in The Persian Revolution, because Browne is making political capital out of the 
rising Pan-Islamic sentiment in the Muslim world as well as the greater understanding of 
Islam in the West mentioned earlier, he whitewashes all signs of religious turmoil. His zeal 
to promote the Constitution is such that when he needs a figurehead to act as a “selfless 
champion whose aim was to unite the Muslim world against despotism and foreign 
aggression” (Amanat, XIX), he not only overlooks the apostasy of the Shi’ite turned Sunni 
Sayyid Jamal al-Din, but praises him highly as the man to whom the Constitutional 
Movement in Persia “in large measure owes its inception” (The Persian Revolution, 30). 
This admiration for al-Din shows Browne’s deliberate avoidance of the fact that the founder 
of the Baha’i faith, his own hero, the Báb, was murdered by Shi’ite Moslems.
86 It also 
necessitates his disregard of “the Babi background of some major constitutionalists”, which 
must have been particularly difficult as he happened to be working on a Baha’i historical   120
text concurrently. Although obviously Browne’s sense of political expediency overrode any 
qualms he may have had in these respects, the point I want to make here that his obsessive 
desire for Persian self-rule triumphed over his intrinsic honesty and openness. Is this the 
point at which Said’s notions of “objective structure” and “subjective restructure” coincide? 
I have already discussed how easily Browne wears the title “The Persian”, but this 
observation demands an answer to the question posed earlier: Was Persia’s “ideal” 
seamlessly concomitant with that of Browne? Was Browne Persia? 
 
Yes and no. Again the answer is not as simple as it might first appear. It further needs to be 
taken into account that Browne was a passionate proponent of self-determination. He would 
hardly have thrown himself behind his wife’s nationalist endeavours had he believed in the 
intrinsic right of self-rule.
 87  He felt even more strongly that an “awakening” Persia should 
be in control of its own destiny and feared that the country would fall under the dominion of 
one of its imperial neighbours. One only has to read the preface to The Persian Revolution 
to observe the depth and intensity of Browne’s fears in this regard. Like Leonard Woolf 
after him, he vehemently rejected “what was then a common defense of colonial 
domination—that the so-called ‘backward’ countries should be ‘developed’ on a European 
model of material progress” (Amanat, XVIII). 
 
As I have claimed all along, Browne was no imperialist. That much is clear and it makes it 
difficult to disagree with Amanat’s summary in the following passage: “Browne’s liberal 
views in defense of Iran and its revolution, in open defiance of the prevailing imperialism of 
his time, are essentially at variance with the negative stereotype of orientalism developed in 
our time by such critics as Edward Said. The often indiscriminate condemnation of the   121
orientalists, and therefore of their scholarship, has cast upon them a shadow of imperialist 
partisanship, undue romantic exoticism, and even simple mischief which diametrically 
differs from Browne’s vision and his undertaking” (X). 
 
All this is so, but it tends to smother a surfacing issue. If it can be said that Browne 
identifies too closely with the Persians, to what extent, then, does he write Persia and its 
problems, not only for the West, but for Persia itself? Of The Persian Revolution, a review 
in the Spectator (November 5, 1910) asserts: “Probably in Persia itself nothing so full of 
instruction could be written, for much that is said here could not be safely said there; and, 
further, Professor Browne, who has correspondents in every part of Persia, has, we suppose 
more threads of information in his hands than any Persian. . . .  Professor Browne is a 
Persian, as other men are Hellenists; his reverence for Persian literature and art makes him 
perhaps suspect conspiracies against Persia which do not exist . . .” (Bonakdarian, LIII). 
  
It becomes obvious that while Browne may not suffer from an “undue romantic exoticism” 
that he is clearly an idealist in regard to Persia. That this idealism is used to present an 
aspect of Persia to the West is undeniable. When Browne’s discourse is examined within the 
context of the dominant discourse, it is clear that his relationship with the East is dreamy 
and romantic and that out of this romanticism—albeit a different romanticism from that of 
Gallard—arises a paternalistic emotion for Persia.  
 
If this paternal role is powerful enough to influence the affairs of a nation—albeit for that 
nation’s ‘good’—this then is the epitome of “orientalist” manipulation in that it constitutes 
foreign intervention.
88 A Persia thus ‘saved’ becomes Browne’s Persia; Browne displaces 
the Persians in their own country by becoming—as Arberry (and others) label him—“The   122
Persian”. This is the theoretical positioning that makes it unfeasible to refute Said’s 
contention that it was impossible for a European to have anything to do with the Orient 
without both knowledge and power entering the equation.  
  
Accordingly, paradoxically, one can be in complete accord with a defence of Browne such 
as that of Amanat, but it is not possible to escape the fact that the tightly-knit boundaries of 
Said’s discourse make it unworkable for Browne or anyone else with a “vision” beyond 
their own nation—and the contacts and influence to make a difference to that nation—to be 
other than “orientalist”.  
  
While Browne indubitably examined both his own methodology and approach with regard 
to the writing of A Year Amongst the Persians and while this book also provides constant 
evidence of a high degree of reflexivity and self-examination, in his passion for ensuring 
that the Persians get a fair Constitution, Browne falls into a doctrinal mode every bit as 
dogmatic as that of de Sacy. As an Englishman who lived during the years that constituted 
the very apogee of Britain’s empire, Browne was also someone who was, certainly in his 
later years, rich, influential and politically-centric. There is no doubt he used these 
opportunities to assist in “dominating” and “re-structuring” a country that is both 
geographically and ideologically central to the Orient. It does not matter that he acted in 
“open defiance of the prevailing imperialism of his time”, that he spent his life resisting 
racism, or that he was unswerving in his purpose so far as defending Persia was concerned, 
Browne’s interference in Persian affairs of state renders him “orientalist” under the terms of 
the postcolonial framework under examination here. Even the obvious reverence with which 
the Persians still speak of him—epitomized by the street in Tehran that continues to bear his   123
name—does not alter the fact that within the parameters of postcolonial discourse, Browne 
cannot avoid being typecast as “orientalist”. Perhaps the headline from The Times Literary 
Supplement review— “Dreamer in a Land of Dreamers”—says it all (December 16, 1926).  
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Notes 
                                                 
 
1 From the introduction to the “new edition” of The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909, ed. Abbas Amanat 
(Washington DC: Mage Publishers, 1995), X. 
2 Dated January 5, 1911 and cited here from Bonakdarian, “Selected Correspondence of E. G. Browne and 
Contemporary Reviews of The Persian Revolution 1905-1909”,  LIV, in the 1995 edition of The Persian 
Revolution. 
3 See my discussion of Thomas B. Macaulay later in this chapter. Or for a detailed account of the collapse of 
the British Orientalist movement during Governor-General Bentinck’s administration, see Kopf, British 
Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance: The Dynamics of Indian Modernisation, 1773-1835 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1969). Quoted here from “Hermeneutics versus History”, Orientalism: A 
Reader, ed. A. L. Macfie (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 205-6. 
4 Patrick Browne’s full quotation appears in the foreword to the 1984 edition of A Year Amongst the Persians 
(London: Century Publishing  and New York: Hippocrene Books): “Until a few years ago, he was still 
remembered and beloved in Persia. There used to be a street in Tehran named after him, and his statue there is 
said to have been the only statue of a European which was spared during the rule of Dr Mossadeg”  (vi). 
5 My thanks to Shahram Sharafi for this information and for confirming that a street named after Professor 
Edward Browne was still in existence until very recently. I have been unable to verify whether the statue still 
stands. 
6 This edition of Orientalism (London: Penguin Books, 1991). Hereafter cited in the text. 
7 To avoid confusion between the Orientalism of Browne’s day and Said’s “inflationary redefinition” of 
“orientalism”, Trautmann uses the designations Orientalism 1 and Orientalism 2 respectively. I have adopted 
the practice of differentiating between the two meanings by placing the definition of the latter— Said’s 
“orientalism”—in quotation marks. 
8 For a more complete list of works on Browne, see editor Abbas Amanat’s “Notes” in the 1995 edition of 
Browne’s The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 (LVIII).  
9 While this was painstakingly tabulated by Jill Butterworth (librarian at Cambridge University) before her 
retirement in 2001, very little has been done to update the Browne Papers since then. These are badly in need 
of computerisation and cross-referencing to bring the archive into line with the approach taken by Sussex 
University with respect to the Leonard Woolf archive. 
10 For a full-length and balanced account of Browne’s life, I wait with a high degree of anticipation for the 
publication of Dr. John Gurney’s book. 
11 Denis MacEoin’s sketch of the romantic vision the Victorians held of the East is as succinct and accurate as 
any I have read. Significantly, this is uncannily descriptive of the French painter J. L. Gérõme’s painting, “The 
Snake Charmer” reproduced on the cover of the 1991 Penguin edition of Said’s Orientalism.  
12 In this respect, in his “memoir” to the 1950 edition, Browne’s friend of forty years E. Denison Ross 
(London: A. and C. Black) claims: “It is a strange fact that a gift for languages in almost all cases is a gift for a 
particular group or type of languages, and it is quite conceivable that if E. G. B. had not been accidentally 
attracted to the languages of Islám, he would never have taken up linguistic studies at all. . . . He was not 
really interested in languages as such; neither Semitic nor Iranian philology made any appeal to him . . .” (x). 
13  Denison Ross makes a clear distinction between “conversationalist” and “talker” (xvi).  
14 An example of Browne’s incredible energy was his handwritten replies to more than 300 letters of 
condolence he received after the death of his wife. He himself had suffered an immense heart attack the year 
before and was to outlive his wife by only six months. 
15 The controversy that surrounded Browne with regard his efforts to promote and shape the Persian 
Constitution following the release of The Persian Revolution was an exception in this respect. But it was a 
debate that affected only a specific segment of the public for a relatively short period. 
16 While it is true that, outside his Persian experience, Browne appeared to do little that physically called forth 
danger or risk, in terms of the events, undertakings, challenges and campaigns that filled his life, it could be 
considered venturesome enough. 
17 Although “Empire Day was introduced in 1904, and was held on the late Queen’s birthday . . .  the real 
beginning [of empire] . . . is generally acknowledged to be the Great Exhibition of 1851, in which the colonies   125
                                                                                                                                                       
and dominions had their own exhibition spaces to display their own manufactured goods and products”.  From 
Modernism and Empire, eds. Howard J. Booth and Nigel Rigby (Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press, 2000), 11. For more on empire, see John MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire. The 
Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960  (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984). 
18 Just how effective Browne’s own teaching tactics proved can be assessed in the light of this claim by his 
pupil and colleague R. A. Nicholson some thirteen years later: “He would have admitted the value of grammar 
as a necessary discipline for scholars to whom exact linguistic knowledge is either an end in itself or a means 
of promoting philological studies; but his own mastery of three Oriental languages was not gained by those 
methods . . . In his view, to know a language was to possess its literature, and through the literature a key to 
the minds and hearts of men; hence, though he admired profound scholarship . . . he himself really cared for it 
in proportion as it was capable of being used to throw light upon Islamic, and especially Persian, culture and 
civilization”. From A.  J. Arberry, Oriental Essays  (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1960), 192.
  
19 At that time, this was a sect that was regarded as an heretical offshoot of the Islamic faith and, as a 
consequence, severely persecuted. The graphic description of the public execution and subsequent martyrdom 
of the Báb, the young prophet of Shíráz, and the sect’s secretive existence from then on, had an immediate and 
dynamic effect on Browne.  
20 In Browne’s own words:  “. . . gradually pity turned to admiration, and admiration to enthusiasm, until the 
Turks became in my eyes veritable heroes, and the desire to identify with their cause, make my dwelling 
amongst them and unite with them in the defence of their land, possessed me heart and soul” (8). 
21 As Nicholson claims “. . . already we see his whole-hearted sympathy for the Oriental mind and, conversely, 
the fixed point of view from which his judgements on the West were formed and delivered” (Arberry, 167). 
22 In late Victorian England, teachers for Oriental languages were still few and far between and his efforts to 
find tuition for those he found he wished to study make interesting reading and give an idea of his depth of his 
aptitude for language and the commitment to the East that was growing concomitantly. 
23 According to the correspondence in the Browne Papers, Box 12, Cambridge University Library, Browne 
wrote home quite frequently from Turkey during his two months away. In a letter to his mother on September 
7, 1882, he describes his new “friends”, among whom he lists a Sufi, booksellers and prayer-carpet merchants, 
people he found mainly in the bazaars he frequented. Browne divided the people he met into the “new kind” 
and “old kind” of Turk. “The thing is that the good old-fashioned Turks don’t read the papers, and never look 
at a book less than fifty years old—so that they don’t know any thing about passing events. The new kind of 
Turk knows—but doesn’t much care. The papers here write in a very friendly spirit towards England on the 
whole.”
  If Browne found the ‘friendliness’ of the Turks towards England somewhat surprising given the anti-
Turkish sentiment in Britain just four years earlier during the period of the Russian-Turkish war, this could be 
attributed to the “old kind” who “don’t read the papers”. A little more thought, however, dissolves the 
contradiction altogether. The English Royal Family had close ties with Russia at that time. In 1874, Queen 
Victoria’s son, Prince Alfred, had married the Grand Duchess Marie, daughter of Tsar Alexander II. Victoria’s 
granddaughter, Alix, was to become the wife of Russia’s last tsar, Nicholas II.  Thus since the  British 
Establishment had no choice but to be pro-Russian, it follows that the leading newspapers of the day—from 
which Browne would have received his information—would project similar views and thus appear anti-
Turkish in their inevitable support of Russia. But the opposite does not hold. The Turks had no reason to 
dislike the English. 
24 Among the Browne Papers there is a letter from a colleague complaining that he terminated his Arabic 
studies because he could find no one of  “culture” with whom to converse. As a person who practised his 
language skills at every opportunity, one wonders at the impatience and lack of empathy with which Browne 
might have read such a letter. 
25 In an essay entitled “Edward G. Browne’s Turkish Connexion” , Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, 
49 (1986): 25-34, Peter Chelkowski points out that “Browne’s sense of affinity with the Turks endured from 
the time of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-78, when he was only 16, until the end of his life in 1926. In 
1914 he wrote in his introduction to The press and poetry of modern Persia [Cambridge, 1914]: ‘Curiously 
enough it was the Ottoman Turks, a people far less original and talented than either the Persians or the Arabs, 
who so far as the Near East is concerned, introduced the hitherto unknown ideas of “The Fatherland” (watan), 
“the nation” or “people (millat) and “liberty” (hurriyyat) and who succeeded in giving to these old words this 
new and potent significance’” (25).   
26 About this time, too, he met “a very learned but very eccentric old Persian, Mírzá Bákir”, who by dint of 
reading compositions of decidedly unconventional poetry of “grass-eating lions, bears, yellow demons, Gog 
and Magog . . . Hebrew and Arab patriarchs” to Browne over many a long hour helped in this way to correct 
the rather “erroneous and unlovely pronunciation” of Persian Browne had absorbed from his previous tutor   126
                                                                                                                                                       
(13-15). The colourfully drawn ‘characters’ in Mírzá Bákir’s poetry gain relevance in my later discussion of 
similar descriptive writing in the Nights. 
27 See my discussion of the lack of support provided by the British Government to Orientalists later this 
chapter. 
28 Although Browne’s name is more often associated with the Persian language, his knowledge of Arabic and 
Turkish were also excellent. Not only did he hold the Chair of Arabic at Cambridge for over two decades, but 
his written Arabic was indistinguishable from that of a native speaker. A letter from W. A. Smart, written in 
Morocco in 1916, states “ . . .  your letter created quite a sensation among the Ulema of Fez, who were with 
difficulty persuaded that the writer of such pure Arabic could be a Western barbarian”. From the Browne 
Papers, Box 9.   
29 I will examine Woolf at length in the next chapter; it will suffice for the moment to emphasise the 
differences in their awareness of the strategies and effects of British imperialism. 
30 This was one of the ways in which Browne differed from Leonard Woolf. Woolf was, of course, also a 
university graduate but his passions were directed almost solely into his creative and political writings rather 
than scholarship. Browne, however, attracted academic accolades throughout his life. He held the Chair of the 
Sir Thomas Adams’ Professorship of Arabic from 1902 for almost a quarter of a century during a time which, 
according to Professor Inayatulah, was “undoubtedly the most distinguished and exciting in the long history of 
the Sir Thomas Adams’ foundation” (20). From “E. G. Browne: Friend of the Muslim East”, Hamdard 14.1 
(1971): 19-22, 33. In 1903 he was elected a Fellow of the British Academy and in 1922 a Vice-President of 
the Royal Asiatic Society. Nor was his early contribution to medicine ignored. In 1911, he became a Fellow of 
the Royal College of Physicians. Towards the end of his life he was invited to deliver the highly esteemed 
Fitz-Patrick lectures on Arabian Medicine, later published by Cambridge University Press as Arabian 
Medicine and finally translated into a number of different languages, among them French, Persian and Urdu. 
31 The hundreds of letters Browne wrote and received, many of them archived in the Browne Papers, bear 
witness to the extraordinary and unflagging effort he expended on behalf of the Persians. 
32 Although one would have assumed that such a successful marriage would inevitably have taken Browne 
away from his college friends, it would appear that Browne’s energy (and diplomacy!) was such that Firwood 
merely replaced Pembroke as the meeting ground. Although the fact that the tributes and testimonials of 
Browne’s colleagues and peers rarely mention his wife tempts one to consign her to the role of post-Victorian 
wife and mother, this would not in fact be correct. It seems that Alice Browne was the ideal partner for 
Browne in almost every respect. While there were differences in their backgrounds as she came from a 
wealthy Roman Catholic family and their political affiliations were aimed in different directions, they were 
both politically-inclined and a strong sense of nationalism united them. Just as Mrs. Browne was determined 
to further the Irish cause of independence, Browne’s energies were directed towards Persia, but it was not long 
before Browne’s sympathies and support towards both Catholicism and Ireland were engaged in his wife’s 
fight, if in a relatively remote manner. See G. Michael Wickens, Encyclopaedia Iranica, Vol. IV, 484. Alice 
Browne, on the other hand, “took a great deal of personal interest in many of Browne’s scholarly and political 
undertakings and friendships” and became one of the founding members of the Persia Society established in 
1911. See Bonakdarian, The Persian Revolution, XXXIII. 
33 It would perhaps be more accurate to call these evenings of talk, rather than discussion, because from all 
accounts, it was mainly E. G. Browne talking and reciting. 
34 These long evenings of discussion and true argument at Pembroke lasted until 1906 when Browne at the age 
of forty-four married Alice Blackburn-Daniell. 
35 My thanks to Shahram Sharafi for the following information: Ajab-nama is a Persian word with two parts 
and does not translate literally into English. Ajab has an Arabic origin and a meaning that suggests “strange 
things that make people wonder”; nama is a Persian word meaning “showing”. Thus the translation that most 
scholars have decided most closely transliterates is that of a Book of Wonder or Admiration or Amazement.  
36 That this book drew “a sour review or two” aimed at the mediocrity of some of the articles may have taken 
away some of the pleasure from Browne, too. See Encyclopaedia Iranica, 485. 
37 Little known is that the Order of the Lion and the Sun was established to honour distinguished foreigners by 
Shah Feth of Persia in 1808. Pronounced shir-o-khorshid in Persian, the Lion and Sun is a famous symbol of 
Persian culture and is mentioned in much Persian literature. It was also used in the Iranian flag, coins and the 
Iranian equivalent of the Red Cross (called Red Sun and Lion) before the Islamic revolution of 1979. 
Incidentally—of interest in terms of  inverse “orientalist” representation of the other—the Order in the shape 
of a meritorious medal also formed the basis of a short story by Anton Chekhov titled “The Lion and the Sun” 
which represents its Russian protagonist in a very poor light in contrast to his Persian counterpart.   127
                                                                                                                                                       
38 The contention that surrounded this issue laid the groundwork for Browne’s later anger with regard to 
English and Russian interference in Persian affairs. 
39 Note Browne’s admiring comments on the French system started by Sacy and backed by his government, 
which on completion of satisfactory training, would offer to a French subject “such employment as his tastes, 
training, and attainments have fitted him for” (4). See, too, Browne’s unsparing use of exclamatory 
punctuation; there are more exclamation marks in this paragraph than in the entire “introductory”, and not very 
many more in the total 600 pages of text. Given the gist of the textual message, they function here in a 
denunciatory fashion to highlight his disappointment with his own country’s deficiency. 
40 The Report covered eighty countries and was published in the chaos that surrounded the end of World War 
II. See Arberry, 241. 
41 The commission was appointed on December 15, 1944. 
42 United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization. 
43 Which is, of course, not surprising, because the sentiments expressed are not recognized within postcolonial 
discourse. 
44 See my discussion of Bhabha in chapter one or see, as an example, his lecture series titled “Minority Culture 
and Creative Anxiety” presented as part of the “Re-inventing Britain” workshop. 
45 For a detailed discussion of events, see Kopf, British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance: The 
Dynamics of Indian Modernisation, 1773-1835. 
46 The sentiments embedded in Trautmann’s descriptive phrase “dreamy obscuranticism” with reference to the 
Orientalists is echoed in a review of A Year Amongst the Persians titled “A dreamer in a land of dreamers”, 
The Times Literary Supplement, December 16, 1926. 
47 Browne’s output in terms of published works was considerable and thanks are due to R.. A. Nicholson that a 
complete and almost fully classified bibliography exists. A Descriptive Catalogue of the Oriental MSS 
belonging to the late E. G. Browne was collated, edited and published posthumously by Nicholson in 1932 
and, along with a memoir by Nicholson, contains a classified bibliography of the fifty-five major items 
published by Browne. Many of his numerous articles are listed in the Index Islamicus. 
48 Little has been said on Browne’s involvement with the Baha’i in this thesis for two major reasons. Firstly, 
the story of Browne and the Baha’i  faith  is a full-length work on its own; secondly, much of the scanty 
critical material extant on Browne has already covered this area of his life. For my purposes here it is 
sufficient to note that his focus in this respect was every bit as centred as the efforts he expended on behalf of 
the Persians and what he believed were their constitutional rights. 
49 That these volumes were twenty-two years in the writing is due in part to Browne’s six or seven years of 
intimate involvement with the Persian crisis and the books that were to come out of this that drew Browne’s 
attention from this major work. But even so, Browne claimed that this task represented “the labour of a life-
time, for ever since I began the study of Persian in the summer of 1880, being then only eighteen years of age, 
the desire to write a complete Literary History of Persia has increasingly possessed me”. From Vol. IV, this 
edition (London: Cambridge University Press, 1956) vii. 
50 Encyclopaedia Iranica, 484. 
51 From Vol. I, this edition (London: Cambridge University Press, 1956), viii. 
52 Rhetorical though it might be, the question must again be asked: Where were those “scholars of Iran” when 
Browne’s “tribute” was being prepared? Why were they not invited to contribute? If they were, no record 
exists.  
53 From Conrad’s Heart of Darkness in Youth and Two Other Stories (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 
Page, 1925), 52. 
54 See, for example, the voluminous correspondence contained in the Browne Papers, Box 2. 
55 There is no doubt that Browne was a romantic; he would hardly have followed through on his boyhood 
dream to visit Persia had he not been lured by the idea of adventure. Neither would he have rebelled against 
the wishes of a father for whom he had a high regard—witness the tone of his frequent letters from Turkey—
had he not had more imagination than was needed to follow in his ‘father’s footsteps’ in the Victorian mode of 
the day. However, this does not in itself mean he misrepresented his subject matter by exoticising or 
idealizing. 
56 See Chinua Achebe’s 1987 lecture “An Image of Africa: Racism in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness” (reprinted 
in Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness, ed. Robert Kimbrough (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1988) 
in which Achebe takes Conrad to task for his “obvious racism” (258). And further that  “. . . this simple truth 
is glossed over in criticisms of his work due to the fact that white racism against Africa is such a normal way 
of thinking that is manifestations go completely unremarked” (257). The point I want to make here is, firstly, 
that Achebe is taking Conrad’s text out of its Victorian context and applying to it a twentieth-century   128
                                                                                                                                                       
awareness. In a recent interview with Achebe (Guardian Review, Essay section, 22.2.2003), fellow writer 
Caryl Phillips questions the widely-acknowledged “father of African literature in the English language and 
undoubtedly one of the most important writers of the second half of the 20
th century” on his long-held and 
polemical views on Conrad. Phillips asks: “‘But is it not ridiculous to demand of Conrad that he imagine an 
African humanity that is totally out of line with both the times in which he was living and the larger purpose of 
his novel [which is to show the infinite capacity of human beings for evil]’”. Achebe’s answer lies in my 
second point which underscores my argument in relation to Browne. Namely, that it becomes clear from this 
article that Achebe’s central concern is the portrayal of Africa and Africans in this story, and that in this 
dehumanizing representation he finds a corresponding betrayal by someone he otherwise—and actually—
regards rather highly as a fellow artist. With thanks to Pamela Mace for sending me this article. 
57 In the sense of what I am discussing here, the word exotic contains connotations of ‘misleading’. 
58 The true origin—dates and places—of the Nights is a matter of some controversy and we know that the 
original must have passed through the hands of many scribes and editors along the way. However, it is 
obvious that the tales come from many Eastern lands and also from different epochs. We know, too, that the 
Kitab-al-Fihrist, an index of Arabic works compiled in A. D. 987, claims “that the framework of the book, the 
story of Scheherazade and the misogynist king [the ninth-century Hárúnu’r-Rashíd], was Persian in origin and 
that the device was taken over by the Arabs who ‘polished and embellished’ the Persian tales and ‘wrote 
others resembling them’” (Newby, 8). Given that the origin of at least some of the tales are Persian, I find it 
interesting that E. G. Browne does not enter this debate and one has to wonder whether he holds back out of a 
Victorian prudishness.  His references to the Nights are few and brief. Of one of the ninth-century poets, Abu 
Nuwas, presumably responsible for many of the tales, Browne says:  “. . . one of the most brilliant and 
shameless poets of Hárúnu’r-Rashíd’s Court. His discreditable adventures, ready resource, and unfailing wit 
are familiar to all readers of the Arabian Nights” (A Literary History of Persia, 277). 
59 Galland was a French scholar and Orientalist who, as attaché-secretary to the French ambassador, travelled a 
great deal in the Middle East. His translation of the Nights, or Mille et une Nuits, Contes Arabes traduits en 
Francois, to give it its correct title, was published between 1704 and 1717. 
60 Burton worked on the project somewhat spasmodically from 1852 onwards; his translation is widely held to 
be the most faithful. 
61 From the outset, his representation of the British Government is clearly a reflection of his own thoughts and 
impressions on imperial administration as the testimonials from his peers and excerpts from his own 
correspondence make manifest. Plainly the Government’s lack of encouragement for the learning of Oriental 
languages and the equal lack of any attempt to provide a career for those who were proficient in foreign 
languages discussed earlier in this chapter was, in Browne’s view anyway, not only shortsighted but insulting. 
62 While there was no doubt that the desire had been in Browne’s mind for quite some time, I maintain the trip 
was destined to take place simply because the timing was perfect. At this point his medical studies were 
complete; he had spent considerable time and effort securing tutors for his languages; there was a post for a 
Persian teacher in the offing at Cambridge; and the Fellowship from Pembroke College enabled the trip 
financially. 
63 Browne travelled very little in his life. Travel outside England consisted of his visit to Turkey in 1882 and 
Cyprus and Palestine in 1890.  
64 Somewhat ironically, these two books sit cover to cover on the shelves of the Faculty of Oriental Studies at 
Cambridge University. 
65 In contrasting Curzon’s approach with that of Browne, MacEion appropriately describes Curzon as “a one-
man fact-finding expedition” while “Browne is next to useless as a guide for the traveller or as a source of 
information for the merchant . . .” (A Year Amongst the Persians, ix-x). Curzon’s book certainly attracted 
positive reviews, not the least from Browne himself, and it was unquestionably researched with thoroughness 
and packed with the type of facts and figures that travellers of the times would have found useful. 
66 I think there is no question of Browne’s intention in placing the Persian ahead of the English and suggest 
that his act of enclosing the English translation in parenthesis only underscores his honouring of the Persian. 
67 Interestingly, Persia and the Persian Question was written ten years before Curzon was to become Viceroy 
of India. In contrast to Browne’s work, note how both the title and the words of introduction declare Curzon’s 
strategic location in relation to the text. 
68 The full title is Problems of the Far East: Japan, Korea, China  (London: Longmans, Green, 1894). 
69 John M.  MacKenzie’s descriptive phrase in Orientalism: History, theory and the arts (Manchester and New 
York: Manchester University Press, 1995), 5.   129
                                                                                                                                                       
70 The Exordium contains an Arabic quotation translated by Richard Burton into English, thus: “‘Es-seferu 
kit‘atun mina’s–sakar’ (‘Travel is a portion of hell-fire’)” which clearly expresses Browne’s own attitude 
towards travel. 
71 In this excerpt, I have attempted to duplicate the spacing in the 1984 edition of A Year Amongst the 
Persians. 
72 Throughout his works—and in his verbal renderings too—any quotation that Browne has translated from the 
Persian is reproduced in Persian and is given precedence in its placement above the respective English 
translation.  
73 The fact that the Persia of Arabian Nights does not appear in Browne’s book does beg the question, 
however, as to how much else he saw and silently appreciated or alternatively, was repelled by, and did not 
report. 
74 Scholars suggest that the detail included in this narrative is a result of Browne’s prodigious memory.   
However, he also relied heavily on travel notes and journals to which the plethora of notebooks in Box 8 
attest. 
75 From a literary standpoint, the diary style and structure achieves a greater degree of empathy than would 
have the “systematic treatise” which was one of Browne’s other options insofar as the narrative treatment of 
the text was concerned. He had been tempted to write a “systematic treatise” but decided not do so for a 
number of reasons: that his publishers thought the narrative form would be more readable, and thus more 
saleable, that a treatise of the type he had in mind would absorb more time than he could devote, and because 
Curzon’s “encyclopaedic work” was already in existence. 
76 Given that this review was written at the time of high empire, to my mind the observation that “. . . its writer 
eschewed the society of Europeans . . .” is a political statement in itself. 
77 For a more complete account of the furore that reigned at the time, see Bonakdarian’s “Selected 
Correspondence of E. G. Browne and Contemporary Reviews of The Persian Revolution 1905-1909”, XXIX-
LVII. 
78 There is no doubt that Browne was a hoarder, but he hoarded with intent and precision and it is his diaries 
and detailed notebooks from which his books on Persia were drawn. 
79 I am indebted both to Mansour Bonakdarian’s selection of Browne’s correspondence on this subject and 
contemporary reviews from the press of the day. 
80 Quoted here from Bonakdarian, LVII. 
81 Qtd. from Bonakdarian, LIV. 
82 Browne Papers, Box 8 (tin trunk). 
83 Although not relevant in this respect, Amanat’s analyses and reasoning behind the two revolutions Iran has 
undergone in the course of a century make fascinating reading in the light of contemporary issues. 
84 See my discussion of Bakhtin in chapter one or my later exploration of the use of the dialogic in Amitav 
Ghosh’s work. 
85 See, as an example, his discussion of the mystical aspects of the mind (A Year Amongst the Persians, 16-7). 
86 A large portion of A Year Amongst the Persians is devoted to discussion of the relationship between 
Moslems and Baha’is, the latter persecuted within Persia for most of Browne’s lifetime. A typical passage 
relates the following:  “‘You see, Sáhib,’ whispered my companion, ‘what our condition is. We are like hunted 
animals or beasts of prey, which men slay without compunction; and this is because we have believed in God 
and his Manifestation’” (231). 
87 See my note 32. 
88 We are witnessing clear examples of this in contemporary politics.   130
Chapter three 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LEONARD WOOLF: A CONSCIOUS IMPERIALIST? 
 
 
 
 
The British Empire in 1907 was certainly a very strange phenomenon. 
 
Leonard Woolf 
1  
 
 
It is true that the question whether Africans should be ruled 
 by Frenchmen, Germans, Englishmen, Portuguese, Belgians, or Italians 
has caused the most difficult and dangerous international situations, 
 but the policy pursued in nearly all cases, has been comparatively 
 simple and direct. It is the policy of grab. 
 
Leonard Woolf 
2 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
As a figure almost totally overshadowed by his famous wife, it is difficult to view Leonard 
Woolf as anything other than the self-assured, albeit somewhat uncomfortable, British 
imperialist who was married to Virginia.
3 But this would be inaccurate as he is—as the 
scope and intensity of his writing demonstrates—infinitely more complex and anti-
imperialist than is popularly held. His inclusion here is due partly to the perspective this 
complexity brings to my thesis and partly because in his writing about a culture not his own, 
he provides a useful comparison to the figures of Browne, Ghosh and Ondaatje. Born over 
sixty years earlier than Ondaatje, Woolf writes about colonial Ceylon, the Ceylon of 
Ondaatje’s parents, before it became the independent republic of Sri Lanka. And as a close   131
contemporary of Browne—who was born just eighteen years earlier—it is quite a revelation 
to observe the marked difference in the awareness and attitude of the two men towards 
empire. 
  
In the introduction to Woolf’s first autobiographical volume, Sowing: An Autobiography of 
the Years 1880-1904, one of his friends, Quentin Bell, describes Woolf’s personality. I 
quote it here not only for its quick summary of the nature of the man, but primarily for its 
ostensibly casual, but significant, reference to the influence that the Ceylon of the early 
twentieth century had on his character: 
. . . it would be wrong to think of him as one so cerebral in his approach to 
life as to be quite separated from his fellows by a ‘superior’ Cambridge 
arrogance. . . . If he ever had that quality he lost it in Ceylon. I have only to 
recall the many times that I myself have heard him, patiently, quietly, 
without the faintest air of condescension or of ‘side’, explaining . . . some 
difficult question. . . . He had only one aim in view, to make a difficult 
proposition clear; there was an honesty and a simplicity about him to which 
those audiences responded. His clarity gave them greater acuteness than 
they knew themselves to possess; his manifest sincerity was entirely lovable 
(my emphasis).
4 
 
Leonard Woolf provides an example of an early twentieth-century Orientalist who—unlike 
Browne whose focus was philological scholarship—travelled to Ceylon as a civil servant of 
the British Empire whose ambit was to administer the colony in the name of the Crown. In 
chapter one I argued that—broadly speaking—many Orientalists of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth-century were men who “worked or travelled within the East arriving back in 
the West to write about their experiences”, an appropriate description for Woolf.
5 Given that 
Edward Said’s definition of someone who practises Orientalism is irretrievably tied to 
eurocentricism and thus “orientalist” with all the implications that word now connotes, in 
what follows here,  I ask to what extent this particular Orientalist can be described as 
“orientalist”. In that Woolf administers a colony on behalf of the British Government; in   132
that he writes fictionalized versions of oriental countries based on his experiences in the 
East, is he a prime example of an “orientalist”—a word Said equates with power, abuse and 
arrogance—or are there any mitigating factors for his defence? Does, for example, the lack 
of arrogance and condescension that Bell and others perceive in his habit and behavior 
challenge Said’s definition of an “orientalist”? Do accolades such as this of Michael 
Ondaatje—“Apart from Knox, and later Leonard Woolf in his novel, The Village in the 
Jungle, very few foreigners truly knew where they were”
6—justify Woolf’s attempts to 
write about a culture other than his own? 
  
But before I start to analyse the critical reception of his work, a biographical note will serve 
to contextualise Woolf in time and place. He was born Jewish (which, although beyond the 
scope of my interests here, inevitably provided its own influence on his world view) in 
London in 1880, attended St. Paul’s School in Brighton and completed his education at 
Trinity College, Cambridge. Unlike Browne, he looked back on his years at Cambridge with 
mixed feelings, but similarly, he left England for his first and only overseas experience 
when he was twenty-four years of age. Having failed to qualify for the Indian Civil Service, 
in 1904 he accepted a position as a cadet in the Ceylon Civil Service where he served in 
various capacities over the next seven years rapidly working his way through the ranks to 
the post of assistant government agent.
7 On his return to London, he was introduced to 
Virginia Stephen by her sister Vanessa and they were married a year later in 1912. 
Evidently, at this point Woolf felt it safe to allow his natural intellectual disposition to 
surface and along with people like John Maynard Keynes, Lytton Strachey and E. M. 
Forster, the Woolfs became the centre of what developed as the Bloomsbury group, the 
intellectual cult-society of writers, philosophers and artists. But the return to London was   133
useful in another way, too. It appeared to liberate Woolf’s creative nature and in 1913 he 
published The Village in the Jungle, the first of his twenty-one published books and one of 
those I look at closely here.
8 
  
It is a moot point, however, whether an England at the apogee of empire whose critical 
centre was peopled by the likes of the Bloomsbury set was ready for a tale of the nature of 
The Village in the Jungle. A starting point for my discussion of its reception lies in Anindyo 
Roy’s claim that this book “was largely ignored by scholars” until the 1960s when it was 
suddenly recognized and hailed “as a significant social document about colonial Ceylon”.
9 
Given the literary circles in which Woolf moved, it is all the more surprising that Woolf’s 
book was by and large overlooked by the scholarly community, but Roy’s words do not give 
the complete picture of the critical response to the novel which is a pertinent part of my 
discussion here.
10 Scholarly attention The Village in the Jungle may have lacked, but it 
should be noted that while in a number of cases the book was greeted with what we would 
today regard as imperialist arrogance and some misunderstanding, it was also received with 
enthusiasm, and it certainly did not go unnoticed by literary critics.
11 Another round of 
reviews both from the Sri Lankan and English press followed Woolf’s visit to Sri Lanka in 
1960 after an absence of nearly fifty years, these coinciding with a reprint of The Village in 
the Jungle and the release of Growing in 1961.
12 His next novel, The Wise Virgins—based 
on the racial and class antagonisms and prejudices modelled on those that existed between 
Virginia’s family and his own with insights into the disturbed and disturbing relationship 
between Virginia and her sister Vanessa Bell—was published the following year.
13 A 
similar theme of religious intolerance emerges in a short story titled “Three Jews”, which 
appeared along with Virginia’s “The Mark on the Wall” in Two Stories, the first publication   134
undertaken by The Hogarth Press in 1917.
14 Woolf’s attempts at writing fiction ended in 
1921 with a collection of three short stories published as Stories From the East—rather 
pointed tales which clearly highlight instances of  colonial superiority—and which appeared 
to receive as little scholarly consideration as his first text. Apart from The Hotel (a play 
published in 1939), the remainder of his work reflects his preoccupation with political 
theory in its focus on the issues of imperialism and socialism and it was not until the 1960s 
that he published his autobiography in five volumes: Sowing (1960), Growing  (1961), 
Beginning Again (1964), Downhill All the Way (1967), only completing the final link, The 
Journey Not the Arrival Matters (1969) in the year of his death. 
  
However, what concerns me first here is a closer investigation of Roy’s claim of inattention 
by scholars and the literary magazines of the time to The Village in the Jungle.
15 Given that 
I too have been unable to find evidence to suggest any substantive scholarly interest, I 
propose to quote excerpts from the popular press of the day instead, which will give some 
idea of the early twentieth-century mindset that sits at the centre of Edward Said’s 
grievances. The Times Literary Supplement, for example, headed its review of The Village 
in the Jungle with the clause, “It requires no small skill to write a story wholly about 
natives, in whatever part of the world they may be, without introducing civilized man as an 
occasional relief;” in a similar vein the Morning Post wrote, “Mr Woolf knows India as well 
as Kipling or Mrs Steele, but makes no attempt to rival either. He reproduces the very 
atmosphere of the jungle, without animal language: from the animal nature of the village 
native, who seems scarcely to understand the use of language at all. The concentrated 
misery of these innocent and inarticulate creatures is most powerfully drawn. Cowed by 
superstition, and tricked at every turn by the cunning of unprincipled petty officials or   135
travelled merchantmen, they have no idea how to benefit by the means of obtaining justice 
so carefully established under English rule”. A less arrogant summary from Hubert Bland of 
The New Statesman reads, “Mr Woolf’s interesting and most admirably written story takes 
us a long way from Europe, to the very heart of Ceylon . . . the reading of The Village in the 
Jungle has been a sombre as well as a poignant experience; but it has been a real experience 
and one not readily to be forgotten”. Another positive appraisal, but again a confusion 
between India and Ceylon, is this review from The Daily Press, “This is a quite enjoyable 
novel, though perhaps a little superabundant in asides and digressions. The author evidently 
writes from real knowledge of India and the life of the villages”. Lytton Strachey, one of 
Woolf’s own circle of friends, criticized the book for having “too many blacks in it”.
16 
Another longish, equally arrogant review in the Daily News (May 27, 1939) ends: 
“Everywhere it is read—except perhaps Ceylon”. This was an assumption quickly laid to 
rest by the number of articles and reviews that followed his visit in 1960. This excerpt from 
the Ceylon Daily News (March 6, 1962) is a typical example: “Woolf’s recent sentimental 
journey to Ceylon kindled a new interest in him and his work notably [The]Village in the 
Jungle generally regarded as the supreme work of fiction about this country . . .”  
  
As troubling as some of these phrases become when read from within a postcolonial 
context, it is salutary to bear in mind the fundamentally—and inevitably—parochial 
worldview of a British press and its public emerging from six decades of cloistered 
Victorianism. For example, when I analyse some of the reviews from which I have quoted 
above, I find instances of ignorance of basic geography in national newspapers and the 
reason for this is not difficult to understand. The influence exerted by Queen Victoria and 
Rudyard Kipling on public and press should not be underestimated. If there were a country   136
outside England that resonated with the British at the end of Victoria’s reign, it was India, 
and in a number of reviews, Ceylon is mistaken for India.
17 But it is the perspective that 
becomes all important here. As I have stressed in earlier chapters, what we today regard as 
ignorant or arrogant, or a combination of both, was a manner of speaking and understanding 
which was quite natural within its surrounding context. The language was a manifestation of 
what was going on in newspaper rooms and parlours in England—it was a language turned 
in on itself much as Bush’s rhetoric on Iraq—and as insulting as we now find it, it had 
nothing whatsoever to do with the inhabitants of Ceylon.
18 In short, it is tempting to argue 
that it was, as I have suggested, simply that stories with an indigenous or “native” bias were 
too foreign in taste and flavour for an essentially insular British press and its public.
19  
  
But perhaps my interpretation is guilty of reductionism? Examined now from a distance of 
over ninety years, is it that the mistakes—or the silences—speak with a greater clarity than 
the words? One of the (still) comparatively few critics of Woolf’s work is unambiguous in 
his assertion of a political cause for the critical silence that greeted the release of Woolf’s 
work. Roy maintains that the “underlying question about questioning  authority . . . open[s] 
a particularly ‘brutal’ history of power relations between the metropolis and the colony . . . 
[and further that] Woolf had targeted his own Bloomsbury audience for being complicit in 
maintaining these power relations while professing to be emancipated left liberals” 
(“Telling Brutal Things”). While there is much to be said for this line of reasoning—which I 
will explore in detail later in the chapter—a critical comparative reading of two of Woolf’s 
texts in particular—The Village in the Jungle and his autobiographical Growing which 
details his years in Ceylon—begs the question as to how someone with such an affinity and 
understanding of local people, conditions and wildlife found it possible, not only to align   137
himself with the rather ersatz intellectualism for which the Bloomsbury set was renowned, 
but to take a central position within that group. While Woolf makes much of his own 
intellectual qualities, this was not necessarily a social intellectualism: an equally substantial 
part of his character was just as self-reflexively solitary and introspective. While there is no 
doubt he was anxious to be accepted as “a good fellow” in the colonial society in which he 
found himself in Ceylon, this was a conscious decision taken more for reasons of career 
ambition than it was to join the social circles by which he became almost instantly and 
increasingly bored. In fact, Woolf regarded intelligence as a social “liability”:  “Intelligence 
and the intellectual produced the same feeling of uneasiness, suspicion, and dislike among 
the white population of Jaffna and Ceylon as they had . . . in nearly all strata or pockets of 
English society . . . [which resulted in my constructing] a façade behind which I could 
conceal or camouflage my intellect and also hide from most people, both in Ceylon and for 
the remainder of my life, the fact that I am mentally, morally, and physically a coward”.
20  
  
If there is an anomaly here, perhaps it is answered in Stories From the East. An analysis of 
this collection leads one to suspect that a story such as Woolf’s “A Tale Told by 
Moonlight”, which appears at first glance to present an “orientalist” fantasy for a Western 
readership has a sting in the tale, and that sting is directed backwards at the expatriate, or 
sideways at the Bloomsbury group perhaps, certainly at people of their ilk. If author 
Michèle Drouart, with all the self-reflexivity engendered by thinking and writing at the 
other end of the twentieth century, found it necessary to start her story “within orientalism” 
in order for it to be understood by and appeal to “ordinary people” before taking an “anti-
orientalist stance”, it could be argued that so too did Woolf write the imperialist tale for his 
imperialist audience, ending it with an anti-imperialist twist in the form of a moral.
21 That   138
way, he could be sure of his stories being read and absorbed, if not yet understood (as is 
clear from the language and orientation of the reviews) or acted upon.
22 It is sobering to 
reflect that it was not for another fifty years that his fiction was to gain the critical attention 
it deserved.  
 
Woolf’s world view 
This discussion of Woolf’s work has so far been limited to his fictional and 
autobiographical works, all of which are substantially anti-establishment as well as anti-
imperialist. Because Woolf’s socialist politics lie outside the direct concern of the literary 
orientation of this thesis, I have not listed the many political, social and economic texts 
which constitute by far the major portion of Woolf’s corpus of works. But while it is not my 
intention to analyze these texts in any detail, neither can they be ignored, so clearly do they 
explicate Woolf’s constant challenge to the imperialistic order which lies at the centre of my 
concerns here.
23 As an example, Empire and Commerce in Africa—part of the series The 
Empire and its Critics 1899-1939—provides an exposé of the expropriating process of 
exploitation and cruelty and of the general “delusion” and arrogance of colonial government 
in Africa. Although it represents an attempt to portray circumstances as they appeared to be, 
it is written with an overt sarcasm: “And yet in the end . . . the fruit of empire . . . dropped 
gently into the hands of General Kitchener and Colonel Harrington, and thence as gently 
into the lap of the British Empire” (203).
24 As an exercise in disdain, it is well deserving of 
a place alongside Said’s Orientalism for the simple reason that if Orientalism could be said 
to provide an uncompromising representation of Western hegemony in the East, Empire and 
Commerce in Africa is equally critical, unrelenting and focused in its bias and   139
condemnation of European praxis in Africa. I quote from the final chapter, “The Future of 
Africa”: 
. . . I have attempted to trace the general effects of European policy in 
Africa. In my judgement those effects have been almost wholly evil. The 
European went into Africa about forty years ago desiring to exploit it and 
its inhabitants for his own economic advantage, and he rapidly acquired the 
belief that the power of his State should be used in Africa to promote his 
own economic interests. . . . The State, enthroned in its impersonality and a 
glamour of patriotism, can always make a wilderness and call it peace, or 
make a conquest and call it civilization. The right of Europe to civilize 
became synonymous with the right of Europe to rob or to exploit the 
uncivilized. The power of each European State was applied ruthlessly in 
Africa. In bitter competition with one another, they partitioned territory 
which belonged to none of them. By fraud or by force the native chiefs and 
rulers were swindled or robbed of their dominions. . . . In this process tribe 
was used against tribe and race against race, and wherever any native 
administration existed it was destroyed. (352-3) 
  
Holding together some well-researched statistical information, there are many such passages 
in this text. On its release in 1920, it is not surprising that this book, in its unflinching 
condemnation of British power politics (integral to the economic policy of its governance), 
failed to find favour in an empire already showing signs of decline. Like Browne, Woolf 
was pursuing an unpopular path and such texts were unlikely to be well-received by the 
establishment and the book was almost completely ignored until its reprint by 
Routledge/Thoemmes in the more favourable critical climate of 1998.
25 
  
This returns me to my discussion of Orientalism in chapter one, where I suggested that one 
reason for the success of what I describe as “Said’s polemic” is its timing in that a 
postcolonial marketplace is a fertile receptor for such views. Support for this argument lies 
in the nature of the reception of another text written by Woolf which is equally critical of 
European dominance. This takes the form of a pamphlet titled, “Kenya: White Man’s 
Country?” (London: Fabian Society, 1944) and it is an interesting document in that the 
statistical information it contains cannot really be separated from its political orientation.   140
Although this was not printed until 1944 when Britain was getting ready to divest herself of 
her colonies and although its concern is with Africa and not Asia, I refer to it here for its 
clear and unequivocal declaration of Woolf’s position with regard to British policy and 
settlement abroad. The grievances Said outlines in Orientalism with respect to British rule 
in Asia are echoed in what Woolf says here: 
For very many years now a few instructed persons, notably Dr. Norman 
Leys, have been insisting that Kenya and its government are a test case of 
British colonial policy, of our sincerity in maintaining that we rule our 
Colonies in the interest of the native inhabitants. This pamphlet shows that 
Kenya still remains the test case and that a radical change of our policy is 
still required if we are to prove our sincerity. This is not a theoretical 
question or merely a nice point in academic morality. History, I think, 
teaches us one lesson at any rate—that great empires may be founded, but 
cannot be permanently based, on political cant and social hypocrisy. 
However good our intentions, if our practice is not in accordance with our 
principles, it is the practice which will hunt us down in the long corridors of 
history. . . . In Kenya our professed principles and our political practice 
have contradicted each other ever since the beginning of the century. For 
forty years the interests of three million Africans have been sacrificed to 
those of a handful of Europeans. To say that the Kenya Government during 
those years has administered the country in the interests of the African 
people or treated their prosperity and process as a ‘sacred trust’ would be a 
hypocritical lie. . . . I end as I begun with a hope that the pamphlet will be 
read by the ordinary voter. For it is upon us, the ordinary people of Great 
Britain, who will vote at the next election, that the responsibility for what 
has been and will be done in Kenya rests . . . The economic power of the 
country is in their hands [the hands of the European population], and the 
political power is all but in their hands as well. They use this political 
power to acquire for themselves further special privileges of every sort—in 
health and education facilities, in financial subsidies, in recruitment of 
labour, and in the distribution of land. (3-5)
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But there was, too, another other form of writing in which Woolf indulged, in this case at 
the order of the British Government, and this was in the form of the diaries he kept so 
punctiliously during the years he spent as assistant government agent in the Hambantota 
district in south-eastern Ceylon.
27 Although the prime purpose of the diaries was to keep the 
centre of government in Colombo informed, as a byproduct of that effort a valuable archive 
of the history of colonial administration was compiled. This meant that from 1908 until his 
departure in 1911, Woolf kept a faithful record of his activities, recommendations and   141
observations, the content of which was to form the inspirational basis for The Village in the 
Jungle and which obviously also provided the source material for Growing.
28 It is these two 
books that take up from where the diaries leave off—in terms of humanizing what is 
essentially and necessarily governmental reportage—and which start to provide answers to 
the questions I posed at the start of this chapter with regard to the agenda—unconscious or 
otherwise—of the young Woolf who went out to Ceylon to administer a colony on behalf of 
Britain. Before I begin to analyse selected texts, a brief comparison of the social and 
political outlooks of the two Orientalists under review in this thesis—Woolf and Browne—
using their respective attitudes towards travel and “travail” opens up a worthwhile 
discussion.  
 
As I have already implied, there is a much greater awareness of the politics of imperialism 
and of capitalist society in general exhibited in the autobiographical Growing than there is 
in Browne’s text, A Year Amongst the Persians, even though the two men lived for much of 
their lives contemporaneously. Bearing in mind that Woolf went out to Ceylon when he was 
almost exactly the same age as was Browne when he went to Persia, the difference between 
the resulting books written by the two men insofar as a critical awareness of empire is 
concerned is marked. Although it is clear that they were both motivated by a political 
agenda, Woolf shows a greater and more specific sensitivity to the specificity of colonial 
governance than does Browne whose twin obsessions were focused on promoting the 
Baha’i faith on the one hand and attacking the policies of the British Government in his 
defence of the Persian political situation on the other. Imperialism, both as a term and in 
effect of what it did and did not achieve, is not mentioned in all six hundred pages of A Year   142
Amongst the Persians and I suggest that there are both interior and exterior reasons for this 
heightened awareness of an imperialistic Britain in Woolf’s work.
29  
  
Firstly, although both Browne and Woolf lived through an empire at its zenith, Browne did 
not live through its decline as did Woolf. Almost inevitably, there is a particular certainty 
about the existence of a status quo that does not necessarily invite debate or doubt. 
Secondly, a dying empire readying itself to dispense with its colonies as was happening 
during the twenty years between the two World Wars at the time Woolf was writing his 
major political texts offers itself as a prime candidate for interrogation. Although it is not in 
doubt that Woolf’s anti-imperialist political orientation was determined well before he left 
Ceylon, I would suggest that the greater temporal distance from which Woolf writes about 
his colonial experience in Growing has a significant bearing on the book’s anti-imperialistic 
discourse. While Browne wrote about his experiences in the immediate period—the first 
four years—that followed his trip to Persia, Woolf’s insights had the advantage of some 
fifty years’ distillation and of being written in an era that had the distinct benefit of 
hindsight.
30 
  
This retrospective view of empire does not, however, explain why The Village in the Jungle 
and Stories From the East, published in 1913 and 1921 respectively should demonstrate a 
similar level of anti-imperialism and neither does it fully account for the political nature of 
Woolf’s earlier non-fiction texts. Hence I suggest that there was one specific incident in 
Woolf’s life which provoked an early attentiveness to the insidious production of power-
mongering and hegemonic actions in general. It is significant that one of his first references 
to imperialism occurs, not directly in relation to British rule in Ceylon, but in connection   143
with British class war in an early incident on board ship on his way out to the colony. Fifty-
six years later, he recalls the incident in Growing: 
One bitter lesson . . . [is] still vivid to me after more than fifty years. I am 
still, after those fifty years, naively surprised and shocked by the gratuitous 
inhumanity of so many human beings, their spontaneous malevolence 
towards one another. There were on the boat three young civil servants [of 
whom Woolf was one, as well as] . . . two or three Colombo business men, 
in particular a large flamboyant Mr. X who was employed in a big Colombo 
shop. It gradually became clear to us that Mr. X and his friends regarded us 
with  a priori malignity because we were civil servants. It was my first 
experience of the class war and hatred between Europeans which in 1904 
were a curious feature of British imperialism in the East. . . . 
 
White society in India and Ceylon, as you can see in Kipling’s stories, was 
always suburban. In Calcutta and Simla, in Colombo and Nuwara Eliya, the 
social structure and relations between Europeans rested on the same kind of 
snobbery, pretentiousness, and false pretensions as they did in Putney or 
Peckham. No one can understand the aura of life for a young civil servant in 
Ceylon during the first decade of the twentieth century—of indeed the 
history of the British Empire—unless he realizes and allows for these facts. 
It is true that for only one year out of my seven in Ceylon was I personally 
subjected to the full impact of the social system, because except for my year 
in Kandy I was in outstations where there were few or no other white 
people . . .  Nevertheless the flavour or climate of one’s life was 
enormously affected . . . both by this circumambient air of a tropical 
suburbia and by the complete social exclusion from our social suburbia of 
all Sinhalese and Tamils. 
 
These facts are relevant to Mr. X’s malevolence to me and my two fellow 
civil servants. . . . [He] hated us simply because we were civil servants . . .  
[and] under the drapery of a joke he was able to make us “small, inferior, 
despicable, and comic” and so satisfy his malevolence and enjoy our 
humiliation . . . (16-19)
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The “joke” played on Woolf and a fellow civil servant was, of course, no joke, but instead a 
deliberate and successful effort to belittle the two men in front of a group of spectators and 
one that Woolf was to remember with bitterness for the rest of his life. The incident interests 
me for two reasons.  
  
Firstly, it was exactly this type of social behaviour that was all too often indulged in by 
expatriates and usually directed at the subaltern (or someone unable or unlikely to retaliate)   144
that was responsible for a great deal of anti-imperialist feeling of the first half of the 
twentieth century. The unfortunate mix of irresponsibility and arrogance on the part of Mr. 
X inevitably provokes what could be construed as overreaction, but I suggest this is only an 
outward manifestation of the depth of inward hurt. Said’s broad generalisation that 
condemns all Orientalists for the transgressions of a minority is another example of this 
type of reaction.
32 In examining texts in the cold light of scholarship, it is all too easy to 
overlook emotion as a motivating factor for the presence of those texts in the first place and 
for the content therein.  
  
Secondly, the incident described above gives an insight into Woolf’s level of awareness and 
self-consciousness, which no doubt lies at the base of how he responded to and treated 
others throughout his life. I think, too, that this type of “civilized dirty joke” and the 
“malevolent hostility” which it poorly cloaked made Woolf even more appreciative of the 
primitive world in which he was soon to find himself and in large measure led to the 
sensitivity that was to surface in his fictional writing. This is evident particularly in relation 
to the way in which he tackles the writing of The Village in the Jungle, in particular the 
narrative style and the language about which I will say more later.
33 It seems to me no 
coincidence that this volume of autobiography—which after all documents a stage of 
Woolf’s self-enlightenment—is framed by a description of this incident which takes place 
within the first few pages of Growing and Woolf’s reference to starting work on The Village 
in the Jungle in the final few page of the book.  
  
But probably the most significant difference between the outlooks of Woolf and Browne 
lies in the fact that as a member of the colonial administration, Woolf not only experienced   145
the effects of empire firsthand, but insofar as it was his perceived duty, colluded with the 
system. A further demonstration of Woolf’s heightened awareness of empire and the 
position of the Orientalist within that discourse appears in the passage that follows which 
provides an unusually honest description of what a young Orientalist might feel in a strange 
country. As Woolf relates the feelings he experienced at a dinner party a few weeks after his 
arrival in Ceylon, it could equally be the voice of the nameless young clerk in the chapter on 
Browne. This account foregrounds the somewhat heady feeling of power, and comes 
uncannily close to the sense of theatre Said talks of in relation to expatriate behaviour. 
The conversation never flagged . . . But we were all rather grand, a good 
deal grander than we could have been at home in London or Edinburgh, 
Brighton or Oban. We were grand because we were a ruling caste in a 
strange Asiatic country; I did not realize this at the time, though I felt 
something in the atmosphere which to me was slightly strange and 
disconcerting. 
 
It was this element in the social atmosphere or climate which gave the touch 
of unreality and theatricality to our lives. In Cambridge or London we were 
undergraduates or dons or barristers or bankers; and we were what we were, 
we were not acting, not playing the part of a don or a barrister. But in 
Ceylon we were all always, subconsciously or consciously, playing a part, 
acting upon a stage. The stage, the scenery, the backcloth . . . at the Vigor’s 
dinner table was imperialism. In so far as anything is important in the story 
of my years in Ceylon, imperialism and the imperialist aspect of my life 
have importance and will claim attention (my emphasis). . . .  In 1905 . . . 
the British Empire was at its zenith of both glory and girth. I had entered 
Ceylon as an imperialist . . .  The curious thing is that I was not really aware 
of this. . . .  Travelling to Jaffna in January 1905, I was a very innocent, 
unconscious imperialist. What is perhaps interesting in my experience 
during the next six years is that I saw from the inside British imperialism at 
its apogee, and that I gradually became fully aware of its nature and 
problems. (Growing, 24-5) 
 
Meanwhile, back in Bloomsbury for a year’s leave among his Cambridge friends which he 
tellingly describes as a “slightly icy plunge . . . into an entirely different world, almost a 
different universe”, Woolf debates his future. If Virginia agrees to marry him, he decides 
that he will resign from Ceylon and try to earn his living by writing; if she refuses, he will 
return to Ceylon, note, not  to “become a successful civil servant in Colombo and end   146
eventually with a governorship and K. C. M. G. [but to] . . . immerse myself in a District 
like Hambantota for the remainder of my life” (Growing, 246-7).  
  
In the final pages of Growing, which contain the correspondence with the Colonial Office 
concerning his resignation, Woolf presents this summation: “I did not feel that I could 
explain to Mr. Harcourt or Mr. Stubbs that I had come to dislike imperialism, that I did not 
want to become a Governor, that I wanted to marry Virginia Stephen, and that, if I didn’t 
marry her, I would like to continue to be a Ceylon Civil Servant provided that they would 
appoint me permanently Assistant Government Agent Hambantota” (251-2). As we now 
know, Woolf did marry Virginia and, despite his obvious depth of feeling for the country 
and its people, did not re-visit Sri Lanka until the 1960s, not long before his death.
34  
 
By now Woolf’s obvious and enduring antipathy to the imperialistic machine and the degree 
to which he debated this point should not be in doubt. The personal nature of this insight 
into colonial imperialism is rare. Even rarer perhaps is the level of self-reflexivity 
engendered by his experiences: “I had been born in an age of imperialism and I disapproved 
of imperialism and felt sure that its days were already numbered” (Growing, 248). As noted 
by Quentin Bell and quoted earlier, it is clear from the final tone of this autobiographical 
text that Woolf was much changed by his experiences in Ceylon. Gone was the 
“unconscious imperialist” of the voyage out. Gone, too, was any vestige of the youthful 
arrogance so evident on his arrival in Ceylon.  
  
It is clear that the articulated awareness of the defects in the imperialist order that surfaces 
in this autobiographical narrative renders Leonard Woolf quite singular. Given the   147
controversial anti-imperialist convictions present throughout the corpus of his work, it 
becomes less difficult to understand how he may have embarrassed and prejudiced the 
agendas of his contemporaries which resulted in the silence with regard to his work already 
discussed. He is completely forthright, for example, in his summary of the relatively 
“simple and direct” manner in which the European nations laid claim to colonies in Africa, 
calling it “the policy of grab” (Empire and Commerce in Africa, 55). And almost as candid 
is the blatantly racist portrayal of white authority embedded in his collection of three short 
stories which again attracted no more attention than his other works. From what I have been 
able to ascertain, they were ignored almost completely from the time of their publication in 
1921, right through their re-publication in Diaries in Ceylon 1908-1911 and Stories From 
the East in 1963 to the present day.
35  
  
In this respect, and as but one example, I find it quite remarkable that a writer and academic 
of the calibre of Chinua Achebe neglects to acknowledge Woolf’s work. Although it is, 
perhaps, understandable that Edward Said’s stated mode of discursive treatment precludes a 
confession in that his generalized condemnation of Orientalists does not allow for any 
exception, at the same time it is a fact that a perceived weakness in an argument can also be 
a strength in the interests of an honest and thorough methodology, an option freely available 
to Achebe. In Home and Exile, for instance, a critique of Woolf’s style, language, gaps and 
silences would have provided a refreshing change alongside his continuing criticism of 
Cary’s Mister Johnson and his more general and unrelenting censure of Conrad’s works. 
While it could be argued that Achebe is discussing only African fiction—more specifically, 
primarily West African fiction—Woolf’s attitude towards the empire as well as the 
connection instigated by his views in Empire and Commerce in Africa would have provided   148
an interesting antithesis to Achebe’s discussion. Achebe’s silence on Woolf is a point that I 
will return to later.  
  
At this point it is appropriate to signal a comparison with Ondaatje’s text Running in the 
Family which I will discuss at some length in the next chapter. Although, as I will 
demonstrate, there are instances of self-reflexivity in this book, it is clear that the type of 
reflection Ondaatje displays is of a different nature to that of Woolf. Woolf’s has less of the 
meditative, revolving, self-consciousness of narrative form and style that informs the 
Ondaatje text, but reflects instead the beginning of a depth of awareness which contains an 
undeniable disenchantment with the ‘system’. It is deeper, more reasoned and reasoning, 
more in line with a conscious indictment of both self and empire. While both writers are 
obviously sincere in their efforts to enter into a self-examination of their motives, in 
comparison the level of fluidity surrounding Ondaatje’s right to belong to—and thus ‘write 
about’—Sri Lanka clearly shows him as much an “orientalist” in Saidan terms as Woolf 
was in effect. 
  
If I were now to refer back to Said’s statement—“one way of opening oneself to what one 
studies in or about the Orient is reflexively to submit one’s method to critical scrutiny”—
based on that premise and on the evidence examined so far, it could be concluded with some 
certainty that Woolf, the true Orientalist, would be exonerated from charges of  what Said 
would describe as  “orientalist” behaviour (Orientalism, 327). But this addresses only one 
aspect of “orientalism”. What of the nature of Woolf’s representation of the East and its 
people contained in his novel, The Village in the Jungle? Does this text not attempt to 
reconstitute the Orient, to “recreate” Sri Lanka and its village life for western consumption?   149
And what about his Stories From the East? Before examining the novel in some detail, there 
are two short stories in particular that I wish to examine briefly, largely in an attempt to 
understand the reluctance of other scholars to engage with the issues they foreground, but 
also to examine for possible slippages. 
 
Stories From the East 
36 
Somewhat in the style of Conrad, the first story “A Tale Told by Moonlight” employs the 
device of an unnamed frame narrator and his friends engaged in conversation on an English 
moonlit night. Spurred by the sight of two lovers walking along a riverbank, a second 
narrator, Jessop, unburdens his memory by telling a story that initially appears to offer a 
typical “orientalist” fantasy. It is an ostensibly uncomplicated tale. The two settings—the 
river in the moonlight and the Colombo bungalow—symbolize the metropolis and the 
colony respectively in much the same way as Conrad’s settings of the Thames and the inner 
station in Heart of Darkness.  
  
The story is plotted simply. A novelist by the name of Reynolds comes out to Ceylon to stay 
with his friend Jessop who, feeling somewhat sorry for his friend’s naivety and desire to 
experience ‘life’, takes it upon himself to show him a good time by suggesting they visit a 
brothel. The inevitable happens: Reynolds falls for a beautiful Asian prostitute, and 
becomes completely enraptured and entrapped to the point where he contemplates suicide. 
Jessop saves the situation by suggesting that they buy the woman, Celestinahami, out of 
service and that the lovers then set up house together. This comes to be and for a while 
Reynolds and Celestinahami are happy until, once again, there is conflict: the novelist 
grows bored with the lack of intellectual stimulation of his beautiful companion and   150
becomes restless. Empathising with her lover’s unhappiness, but uncomprehending of the 
reason, the beautiful Celestinahami becomes increasingly western in dress and habits in 
order to placate him: “And she—she of course couldn’t even understand what was the 
matter. She saw that he was unhappy, she thought she had done something wrong. She 
reasoned like a child that it was because she wasn’t like the white ladies whom she used to 
see in Colombo. So she went and bought stays and white cotton stockings and shoes, and 
she squeezed herself into them. But the stays and the shoes and stockings didn’t do her any 
good” (Stories From the East, 263). 
  
Reynolds is persuaded by Jessop to settle some money on the girl and leave the colony. The 
narrator sees Celestinahami once more, but this time at the inquest of her death. She has 
been found floating in the sea “bobbing up and down in her stays and pink skirt and white 
stockings and shoes” (264). 
  
The frame narrator concludes the tale: “Jessop stopped. No one spoke for a minute or two. 
Then Hanson Smith stretched himself, yawned, and got up. “Battle, murder, and 
sentimentality”, he said. “You’re as bad as the rest of them, Jessop. . . . I’m off to bed.” 
After a couple of minutes’ silence, the poignant ending of the tale is essentially greeted by a 
yawn as the group breaks up and its members depart for bed. 
  
If this is the sort of reaction to his writing that Woolf expected from the Bloomsbury group, 
this is in essence was what he received: a yawn. I am interested in why that should have 
been so. The reaction encoded in the very silence and lack of debate from this intellectual 
group was deafening. Was Woolf too transparent in the model he chose for his story? Was   151
the yawn one of embarrassment rather than boredom? Or was it designed to cut off further 
discussion, to silence the storyteller? What threat to the order of social being was contained 
in the story to provoke this type of reaction? 
  
Let me return to the scene quoted above and look at it from a number of angles. Obviously, 
Celestinahami’s dressing in Western attire in order to please Reynolds produces instead the 
opposite result in a decrease of the interest she was trying to revive. In claiming that Woolf 
has written in “the need of the western man to preserve the image of the exotic object after 
it has been subjected to the violent form of colonial traffic”, Roy’s interpretation leads to 
the heart of this thesis in that this, then, is the type of writing that sits right at the centre of 
what Said describes as “orientalist”. In other words, what is presented is what Said would 
clearly term and condemn as “a highly artificial enactment of what a non-Oriental has made 
into a symbol for the whole Orient” (Orientalism, 21).   
  
But Roy goes further in suggesting that “Woolf/Jessop’s narratorial authority [is] subject to 
the same illusionary haze that makes his metropolitan interlocutors reject his story while 
missing ‘the real’—the powerful fictionality of the state”.
37 In this way, he asserts that 
Woolf “forces the question of the failure of representation into the domain of colonial 
ideology, disclosing its spectral power—the power to invest metropolitan subjects with their 
freedom and individuality while blinding them to their own fictionality”. In other words, the 
space between the metropolis and the colony is so great that such stories can belong only in 
the province of melodrama and thus lack any “real” meaning for the people of the group. 
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Douglas Kerr approaches the issue from a more literary angle, that of his observation that 
Woolf’s narratives are produced “in five different genres based on his Ceylon experience”.
38 
Kerr argues that, “None of them [the individual genres] stands at the centre: all of them, the 
full constellation, are the real stories of the east. . . . [“A Tale Told by Moonlight” is a story 
in which] seems to question the generic supercession of Woolf’s diaries by his novel. But 
although one of the morals of the tale seems to be the inferiority of the literary man’s 
perspective when compared to the lessons of hard experience . . . [it] is itself thoroughly 
literary: masculine, distanced, ironic, understated, unforgiving, it is in intertextual thrall to 
both the great masters of the colonial tales, Kipling and Conrad”.  
  
While both arguments are scholarly and literate and make interesting, if opposite, points, I 
believe there is yet more to this. It is the gap in the story itself that interests me most, the 
silence between the ending of one narrative and the beginning of another. It is in this 
interstitial gap—the gap between the You and the I or in this case the I and the I, the 
Woolf:Jessop dialectic—that the essence of the reality of imperialism is articulated. In 
claiming that this “Third Space of enunciations” carries a cultural and historical dimension 
which stands as a precondition for the articulation of cultural difference, I am returning in 
part to the theory of Homi Bhabha discussed at some length in chapter one:  the Third Space 
that is the in-between or the interstices—the gap in the conversation or narration—which 
carries the burden of the meaning of culture. It is within this space that Woolf allows 
himself the opportunity to articulate the difficulties inherent in and inseparable from 
interpretation. This stage of apparent disjuncture is his moment of “dialectical 
reorganization” or reconstruction. This moment, or space of articulation, signifies the 
collapse of linear time and the rolling of the past into the present. This gap carries a further   153
weight in that it acknowledges Woolf’s own recognition of himself, of his own moment in 
time and space, of his ‘other’. He comes face to face with the “Simurg”, with his own face 
in the mirror of life.
39 Applying this theory to the passage in question involves recognizing 
that the process of interpretation is ambivalent and forever changing. In other words, the 
significance of any one act of interpretation is circumstantial, belonging only to that one 
fleeting moment in time. 
  
I suggest that the ‘group of friends’ listening to the tale, their momentary silence as they 
ingest the message, and their rapid dismissal of the narrative to the realm of melodrama is 
clearly representative of the Bloomsbury set. The embarrassment of this group of 
intellectuals is articulated both within the gap in the narrative and within the silence with 
which they received the tale. Celestinahami’s sacrifice was not in vain. 
  
On the one hand, I see this as an unquestioned attempt on Woolf’s part to present a story 
that carries a clear message of anti-imperialism. On the other, it cannot be denied that in 
constructing Celestinahami as the stereotypical ‘exotic’ oriental, Woolf is himself 
promoting just that myth that he is attempting to discredit, an important point that I will 
return to later in the chapter. 
  
A second story in the collection, titled “Pearls and Swine”, is written in a similar manner 
with a narratorial frame structure and style that again calls to mind Conrad’s Heart of 
Darkness.
40 As in “A Tale Told by Moonlight” there are two settings: the frame setting 
which symbolizes the closed and collusive system of an ‘old boys’ network’ and the 
colonial setting into which the moral of the story is inserted. In this story, a group of men   154
are gathered in the “smoking room” of an English club. The atmosphere is clouded not only 
with smoke, but with opinionated ‘views’ and the inevitable accompanying pomposity, the 
‘hypocrisy’ which Woolf uses for “peeling the sordid reality away from the inflated 
platitudes of empire” (Boehmer, xxiii). Again, there is a frame narrator who functions as the 
observer of the group in the metropolis; again a second narrator, this time an Anglo Indian 
who tells of his experiences in managing a pearl fishery set in a mythical place in India. The 
story is, of course, based on Woolf’s Sinhalese experiences of administering just such an 
enterprise. 
  
At the heart of this story is the juxtaposing of the three white administrators in this fishing 
‘camp’ with the “twenty million or so” Tamils, Arabs, Negroes, Telegus and Parsees who 
actually did the fishing for pearls. The climax of the tale is a comparison of the death of one 
of the white men (significantly named “White” who dies with as much “horror” as Kurtz) 
with the dignity with which the Arabs handle the death of one of their own.
41 
And White thought they [the natives] weren’t real, that they were devils of 
Hell sent to plague and torture him. He cursed them, whispered at them, 
howled with fear. I had to explain to them that the Sahib was not well, that 
the sun had touched him, that they must move away. They understood. 
They salaamed quietly, and moved away slowly, dignified. . . . As dawn 
showed grey in the east, he was suddenly shaken by convulsions horrible to 
see. He screamed for someone to bring him a woman, and, as he screamed, 
his head fell back: he was dead. . . . Robson was sitting in a heap in his 
chair. He was sobbing, his face in his hands. (Stories From the East, 278) 
 
Compare the dying of White with this description of the dead Arab: 
They had a dead Arab on board, he had died suddenly while diving . . .  
Four men waded out to the boat: the corpse was lifted out and placed upon 
their shoulders. . . . The body was laid on the sand. The bearded face of the 
dead man looked very calm, very dignified in the faint light. An Arab, his 
brother, sat down upon the sand near his head. He covered himself with 
sackcloth. I heard him weeping. It was very silent, very cold and still on the 
shore in the early dawn.  
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A tall figure stepped forward, it was the Arab sheik, the leader of the boat. 
He laid his hand on the head of the weeping man and spoke to him calmly, 
eloquently, compassionately. I didn’t understand Arabic, but I could 
understand what he was saying. The dead man had lived, had worked, had 
died. . . . I watched them move away, silent, dignified. . . . 
 
Then I moved away too, to make arrangements for White’s burial: it had to 
be done at once. 
 
At this point, the frame narrator takes over: “There was silence in the smoking room. I 
looked round. The Colonel had fallen asleep with his mouth open. The jobber tried to look 
bored, the Archdeacon was, apparently, rather put out” and suggested that the narrator had 
chosen “rather exceptional circumstances” for his story. Of this motley representation of 
empire, only the Commissioner is thoughtful: “There’s another Tamil proverb”, he said: 
“When the cat puts his head into a pot, he thinks all is darkness” (279). 
  
Aside from the Commissioner, who is allowed the benefit of the doubt here, and working 
from the setting of the ‘club’ (that bastion of colonialism) outwards, this story not only 
challenges but ridicules the empire and the ‘whites’ who people it. Significantly, too, once 
again there is the gap, a strained and uncomfortable moment of silence between one narrator 
and the next, when what is clearly regarded as a treacherous attitude to empire is articulated 
by the boredom of the men, tellingly cut short by the unspoken rebuke aimed at the narrow-
mindedness of his companions contained in the Commissioner’s Tamil proverb. In all, 
Woolf was a great deal less subtle than Conrad with regard to his attacks on the British 
power system.
42 Small wonder that these stories were received in silence by the Western 
audience at which they were projected.  
  
I return now to my earlier discussion in which I suggested that while, from a postcolonial 
perspective, Woolf’s position on imperialism appeared to be irreproachable, there were   156
certain slippages in his stories and aspects of his tales which could be said to betray an 
underlying “orientalist” attitude. As I have already implied, one explanation for this could 
be the degree to which such thinking was naturalized within Britain in the first decades of 
the twentieth century. But does such a process of naturalizing of attitude constitute an 
apology for behavioural traits? In both these stories is not the East still being presented in an 
‘exotic’ or theatrical manner? 
  
A more rounded answer to these questions can be achieved by reading Woolf’s second 
volume of autobiography, Growing, against The Village in the Jungle.
43 Although written 
some distance apart, read in a twenty-first century context, the two texts lend to each other 
an impressive synergetic influence, particularly if read in that order and it is only when one 
account is read alongside the other that one realizes just how enmeshed Woolf became with 
the local people of Ceylon, their conventions and convictions. It is this closeness and the 
resulting empathy that gives the fictional text its credibility.
44  
 
But as discussed in my chapter on Browne, in the context of this thesis and its concerns with 
“orientalism”, it is this very empathy that gives rise to questions that demand explanation. 
We need to know, for example, how an Orientalist came to write a book like The Village in 
the Jungle which offers up such a credible and convincingly intimate knowledge of jungle 
life and native lore. In writing the story of the Orient from a western perspective—albeit an 
extremely knowledgeable and empathetic one—is Woolf not displacing the villagers 
themselves? If my discussion of Ondaatje’s account of life in Ceylon in chapter four causes 
me to suggest that this figure exists as native informant, what is to stop us from dismissing 
Woolf’s story as an example of pure “orientalism”?   157
 
The Village in the Jungle 
Before I attempt to answer these questions, I need to look more closely at the narrative in 
question and what it attempts to achieve. The Village in the Jungle tells the story of an 
indigenous villager and the quandaries progressively faced by him and his two daughters. 
The story is one of human nature: of greed, fear, integrity and the power of human 
hopefulness and hopelessness. If I were to attempt to assign it to a sub-genre, I would say 
that it unfolds as a tale of sacrifice.
45 
  
At the same time, as a tale that at first reading appears deceptively simple, but which 
contains some useful ‘truths’, it also falls into the category of fable. It personifies the jungle, 
anthropomorphizes the animals, indulges the supernatural and offers a final moral. What it 
is decidedly not is an “historical novel” (Toynbee, 225), although admittedly, in retrospect, 
it does indeed have historical significance in that it exists as a social, almost 
anthropological, document.
46  
  
In terms of narrative style, it is a story simply told. It avoids any attempt to emulate the 
modernist innovation and experimentation that was shortly to become so prominent in 
Woolf’s world
47; at the other end of the literary scale, it also lacks the finely-tuned 
sophistication and lyrical quality of an Ondaatje text. In fact, its power—the evocative 
nature of the text, the detailed characterization, the measured rise of suspense and the clarity 
of style—lies in this apparent simplicity. 
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The jungle in Woolf’s narrative has been compared to the jungle in Conrad’s Heart of 
Darkness, both settings symbolizing evil and suffering therein (Mervyn de Silva, Diaries, 
lix).
48 But, unlike Conrad’s setting, the jungle in Woolf’s text does not stay on the page. It 
pervades a village which is both “in, and of, the jungle”; it dictates the lives of the villagers 
and their chenas
49; it becomes both arbiter and executioner and, as such, is integral to this 
story. It is personified as oppressor, sharing the position of villain or antagonist with the 
wicked vederala. It provides an overbearing backdrop against which and within which the 
narrative unfolds. In other words, in the final analysis, it is both character and setting.  
  
The exposition foreshadows the power that the jungle will wield over the villagers: “There 
are people who will tell you that they have no fear of the jungle . . .  Such people are either 
liars and boasters [sic], or they are fools, without understanding or feeling for things as they 
really are. . . . All jungles are evil, but no jungle is more evil than that which lay about the 
village of Beddagama” (2-3). 
  
It is made clear in Growing that Woolf’s knowledge and fear of the forests in Ceylon were 
gained first-hand. If sometimes he lets slip a grudging respect, it is the type of respect that 
signifies a wariness. But Woolf’s animation goes further than merely attributing human 
qualities to the jungle. Encoded in his language is the animal within human; the primal is 
privileged over the somehow unsatisfactory veneer of civilization.
50 The jungle crouches, 
waiting, exhibiting a stealth and an omnipresence that belongs as much to animal as man. In 
the fictional version: “Punchi Menika . . . was dying, and the jungle knew it; it is always 
waiting; can scarcely wait for death” (The Village in the Jungle, 306). And in his 
autobiography: “But the jungle and jungle life are also horribly ugly and cruel. When I left   159
Ceylon, and wrote The Village in the Jungle, that was what obsessed my memory and my 
imagination and is, in a sense, the theme of the book. The more you are in jungle, 
particularly if you are alone, the more one tends to feel it personified, something or 
someone hostile, dangerous. . . . I twice lost myself in jungle, a terrifying experience . . .” 
(Growing, 212). 
  
I get the distinct impression that of the changes Woolf observes when he returns to Sri 
Lanka in 1960, the one that relieves him the most is the sight of the “flourishing villages” 
that exist in place of the Beddagamas of his day replete as they were with their “thousands 
of acres of waste land and scrub jungle” (Preface, Diaries, lxxx).
51 For the present, at least, 
the jungle had been contained. 
  
As I have stated, for the narrowly focused Bloomsbury set, this book contained “too many 
blacks”. And earlier in this chapter I excerpted a number of quotations from the British 
press most of which tended to dismiss the book as a romantic novel in an exotic Eastern 
setting. But I wonder whether the wider British public of Woolf’s day would have seen 
beyond the fictionality of this novel? Would they, for example, have re-sited Woolf’s 
portrayal of either the villagers or the white magistrate in any real political context? It is 
doubtful, I suggest. However, as a text that depicts indigenous village life under colonial 
rule, it offers a compelling site for examination by postcolonial critics. In the main, it is 
praised because it not only comprises an important social document about a country under 
British imperial administration, but also because in so doing it “avoids both the exoticism of 
traditional accounts and the colonial cringe of the more recent ones in its projection of a 
village gradually destroyed by nature and an uncomprehending British administration”   160
(Roy). For De Silva, it is the personification of the jungle, which Woolf elevates to the 
position of a “‘central character’ that lifts it from the level of that kind of [exotic, romantic] 
fiction”. Instead Woolf replaces these potential “orientalist” traps with an awareness of the 
imperialistic order and an intimate understanding of the jungle in respect of both its dangers 
and its ways gained through deep personal experience. It would seem, then, that scholars 
agree that, unlike “A Tale Told by Moonlight”, this tale is neither romantic nor exotic in an 
“orientalist” sense.  
  
However, in this case, the issue of the exotic cannot be dismissed quite so easily. As a work 
of colonial literature, there is a further issue—a replication of the concern that arose in my 
discussion of Browne’s emotive connections with Persia which resurfaces in Woolf’s close 
and empathetic identification with a culture not his own—that has to be taken into 
consideration in the deconstruction of this book. After all, Woolf is still an Englishman 
presenting his interpretation of the East and the people who live there. Although the claims 
of the Sinhalese themselves in this respect are unambiguously supportive of Woolf does this 
alone absolve Woolf from charges of displacing the locals?
52 This excerpt shows the 
susceptibility of the father who refuses to give his daughter to the the vederala although he 
knows his disobedience will incur an evil spell.  
“. . . Evils come upon a man: it is fate. What can I do? The girl is unwilling: 
am I to throw away the kurakkan when the rice is already stolen? Am I to 
help the thief to plunder my house? I am a poor man, and the evil has come 
upon me; I can do nothing against it. His devils will enter me, and I shall 
waste away. But as for the child, what else is left to me? I will not force her 
to go to this son of a --------.” . . . He remained squatting in the compound, 
and as his anger died down fear possessed him utterly. He had no doubt of 
the powers of Punchirala over him: he knew that he had delivered himself 
into his power, and the power of the devils that surrounded him. . . . The 
charms of the vederala did not take long to act upon Silindu. He felt that he 
was a doomed man, and his mind could think of nothing but the impending 
evil. (82-3) 
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Rather than an exotic portrayal or fetishism of the East, this portrayal of a villager’s anguish 
is more akin to the nature of representation in Achebe’s Things Fall Apart.
53 This is a 
quotation from an unashamedly realist text that presents the agitated ruminations of a father 
about to force his daughter into an unhappy marriage. It contains angst and anguish. It gives 
insight into the customs and thought processes of a Ceylonese villager. But what saves it 
from the exotic more than anything else is the language that Woolf has chosen for the 
villagers’ speech. As Peter Elkin points out, “Woolf knows intimately the speech of the 
people: the dialogue . . . is rooted in the idiom of rural Sinhalese speech; its fidelity to this 
idiom was confirmed by Mr A. P. Gunaratna’s Sinhalese translation of the novel . . . At the 
same time the English is not outlandish, but remains simple and forceful within the 
distinctively Sinhalese rhythm and turn of phrase” (54). Elkin’s words are confirmed by 
Sinhalese Goonetilleke fifteen years later: “The artlessness of the speech and the occasional 
non-English turn of phrase are appropriate to the conversation of primitive women; the non-
English turns of phrase echo Sinhalese idiom” (75).  
  
Importantly, however, for my later progression of this argument, while Goonetilleke 
compares Woolf’s turn of phrase to that of Forster, I see a more direct comparison in the 
work of Achebe. Both Woolf and Achebe use the metaphoric language of the villagers 
ostensibly to make a point, but create instead a metalanguage which evokes the primitive 
essence they are attempting to represent. For example, compare this version of Woolf’s 
dialogue: “‘They call us veddas in the village, while you are of the headman’s house. Does 
the leopard of the jungle mate with the dog of the village?’  ‘That is nothing to me. The wild 
buffalo seeks the cows in the village herds. The girl is very gentle, and my mind is made 
up’” (59) with this of Achebe: “‘We do not ask for wealth because he that has health and   162
children will also have wealth. We do not pray to have more money but to have more 
kinsmen. We are better than animals because we have kinsmen. An animal rubs its aching 
flanks against a tree, a man asks his kinsman to scratch him’”.
54 The idiom of the villagers 
articulates an arguable logic which still defies being close-coupled with the issue of 
exoticism. 
  
But as discussed in my chapter on Browne, while this writing is clearly not the flamboyant 
prose of Flaubert, the question still remains: Is Woolf still guilty of identifying too closely 
with another culture? Further, if the excerpt quoted above is typical, then it is clear that 
Woolf is offering a representation of the East in a story aimed at a Western audience, just as 
I show with regard to the works of Browne, Ghosh and Ondaatje in this thesis.  
  
This is a good time to return to an examination of a further argument of Edward Said, 
namely, his acknowledgement that the English—he talks specifically of Richard Burton—
have a tendency to “orientalize” or mythologize the Orient to a lesser degree than the 
French. There is, moreover, a grudging admiration in his words as he describes Burton “as 
sharing the life of the people in whose lands he lived”, of Burton’s fluency with the 
languages of the East, of the vast information he gleaned first-hand of the Orient and of his 
ability “to steer a narrative course” through this archive of knowledge (Orientalism, 195-6). 
Thus Said claims, “So what we read in his prose is the story of a consciousness negotiating 
its way through an alien culture by virtue of having successfully absorbed its systems of 
information and behavior. Burton’s freedom was in having shaken himself loose of his 
European origins enough to be able to live as an Oriental. . . . In no writer on the Orient so 
much as in Burton do we feel that generalizations about the Oriental . . . are the result of   163
knowledge acquired about the Orient by living there, actually seeing it firsthand, truly trying 
to see Oriental life from the viewpoint of a person immersed in it” (196). 
  
High praise indeed which would appear to absolve both Burton and Woolf from charges of 
displacing the local people. In fact, if this passage were to be read out of context, it might 
lead one to question Said’s entire position on the Orientalists of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, or “orientalist discourse” as a whole. Because if we then compare what 
we know so far of Leonard Woolf—his proficiency with the language, his first-hand 
experience of the country, his empathetic communication and feeling for the Sinhalese, and 
the viewpoint from which he presents his novel The Village in the Jungle—it would seem to 
be a reasonable assumption that Woolf, too, would gain a similar level of appreciation to 
that of Burton, and thus would constitute yet another exception to Said’s earlier 
condemnation of all Orientalists. 
  
However, Said’s argument continues and is not to be dismissed so lightly. In fact, my de-
contexualisation above created a complete reversal of meaning. For, on reading further, 
while Burton is highly commended on the one hand for “truly trying to see Oriental life 
from the viewpoint of a person immersed in it”, at the same time he stands culpable of 
“orientalist” practices because his prose presents a “sense of assertion and domination over 
all the complexities of Oriental life”. Said demands a recognition of “how the voice of the 
highly idiosyncratic master of Oriental knowledge informs, feeds into the voice of European 
ambition for rule over the Orient”.  As a result, with such statements in his Pilgrimage as 
“Egypt is a treasure to be won”, Burton fails to pass through the second stage of Said’s 
discursive net that condemns the imperialistic phrases which lie close to the surface of his   164
works and thus, by reasonable assumption, close to his ideological self. Accordingly, Said 
completes this stage of his argument by asserting that such writing “becomes synonymous 
with European domination of the Orient” and thus, it follows, “orientalism”. 
  
If, against this portion of Said’s theory, I attempt to deconstruct either of Woolf’s full-
length texts from which I have been quoting so far, I think it is fair to say that these works 
certainly pass the first test. If the telling phrase here is “generalizations about the Oriental”, 
it is clear from what I have said so far that the temptation to make generalizations about the 
local people is exactly what Woolf avoids in this story. To the contrary, he is commended 
for his empathy, insights into the Sinhalese character, for his “understanding of social . . . 
[and] psychological processes, particularly that of “primitive psychology” (Goonetilleke, 
74). We can assert that he truly attempts to look at life from the viewpoint of the people 
about whom he is writing. His realistic portrayal of Sinhalese customs and society and his 
level of absorption with its systems of information and behaviour are obvious from the short 
excerpts already quoted. But how does he fare measured against the second stage of 
argumentation? 
  
I return first to Growing in which, as I have said, Woolf describes his increasing 
understanding of, and feeling for, the Sinhalese and their customs which expands in 
proportion to his growing disillusionment with the system of imperialistic rule. But in 
relation to Said’s comments on Burton, there is one incident that should be explored in 
greater depth.  
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In his duties as “policeman, magistrate, judge & publican”—during which he would travel 
up to 140 miles a month on horseback or by bullock cart in pursuit of his work—the sights, 
scenes and experiences that Woolf writes about are those that he took very seriously in his 
tasks as imperial administrator and in which he was immersed on a daily basis over a 
number of years. The incident in question took place on a day he travelled to one of the 
more remote villages. To his surprise and embarrassment, half a mile from the village he 
was met by a reception committee of headmen and villagers, complete with tom-toms and 
dancers. In his own words: 
Then I had to stand . . . while each member of the crowd came and 
prostrated himself, touching the ground with his forehead.  
 
In a letter . . . describing this, I tried to defend the system, arguing that the 
Europeanizing of non-Europeans is a mistake, that it is best for every race 
to remain “as it was before Adam” (a curious and somewhat exaggerated 
idea). The Kandyan, I said, grovels on the ground and touches your boots, 
but has retained his independence and manners. This letter reflects my 
growing awareness of the problems of imperialism and my personal relation 
to it in the plains of Jaffna, the mountain villages of Kandy, and later the 
jungles of Hambantota. For a long time I was uneasily ambivalent, 
exaggerating as in this letter, my imperialist, stern Sahib attitude to 
compensate for or soothe a kind of social conscience which began to 
condemn and dislike the whole system. Kandyan society in my day . . . [was 
an] extraordinary, hierarchical, and complicated engine of Empire and 
imperial government, [whereas the] Kandyan society in these villages was 
purely feudal. The Nugawelas, Ratwattes, and all the other great Kandyan 
landowning families were feudal chiefs, and the procession, and tom-toms, 
and prostrations which greeted the O. A. were merely an example of 
manners ordinarily displayed by the villager to the feudal chief . . . 
(Growing, 157-8) 
 
And so it is that Woolf gradually comes to the realization that his initial assumptions that 
the reception was staged purely because he was European and his subsequent 
embarrassment on this account were both misplaced, but not altogether incorrect. In other 
words, the scale and nature of the reception and the obeisance to which Woolf was 
subjected were not necessarily because he was a white man, but because he was an official. 
I repeat: “the procession, and tom-toms, and prostrations which greeted the O. A. were   166
merely an example of manners ordinarily displayed by the villager to the feudal chief . . .” 
Again, it is easy to impart a racist conclusion which is not necessarily accurate. Instead what 
this incident foregrounds is the fact that one of the many “problems” of imperialism was the 
elevation of the government official to the rank of chieftain. Since that official was often, 
though not always, white (see Woolf’s portrayal of the Sinhalese Ratemahatmaya in The 
Village in the Jungle) it is easy enough to overlook the fact that the natives’ respectful 
actions were predicated on the official nature of the visit and not solely or necessarily 
because that official happened to be European. In other words, the villagers’ respect was 
directed at Woolf’s status, not his colour. 
  
Perhaps the degree of self-reflexivity to which the incident was subjected by Woolf is 
enough to absolve him of accusations of “orientalist behaviour”, and on that count he does 
pass Said’s test, but it is in the words that follow that his writing slips and undercuts itself. 
In this next passage, Woolf is honest enough to admit that he is not impervious to this type 
of flattery and that he enjoys being treated as “the great man and the father of the people”, 
and this is where he falls into the same “orientalist” trap as Burton. He admits that this 
almost inevitably leads to a type of schizophrenia as he becomes “more and more . . . an 
anti-imperialist who enjoyed the fleshpots of imperialism, loved the subject peoples and 
their way of life, and knew from the inside how evil the system was for ordinary men and 
women” (158-9). 
  
It is the nature of this behavioural division, albeit more honest and open than that of Burton, 
that would provoke Said’s criticism, somewhat justifiably I am forced to admit. Constantly   167
one must bear in mind that we are addressing early-twentieth-century behaviour with the 
political consciousness of the twenty-first, and partly therein, I think, lies the difference. 
  
However, this glimpse into the nature of someone who calls himself “a conscious 
imperialist” is excerpted from his autobiography and it clearly portrays the type of 
“orientalist” thought processes that Said condemns. Is there any absolution for Woolf from 
charges of “orientalism” if I now return to The Village in the Jungle? This is a text which, as 
I have said, is celebrated for its lack of exoticism and fetishizing of the East, its empathetic 
portrayal of its subject matter, and of its writer’s empathy and understanding of the local 
customs and lifestyle of villagers in rural Ceylon. When all is said and done, if this text 
were to stand alone, how would it rate? Is it indeed impervious to the type of slippage 
shown above?  
  
At this point, it is pertinent to investigate Woolf’s portrayal of the role of empire in this 
narrative? As I have said, in both form and style, and to some degree in content too, this tale 
bears a surprising relationship to Chinua Achebe’s highly political (and highly acclaimed) 
Things Fall Apart written nearly fifty years later. In Woolf’s story, however, the magistrate 
is depicted in a somewhat more sympathetic manner than is the white court in Achebe’s 
account. 
  
Take, for example, the scene where the exhausted protagonist, Silindu, is brought by the 
Sinhalese official, the Ratemahatmaya, before the white magistrate who when they entered 
was “lying in a long chair reading a book”. Woolf writes, “He [the magistrate] got up and 
went over to sit down at the writing-table. . . . He sat back in his chair and stared at Silindu   168
in silence for a minute or two . . . he looked cross and tired. Silindu had instinctively 
squatted down again. The Ratemahatmaya angrily told him to stand. The magistrate seemed 
to be lost in thought: he continued to stare at Silindu, and as he did so the look of irritation 
faded from his face. He noted the hopelessness and suffering in Silindu’s face . . .  ‘He need 
not stand,’ he said to the Ratemahatmaya. ‘He looks damned tired, poor devil’” (The Village 
in the Jungle, 241). 
 
An interesting comparison presents itself between the portrayal of an imperialist in the form 
of a magistrate by a white writer and the portrayal of an imperialist as district commissioner 
by a black writer as in Achebe’s celebrated text. While Woolf constructs his imperialist as 
an empathetic human being, in Achebe’s narrative the administrator is presented as 
completely devoid of any feeling. I quote from the final passage which presents the thought 
processes of the District Commissioner just after he has been led by the villagers to observe 
the hanged body of Okonkwo: 
The Commissioner went away, taking three or four of the soldiers with him. 
In the many years in which he had toiled to bring civilization to different 
parts of Africa he had learned a number of things. One of them was that a 
District Commissioner must never attend to such undignified details as 
cutting a hanged man from the tree. Such attention would give the natives a 
poor opinion of him. In the book which he planned to write he would stress 
that point. As he walked back to the court he thought about that book. Every 
day brought him some new material. The story of this man who had killed a 
messenger and hanged himself would make interesting reading. One could 
almost write a whole chapter on him. Perhaps not a whole chapter but a 
reasonable paragraph, at any rate. There was so much else to include, and 
one must be firm in cutting out details. He had already chosen the title of 
the book, after much thought: The Pacification of the Primitive Tribes of the 
Lower Niger. (179) 
  
The pathos in this excerpt is unquestionable. The tribal customs on which the story is 
predicated proscribe the touching of someone who has committed suicide even if (or 
particularly) as in this case, he is “one of the greatest men in Umuofia”. Thus the final irony   169
becomes the most savage reality: that the enemy, the indirect cause of Okonkwo’s death, 
has been asked to intercede in the burial.  
  
This book has attracted so much attention that I do not intend to spend much time on it here. 
What interests me is the attitude of the Commissioner and complete lack of humanity in his 
response. Compared to Woolf’s magistrate, he is a personification of inhumanity, if such an 
oxymoron be permissible. It is not so much that he portrays an inexorable callousness, but 
that he appears quite unmoved, totally unresponsive to the situation before him. 
  
But there is more here and I am led to ask: If Woolf’s empathetic imperialist (the 
magistrate) is a projection of Woolf’s person and Achebe’s coldly preoccupied imperialist is 
a projection of the thought processes he attributes to an administrator like Woolf who 
returns home to write a novel about the villagers of his experience, called not quite The 
Pacification of the Tribes of the Lower Niger but The Village in the Jungle, which of these 
opposing authority figures most closely represents the ‘truth’?
55  
  
Perhaps the only answer to a question which is rhetorical at heart is to suggest that the 
portrayal of both men, opposite as they are, is about as realistic as one could get. In the vast 
majority of cases, the men who went out to Europe’s colonies were not handpicked for 
either their empathy or their predisposition to callousness. The process was considerably 
more arbitrary and less conscious than that. They came from all walks of life; their 
temperaments and their agendas were a mix. In other words, they were men who raised their 
hands for an overseas posting. If they could be said to have any characteristics in common, 
they could be described as slightly bored—and not always very bright—young men who   170
yearned for something different. Thus an imperialist could be a Browne without a racist 
bone in his body, a Woolf whose awareness quickly brought a realization of the cruelties 
and inequities within the system which in his own quiet way he did his best to illuminate, 
one of the Balfours and Curzons of whom Said speaks, or a personality in the form of the 
Mr. X who invoked Woolf’s eternal wrath. 
  
The question now becomes, what agendas are at work here? I argue throughout this work, 
textual meaning is inseparable from context of both writer and reader. That being the case 
and looking first at The Village in the Jungle, could it be that Woolf, who was himself a 
magistrate, projected his own feelings and sympathies into the trial of Silindu? After all, this 
first book was written very shortly after his return from Ceylon. And his Diaries bear 
testament to the fact that on a daily basis during his years in Ceylon, Woolf was gathering 
experiences which would easily translate to that type of information. Despite his sensitive 
handling of The Village in the Jungle, in the writing of that text was he practising betrayal 
of trust and confidence at a certain level? Not as native informant, obviously, but perhaps as 
resident informant? Such questions have to lead me to claim that while assumption plays a 
part here, it is not unreasonable to suggest that Said’s thesis has merit. In other words, is not 
the writing of this novel a clear-cut case of a colonial administrator indulging in just the 
type of “orientalism” Said condemns? While the autobiographical Growing may contain the 
mitigating factor of self-reflexivity, this story is unambiguously an attempt to represent the 
Orient. It is a story of village life, observed, interpreted by a colonial administrator and 
written for consumption by a Western audience. Although this book drew little critical 
attention, the fact that it reached a relatively wide readership cannot be in doubt since it was 
printed a number of times between 1913 and 1961.
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But before condemning Woolf, I would like to look a little further at Chinua Achebe. It is 
well-known that Achebe—who later became celebrated for his afro-centricism and his much 
publicized antagonism to Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness and Joyce Cary’s Mister 
Johnson (novels which form the basis of much scholarly discussion in relation to Achebe as 
well as providing a central concern in his recent Home and Exile)—wrote Things Fall Apart 
to celebrate the stirrings of his political agenda in London in the mid-1950s. In choosing to 
write about the villagers, their customs and beliefs—of which he has never, certainly at the 
tribal level of which he writes, been a part—it is my contention that this text could also be 
said to be tantamount to a betrayal of trust and, finally, a disclosure of information held dear 
to the Igbo. While, as with the other figures that form part of this thesis—Browne, Ghosh, 
Ondaatje, Woolf—perhaps he is not quite the native informant, nor a resident informant, but 
he is an informant nevertheless. Ironically, on this basis, Achebe becomes as much an 
“orientalist” as Woolf. While Achebe is apparently an Igbo writing about the Igbo, he is an 
educated man who has chosen to live in the metropolis and who, for political expediency, 
has chosen also to present his writings in the language of the metropolis.
57  
  
In this—although in this only—his rationale reflects that of Naipaul and it should be 
emphasised that the comparison between Achebe and Naipaul stops right here as these 
writers occupy diametrically opposite discursive positions from one another. In her 
discussion of modalities in Travelling Identities, Clare Johnson claims:  
 
V. S. Naipaul occupies a particularly interesting position, accepting his 
interpellation by colonial discourse and adopting the role of the colonizer, 
freely embracing dominant attitudes not as one of the oppressed, but as an 
oppressor himself. However, he is also of necessity assigned to the position 
of the oppressed, since no matter how effective his ‘mimicry’ is, he cannot    172
 
 
alter the ineluctable fact of his skin colour—the irreducible signifier of 
difference: because he accepts the terms of oppression, he must also submit 
to them. . . . his position is always under threat because he is not white.
58  
 
It is not therefore surprising that Achebe goes so far as to describe passages in Naipaul’s A 
Bend in the River as “pompous rubbish” and brings a Saidian turn of phrase to his précis of 
Naipaul’s book.
59 But Achebe’s famous 1975 lecture—“An Image of Africa: Racism in 
Conrad’s Heart of Darkness” as visiting professor at the University of Massachusetts in 
which his condemnation of what he sees as Conrad’s xenophobia is absolute and where 
Heart of Darkness is described as “an offensive and deplorable book” (259)—prepares us 
for his reaction to Naipaul.
60 It could be argued that a quick comparison between the two 
writers excuses Conrad on two counts for what Achebe views as his “racism”: namely a 
combination of being European and the particular historical moment in which the novel was 
produced.
61 Or does it? Perhaps, as an outsider, Conrad should not have presumed to depict 
a foreign culture? In an interview with Achebe, self-admitted admirer of both writers Caryl 
Phillips seeks a response from Achebe specifically on this representation of Africa and its 
people.
62 I have excerpted part of their fascinating conversation in the following: Phillips: 
“‘But you’re not suggesting that outsiders should not write about other cultures?’” Achebe: 
“‘No, no. This identification with the other is what a great writer brings to the art of story-
making. We should welcome the rendering of our stories by others, because a visitor can 
sometimes see what the owner of the house has ignored. But they must visit with respect 
and not be concerned with the colour of skin, or the shape of nose, of the condition of the 
technology in the house.’” . . . “‘Chinua, I think Conrad offends you because he was a 
disrespectful visitor.’ . . . The realization hits me with force. I am not an African. Were I an 
African I suspect I would feel the same way as my host. But I was raised in Europe, and   173
although I have learned to reject the stereotypically reductive images of Africa and 
Africans, I am undeniably interested in the break-up of a European mind and the health of 
European civilization. I feel momentarily ashamed that I might have become caught up with 
this theme and subsequently overlooked how offensive this novel might be to a man such as 
Chinua Achebe and millions of other Africans. . . . However lofty Conrad’s mission, he has, 
in keeping with times past and present, compromised African humanity in order to examine 
the European psyche. [Thus] Achebe’s response is understandably personal.”  
  
And it is on this last point—the respect with which he treats the local people, the empathy 
and understanding in the way he writes his tale of the villagers—that I believe exonerates 
Woolf in much the way Said claims Kipling’s aesthetic ‘saves’ Kim.  For just as Kim “most 
assuredly is not a political tract”, in terms of promoting a hegemonic empire, neither is The 
Village in the Jungle (Culture and Imperialism, 196). Quite apart from his anti-imperialist 
treatises, books and pamphlets, what becomes paramount is the way in which Woolf 
conducts himself—in person and in his written work—and the bearing this has with regards 
to the respect with which he held—and in which he was received—in his hosts’ country. 
This is why he was received so kindly and so enthusiastically in postcolonial Sri Lanka—in 
which after all he spent only seven years half a century ago as a self-admittedly sometimes 
harsh colonial administrator. 
 
Thus, in summary of this chapter, it can be seen that while it proves impossible to extricate 
Woolf totally from charges of “orientalism”, there are murmurs from both Achebe and 
Said—albeit reluctant—which suggest there might be mitigating circumstances. In 
particular, Achebe’s silence on Woolf becomes more understandable when one recalls   174
Mukherjee’s cry of betrayal.
63 Scholarship admits only the argument in focus. This last 
word from Phillip’s interview with Achebe in regard to Conrad says it all: “Well, as you 
know, we have very few who have the talent and who are in the right place, and to lose even 
one is a tragedy. We cannot afford to lose such artists.  It is sheer cussedness to willfully 
turn and walk away from the truth, and for what? Really, for what?
64 I expect a great artist . 
. . not to make life more difficult for us. Why do this? Why make our lives more difficult? 
In this sense Conrad is a disappointment.”  
  
Whatever side one takes in the imperialist/anti-imperialist Conradian debate, Heart of 
Darkness only has to be placed alongside The Village in the Jungle for the difference in 
representation of the native people to become patently clear. It is precisely because Leonard 
Woolf’s depiction of Sri Lanka is so empathetic that Achebe, the scholar, does not single 
him out for attention. In many ways, unlike Conrad, Woolf did not “disappoint”. Certainly, 
he was neither arrogant nor abusive. But he was clearly a part of the imperialist camp. In his 
final phrase of Things Fall Apart, Achebe, the writer, makes that patently obvious by his 
choice of title for the District Commissioner’s book: The Pacification of the Tribes of the 
Lower Niger. 
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1 From Leonard Woolf, Diaries in Ceylon 1908-1911 and Stories From the East (London: The Hogarth Press, 
1963. First published Colombo: The Ceylon Historical Journal, 1962). 
2 Empire and Commerce in Africa (London: Routledge/Thoemmes Press, 1998. First published 1920), 55. 
3 A rather sad indictment of Woolf’s work is contained in his obituary: “A notable part of Leonard Woolf’s 
contribution to English literature was the way in which he made it possible for Virginia Woolf to express her 
genius as a writer” as printed in the New Statesman (22.8.1969), 251. Cited from Anindyo Roy, ‘“Telling 
Brutal Things”: Colonialism, Bloomsbury and the Crisis of Narration in Leonard Woolf’s “A Tale Told by 
Moonlight.,”’ Criticism 43.2 (2001): 189-222. This version obtained electronically 28.2.2003. That Woolf was 
to spend his life living in Virginia’s shadow seems just a little unfair, but then of course Virginia Woolf was 
quite an exceptional person in that, it could be argued, she was among two or three of the very great English 
novelists of the twentieth century. Not everyone is of this opinion, however. In fact, with regard to Woolf’s 
first novel, a review at the time states quite categorically: “The Village in the Jungle is not a work of art—it is 
a miracle in writing. At no time has the author’s more celebrated wife, Virginia Woolf, approached this height 
in workmanship” (The Daily News, 27.5.39). And somewhat later (1960), Peter Elkin was to compare Woolf’s 
book favourably with Forster’s A Passage to India. There is also no doubt that Virginia was greatly assisted at 
the outset of her writing career in terms of her freedom to experiment by the availability of the Hogarth Press 
and perhaps by the (albeit controversial) support of Leonard Woolf. Selma S. Meyerowitz suggests a 
synergetic relationship between the two, at least as far as their work was concerned. She claims that “. . . there 
are striking similarities in the works of Leonard and Virginia Woolf, which suggest that they influenced each 
other. They were concerned with social and political factors in their fiction and nonfiction, as they both 
explored the close relationship between social experience and individual consciousness. Virginia, however, 
developed this relationship in terms of the artist’s vision and his art form, while Leonard focused on individual 
and social behaviour in relationship to political thought and economic systems. In their earliest novels . . .  
they present their views of love, both spiritual and physical, marriage, and individual fulfillment as they 
portray twentieth-century English society. They both emphasize the important effects of class conventions on 
psychology and behaviour.  . . . Around this time, in their respective journalism work, they were writing about 
the same authors, and, with their founding of the Hogarth Press, there must have been continued exchanges of 
opinion about new manuscripts, new authors, finances, and the literary and political philosophy of the press” 
(17-18). For more, see Meyerowitz, Leonard Woolf (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1982).  
4Sowing: An Autobiography of the Years 1880-1904  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), xiii-xiv. 
5 For a more comprehensive account of what constituted an Orientalist, see my discussion in chapter one. Or 
see Trautmann’s Aryans and British India or essays by Sadik Jalal al-‘Azam, Michael Richardson, Bernard 
Lewis and John MacKenzie in Orientalism: A Reader, ed. A. L. Macfie. 
6 Running in the Family (London: Picador, 1982), 83. 
7 Woolf attributed his comparatively rapid rise through the ranks of the civil service to his early insight that if 
he were to become known as a “good fellow” within the ideology operating in the colonies at the time, he 
would need the good sense to suppress his intellectual leanings. Challenging the colonial hierarchy was the 
quickest way to nowhere in terms of promotion. 
8 He was also a publisher and editor of a number of periodicals and together with Virginia founded the 
successful Hogarth Press in London in 1917.  
9 See Roy’s critical essay “‘Telling Brutal Things’”.  
10 Archival research into the Leonard Woolf Papers at the University of Sussex in Brighton  (specifically files  
IA 3f and IL 13e) produced a reasonable quantity of press clippings from literary critics  that greeted its 
release, but I am aware that in the restricted period I had available for research in Britain that I may have 
missed others of significance. There was, for example, a favourable review from Blackwood’s Magazine by 
Sir Hugh Clifford, mentioned briefly in Letters of Leonard Woolf, ed. Frederick Spotts, that did not appear to 
be among the Woolf Papers, but it is conceivable that I may have missed it. 
11As one would expect from a book published in the English language in England, the early reviews were 
primarily from the British press—among them The Times Literary Supplement (27.2.13), the Morning Post 
(10.2.13), The Daily News and Leader (14.3.13), the Scotsman (21.2.13), The Westminster Gazette (22.2.13), 
The New Statesman (19.4.13), The Spectator (1.3.13)—while a number of later reviews greeted later reprints 
of the novel: Daily Herald (17.9.31), The Daily News (27.5.39). In Sri Lanka, there appears to have been little 
printed—save in the Weekly Times of Ceylon (3.4.13)—until the 1960s, as Roy notes.   176
                                                                                                                                                       
12 The attention he received from postcolonial scholars came much later and some significant critiques of his 
rather sparse fictional work have come from Yasmine Gooneratne, D. C. R. A. Goonetilleke, Elleke Boehmer, 
Selma S. Meyerowitz and Shirley Chew. The Sinhalese translation was undertaken by A.  P. Gunaratna in 
1947.  A significant addition to local recognition of Woolf’s book was the television series based on Woolf’s 
novel The Village in the Jungle by Sri Lankan film and television director Wipula Sumanasekara which 
follows the 1980 film Beddegama based on the same novel (Sunday Times 6.6.93). For a comprehensive list of 
postcolonial Sri Lankan critics, see Douglas Kerr’s article “Stories of the East”, English Literature in 
Transition  1880-1920 41.3 (1998): 261-79, this version obtained electronically 26.6.2003 via Literature 
Online http://lion.chadwyck.co.uk 
13 Conflicting opinions with regard to the success of this book come from Roy and Meyerowitz. Roy claims 
that The Wise Virgins “remains his most widely discussed literary work, mainly because of its portrayal of the 
troubled relationship between Virginia Woolf and her sister Vanessa Bell” which would have appealed far 
more to the taste of the society in which it was produced than tales about ‘foreign lands’. While Meyerowitz 
remarks only that “it did not sell well and went out of print” (5). 
14 The Hogarth Press was founded by Leonard and Virginia for printing both their own works and “literature 
by new writers which would not be acceptable to commercial presses. Soon they became the publishers of 
such important writers of literature as Katherine Mansfield, T.  S.  Eliot and E.  M.  Forster, and such 
significant social writers as John Maynard Keynes and Freud” (Meyerowitz, 8). In his edition of E. M. 
Forster’s A Passage to India (London: Penguin Books, 1979), Oliver Stallybrass called Leonard Woolf  “that 
literary obstetrician of genius” for encouraging Forster to continue with his novel (13). 
15 Leonard Woolf, The Village in the Jungle (London: The Hogarth Press, 1961. First published 1913). 
16 Letters of Leonard Woolf, ed. Fredric Spotts (New York: Harcourt, 1989), 197. But although this was the 
“reason” Lytton Strachey gave for not liking it, I wonder whether there was more to this? After all, Strachey 
and Woolf were at one stage the best of friends. In his voluminous correspondence from Ceylon to Strachey in 
London, Woolf was either lonely enough or close enough to Strachey to write, “I feel I want to talk [to you] a 
little before I go to bed”, but the change that Bell perceived in him on his return to London was even then 
beginning to take place (63). Eventually “around the midpoint of his years in Ceylon—the challenge of work 
and fascination with the country supplanted Leonard’s curiosity about old friends. He wrote fewer letters and 
eventually brought the correspondence with Strachey to an abrupt close; after years of encouraging a visit, he 
scotched any idea of his coming to Ceylon. Leonard had changed; as he wrote to Strachey in October 1908, ‘I 
have no connection with yesterday: I do not recognize it nor myself in it.’ He was growing; Strachey was 
stagnating. . . . The break [that ensued] in the correspondence marked a break in an emotional intimacy that 
was never fully restored” (64). Given this information, it’s hard to read Strachey’s comment as anything other 
than an expression of emotion or anger at having been superseded in Woolf’s affections by a foreign country 
and its people. 
17 Obviously I speak of these figures as significant symbols, rather than in a restrictive sense. Victoria was, 
after all, proclaimed Empress of India in 1877, a symbolic attempt to consolidate the ‘British Raj’. Before 
Conrad, what anyone who claimed to be part of the literati ‘knew’ about ‘foreign parts’ would largely have 
been gleaned from Kipling’s tales. 
18 Said’s caution, “It is crucial to remember that there were no appreciable deterrents to the imperialist world-
view Kipling held, any more than there were alternatives to imperialism for Conrad” applies as much to the 
newsrooms of Europe as it does to Kipling and Conrad. See Culture and Imperialism (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1993), 176. 
19 Or was it that a pre-war Britain had more on its mind? 
20 Growing (London: The Hogarth Press, 1970), 36-7. 
21 From a telephone conversation with Michèle Drouart, author of Into the Wadi (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts 
Centre Press, 2000). 
22 As I discussed in chapter one, it is my contention that Edward Said achieved—in a different milieu 
perhaps—much the same ‘raising of awareness’ with Orientalism. 
23 These include such titles as International Government (1916), Economic Imperialism (1920), Empire and 
Commerce in Africa (1920), Socialism and Cooperation (1921), Fear and Politics (1925), Imperialism and 
Civilization (1928), Quack, Quack! (1935), The War for Peace (1940), Principia Politica (1953), and After the 
Deluge (Vol. I, 1931; Vol. II, 1939). 
24 I quote from the 1998 edition of Empire and Commerce in Africa. 
25 Although, perhaps, the comparatively short period that has passed since reprinting does not allow a 
sufficient length of time in which to gauge current market reaction to the contents of this text, what does 
surprise me is that it is not more often discussed by students of postcolonialism in Africa.   177
                                                                                                                                                       
26 Kenya was ‘granted’ Independence on December 12, 1963. 
27 The keeping of a detailed daily account of the work done by government agents and their assistants was a 
requirement instituted by one of the governors of Ceylon, Sir Thomas Maitland, in 1808, a practice that 
continued for one hundred and thirty years. 
28 One of the two excellent introductions to Woolf’s Diaries is by S. D.  Saparamadu, the original editor of 
The Ceylon Historical Journal who published Volume 1, Number 1 “when he was still in his teens, or just out 
of them” (Ceylon Daily News, 6.3.62, Leonard Woolf Papers,  ref. IA 3 f, University of Sussex Library).  
Saparamadu (identified only by the initials S. D. S. in his introduction to the Diaries) provides an illuminating 
account of the colonial civil service and it is from this account that I have taken this information. The Ceylon 
Historical Journal first published Woolf’s diaries in book form together with the accompanying trio of short 
stories in 1962.  
29 See my chapter on Browne for an indication of the reaction of the British press to his work. 
30 This time difference in the writing of books that were essentially about events that took place within the 
same temporal dimension may account, too, for the more modern turn of phrase in Woolf’s works in relation 
to those of Browne. 
31 A number of incidents within my own experience support Woolf’s in that I have witnessed the class hatred 
to which he refers among expatriate Europeans and seen the extent to which this class snobbery becomes 
synonymous with and, as a consequence, inseparable from, imperialism. Accordingly, I have to agree with 
Woolf that since this sort of behaviour results from a sense of inferiority bestowed on the English by their own 
societal system, in that era in particular, it was so inextricable from English class consciousness that it did 
indeed lie at the heart of Empire. However, I need to go further than Woolf in stating that this need to feel 
good by ridiculing another in order to overcome an innate feeling of inferiority was not restricted to class 
relations but in the context of imperialist rule inevitably manifested in similar brutish behaviour towards 
indigenous peoples. From the distance of my own teenage years, I can remember a similar type of person to 
Mr. X making an indigenous person feel “small, inferior, despicable, and comic” and the distress of that 
experience remains just as vivid in my own mind as it obviously did in Woolf’s. There is little wonder that 
imperialism left behind such an obnoxious image.  
32 One of the accusations levelled at Said concerns the emotive style in which Orientalism is written which 
some scholars view as “unscholarly”. As I have shown in my account of Browne in chapter two and as I am 
about to argue in the case of Woolf, it is clearly inaccurate to place all Orientalists in the same category. 
However, the feelings responsible for the manner in which this text is written and for its exaggerated 
generalizations can be better understood vis à vis the attitude and actions of Mr. X. particularly if I extend the 
example to cover a range of physical or mental abusive situations, specifically the abuse inherent in being 
ignored or “obliterated” by all such Mr. Xs. Consider, firstly, Said’s stated motivation for writing Orientalism: 
“My own experiences . . . are in part what made me write this book. The life of an Arab Palestinian in the 
West, particularly in America, is disheartening. There exists here an almost unanimous consensus that 
politically he does not exist, and when it is allowed that he does, it is either as a nuisance or as an Oriental. . . .  
The nexus of knowledge and power creating ‘the Oriental’ and in a sense obliterating him as a human being is 
therefore not for me an exclusively academic matter (27)”.  To be the target of such dehumanizing behaviour 
doubtless comprises part of the depressing “experiences” Said mentions. What Said fails to acknowledge is 
that this dominance—in whichever shape it takes—is not solely and necessarily projected at Said the Oriental, 
but just as much at Said the man. There is no reference to Freud in Orientalism, but his theories cannot be 
ignored.  
33 In pondering this incident in Growing, Woolf quotes from Freud whose “usual lucidity unravels the nature 
of this kind of joke in Chapter III, ‘The Purposes of Jokes’, of his remarkable book Jokes and their Relation to 
the Unconscious” (19). “Since we have been obliged to renounce the expression of hostility by deeds—held 
back by the passionless third person, in whose interest it is that personal security shall be preserved—we have 
just as in the case of sexual aggressiveness, developed a new technique of invective, which aims at 
enlightening this third person against our enemy. By making our enemy small, inferior, despicable or comic, 
we achieve in a roundabout way the enjoyment of overcoming him—to which the third person, who has made 
no efforts, bears witness by his laughter” (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960), 103. 
34 The Ceylon Independence Act was passed in 1947 and the dominion of Sri Lanka came into being the 
following year on February 4, 1948. 
35To the best of my knowledge, the only scholarly attention of any substance that these stories have received is 
from a critical article by Douglas Kerr, Selma Meyerowitz in Leonard Woolf; Anindyo Roy who concentrated 
solely on “A Tale Told by Moonlight”, and Elleke Boehmer, “‘Immeasurable Strangeness’ in Imperial Times: 
Leonard Woolf and W. B. Yeats”, in Modernism and Empire, eds. Howard J.  Booth and Nigel Rigby  (New   178
                                                                                                                                                       
York: Manchester University Press, 2000), 93-111. What I find more difficult to understand than the earlier 
scholarly lack of attention, is why Woolf continues to be overlooked by present-day scholars intent, one would 
hope, on setting past records straight and not in founding yet another archive as biased and incomplete as the 
imperial one that has gone before.  
36 An interesting slippage concerning a subtle change in this title with the preposition “of” replacing the 
correct “from” that occurs in the works of some postcolonial critics among which the otherwise well-argued 
essays of Douglas Kerr, Anindyo Roy and Elleke Boehmer stand as examples. In other words, the stories 
appear in scholars’ essays under the title Stories of the East (and in Shirley Chew’s case, Stories in the East). 
However, they were written, and published, as Stories From the East and the slip becomes less subtle in the 
orientation of what I have been discussing here. While The Oxford English Dictionary allows for some 
overlapping of semantics, it states that “from” is more commonly used to denote “departure or moving away” 
or to indicate “the starting point or the first considered of two boundaries adopted in defining a given extent in 
space”. “Of”, on the other hand, is commonly used to indicate “the thing or person whence anything originates 
. . . is acquired or sought”; it is also used to express “racial or local origin, descent”; or after a subject “of 
connects the material immediately with the thing”. These prepositions are both function words but their 
implications are opposite: while of connotes belonging or possessiveness or the object of an action,  from 
connotes starting point, separation, distance, source. This becomes significant in the light of a discussion 
where the stated objective is to ascertain the degree of “orientalist” discourse discernible in Woolf’s writing. 
37 How conscious is it on Roy’s part, I wonder, to use the phrase “illusionary haze” which conjures up images 
of the “haze” and “brooding gloom” that hangs over the five men in the Nellie in Heart of Darkness? Could 
one substitute “optional blindness” for the first phrase? 
38 The five genres to which Kerr refers are:  Woolf’s letters, the diaries he kept in Hambantota during his 
administration, his novels, short stories, and five volumes of autobiography. There were, as I have mentioned, 
a considerable number of political books. 
39 See Farid al-Din Attar’s famous Persian fable, The Conference of the Birds, with regard to my reference to 
the Simurg. Or see Salman Rushdie’s first novel, Grimus (London: Vintage, 1996) where the title is an 
anagram of Simurg. 
40 The influence of Conrad is as clear in Woolf’s work as the influence of Woolf is on Achebe. See my 
discussion on Achebe later this chapter. 
41 In fact, White’s death very closely resembles Marlow’s description of Kurtz’s final hours: “I saw on that 
ivory face the expression of sombre pride, of ruthless power, of craven terror—of an intense and hopeless 
despair. Did he live his life again in every detail of desire, temptation, and surrender during that supreme 
moment of complete knowledge?” Heart of Darkness, ed. Robert Kimbrough (New York: W. W. Norton and 
Company, 1971) , 71. As White’s death approaches, the “memory of his sins” asserts itself and he becomes 
aware of the “things which had happened to him, and things which he had done—and they weren’t nice either” 
(Stories From the East, 276). And a little later, overcome with “fear of punishment, of what was coming of 
death, or the horrors, real horrors and the phantom horrors of madness” White loses control completely (277), 
just as does Kurtz before his death with his famous words of comprehension, “‘The horror! The horror!’” (71). 
42 I am reading resistantly here in relation to Conrad. I am, of course, aware that the dominant or popular late-
twentieth-century reading of Conrad’s asserts his own imperialist agenda and do not intend here to go down 
that well-worn route. Suffice it to say, whether anti-imperialist or otherwise, it would be difficult not to miss 
the paradoxes of empire presented in Heart of Darkness. Interestingly, however, despite his own avidly 
political orientation, Woolf does not appear to derive any sense of the political from Conrad’s books. In the 
essay titled “Joseph Conrad” in Woolf’s Essays on Literature, History, Politics, etc.  (London: The Hogarth 
Press, 1927), 57-71, he claims: “Conrad was in no sense a preacher; he can hardly be said to have had what is 
ordinarily called a message; politics and social questions did not appear in his books; he had no axes to grind. 
He was pre-eminently a writer, and, I think, within certain limits, a great writer. . . . In Conrad’s best work, in 
Lord Jim, Heart of Darkness, Typhoon, there is either no ‘plot’ at all or at best but an incident which is made 
to do the duty of a ‘plot’; but about this incident of a young seaman’s panic or about a fact or phenomenon like 
Africa, Conrad weaves his immensely elaborate and often beautiful structure of words” (59).  This admiration 
for the beauty of Conrad’s prose did not stop him, however, from commenting on the “purple passages” (58) 
in Lord Jim or of describing Conrad’s later work as “splendid shells, magnificent facades, admirable forms, 
but there is no life in them” (70). It is clear that Woolf intends this to be a literary and not a political critique of 
Conrad’s work which is a little at odds with the deliberate political perspective embedded in “A Tale Told by 
Moonlight” and “Pearls and Swine”, stories whose narrative structures so closely emulate that of Conrad’s 
famous novella.   179
                                                                                                                                                       
43 As I have mentioned, the seminal source for both books were the diaries that Woolf kept religiously as part 
of his duties as assistant government agent during his years in Hambantota, Ceylon.  
44 It is, however, important to note that while the issue of credibility is particularly important in this context, 
the merit of The Village in the Jungle as a work of literature should not be overlooked. For example, English 
historian Arnold Toynbee—a man highly praised for his profound scholarship and erudition—places Woolf’s 
text in such illustrious company as Herodotus, Tolstoy and Victor Hugo, men noted for their literary prowess 
and ability to tell a good story as well as their attention to historical accuracy (A Study of History, Volume X, 
225). The work for which Toynbee himself is most fêted is the twelve-volume A Study of History which ranks 
alongside Browne’s four-volume A Literary History of Persia in terms of a monumental scholarly 
undertaking. 
45 Initially puzzling is the number of Sinhalese words it contains which are explained only by their context (in 
interesting contrast to Achebe’s Things Fall Apart which contains a glossary for this purpose), as well as the 
wealth of indigenous folk tales, charms, spells, superstitions and sayings. However, somewhat in line with the 
hermeneutic principles that became popular in narrative—and film—some fifty years after The Village in the 
Jungle was written, this adds to the demand of interpretive energy invested in the reading and, in so doing, 
promotes an added empathy with the characters. 
46 I am somewhat surprised at this assertion by Arnold Toynbee; my own definition of an historical novel is as 
one set in the past or what which covers past events, not one containing a description of contemporary places 
and events. 
47 While The Village in the Jungle predates T. S. Eliot’s “Alfred J.  Prufrock” by only three or four years, 
Woolf was out of London’s literary circles for some seven years prior to the writing and publication of his 
novel. 
48 In relation to the similarity of some aspects of Conrad’s style that scholars have noted in Woolf’s fiction, 
Boehmer makes an excellent point. She suggests that: “The formal echoes of Conrad in Woolf are strong 
enough to suggest that the latter was increasingly relying on Conrad’s epistemological questions, and moving 
away from Rudyard Kipling’s colonial caricatures, in order to represent his own personal and political 
anxieties as an imperialist” (95). 
49 Chenas were created by the controversial system of burning portions of the jungle for progressive plots of 
agriculture. 
50 Another interesting link back to Freud can be made here. See Freud’s final words in Civilization and its 
Discontents, tr. Joan Riviere, ed. M.  Masud R. Khan (London: The Hogarth Press, 1975): “The fateful 
question for the human species seems to me to be whether and to what extent their cultural development will 
succeed in mastering the disturbance of their communal life by the human instinct of aggression and self-
destruction. . . . Men have gained control over the forces of nature to such an extent that with their help they 
would have no difficulty in exterminating one another to the last man” (82). It is clear from my earlier 
discussion that Woolf knew and respected Freud and that he was familiar with—and published some of—his 
work. The two men had a mutual interest in humanity and some of Freud’s psychoanalytical theories would 
have had a bearing on Woolf’s own reflections and writing. Meyerovitz presents an interesting discussion on 
Woolf’s fascination with “man’s conflicting impulses toward the communal psychologies of civilization and 
barbarism, and the relationship of social, political, and economic institutions to these psychologies. . . . After 
the Deluge, Volume I (1931) and Volume II (1939) were the first two parts of Woolf’s study of the psychology 
of man as a social being” (10).  
51 Perhaps it is in this respect—that is, in comparing the poverty of 1910 with the comparative “prosperity” of 
1960—that The Village in the Jungle fulfills the historical function that Toynbee ascribes to it. 
52 As one example, Mervyn de Silva, for instance, states, “Woolf’s ‘village’ shows an inward understanding. 
He was able to sense the quality of living in this small community and this required an intuitive power and a 
gift of imagination” (Diaries, lviii-ix). 
53 Woolf’s The Village in the Jungle elicits a surprising number of comparisons with other works of literature. 
The temptation to compare Woolf with Conrad has arisen from a number of scholars and at least one critic has 
compared The Village in the Jungle with Forster’s A Passage to India and Kipling’s Letting in the Jungle. 
Peter Elkin hails it as a “masterpiece”, comparing it favourably with A Passage to India and the 
“consciousness of a life in nature which is stronger and more enduring than the human” in the novels of D. H. 
Lawrence (47). See “Leonard Woolf’s Masterpiece”, AUMLA:  Journal of the Australasian Universities 
Language and Literature Association 13 (1960): 46-54. In “Leonard Woolf’s ‘Waste Land’: The Village in the 
Jungle”, The Journal of Commonweath Literature 7.1 (June 1972): 22-34, Yasmine Gootneratne draws an 
interesting parallel between Woolf’s novel and T.  S. Eliot’s The Waste Land, suggesting that as “the jungle 
‘crouches’, waiting for rain, the poem captures the unmistakable atmosphere of the fine ‘drought’ passage in   180
                                                                                                                                                       
chapter one of The Village in the Jungle, that begins: ‘The wind from the north-east drops .  .  .’ and ends with 
the magnificent picture of the herds of desperate animals that wander on helplessly, ‘until at last they stand 
upon the barren, waterless shore of the sea’” (32-3). As already mentioned Woolf was Eliot’s first publisher 
and The Waste Land was printed by the Hogarth Press in 1923. Under the circumstances, it would have been 
unlikely that Eliot would not have read Woolf’s book. But Gootneratne’s explanation for the similarities is 
plausible: “The fact that the novel is not among the many references provided by Eliot in this most heavily 
annotated of poems suggests that his borrowing from the ‘drought’ passage was as unconscious and 
unperceived in fact as it appears to be in the text, the result of an intimate, involuntary communication of 
impressions, of convictions, and even of images, rather than of a quotation consciously and deliberately 
made”.  D. C. R. A. Goonetilleke adds to this list the novels of Joyce Cary and Graham Greene, claiming that 
Woolf  “is closer to the Ceylonese than Forster is to the Indians . . . [and more] akin to Joyce Cary” in that the 
novel has as its central characters indigenous people. “It is the indigenous quality of The Village in the Jungle 
that makes it an integral part of the tradition of Ceylon fiction in England, while it remains at the same time an 
integral part of a British tradition” (72-3).  From letter to the editor, Journal of Commonwealth Literature 9.3 
(1975): 72-5. 
54 Things Fall Apart (Oxford: Heinemann, AWS,1986), 117. 
55 Although written half a century apart and set in different geographical locations, I see numerous parallels in 
these two texts: The Village in the Jungle and Things Fall Apart. Both books were about village life, customs 
and beliefs in a jungle setting in the early-twentieth century. In both cases, the protagonist is exiled from his 
own village. Although both stories are told largely from the points of view of their respective protagonists, in 
both cases, the viewpoint becomes omniscient with the entry of the imperialists as authority figures. White is 
set against black as arbiter in the latter’s own land with a blatant disregard for native customs and beliefs. 
There are other interesting points as well:  Despite his own well-known antipathy to imperial authority, how 
much of Woolf is portrayed in Achebe’s Commissioner who walks away from the suicide site with no more on 
his mind than the book, quickly reduced to a single paragraph, that he will write about the incident? 
56 Specifically, it was first published in 1913, reprinted twice in the same year, again in 1925 and 1931, 1951 
(New Phoenix Library Edition), 1961 (The Hogarth Press). 
57 Quotation from Achebe: “I’m an Igbo writer, because this is my basic culture; Nigerian, African and a 
writer . . . no, black first, then a writer”. From Kole Omotoso, Achebe or Soyinka: A Study in Contrasts 
(London: Hans Zell Publishers, 1996), xi. Omotoso’s final comment in this book is a quotation from Declan 
Kiberd (Synge and the Irish Language, 199): “‘The problem faced by nineteenth-century Irish writers was the 
linguistic disorder resulting from rapid loss of Irish and the yet imperfect assimilation of English. That 
problem, in Synge’s opinion, was solved by 1902, when he wrote that ‘the linguistic atmosphere of Ireland has 
become definitely English enough, for the first time, to allow work to be done in English that is perfectly Irish 
in essence’ (Prose, 385)”, 147. 
58 “Travelling Identities: Interrogating the subject of (post)colonial discourse in contemporary travel writing” 
(Murdoch University, MA thesis, 1997), 71.  
59 Note the language Achebe uses in Home and Exile (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000): 
“The real story of A Bend in the River is how an Indian shopkeeper doing business in the heart of Africa and 
with family connections in East Africa learns to break free from primitive ties to a doomed continent and make 
a dash for the bounties of the universal civilization in Europe and North America” (my emphases, 90-1).  
60 From Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness, ed. Robert Kimbrough (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 
1988). 
61 Even Achebe is forced to concede that the novel reflects “the dominant image of Africa in the Western 
imagination” (261). 
62 From an essay titled “Out of Africa” (Guardian Review, 22.2.2003). 
63 Mukherjee’s views are discussed at greater length with regard to Ondaatje in the following chapter. 
64 There are echoes of Said’s disappointment with Rodinson here. See my discussion in chapter one.   181
 
Chapter four 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MICHAEL ONDAATJE AND THE BURDEN OF CULTURE 
 
 
 
 
 
Migration is a one-way trip. 
 There is no home to go back to. 
  
Stuart Hall
1 
 
 
Exile is predicated on the existence of, 
 love for, and a real bond with one’s native place. 
 
Edward Said
2 
 
 
. . . it’s my present that is foreign . . . the past is home, 
 albeit a lost home in a lost city in the mists of lost time . . .  
 
Salman Rushdie 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moving on from the traditional Orientalists to contemporary writers at the other end of the 
twentieth century, the next figure in my re-reading of “orientalism” is located between 
cultures. This chapter reiterates my argument from a different discursive direction—that of 
diasporic “orientalism”—on which I reflect through the works of Michael Ondaatje, a writer 
I have chosen because of the sense of unease I have with regard to his cultural position. He   182
is neither native nor alien, neither settler nor expatriate, and yet, at the same time he is all of 
these. Strictly speaking, he lives in the diaspora, but it is not clear where he positions 
himself in relation to his birthplace. 
  
In discussing Ondaatje’s “exteriority”, I ask to what extent his Running in the Family “re-
creates” the Ceylon of the past and how he has located himself with respect to this text. 
Thus, one of the key issues I address is the extent to which Ondaatje’s work presents an 
example of the ‘other’ as ‘native informant’. How much of the informant can be detected in 
his works? Does he write from the outside or from the inside? By living in the diaspora, has 
he given up the right to represent the Orient? In other words, should texts that concentrate 
on a culture re-visited be construed as exploiting—or telling the secrets—of one’s erstwhile 
homeland or are there exonerating circumstances?  
  
Some of these enquiries provide for connections between the texts of Homi Bhabha, Said, 
Žižek and Barthes as I endeavour to show how Ondaatje deals with the difficulties of 
representation and to assess whether his ‘sense of belonging’ to more than one culture 
absolves him from presumptions about that culture. In other words, in what way does 
Ondaatje’s cultural status simplify or complicate Said’s contentions with regard to the 
West’s “writing the East”? Does ‘the family home’ give him an intrinsic right to “write the 
Orient” and, in so doing, excuse the indisputably ‘exotic’ within his writing? Is there a 
contradiction between his verbally stated cultural affiliations and the way in which a 
cultural ambiguity surfaces in his works?  
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It is clear that these questions cannot be answered without some discussion of identity 
which will help to establish a point of departure for Ondaatje’s viewpoint. By using two of 
Ondaatje’s texts in conjunction with excerpts from the work of other writers and theorists, I 
aim to demonstrate the extent to which issues of cultural identity and displacement dictate 
the way in which writers actively construct or re-present a certain world view for their 
readers. What sort of a text emerges? And what biases are contained therein? 
 
Ondaatje and identity 
In a number of interviews that took place in 1992 following the publication of The English 
Patient for which he just had received the Booker Prize, Ondaatje clearly states his 
affiliation with two very diverse countries: Canada and Sri Lanka.
4 At this point, he has 
spent the last thirty years of his life in Canada and when quizzed by the interviewer if, after 
this length of time, he still felt he was “. . . in a sense a Sri Lankan person”, he replied, 
“Yes, very much so . . . being Sri Lankan born and growing up there, I feel it’s half my life . 
. . Sri Lanka was my culture . . . [but] Canada was the culture I adopted . . . so these two 
things are very important to me”.
5 
  
If I were to analyse Ondaatje’s statement vis à vis the facts, clearly his childhood in Sri 
Lanka did not take up “half” his life, and a great deal less in terms of ‘recollected time’. At 
the same time, there is no reason to doubt that recalled from a distance of forty years those 
eleven years may have felt like half his life.  In an attempt to determine why—and bearing 
in mind that my interest here is restricted to the way in which the loss of a childhood home 
translates into feelings of identity and its consequent translation into literature—I need to 
touch on some differing viewpoints on the subsequent impact of events experienced in   184
childhood. Certain experiences on a young psyche can resurface in the conscious mind at a 
later date with a greater intensity and thus produce a telescopic effect on the period during 
which they took place; others remain suppressed and active only in the subconscious.  
  
In  Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson suggests the following: “All profound 
changes in consciousness, by their very nature, bring with them characteristic amnesias. Out 
of such oblivions, in specific historical circumstances, spring narratives. After experiencing 
the physiological and emotional changes produced by puberty, it is impossible to 
‘remember’ the consciousness of childhood. How many thousands of days passed between 
infancy and early adulthood vanish beyond direct recall!  How strange it is to need another’s 
help to learn that this naked baby in the yellowed photograph . . . is you. . . . Out of this 
estrangement comes a conception of personhood, identity (yes, you and that naked baby are 
identical) which, because it can not be ‘remembered,’ must be narrated”.
6  
  
Following through on this premise, it could be said that arising out of circumstances of 
“estrangement” or loss, there is a need for “a narrative of identity”. What cannot be 
remembered must be narrated. Because narratives of this nature are by definition necessarily 
removed from their temporal and geographical actuality, being “set in homogeneous, empty 
time . . . their frame is historical and their setting sociological . . . [this is the reason] that so 
many autobiographies begin with the circumstances of parents and grandparents, for which 
the autobiographer can have only circumstantial, textual evidence; and why the biographer 
is at pains to record the calendrical, A.D. dates of two biographical events which his or her 
subject can never remember: birth-day and death-day” (204). As specific examples of how 
this “narrative of identity” declares itself, I quote below from two very different and   185
somewhat arbitrarily chosen pieces of text from Salman Rushdie and Ondaatje, both of 
which illustrate a sentiment, implicit and trapped.
 7 
  
Importantly, too, because both pieces of text are removed from a chronological patterning, 
they fall into a category of story-telling where the limiting effect of time is removed and the 
sociological is privileged in its place. Sigmund Freud’s psycho-analytic histories are a case 
in point where the wish or the fantasy thus becomes a “shaping device” for the narrative, 
allowing the dream or “reconstruction” of desire to be presented as evidence.
8 “The case-
study is not concerned with what really happened, it is not told in the order of historical 
time; chronology makes few demands on it” (49).
9  
  
In the first example, the “absent” resonates in Salman Rushdie’s “broken mirrors” of 
memory, captured so beautifully in the Hindi song “Mera Joota Hai Japani” and roughly 
translated by Rushdie as: 
  O, my shoes are Japanese 
  These trousers English, if you please 
  On my head, red Russian hat— 
  My heart’s Indian for all that.
10 
  
In this song, it is the very absence of place—the place that exists only in the memory and 
thus the imagination—that adds to and thus defines the character. The imagination fills in 
what cannot be remembered or is remembered incompletely. Or, sometimes, for something 
that is absent. It allows a reaching out, an attempt to forge a link, an attempt to collapse 
present, past and future into one.  
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In a different way but designed to arrive at the same end, a desire to capture memory of 
place rounds out both the moment of experience and the identity of the author/protagonist in 
a passage taken from Ondaatje’s final words in Running in the Family:
11 
Half an hour before light I am woken by the sound of rain. Rain on wall, 
coconut, and petal . . . I get up and stand here, waiting for the last morning.  
 
My body must remember everything, this brief insect bite, smell of wet 
fruit, the slow snail light, rain, rain, and underneath the hint of colours a 
sound of furious wet birds . . . Dark trees, the mildewed garden wall, the 
slow air pinned down by rain. . . . I do not turn on the light yet. I want this 
emptiness of a dark room where I listen and wait . . . on my last morning, 
all this Beethoven and rain. (202-3) 
 
Who can read either of these two pieces and not be moved? But why are we moved? What 
element calls to us from these apparently dissimilar pieces of text.
12 
  
I suggest that there are two overriding ways in which these pieces of literature speak to the 
reader: the emotive and the visual. Both pieces are awash with feeling and, at the same time, 
totally devoid of overt sentimentality. They can be described as narratives of identity 
because they each tell the ultimate story. They are case studies, too, separated as they are 
from a causal configuration. The visuals create pictures in the reader’s mind and in so 
doing, support the story by allowing the imagination to fill in the missing details. This is 
‘the real’ combined with the fictive, a sense of poetry fused with the prose, the everyday 
experience lifted above the humdrum, feeling without sentimentality, a connection of 
homeland with identity . . . transnational writing at its best.  
  
In the first excerpt, the “heart” is a symbol of feeling, love even, but the lack of sentiment is 
such that the text easily surmounts the problem of describing emotion on which the merit of 
a portion of text is so often judged. Hats, trousers, clothing can be destroyed without   187
destroying the person; but destroy the heart, you kill the living entity within identity. 
Visually, there is a brightness—an almost tangible jauntiness—about the song that would 
cause it to resemble a ditty save for the seriousness of the underlying message in the last 
line; “My heart’s Indian for all that”.
13 This provides a contrast, a shock to the audience, a 
re-cognition of expression of feeling which cannot help but to call forth empathy, and thus a 
binding of reader, or listener, to the narrator. At the same time this segment of song, this 
narrative of identity, stands as a clear and unambiguous expression of national identity. 
  
On the face of it, then, this is the effect on the reader of the text quoted by Rushdie. But 
what about the second example? How does Michael Ondaatje generate his effect? How does 
he draw the reader into his world of dark and rain? How does he narrate himself?  
  
In the excerpt I have quoted, again there is emotion without over-romanticization. The 
reader’s attention is held by a sense of waiting, the sense of rupture we know is about to 
take place, but which in the narrative never does. And then there is a reference to “my 
body”, the corporeal inserted into a description of surroundings, of nature.
14 The insect bite 
is welcomed. As in Donne’s “The Flea”, the insect now carries human blood, the narrator’s 
blood. It provides a link with Ondaatje’s homeland; now he will leave something of himself 
behind. Throughout the passage is the repetition of rain, the persistence of rain, the all-
enveloping heartbeat of rain, a watery symbol of emotion that saturates the atmosphere of 
this final morning, a moment that belongs to both past and present and has no future. Unlike 
the vibrant colour imagery in the first passage quoted, visually this space is virtually 
monochromatic. The mind sketches in the imprint of a man’s body dark against a grey 
background; the fan is but a revolving shadow, the mildew dark splashes on a lighter wall.   188
Light is slowly seeping into the day, lending objects “a hint of colours” not unlike the 
subtlety of almost-colour, a sepia, gently shaded onto the cheeks, lips, eyes of the 
photographic portraits of the past. A greater sense of  ‘colour’ is derived from what is not 
described: a contrasting sense of urgency to the waiting scene is inserted by the “furious wet 
birds” which awakens the senses, encourages the mind to draw on memories, and thus 
inserts images of the bright plumage of the birds of the jungle.
15 
  
Part of the appeal of this piece is that not only does it call on a range of reader senses: sight, 
touch, smell and hearing, but the act of waiting creates a tension between those senses. It 
further draws in the reader with repeated phrases like “last morning” which even in the most 
secular of adults (at least within the Western market towards which his text is projected) 
resonates with the lyrics embedded within biblical songs and hymns learnt by rote in 
childhood. 
  
In both the examples, the descriptive prose is deliberately sparse with a corresponding 
absence of explicit sentimentality. And yet the effect on the reader is one of an experience 
vividly shared, apposite and unequivocal. In an attempt to explain why this should be so, I 
suggest that these passages are emblematic of narratives of identity: the under-writing, the 
shifting of responsibility to the reader’s imagination, the sincerity embedded in both allows 
us to empathise with the claiming of identity, the claiming of ‘personhood’, perhaps even 
filling that gap within ourselves. 
  
Therefore, what would appear to emerge clearly from both these pieces of text is a total lack 
of ambivalence with regard to identity. In the first piece, it is clear that no matter what   189
imprint, or set of expectations, the rest of the world places on this character, his own sense 
of belonging is not in doubt. In the second passage, no longer do we question Ondaatje’s 
arbitrary doubling of the time he spent in the land of his birth because we understand that 
those years are weighted with something heavier and deeper . . . perhaps something that can 
never be adequately verbalized but finds instead its expression in a “narrative of identity”. 
After all the  physical, mental and emotional delving into family history, after all the 
journeying—both metaphorically and in actuality—with members of his family and friends 
in the country of his birth, in this last short chapter there is a sense of stillness. Ondaatje is 
alone with memories that continue to ferment in the quiet of the morning. Just the writer and 
his world.  
  
In this final passage, then, there would appear to be no hint of ambiguity with respect to 
Ondaatje’s belonging. Unquestionably, from the evidence offered in this passage and my 
accompanying analysis, it would appear that he has a clear sense of identity, of belonging to 
the landscape by which he is enfolded, of homeland.  
  
This is neat, but too simplistic, and only one way of evaluating the text. If I set out to further 
analyse Ondaatje’s narrative, there are factors which emerge that not only challenge this 
conclusion, but which could be said to prove the opposite: Taken as a whole, Running in the 
Family ostensibly presents a total confusion of identity. For example, more than once in the 
earlier part of this narrative, Ondaatje stresses the paradox within which he suggests he is 
trapped. “I am the foreigner. I am the prodigal who hates the foreigner,” he asserts (79). 
Two pages later, again he claims: “We own the country we grew up in, or we are aliens and 
invaders. . . . This island was a paradise to be sacked.” What is Ondaatje saying here? Is he   190
claiming that within his homeland he is simultaneously a stranger, a spendthrift who has 
squandered his inheritance, a native with rights of ownership and a conqueror who has 
plundered without permission? Is he admitting that he is both agent and victim of colonial 
aggression?  
  
In discussing this question of identity, Rocío Davis’ answer to this apparent contradiction is 
to draw a parallel between Rushdie’s Imaginary Homelands and Running in the Family in 
suggesting that in this text Ondaatje portrays a duality or doubled identity: “Ondaatje’s 
perception of Ceylon is thus made profound and complex because it entails examining the 
past with what Rushdie has designated a ‘stereoscopic vision . . . a kind of doubled 
perspective: because they, we, are at one and the same time insiders and outsiders in this 
society’”.
16 This supports Kanaganayakam’s view of “the voice of the expatriate, the exiled 
voice that . . . is both marginal and central, divided in its loyalties, but clear and unequivocal 
in its commitment to struggle with competing identities”.
17 
 
The question of a “doubled identity” needs to be addressed at this point because a neat  
way of bypassing this whole identity problem is to acknowledge Ondaatje’s ‘affiliations’ 
with both countries by acquiescing to this argument of “stereoscopic vision” and simply 
labelling him a Canadian-Sri Lankan. Admittedly, this provides one way around the identity 
problem, but one which is simultaneously too simplistic and potentially unwieldy. 
Categorizing Ondaatje as Canadian-Sri Lankan ignores two other important constituents of 
his genealogical identity: the Dutch and the Tamil. A search for identity is a search for self 
and the self is somewhere apart from physical surroundings. If the result is doubled, the self 
(which is necessarily single) has not been found and the psyche remains split.  It neither   191
explains the importance nor the role of identity within literature. Examples taken from the 
works of two other first-class writers—Salman Rushdie and V. S. Naipaul—will clarify just 
what I mean here. 
  
Rushdie describes himself—quite proudly and openly—as British Indian. He argues quite 
clearly for a “doubled identity”. But let me examine further the song “Mera Joota Hai 
Japani” quoted above and extracted, in this case, from Rushdie’s Imaginary Homelands. 
However, in Imaginary Homelands, Rushdie states that it could “almost be Saleem’s  theme 
song”. Since Saleem is the protagonist in Midnight’s Children, this reference provides a 
second instance in his work in which this song has significance. It is also the song sung by 
another protagonist, Gibreel Farishta at the beginning of The Satanic Verses.  I have already 
established the unambiguous sense of national identity projected by the character in the 
song. That the same song repeats itself in three of Rushdie’s major texts would suggest to 
me that there is a strong likelihood of the author’s feelings paralleling those of his lead 
characters in this particular instance.
18 And so while Rushdie, like Ondaatje, is appropriately 
grateful to his adopted country for the basics of food, shelter and clothing—and, no doubt, 
opportunity—it is reasonable to assume that his heart, his feeling, lies in his homeland and 
that perhaps a doubled identity becomes more a matter of ‘political correctness’ than a sense 
of rootedness. Accordingly I find the term “doubled identity” somewhat fragile and 
ambiguous. But I query the usefulness of the term in the context of this thesis for another 
reason, too: namely because it does not adequately explain why and how a writer with a 
sense of belonging to more than one culture writes. 
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Rushdie captures the problem of writing from without in this extract from Imaginary 
Homelands:  
It may be that writers in my position, exiles or emigrants or expatriates, are 
haunted by some sense of loss, some urge to reclaim, to look back, even at 
the risk of being mutated into pillars of salt. But if we do look back, we 
must also do so in the knowledge—which gives rise to profound 
uncertainties—that our physical alienation . . . almost inevitably means that 
we will not be capable of reclaiming precisely the thing that was lost; that 
we will, in short, create fictions, not actual cities or villages, but invisible 
ones, imaginary homelands, Indias of the mind. (10) 
 
 
In relating his experiences in attempting to recall Bombay in the 1950s and 60s just prior to 
the writing of Midnight’s Children, Rushdie claims: 
. . . it was precisely the partial nature of these memories, their 
fragmentation, that made them so evocative for me. The shards of memory 
acquired greater status, greater resonance, because they were remains . . . 
the mundane acquired numinous qualities. . . . I suggest that the writer who 
is out-of-country and even out-of-language may experience this loss in an 
intensified form. It is made more concrete for him by the physical fact of 
discontinuity, of his present being in a different place from his past, of his 
being ‘elsewhere’. (12) 
 
 
One of the reasons that identity is so vital to a writer is because it is the groundswell from 
which he or she draws inspiration. It could thus be argued that an identity that arises from, 
or is created by, cultural displacement is inevitably more intricate than one which has arisen 
without that complicating factor. But is this always so? 
  
A possible answer to this question lies in the second example. Here I quote from an address 
given by Nobel Prize winner V. S. Naipaul in New York in 1992.
19 In an address titled “Our 
Universal Civilization”, Naipaul recounts the story of a young Javanese boy who wanted to 
be a poet. An important part of this story is the description of the boy’s mother: an elegant,    193
 
learned and refined woman whose “manners were like art; they were Javanese court 
manners”. Conflict between mother and son occurs when the mother rejects her son’s 
choice of vocation because in the tradition in which she has been brought up “the epics of 
her country—and to her they would have been like sacred texts—already existed, had 
already been written. . . . For the mother, all poetry had already been written” (504). 
Although the boy has grown up in the same nation and, ostensibly, in the same culture as 
his mother, a modern education has resulted in a set of values and corresponding ambitions 
that are vastly different. The distance between his mother and himself is more than a 
generation gap, more than an educational gap: it is a culture gap. In an analogy he uses to 
describe the magnitude of the lack of comprehension between the two, Naipaul suggests 
that it would be like “a devout mother in another culture asking her writer-son what he 
intended to write next, and getting the reply, ‘I am thinking of adding a book to the Bible.”’ 
And this lack of understanding stems from within the same cultural milieu. Could it be that 
lack of understanding is all too often attributed to cross-cultural clashes when the real 
reason lies somewhere else? Thus while cultural displacement obviously generates its own 
problems, one must be wary that it does not become a handy catch-all for totally unrelated 
issues. 
  
Take the notion of ‘home’, for example, as used in the sense of a place or country of origin 
and imbued with connotations that words like ‘domicile’ do not evoke. Recent findings as a 
result of case studies in the field of social anthropology and the new ethnography are 
salutary in that they show that this concept is also in a state of a flux. Witness the following 
statement: “Whilst they [expatriates] may dream of returning ‘home’, they can never go   194
back to the place they originally left, for the processes of globalization and modernity in 
which both they and the societies they left behind are caught up, have irredeemably changed 
them both”.
20 
  
A seminar discussion with Satendra Nandan and Brij Lal arrives at a similar conclusion. 
Both Nandan and Lal were in agreement when discussing a return to the villages in which 
they grew up. “There are all sorts of confluences of influence [within Fiji]. We [no longer] 
speak the language of the local community . . . there are barriers to cross within our own 
group . . .”
21 
  
Thus when discussing the often shattering effects of displacement, it is constructive to bear 
at the forefront of our minds that the cultures and nations of origin are not immune from 
change from within. And this is where I suggest that the position of exile may well be 
privileged in comparison to being displaced in one’s own culture. If one is displaced either 
as an elder or, as in the case of the story above, as part of the younger generation—one 
becomes in effect as much a stranger within one’s own country as the exile is in another. 
This can be a lot harder to bear since this form of alienation attracts less attention, less 
empathy, less sympathy, than that of the exile. Indeed, the only way to ensure that one’s 
‘knowledge’ of a homeland remains intact is to hold on to the illusion. That necessitates 
leaving and never returning. And never picking up a newspaper.
22 
  
But the attempt to ‘go back’ is too firmly linked to primal behaviour to be lightly discarded. 
It is instinctual within the animal kingdom to try to return to what has been left behind, to 
attempt to recapture whatever it was that one thought he or she had. There are those who    195
 
return to the geographical space that used to be called ‘home’ for whom the notion of a 
homeland can never be erased, however inaccurate. It is a sobering fact that this removal of 
self from a place of birth with its attendant need to rely on memories as unreliable as fading 
snapshots, intensifies an experience which may be magnified either by distance or by a real 
panic that the loss may be permanent. Thus ‘home’, too, is an unstable concept. 
  
However, part of the fluidity of identity is that it, almost by definition, encompasses one’s 
own world view. In other words, while it is linked both to the ideology of a homeland and a 
nationality, it can also be separate from both, and closer to one’s perception of oneself. Thus 
while Rushdie talks of a “doubled identity”, Naipaul uses the predicament of the young 
Javanese boy as an introduction to a discussion of his own sense of identity, but the 
conclusion he draws is somewhat different to that of Rushdie. For Naipaul there is a 
“universal civilization” from which his identity is drawn.  
I am not going to attempt to define this civilization. I will only speak of it in 
a personal way. . . . It is the civilization in which I have been able to 
practise my vocation as a writer. To be a writer, you need to start with a 
certain kind of sensibility. The sensibility itself is created, or given 
direction, by an intellectual atmosphere.  
 
Sometimes an atmosphere can be too refined, a civilization too achieved, 
too ritualized. [As in the story of the Javanese culture quoted above.] . . . 
This kind of society [intellectual atmosphere] didn’t exist in Trinidad. It 
was necessary, therefore, if I was going to be a writer, and live by my 
books, to travel out to that kind of society where the writing life was 
possible. This meant, for me at that time, going to England. I was travelling 
from the periphery, the margin, to what to me was the centre; and it was my 
hope that, at the centre, room would be made for me. It took time; I was 
forty—and had been publishing in England for fifteen years—before a book 
of mine was seriously published in the United States. 
 
But I always recognized, in England in the 1950s, that as someone with a 
writing vocation there was nowhere else for me to go. And if I have to 
describe the universal civilization I would say it is the civilization that both 
gave the prompting and the idea of the literary vocation; and also gave the 
means to fulfil that prompting; the civilization that enabled me to make that   196
journey from the periphery to the centre; the civilization that links me not 
only to this audience but also to that now not-so-young man in Java whose 
background was as ritualized as my own, and on whom—as on me—the 
outer world had worked, and given the ambition to write. (507) 
 
It was from within “the centre,” that Naipaul certainly fulfilled his writing ambitions, but 
leaving his birthplace served other purposes, too.
23 It not only allowed him to view his 
Trinidadian past from a distance, but in addition it offered him a passage through “many 
states of knowledge and self-knowledge”. And although he admits that the question of 
identity was a “more complicated matter” for him than it had been for his parents and 
grandparents, he claims, perhaps relative to what he feels he has gained, that “there was no 
problem for me there. Whole accumulations of scholarship were mine . . . I could carry four 
or five or six different cultural ideas in my head. I knew about my ancestry and my ancestral 
culture; I knew about the history of India . . . I knew where I was born. . . . I knew about the 
journey I would have to make to the centre in order to exercise the vocation I had given 
myself” (512). In other words, he knows from whence he comes and where he is going. 
  
Thus for Naipaul, nationality is but one component of an identity that is truly encompassing, 
composed as it is of a rich seam of “knowing” . . . a  knowledge of ancestry, history, 
scholarship, cultures. But it was only by breaking free, moving away—in this case to the 
metropolis—that allowed Naipaul’s identity to surface by giving free reign to an 
imagination well-served by his underlying scholarship. This is the “universal civilization” to 
which he belongs and within which he claims a space.
24 This is a civilization apart from 
nation, “an elastic idea . . . [implying] a certain kind of society, a certain kind of awakened 
spirit. I don’t imagine my father’s parents would have been able to understand the idea”. 
The last sentence gives us a clue to as to why Naipaul needed to escape from the confines of 
his Trinidadian present: the only way in which he was to find the writer within himself was   197
to carve out another identity. Different from the idea that his father and grandfather had of 
him and for him; different from Salman Rushdie’s idea of identity, different again from that 
of Ondaatje. And different from Satendra Nandan, whose identity stems from within, in that 
Naipaul claims an identity from without, from the universal. 
  
Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that identity is a fluid concept, dependent to a 
certain extent on individual levels of self-esteem and running in tandem with—influenced 
by but detached from—a sense of home and of nation. While in itself this contention does 
not yet present an answer to what I am exploring here—the reason for the apparent 
confusion of identity Ondaatje presents within Running in the Family—it paves the way for 
other assertions.  
  
Ondaatje is a consummate writer and storyteller, an author whose textual messages—and 
even the gaps contained therein—are more likely to be consciously constructed than 
otherwise. Although it could be said that there is considerable thematic ambiguity in his 
works, I suggest that this is more deliberate than otherwise.
25 Accordingly, I want to return 
to the passage analysed earlier. The point that I want to stress is that by placing himself 
within the half-light of breaking day, Ondaatje stresses an ambivalence between light and 
dark. There is no real conclusion to Running in the Family. No neat ending. It is a work in 
progress. “‘You must get this book right,’ my brother tells me, ‘You can only write it once.’ 
But the book again is incomplete.” As readers, we are left to form our own conclusion, to 
produce our own meanings. This is what Barthes would call a scriptible or “writerly text”, a 
text which is not a product, but a production which calls as much upon the imagination of 
the reader as the writer and becomes a “perpetual present”.
26   198
  
Despite constantly shifting the position from which he writes (indicative of what Homi 
Bhabha has called “the politics of polarity”), in the final moments of Running in the Family, 
Ondaatje articulates a clear and unambiguous sense of identity in that the reader is left in no 
doubt that he belongs to the landscape he describes. But from a distance, he claims 
emotional attachment to two major, very different, nations. Although there is an apparent 
paradox contained in the distancing of himself from his birth land in one chapter and 
reclaiming it in the next, I suggest that Ondaatje is too competent a writer to write himself 
into a contradiction without good reason.  
  
As in any discussion of representation, it becomes necessary to dig beneath the referential 
surface. Having rejected the notion of doubled identity as inadequate for my purpose here, 
and while acknowledging that an inevitable fluidity informs and distorts the concept of 
identity inextricably linked as it is to the other equally unstable concepts of nation and 
perception, I need again to turn to theoretical intervention, although this method of 
reasoning may well have its practical application in the way we approach or interpret 
literature of this transnational nature. 
  
Accordingly, this is the juncture at which I wish to reintroduce the theory Homi Bhabha 
calls the “Third Space” which concerns the space between the “You” and the “I” implicit in 
any literary enterprise. Although this was discussed in some detail in chapter one, a 
reiteration of the main principles is useful here. 
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This “Third Space of enunciations” carries a cultural and historical dimension which stands 
as a precondition for the articulation of cultural difference. Thus the Third Space is the in-
between or the interstices responsible for carrying the burden of the meaning of culture. It is 
within this space that Ondaatje allows himself the liberty to articulate this “freedom from”. 
Thus the points of apparent disjuncture within the text are his moment of “dialectical 
reorganization”, or reconstruction. It is his own recognition of himself, of his moment in 
time and space, of his ‘other’. It is the moment, or the gap, of articulation itself, the collapse 
of linear time and the rolling of the past into the present. Applying it to the text in question 
involves recognizing that the process of interpretation is ambivalent and forever changing. 
In other words: 
The pact of interpretation is never simply an act of communication between 
the I and the You designated in the statement. The production of meaning 
requires that these two places be mobilized in the passage through a Third 
Space, which represents both the general conditions of language and the 
specific implication of the utterance in a performative and institutional 
strategy of which it cannot ‘in itself’ be conscious. What this unconscious 
relation introduces is an ambivalence in the act of interpretation. The 
pronominal I of the proposition cannot be made to address—in its own 
words—the subject of enunciation, for this is not personable, but remains a 
spatial relation within the schemata and strategies of discourse. The 
meaning of the utterance is quite literally neither the one nor the other. . . . 
 
The intervention of the Third Space of enunciation, which makes the 
structure of meaning and reference an ambivalent process, destroys this 
mirror of representation in which cultural knowledge is customarily 
revealed as an integrated, open, expanding code. Such an intervention quite 
properly challenges our sense of the historical identity of culture as a 
homogenizing, unifying force, authenticated by the originary Past, kept 
alive in the national tradition of the People. In other words, the disruptive 
temporality of enunciation displaces the narrative of the Western nation 
which Benedict Anderson so perceptively describes as being written in 
homogeneous, serial [sic] time. (The Location of Culture, 36-7)
27   
 
Thus one possible answer to Ondaatje’s apparent contradictions suggests that these are 
nothing other than his expression of a hybrid identity, “caught in the discontinuous time of   200
translation and negotiation”, the split-space of enunciation. In this “‘politics of difference’ 
the ‘other’ is never outside or beyond us; it emerges forcefully, within cultural discourse, 
when we think we speak most intimately and indigenously ‘between ourselves’”.
28  In other 
words, by “exploring this Third Space, we may elude the politics of polarity and emerge as 
the others of our selves” (The Location of Culture, 38-9). 
  
In this instance, theoretical reasoning has produced a practical answer. It has opened the 
path to a further possibility, to “conceptualizing an international culture, based not on the 
exoticism of multiculturalism or the diversity of cultures, but in the inscription and 
articulation of culture’s hybridity. To this end we should remember that it is the ‘inter’—the 
cutting edge of translation and negotiation, the in-between space—that carries the burden of 
the meaning of culture” (38).
29
 
  
Acknowledging the contradiction at the site of enunciation suggests a natural ambivalence 
and intertextual relationship between the nation of origin and Western culture. Thus a 
hybrid identity could be asserted for Ondaatje—which allows him the freedom to be 
Sinhalese and Canadian and Dutch and Tamil—for in fact he cannot be the one or even a 
combination of two while ignoring the other elements of the colonial background—of the 
‘other’ selves—that he clearly sees as Running in the Family. 
  
Plainly, then, this search for an identity for this writer is not pure pedantry. The debate with 
which I started this chapter—the attempt to assign an identity to Ondaatje—has a practical 
result in that it offers one resolution to a paradox within a critically acclaimed text of 
literature. The celebratory closure of his narrative could thus be seen as a part of this   201
process of understanding that this moment of transit has neither past nor present, nor future. 
It just is. Ondaatje lives in the “unhomely” world of Morrison’s Beloved which defies 
outdated ideas of cultural designation. He ‘belongs’ in Sri Lanka just as he does in Canada. 
He ‘belongs’ to the colonial invaders, just as he does to the Tamil workers. As Bhabha 
states, “The meaning of the utterance is quite literally neither the one nor the other . . .” 
Ondaatje waits in the wings of  “homogeneous, empty time” where moments are created by 
the rhythm of the fan which lends neither a past nor a present to the scene, but instead a 
sense of simultaneity. Thus, it follows, that the apparent contradiction with which I started 
this chapter resolves itself. In spite of, or perhaps because of, what is often regarded as his 
confused and confusing history, Ondaatje’s ancestry renders him simultaneously ‘agent’ and 
‘victim’ of colonial hegemony. But lest we think such a mixed genealogy is purely a 
product of modernity, we should consider an opinion of nineteenth-century Oriental 
philologist Ernest Renan in his essay “What is a Nation?”  
The truth is that there is no pure race… The noblest countries, England, 
France, and Italy, are those where the blood is the most mixed. Is Germany 
an exception in this respect? Is it a purely Germanic country? This is a 
complete illusion. The whole of the south was once Gallic; the whole of the 
east, from the river Elbe on, is Slav. . . . The zoological origins of humanity 
are massively prior to the origins of culture, civilization, and language. The 
primitive Aryan, primitive Semitic, and primitive Touranian groups had no 
physiological unity. These groupings are historical facts, which took place 
in a particular epoch, perhaps 15,000 or 20,000 years ago . . .  A Frenchman 
is neither a Gaul, nor a Frank, nor a Burgundian. . . . Race is something 
which is made and unmade . . . and the leading nations of Europe are 
nations of essentially mixed blood. (Nation and Narration, 14-5)
30 
 
If we accept the premise that we  are all hybrids in one form or another—in many cases not 
only blends of nationalities, but also of families, religions, cultures and philosophical or 
belief systems—the process of globalization with its increasingly sophisticated 
communication systems will only increase that trend. So far as this civilization is   202
concerned: could it be said that the mythological symbolism of the Tower of Babel in the 
grand narrative of Western institutionalized religion is crumbling?  
 
Representing the unrepresentable 
Although a full investigation into the issues of representation is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, Edward Said’s insistence on the role that this notion plays in Western works about 
the East demands an exploration of the concept inasmuch as it affects the writers and 
writing under analysis. Having established a hybrid identity for Ondaatje and, in initial 
exploration, seen the effect this sense of identity imposes on a small segment of his writing 
in the final paragraphs of Running in the Family, I need at this juncture to look more 
directly at some of the theoretical assumptions that underlie the issues of representation 
before examining Ondaatje’s texts in more detail.  
  
I mentioned earlier that I considered Ondaatje’s text to be “writerly”. Since a writerly text is 
one way of representing the world, I would like now to rehearse some of the possibilities 
inherent in that term. At the risk of going over familiar ground, I first return to Barthes and 
his insistence that the writerly text acknowledges the essentially shifting characteristic of 
representation by leaving the act of interpretation to the reader.
31 According to this theory, 
no longer is the “novel bound by the realities and limitations of the actual world and the 
laws of probability”.
32 No longer is it limited to realism. To the contrary, the contemporary 
novel portrays an almost celebratory lack of form or structure which results in a merging of 
fictive constructs with what once was categorized as non-fiction, the neatly labelled genres 
of biography, memoir and history. And so while the act of representing continues to 
demand both representer and represented—or subject and object—giving rise to an   203
inevitable transaction between the two that is impossible to fix in stasis, the determinant(s) 
of meaning is supplied by a third party, the reader, the only boundary now being the 
reader’s imagination. This is, in essence, what Barthes asserts in S/Z when he contrasts the 
“writerly” text with the “readerly” which for him is the “classic” or conventional text.
33 
Thus, to use examples from this thesis, Browne’s A Year Amongst the Persians might be 
classified as a readerly text in that, “By participating in the need to set forth the end of every 
action (conclusion, interruption, closure, dénouement), [it openly] declares itself to be 
historical” (52). In contrast, Ondaatje’s Running in the Family is writerly in that there is no 
clear beginning nor end, no homogeneity, no real linearity.
34 The reader is invited to 
participate in the construction of the text and in the making of meaning. In Barthesian terms, 
one methodology denotes, the other connotes.
35 Thus “… the goal of literary work (of 
literature as work) is to make the reader no longer a consumer, but a producer of the text” 
(4). In other words, there are no final, no official, no “authorized”, meanings. All becomes 
subject to reader interpretation.  
  
Barthes’ theories are persuasive in making meaning of contemporary texts and aptly 
describe the structure of Ondaatje’s Running in the Family which I will address at greater 
length later. But as a method of engaging with the problematic of representation, his 
concentration on reader as producer lacks balance. I therefore want to engage the notion of 
representation from another angle: that of misrepresentation. This approach assumes a 
certain degree of deliberation in misrepresentation that is not present in either the lisible or 
the  scriptible. The difference is that while both the writerly and the readerly in their 
contrasting ways strive towards a truth—in that for the writerly it is the truths that are 
produced by or which resonate with the reader, while for the readerly, it is the writer’s   204
absolute closure of meaning as in: this is how it was or the definitive biblical it is writ—
misrepresentation returns a measure of authority, and therefore control, to the writer.
36 In 
other words, as creator of a work, one can choose to misrepresent an event, a scene, a 
situation, or one can do so unconsciously. But either way—conscious or unconscious—
there is a gap between what is and what is not. It leaves the writer, his or her motives, and 
the work, as exposed as any theory of deconstruction could do.  
  
Let me turn to a work of fiction to clarify my point. In Alex Miller’s The Sitters,
37 the artist-
protagonist claims with some insistence:  
 
Portraiture is the art of misrepresentation. It’s the art of unlikeness. That’s 
why it’s so difficult. . . . You’ve got to avoid the authority of the likeness. . . 
You’ve got to reach into the dark and touch something else. The problem is 
always to visualize the person. Portraiture is an act of faith. In portraiture 
it’s the shy beast you’re after not the mask. . . . The mistake we make, to 
look for the perfect image. . . . The longing for a fixed truth resident behind 
the reality we’ve brought into being ourselves. . . . It takes two to make a 
portrait. And one of them’s always yourself. (38-40)
38   
  
In other words, what Miller is saying is that the production of the work of art—a portrait, a 
book, a piece of sculpture—is as much a journey for the artist as it is for the reader and any 
representation carries an inevitable imprint of its creator. As Miller’s protagonist insists, 
“The portrait’s always the portrait of the artist” (71). Thus, in a subversion of its own 
foundational truth, misrepresentation can in effect be closer to the ‘real’ than representation, 
but the truth it uncovers becomes the truth of the creator, of the author or the artist. Thus the 
writer is returned to the position of producer of the text. Although this line of reasoning 
does not preclude the voyeur or reader standing as the ultimate producer or arbiter of 
meaning, neither of Barthes’ categories—lisible nor scriptible—allows for this mimetic  
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relationship between subject (writer) and market (reader)—a Marxist “exchange”—which 
dominates the object (commodity) which is never allowed to constitute itself fully. 
  
In an extension of what Miller is saying above, Slavoj Žižek draws together Hegelian and 
Lacanian modes of thought to arrive at a anti-descriptivist conclusion: namely, that Miller’s 
“shy beast”, “the ideological distortion”, is written into the “very essence” of the mask itself 
(28).
39 In other words:  
 
. . . ideology is not simply a ‘false consciousness’, an illusory representation 
of reality, it is rather this reality itself which is already to be conceived as 
‘ideological’—‘ideological’ is a social reality whose very existence implies 
the non-knowledge of its participants as to its essence—that is, the social 
effectivity, the very reproduction of which implies that the individuals ‘do 
not know what they are doing’. . . . [O]ne of its possible definitions would 
also be a ‘formation whose very consistency implies a certain non-
knowledge on the part of the subject’:  the subject can ‘enjoy his symptom’ 
only in so far as its logic escapes him – the measure of the success of its 
interpretation is precisely its dissolution. (21) 
 
Interestingly, this last observation of Žižek’s precisely describes the concept contained in 
the allegory of Plato’s cave where the illusion is real until knowledge intervenes. 
40 
  
Again in Midnight’s Children, Rushdie has Saleem say essentially the same thing: “Suppose 
yourself in a large cinema, sitting at first in the back row, and gradually moving up . . . until 
your nose is almost pressed against the screen. Gradually the stars’ faces dissolve into 
dancing grains; tiny details assume grotesque proportions and it becomes clear that the 
illusion itself is reality” (Imaginary Homelands, 13). 
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Writers, philosophers and critics—as diverse as Barthes, Žižek, Miller, Rushdie, Plato—all 
have different ways of arriving at what is, in essence, the same conclusion with regard to the 
hermeneutic possibilities inherent in the text. Regardless of whether the “producer” of the 
text is reader or writer, the product itself (the text) is never allowed to constitute, or 
represent, itself fully. It remains in a state of flux. Illusion may be reality, but it is only 
insofar as it complies with the condition of “non-knowledge”. 
 
Not only is it plain that there is no such thing as “objective reality”, but it is impossible not 
to agree with critics like Anindyo Roy when they insist clearly and categorically that the 
notion of representation in terms of objective depiction is a failure.
41  
  
However, while in terms of its fallibility it may be a poor tool for objective portrayal, 
nonetheless representation is the only tool we have for the depiction of anything at all. 
Without attempts by ancestral and indigenous groups to represent what they considered 
important to their culture on cave walls or around the girths of vases, on tablets or walls of 
stone or papyrus, our histories would be even more fragmented than they already are. 
Specifically, ‘other’ and ‘informant’ Ondaatje may be, but Running in the Family gives us a 
picture of a pre-Independent Ceylon we would not otherwise have.  
  
To this juncture, I have been discussing representation—and misrepresentation—in terms of 
a perfect world of neutral power relations, assuming, too, an impartiality in Ondaatje’s 
portrayal of past Ceylon and present-day Sri Lanka. I have suggested that while 
representation is most often used as a means for portraying a likeness, misrepresentation is a 
more deliberate effort to arrive at an essence, and that works of fiction can be described as   207
writerly or readerly in the way they portray the world, respectively leaving more or less for 
the reader to make of the text. But what happens to the notion of representation when it 
becomes an apparatus for control? One only has to bring to mind the symbolic 
representations of power—in the form of the swastika, for example, or Foucault’s 
panopticon—for the notion to take on a more chilling perspective.  
  
Representation’s inevitable relationship with power is the conclusion that Edward Said 
draws in his efforts to define the problematic that stands at the core of his Orientalist 
concerns. Reflecting on the inability of representation to imitate the “truth”, he concedes 
that “the idea of representation is a theatrical one” in that it reaches for the dramatic in its 
turn of phrase or choice of subject. But the critical thrust of his argument here is his 
insistence that “the Orientalist is outside the Orient, both as an existential and as a moral 
fact . . .  [and that the] principal product of this exteriority is of course representation . . .” 
(Orientalism, 21).
42 Said’s concern, of course, is that the dramatic principles that inform 
both the concept of representation and the act of representing will always render any 
attempt at representation dubious. Accordingly, it will always be an act of power within 
postcolonial discourse and, as such, an infringement of the rights of the indigenous party or, 
in the case of Said’s specific discourse, the rights of the Oriental.  
  
When a non-native attempts to write or describe a situation or a people within a country not 
his own, Said claims that inevitability the audience will be presented with “a highly 
artificial enactment of what a non-Oriental has made into a symbol for the whole Orient”.  
In this way, bearing in mind that language itself is “a highly organized and encoded system   208
 . . . the written statement is a presence to the reader by virtue of its having excluded, 
displaced, made supererogatory any such real thing as ‘the Orient’” (21).
43  
  
In other words, following the line of Said’s argument, Browne’s depiction of Persia is 
suspect primarily because Browne was an Orientalist and as such his account is “premised 
upon exteriority . . . on the fact that the Orientalist, poet or scholar, makes the Orient speak, 
describes the Orients, renders its mysteries plain for and to the West” (21). It is a Saidian 
tendency to extrapolate from the general to the specific and, as I have already shown, the 
parameters of Said’s discourse make it difficult for anyone to escape the “orientalist” tag.  
Thus it would follow that, deconstructed from within the discourse Said has fashioned, 
Browne’s representation is not only inevitably subjective, but subtly presented with 
imperialistic hegemonic designs.
44 
  
But what about the transnational author? What about the writer who can no longer claim the 
land of his birth and early upbringing as his normal place of abode, but returns to talk to the 
natives of that land, to uncover and collate evidence in the form of documentation and 
interviews, and then departs in possession of the means to write up this information in such 
a way that it will appeal to an established Western readership? Is not he or she equally 
culpable of just the point that Said is making? Is this form of writing not exactly just what 
Said fears: the appropriation and use of an indigenous knowledge by another party? Is this 
not what upset the Tlingits, the American Indians who objected to their “history” and “law” 
being displayed as “art” and “artifacts” by the Portland Art Museum?
45 
  
More specifically, when Michael Ondaatje writes what is ostensibly an autobiography from 
the distance of his adopted country about the country of his birth, is he guilty of a late-  209
twentieth-century form of “orientalism”? What is it about the way in which he represents 
Sri Lanka that suggests an exteriority “governed by some version of the truism that if the 
Orient [in this case, Sri Lanka] could represent itself, it would; since it cannot, the 
representation does the job, for the West, and faute de mieux, for the poor Orient” (21)? In 
other words, how does Ondaatje portray Sri Lanka? Or would Said’s objection lie not in 
how he represents his subject, but in the very fact and act of his so-doing? Further, what 
does this representation say about the author, about the expatriate condition and about 
literature itself? And, finally, how much basis is there in Arun Mukherjee’s argument that 
“Ondaatje, coming from a Third World country with a colonial past, does not write about 
his otherness. . . . [T]here is no trauma of uprooting evident in his poetry; nor is there a need 
for redefinition in a new context; the subjects that preoccupy so many immigrant writers” 
(187)?
46 
  
In an endeavour to answer these questions, I shall return to Ondaatje’s account of family 
and background in early Ceylon contained in the miscellany of memories he calls Running 
in the Family. I need to look first at the structure of this book and what informs that 
structure as well as to ask whether it works as a piece of writing. 
  
The first point I wish to make about Running in the Family challenges much existing critical 
comment about this text. More than one reviewer has used the phrase “straddles fiction and 
autobiography” in an attempt to typecast the work, but as I have already suggested, this 
work is typically contemporary in that it defies attempts to label it in such a simplistic 
manner. Indeed, what it is not is autobiography since we learn very little that could be said 
to be ‘factual’, useful or insightful about the life of Michael Ondaatje beyond his familial   210
connections and a handful of anecdotal memories of a childhood cut short by early entry 
into an adult world at the age of eleven. Not here the usual writer’s ‘secrets’ spilled, nor the 
clarity of a traditional linear history. Instead, this text offers a jumble of prose, poetry and 
journal entries presented as a medley of memories, experiences, impressions, notes and 
anecdotes which are interspersed, seemingly at random, with historical references and 
incidents which, in turn, sit alongside poems about Sri Lankan village life and quotes from 
other writers and poets. There is a breathlessness about the rapid pace with which the writer 
switches from landscape to landscape. It lacks any real attempts at organization, a storyline, 
a conclusion, but most of all it lacks the lyrical prose of his other works. Much is made by 
critics about the notion of ‘running’ in Running in the Family  and the multiplicity of 
meaning encapsulated within the title suggesting that the narrative is as much about running 
‘in’ as it is about running ‘to’ or ‘from’ or ‘against’, symbolizing continual, but irresolute, 
motion. In addition to the running to and from, there is a kind of running on the spot 
punctuated by a self-centred return again and again to the writer himself.  
  
It is pertinent to ask at this point just what Michael Ondaatje was hoping to achieve with 
this work. In other words, is this no more than a random assortment of memories liberally 
embellished with fiction, a collection of anecdotes which bears little resemblance to the 
corpus of his writing, particularly the prose component? Certainly, as an epigrammatic 
salute or “gesture” to an unavailable father it works as a son’s attempt to connect, albeit 
posthumously, with a man who was little more than a family figurehead.
47 But in the 
postcolonial context of my work here, I am concerned with a different type of exteriority, 
the exteriority that Said has identified, the exteriority that is an inevitable component of 
hybridity, and that which Mukherjee perceives in the silence with which she claims   211
Ondaatje treats his “otherness”. What effect does this geographical distancing have on the 
way in which this writer represents his birth-land? 
  
Thus if I expand on the notion of running  in this text, it  becomes more than just a 
characteristic of the work. In addition, the sense of apprehension (running ‘away’, running 
‘back’) encoded in the word suggests that it defines the rationale for writing the book. 
Within this rationale lies the social agency of the author, because while this text ostensibly 
serves the purpose of providing a family ‘portrait’ and a memorial to Ondaatje’s father, the 
underlying message is a search for identity which necessitates, encapsulated again within 
that search, a portrait of Sri Lanka as a fatherland. I repeat an earlier quotation: “But the 
book again is incomplete. In the end all your children move among the scattered acts and 
memories with no more clues.”  
  
This returns me to Ondaatje’s representation of Sri Lanka, an issue on which his critics are 
quite vocal and need to be acknowledged. For example, Arun Mukherjee makes much of 
Ondaatje’s lack of engagement with the political and social realities of Sri Lanka while 
Kanaganayakam claims that his attempts at representation in Running in the Family are an 
outright failure (40).   
  
First Mukherjee’s concerns with regard to Ondaatje’s “otherness” need to be addressed and 
I have two main points to make in this regard. To begin with— although she does not make 
it clear in which society she locates him as “other” (Canadian or Sri Lankan), her labelling 
of Ondaatje as an “immigrant writer” would suggests that she connects his “otherness” to 
the Canadian society in which he resides and that she resents the degree of assimilation that   212
Ondaatje has adopted. Like Maxine Hong Kingston, like Amy Tan, for Mukherjee, 
Ondaatje must set himself apart as the “immigrant writer”.
48 Secondly, there is a possibility 
that Mukherjee’s apprehension in this respect comes from a deeper fear: a dread of a 
betrayal similar to that we observe underpinning the emotion in Said’s work. As a field of 
study, postcolonialism is to a fairly significant extent dependent on writers from previously 
colonized countries acknowledging imperial domination and “writing back to the centre” in 
terms of not forgetting the lessons of the past. Indeed, Patrick Brantlinger goes further. He 
maintains that a cultural “crisis occurs when an established system of representation is 
challenged by increasing numbers of people as not representing or as misrepresenting 
significant aspects of social experience”.
49 In other words, a certain amount of vigilance is 
required to keep alive the differences—la différance— that stand at the core of postcolonial 
discourse for fear that, through apathy, we allow ourselves to slip backwards into an 
insidious re-absorption of Eurocentrism and a return to imperialistic practices in the form of 
a neo-colonialism that waits just around the corner.
50  
  
While it is not difficult to understand Mukherjee’s disquiet in this respect in that it is well-
recognised that creative writers are capable of offering keen and influential accounts of the 
postcolonial condition, and are thus in one of the best positions to endorse the discourse, all 
the same I think she is guilty of an essentialist approach. The situation is a great deal more 
complicated than she allows on the one hand although, paradoxically, correspondingly 
simpler on the other. As I have already suggested, within the hybrid status I have already 
established for Ondaatje is inscribed a permanent ‘otherness’. In both a physical and a 
mental sense, wherever he goes, whatever society he was, is, or will be, part of, he will 
always be ‘other’. Ondaatje’s case is further complicated by Sri Lanka’s own background of   213
settlement by the Portuguese, the Dutch and the English, not to mention local incursions and 
race-related eruptions. But the paradox of growing up as ‘other’, always being ‘other’ is that 
at some point—once the person accepts his or her own lack of belonging—it ceases to 
matter. Thus ‘exteriority’ becomes naturalized to the point at which it not only becomes a 
way of life, but where it also becomes the only way of living. In the interview I referred to 
earlier, Ondaatje referred to his sense of comfort or assimilation within Canadian society. 
This is Ondaatje’s answer to the diaspora. But this need not necessarily constitute betrayal 
of or within the discourse. To the contrary, if indeed, as Homi Bhabha claims, hybridity 
provides a counter-narrative to the traditional canon, then the release of Ondaatje’s work 
into mainstream discourse does in itself provide a disruption to the narrative of colonial 
power.  
  
Kanaganayakam, on the other hand, ascribes a nationalism to Ondaatje that the writer 
himself fails to assert. In his essay, “A Trick With a Glass”, Kanaganayakam claims that 
Ondaatje “abandons a wonderful opportunity to assert a much-needed sense of belonging” 
(40-1).
51 But the question must be asked: “much-needed” on whose part? Is 
Kanaganayakam presuming that Ondaatje—who has already expressed his ambivalence in 
respect of his status of “belonging”—needs this reassurance? Or is it the narrative itself that 
Kanaganayakam feels would be improved by a stronger sense of nationalistic fervour?
52 
  
The answer, I think, lies in the structure of Ondaatje’s text. I suggest that the form of this 
narrative—its apparently chaotic, splintered arrangement—mirrors not only the nation it 
describes but also the composite nationality and hybrid identity of its author.
53  
    214
Further, I suggest that it is precisely by the use of this ostensibly confusing medley of 
images that Ondaatje’s background is represented, or reflected, in and by the structure of 
this text. If it appears at times disjointed—if it ducks, dives and weaves its way through a 
host of anecdotal data, shot through with historical references juxtaposed with pieces of 
poetry, the whole structure undermining itself, rebuilding, collapsing—the disorganization 
inherent this structure is in itself representative of the way in which he imagines and thus 
reconstructs his childhood and his family and his own difficulties with regard to 
nationality.
54  
  
While Kanaganayakam’s main criticism of Ondaatje’s text in this essay is aimed at its lack 
of realism, its failure to “participate actively in the referential” (39), it is precisely this lack 
of engagement with the Real that is its strength, that gives this text its writerly status in 
allowing the reader to engage with the nuances and possibilities within the narrative. This is 
not to say that the text is free of social agency. Indeed, it is those moments within the text 
when Ondaatje’s attempts to represent the Real become credible that should signal the alert 
in terms of the “conditions of possibility” that Žižek claims exist in any attempt at 
objectivity. Accordingly, it is at this point I will consider the social agency that could be 
said to inform all objectivism (Žižek, xiii). 
  
In fact, in this book the entire issue of representation is “fraught with questions that emerge 
out of a complex network of negotiations between writing, reading, and the maintenance or 
subversion of power” (Heble, 187). This representation or misrepresentation takes the form 
of preoccupations which drive some significant agencies operating within his texts which 
are linked to the issues that specifically concern this thesis: the instances that might   215
constitute the ‘exotic’ within his narratives and the notion of celebratory writing which 
needs to be examined in relation not only to Running in the Family but Ondaatje’s prose 
work in general. In this respect, I would like to examine the back-jacket reviews of 
Ondaatje’s book by acclaimed writers Maxine Hong Kingston and Margaret Atwood.  
  
In contrast to Ondaatje, Kingston styles herself as an “immigrant writer” by virtue of the 
fact that all her novels are built on a retrospective look at a homeland through the eyes of 
her Chinese mother.
55An excerpt from her review of Ondaatje’s text asserts: “Running in 
the Family is a beautiful, luscious book. Michael Ondaatje has depicted his extraordinary 
family, who delighted in masks and costumes and love affairs that ‘rainbowed over 
marriages’ in a kind of language that makes glory of their lives. He has gone on a poet’s 
journey to Sri Lanka (Ceylon) and the reader who travels with him enters a truly magical 
world”. The language Margaret Atwood uses in her review is similarly hyperbolic: 
“Michael Ondaatje is here at his agile and evocative best. His latest book is an account of an 
exotic and outrageous family, a true story with all the most exciting qualities of fiction. 
Brightly coloured, sweet and painful, bloody-minded and otherworldly, it achieves the 
status of legend” (back jacket, Picador 1984 edition; all my emphases in both quotations).  
  
Why is it that critics and reviewers, be they writers, journalists or judges, feel they have to 
outdo the writers themselves in the language they use to critique the releases they are asked 
to review? Even allowing for the normal back-jacket hype, ostensibly this is what has 
happened here. Words and phrases like “rainbowed over”, “glory of their lives”, “truly 
magical”, “sweet and painful” and “otherworldly” represent the type of ‘exotic’ writing that 
Said abhors, adjectives that would be more at home in Arabian Nights. Further, taken in    216
 
 
their entirety, neither of the over-written paragraphs quoted above are representative 
examples of the type of language that Kingston and Atwood normally use. This is important 
because if they adequately describe what the reader might expect from between the covers 
of this book, this suggests a similarly flamboyant style of writing on Ondaatje’s part which 
leads to a host of questions. How, for instance, does Ondaatje represent the Ceylon of his 
childhood against the Sri Lanka of his cultural maturity? How writerly is this work in its 
methodology? In other words, does the writerly, in its efforts to avoid direct representation, 
hint at the exotic? 
  
As in these quotations: “My grandmother died in the blue arms of a jacaranda tree. She 
could read thunder” (113). Or, “During our visit to the jungle, while we slept on the 
verandah at 3 a.m., night would be suddenly alive with disturbed peacocks. A casual 
movement from one of them roosting in the trees would waken them all and, so fussing, 
sounding like branches full of cats, they would weep weep loud into the night” (136). Or 
within the confines of “orientalist” discourse, it could mean offering up the mysteries of the 
East “plain for and to the West” as in this description of the Sinhalese alphabet:  
 
I still believe the most beautiful alphabet was created by the Sinhalese. The 
insect of ink curves into a shape that is almost sickle, spoon, eyelid. The 
letters are washed blunt glass which betray no jaggedness. Sanskrit was 
governed by verticals, but its sharp grid features were not possible in 
Ceylon. Here the Ola leaves which people wrote on were too brittle. A 
straight line would cut apart the leaf and so a curling alphabet was derived 
from its Indian cousin. Moon coconut. The bones of a lover’s spine. (83) 
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The dramatic intensity and economical beauty of such writing is pure Ondaatje in that   
similar paragraphs can be excerpted from any of his works. However, there is no denying 
the fact that this type of description, albeit lacking the saccharined phrases of the two 
reviewers I have just quoted, still constitutes a theatrical representation of Ceylon that could 
be construed or read as a “highly artificial enactment” (Orientalism, 21). Note the density of 
the figurative language: the imagery, the similes and the multiplicity of metaphorical 
references in phrases like “blue arms”, “branches full of cats”, “weep weep”, “sickle, spoon, 
eyelid”, “washed blunt glass”, “bones of a lover’s spine”. Note, too, the style: Sentences 
reduced to short phrases, a sparseness of actual words which, paradoxically, increases the 
possibility of meaning. It takes no large leap of  imagination to claim that the subject matter 
of this selective sample—family (aunt), landscape (jungle), alphabet (language)—along 
with the succinct style in which it is rendered and the softness of the descriptive language 
together suggest an intimacy which in turn signifies a sense of relationship that also signals 
possession. A writerly text this may be but, quite plainly, it is romanticized and it is in this 
respect that Ondaatje fall precisely into the trap Said describes in Orientalism: “The 
evidence is found just as prominently in the so-called truthful text (histories, philological 
analyses, political treatises) as in the avowedly artistic (i.e., openly imaginative) text. The 
things to look at are style, figures of speech, setting, narrative devices, historical and social 
circumstances,  not the correctness of the representation nor its fidelity to some great 
original” (21). 
  
If Said’s quotation is read against excerpts of Ondaatje’s quoted earlier, it could be argued 
that Ondaatje not only lays claim to the land and its traditions, but also assumes the 
intellectual authority that lies at the basis of Said’s “orientalist” argument.
56    218
 
 
There is nothing mysterious or natural about authority. It is formed, 
irradiated, disseminated; it is instrumental, it is persuasive; it has status, it 
establishes canons of taste and value; it is virtually indistinguishable from 
certain ideas it dignifies as true, and from traditions, perceptions, and 
judgments it forms, transmits, reproduces. Above all, authority can, indeed 
must, be analyzed. All these attributes of authority apply to Orientalism . . . 
(19-20) 
  
I think it is clear from the textual examples I have provided that some of the questions posed 
earlier in this chapter can now be answered. It is plain that in these examples, particularly in 
that of his description of the Sinhalese alphabet, Ondaatje has not only re-presented the 
East, but additionally he has taken it upon himself to speak on behalf of the East. Not only 
this, but the conscious artificiality of  the way in which the language is romanticized to 
produce a persuasive tone, the choice of traditional topic, the uses of such words as “sickle”, 
“moon”, “lover” and “coconut” to paint a word picture of the Orient is just the sort of  
cultural representation that brings forth “orientalist” accusations from Said. In this specific 
instance, it is obvious that by the use of such gratuitous language which re-informs the 
reader by re-casting an image of something as basic as an alphabet and its letters, it certainly 
could be argued that Ondaatje has displaced or made supererogatory “the real thing”, “the 
sublime object”, the taken-for-granted characters of the Sinhalese script, a metaphor in this 
case, for Sri Lanka itself.  
  
And these are, of course, not the only instances. By idealizing and romanticizing his place 
of birth, Ondaatje’s book not “re-creates” Sri Lanka from the alphabet upwards, but the 
entire structure with its careful juxtaposition of prose and poetry, family and national 
history, of the catastrophic and the euphoric, lends to the text a sense of immediacy and   219
dramatic tension. Running in the Family is theatre on the page, prose drama, the type of 
artificial representation that lies at the centre of Said’s calls of “orientalism” and solicits the 
type of reviews discussed earlier. This is exotic writing at its most blatant: responsible for 
the correspondingly extravagant language in the reviews and, it must be admitted, useful in 
attracting a readership.  
  
At this point, it becomes clear that on the basis of the evidence contained in Running in the 
Family, there appears to be no question that—rightly or wrongly—Ondaatje writes from 
both sides of the cultural divide. On the one hand, he is the informant making full use of his 
birthright in his perceptions and presumptions about Sri Lanka; on the other, critics are 
vocal in their claim that he maintains a distance from the political and cultural affairs of the 
country that equally implies an exteriority.  
  
Thus it must be admitted that Ondaatje is indicted on two counts of “orientalist” writing: not 
only is he the native informant but additionally, in that it is “premised upon exteriority”, he 
provides an account that “. . . does the job [of representation], for the West, and faute de 
mieux, for the poor Orient” (21). 
 
Ondaatje and empire 
So far I have been preoccupied in ascribing a form of cultural identity to Ondaatje as a 
means of adjudging how he locates himself in terms of “writing the Orient”, but I have not 
yet fully addressed his attitude towards empire and the political domination of Sri Lanka, an 
issue almost, but not quite, inseparable from that of the cultural appropriation I have been 
discussing. Among the criticisms levied at Ondaatje are those that are directed at the lack of   220
either political or cultural “involvement” in his home of origin. In their critical engagement 
with Running in the Family, Chelva Kanaganayakam and Arun Mukherjee among others 
profess their disappointment at Ondaatje’s lack of interest in, or avoidance of, political and 
cultural issues in this work.
57 Specifically, Mukherjee’s claim that Ondaatje “does not get 
drawn into the acts of living, which involves the need to deal with the burning issues of his 
time” needs to be addressed.
58  
  
At first it seems difficult to refute these claims: ostensibly, at least, the book is unashamedly 
self-centred, although I think the accusations of solipsism go too far.
59 But there are, 
however, two major mitigating factors which should be aired in Ondaatje’s defence: namely 
that although it is tempting to suggest that these particular concerns were not the province of 
this narrative, a close political reading of the text suggests otherwise; and, secondly, that the 
omission with regard to the contemporary problems Sri Lanka faces was subsequently 
redressed in Ondaatje’s latest novel Anil’s Ghost, a narrative almost exclusively concerned 
with the political/cultural factioning in Sri Lanka in the 1980s and early 1990s.  
  
While discussion or acknowledgement of empire does not at first appear to loom large in 
this text—certainly, in comparison with Woolf’s single-minded emphasis, it is all but 
missing—there are significant moments in the narrative that hint at a darker side to the 
exotic, a disgust of the “foreigner” within himself, and subtle—and sometimes not-so-
subtle—references to authority figures, power structures and European domination of the 
East.
60 Sometimes these ‘moments’ become short chapters. Take, for example, the section 
headed “Don’t talk to me about Matisse”, which encompasses nearly a quarter of the book, 
and which contain the tensions somehow missed by many critics. It is in the first lines of a   221
chapter in this section—titled “The Karapothas” and headed by epigrammatic and 
derogatory quotations from nineteenth and early-twentieth-century travellers to Ceylon (the 
traditional Orientalists)—that Ondaatje states, “I sit in a house on Buller’s Road. I am the 
foreigner. I am the prodigal who hates the foreigner” (79).
61 Later in this chapter, he 
enlarges on the status of the early “foreigners”—those other “foreigners”—in Ceylon:  
Ceylon always did have too many foreigners . . . the ‘Karapothas’ as my 
niece calls them—the beetles with white spots who never grew ancient here, 
who stepped in and admired the landscape, disliked the “inquisitive natives” 
and left. They came originally and overpowered the land obsessive for 
something as delicate as the smell of cinnamon. Becoming wealthy with 
spices. When ships were still approaching, ten miles out at sea, captains 
would spill cinnamon onto the deck and invite passengers on board to smell 
Ceylon before the island even came into view . . . This island was a paradise 
to be sacked . . . 
 
[But the] island hid its knowledge. Intricate arts and customs and religious 
ceremonies moved inland away from the new cities. Only Robert Knox, 
held captive by a Kandyan king for twenty years, wrote of the island well, 
learning its traditions.
62 . . .  Apart from Knox, and later Leonard Woolf in 
his novel, A Village in the Jungle, very few foreigners truly knew where 
they were. (80-3) 
 
The chapter heading, “The Karapothas”, named after the white-spotted beetles who came, 
“overpowered the land” and just as abruptly left—metonymically associated with foreigners 
and thus a metaphor for colonialism—is a strong indictment of imperialism in itself. In the 
text, the strength of words like “obsessive” juxtaposed with “delicate” again illuminates the 
power structure: the European colonization of Ceylon. The notion of “spices”, too, is 
inseparable from the realities of trade and plunder. As we read, we become aware of 
significant modulations in the way in which Ondaatje uses the language. Tension rises with 
changes of tense and in the passage excerpted above, the tense changes three times in as 
many sentences—representing the vulnerability of an island represented in its past, present 
and future as “a paradise to be sacked . . .” 
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Another significant insight into the anti-imperialist constituent of this text comes from Ajay 
Heble. In a discussion of Linda Hutcheon’s coinage of the term “ex-centricity”
63 —or the 
state of being “outside the centre in terms of race, nationality, ethnicity, language, gender, 
sexual orientation, class, or canonization”—he suggests that Ondaatje’s return to Sri Lanka 
is prompted by “the recognition that he himself is the other” (189). He asserts that Ondaatje 
is not so much trying to find a lost past as he is “attempting to provide us with a new 
direction for our reflections on the meaning of postcolonial belonging” and observes, along 
with other critics, a “tenuousness” in the author’s relationship with Sri Lanka (188-9).
64 An 
interrogation of this site of interaction—“the state of being ‘different’ in a dominant 
culture”—forms part of Heble’s response to Mukherjee and Kanaganayakam and is 
designed to show the manner in which this text, rather than avoiding “burning issues” 
instead decides to negotiate the conditions of cultural representation in what could be 
described as a manner which, while undeniably circuitous, is also convincing. While 
Heble’s essay “Rumours of Topography” deserves to be read in its entirety for a fully 
rounded explanation of the number of well-argued points he raises, in terms of 
foregrounding the cultural and political subtleties within the text, one argument stands 
above the rest. In this instance, Heble claims: 
The mechanism that perhaps best enables us to appreciate the cultural 
politics of Running in the Family is lodged in the complex interplay 
between three points of orientation: the syncretism of Ondaatje’s forebears; 
the excerpts from a poem by Wikkramasinha (85-6), and the poems 
Ondaatje fashions in response. Wikkramasinha’s [poem] “Don’t Talk to Me 
about Matisse” raises important questions about the politics of cultural 
representation. Arguing that acts of cultural appropriation replicate and are, 
indeed, inseparable from systems of political domination, the poem offers a 
trenchant critique not only of European representations of non-Western 
culture but also of a government that is perceived to have ruthlessly 
suppressed the spirit of a potential revolution: “to our remote/villages the 
painters came, and our white-washed/mud-huts were splattered with 
gunfire” (86).
65 Painting . . . becomes a metaphor for the murder of the 
indigenous people of Sri Lanka and adds force to an earlier passage, in 
which Ondaatje speaks of the whitewashing (my emphasis in this instance) 
of the imprisoned insurgents’ poetry . . . .(194-5)
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I would like to add a further observation to the points that Heble makes here. If, indeed as I 
have claimed, Ondaatje is not only aware that he is exterior to Sri Lanka, but uncomfortable 
with this exteriority, I suggest that the issues Heble raises attest to Ondaatje’s uneasiness in 
this respect. While Heble uses the phrase “cultural appropriation” in relation to the 
referential in Matisse’s art, I have used the term to refer to Ondaatje’s act in writing about 
the culture from the hybrid position of being an informant on the one hand and a raider on 
the other. If a figure like Matisse can be held accountable for representing what is not his to 
represent, then so can Ondaatje. But there is the all-important différance to take into 
consideration. The difference lies in Ondaatje’s reference to the “powerful and angry” Sri 
Lankan poet Lakdasa Wikkramasinha and the inclusion of Wikkramasinha’s poetry within 
his own work. By excerpting these few lines that refer to Matisse from Wikkramasinha’s 
not inconsiderable oeuvre, Ondaatje is acknowledging the political in the act of writing a 
book that is so much more than the family history many critics claim. Significantly, this 
self-reflexivity is the one justification that Edward Said allows as exoneration for acts of 
cultural appropriation of this nature. 
  
Perhaps Ondaatje’s method of rebelling against empire is too subtle for the majority of his 
critics? He could have made his point more clearly by including in his text the following 
violently anti-imperialist note attached to Wikkramasinha’s first poetry collection, Lustre:  
I have come to realize that I am using the language of the most despicable 
and loathsome people on earth; I have no wish to extend its life or enrich its 
tonality. 
 
To write in English is a form of cultural treason. I have had for the future to 
think of a way of circumventing this treason. (Qtd. in Heble, 193)
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Since I am about to suggest that far from being  a confused jumble of ideas and impressions, 
Running in the Family is a strategically composed work, and that this “Matisse” section in 
particular recasts the cultural and political as an imaginative composition, some attention 
needs to be given to what immediately precedes and follows Ondaatje’s quotation of 
Wikkramasinha. Thus before this quotation:  
 
. . . Ian Goonetileke . . . shows me a book he put together on the Insurgency. 
Because of censorship it had to be published in Switzerland. At the back of 
the book are ten photographs of charcoal drawings done by an insurgent on 
the walls of one of the houses he hid in. The average age of the insurgents 
was seventeen and thousands were killed by police and army. While the 
Kelani and Mahaveli rivers moved to the sea, heavy with bodies, these 
drawings were destroyed so that the book is now the only record of them. 
The artist is anonymous. The works seem as great as the Sigiriya frescoes. 
They too need to be eternal. (85) 
  
 
On the page immediately following Wikkramasinha’s poetry, Ondaatje responds with a 
poem of his own, “High Flowers” (87-9), an encoding of a message as cultural as it is 
political.
68 This is a poem which makes much of light and dark and the ‘between-worlds’ 
condition—the “shadows” that conceal secrets—so that “everthing important occurs in 
shadow”.
69 It has at its centre the toddy tapper—the man who moves from tree to tree high 
above the ground collecting the juice from the flowers of the coconut palms—and his wife, 
cast as the “woman my ancestors ignored”. The simple life of the village is contrasted with 
the controlling metaphors of power: “Kings. Fortresses. Traffic . . .”
70 Thus we have the 
poetry of Wikkramasinha sandwiched between two of Ondaatje’s own brief inclusions of 
political discussion but which “simultaneously calls attention to the potential for art to effect 
change through its restorative powers” (Heble, 195). This inclusion of multiple voices—a 
device Ondaatje uses throughout this text—is Bakhtin’s theory of the dialogic at its best. It   225
strengthens any argument by distancing the writer, by allowing the text to talk. It also 
substantiates my earlier claim that Running in the Family provides an excellent example of 
a writerly text. 
  
I have concentrated on Running in the Family because it appears to be the one text of 
Ondaatje’s that critics and reviewers as diverse as Atwood and Mukherjee least understand. 
Essentially memory writing is like looking backwards down time through a telescope: the 
scope of vision is restricted, individual images privileged. Because of its failure to tell the 
whole story, show the whole picture, this is unquestionably a type of misrepresentation, 
invoking the licence of the artist to depict what he or she sees in an act of imaginative 
sensitivity. This returns me to my earlier argument where I suggested that misrepresentation 
was, paradoxically, a method of uncovering the fundamental. As Edward Said asserts “. . . 
just as there are no simple dynastic answers, there are no simple discrete formations or 
social processes”.
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The question that preoccupied me at the start of this chapter was Ondaatje’s own location in 
relation to this book and I think he makes it clear that the postcolonial “prodigal” returned 
to Sri Lanka has at heart an ambiguity. Thus what critics refer to as a “hotch-potch” is 
instead an intentional arrangement of impressions designed to link past and present, a sonata 
with discords so subtle that they are often overlooked. This apparently random composition 
becomes in Ondaatje’s hands, a deliberate attempt to reflect instability. It is an unstable text 
about an unstable past suggesting a similar uncertainty in present and future and as such 
offers an endless proliferation of possibilities. 
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With respect, I think the point Kanaganayakam, Mukherjee and, to a lesser extent, Heble 
miss is that Ondaatje is not aiming for the referential in this work: he is leaving it to us—as 
readers, critics, scholars—to make the connections, to accept if we will, the lack of a 
“centred causal logic” (Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 141). 
  
Mukherjee is right in one respect, however, in her claim that “. . . there is no trauma of 
uprooting” in his work. But what she seems to miss is that this is precisely because 
Ondaatje does not experience the sense of rootlessness suggested by Rushdie as one 
example, Said as another. This is not “immigrant” writing because Ondaatje has not let go. 
He has not migrated anywhere. He acknowledges—and is impatient with—his “foreigner” 
status in Sri Lanka, but it is a strangeness, an “otherness” that he experiences that heralds 
not so much a return as a sense of never having left and which locates itself alongside his 
indigenous self. The island holds him essentially hybrid, his senses critically alive to its 
vibrancy, his emotions stirred: “. . . all this Beethoven and rain”. Running in the Family is as 
much an attempt to “narrate the nation” as it is to uncover a family history. From the 
distance of the diaspora, how else can one write a “language of national belonging”? It is 
infinitely more complex as Homi Bhabha suggests: 
If, in our travelling theory, we are alive to the metaphoricity of the peoples 
of imagined communities—migrant or metropolitan—than we shall find 
that the space of the modern nation-people is never simply horizontal. Their 
metaphoric movement requires a kind of ‘doubleness’ in writing; a 
temporality of representation that moves between cultural formations and 
social processes without a centred causal logic (my emphasis). And such 
cultural movements disperse the homogeneous, visual time of the horizontal 
society. The secular language of interpretation needs to go beyond the 
horizontal critical gaze if we are to give the ‘nonsequential energy of lived 
historical memory and subjectivity’ its appropriate narrative authority. 
(Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 141) 
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The ‘confusion’ that Running in the Family engenders for some foregrounds a self-
reflexivity that shifts the responsibility of interpretation back to the reader, the interstitial 
point of interaction, the “You and I” of which Homi Bhabha speaks. However, the points I 
have made above—namely that while Ondaatje’s writing is demonstrably “orientalist”, this 
condition is tempered by a cultural concern and awareness that many critics miss—gain 
emphasis through a broader exploration of his work. Ondaatje’s political self, for example, 
surfaces clearly in The English Patient, a text that has been well discussed, and thus my 
purpose here is to refer to it only to substantiate my point above.
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The English Patient 
73 
There are a number of themes that run through The English Patient, but for my purposes 
here, there are two that dominate which in this work are interrelated: namely, the question 
of identity and how it relates to the politics of empire. The identity crisis personalised in 
Running in the Family emerges even more strongly nearly ten years later in The English 
Patient where a re-structuring of identity takes place in a text which, again, is as much 
theatre-on-the-page as it is prose.  
  
Central to this drama is Almásy, the anonymous and crippled possessor of a covert past. 
And key to the identity crisis depicted within this text is that this description can be applied 
just as aptly to all the main players. Almásy acts metonymically for the other characters in 
this novel in that his damage—the gaps and silences, the immobility, the reluctance to 
communicate—applies equally to the other “freak social and cultural displacements” in the 
form of Hana, Kip and Carravagio.
74 The Villa San Girolamo becomes a metaphor for a 
space which exists outside geographical and temporal restrictions—in Bhabha’s interstices   228
perhaps—a space of healing where walls have been smashed and boundaries do not exist. 
As a result this is an unreal world—a Third Space—protected, for the time period of the 
story, from war and the structures of power. For the duration of the text, this world shelters 
the characters gathered there, all of whom exhibit damage from residual marks of authority, 
the drawing of lines in the sand, which becomes lines on maps and lines through the centre 
of human psyches.
75 The division between past and present. The distancing of self from self. 
When Caravaggio asks the patient, “‘Who was talking back then?’” Almásy replies, “‘Death 
means you are in the third person’”(247).  
  
From a postcolonial perspective, one of the most obvious examples of anti-imperialism in 
this text—and thus the most often discussed—is the character of Kirpal Singh who is 
constructed as a non-negotiable challenge to empire: “‘My brother told me. Never turn your 
back on Europe. The deal makers. The contract makers. The map drawers. Never trust 
Europeans, he said’”.
76 However, more restrained in terms of foregrounding the relationship 
between postcolonialism, identity and empire is the relationship between Running in the 
Family and The English Patient. While, ostensibly, these are two entirely different texts 
with diverse themes and concerns, there are similarities in both structure and thematic 
treatment that say more about the iniquities of imperial control and authority than Kip’s less 
subtle attack on the English motifs of etiquette and the old boys’ club: “‘I knew if I lifted a 
teacup with the wrong finger I’d be banished. If I tied the wrong kind of knot in a tie I was 
out. . . . But we, oh, we were easily impressed—by speeches and medals and your 
ceremonies”’ (284).
77 For these similarities, I return to a discussion of form and content. 
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Like its predecessor, The English Patient is a work of fragmented narration that reflects 
back from the irony of its title.
78 And once more that instability is foregrounded in the 
cultural complexities that live uncertainly amongst its pages. Analogous to Running in the 
Family which searches for connection in “running to, running from”, The English Patient 
proves to be a text of reflection: reflecting to, reflecting from, reflecting and deflecting, 
running up and down its own threads.
79 Like its predecessor this, too, is a writerly text 
vulnerable to a number of readings.
80 As D. Mark Simpson suggests:  
 
Like architectural space in the novel, legible space remains resolutely 
precarious, untrustworthy, explosive and implosive by turns. The resulting 
instabilities are not strictly commensurate with ambiguity or, for that 
matter, simply equivalent to evasion. Rather, they signal any number of 
epistemological crises involving place, space, history, transit, alterity and its 
manifold confusions. Not least for this reason, the narrative affords 
provocative means by which to imagine Europe alongside India (and also 
Canada) caught uneasily amidst colonial and postcolonial roles. Crucially 
hybrid,  The English Patient directs its politics past evasion toward 
reckoning. (217) 
  
 
At the centre of this “reckoning” is the shifting identity and concealed nationality of the 
English patient. Almásy’s identity—and by extrapolation his character—is destabilized, its 
unveiling deferred again and again throughout the narrative, almost belonging within a set 
of identifying parameters and then breaking free as he moves through the fictions that have 
been created for him (Cook, 46). This returns me to a point I made earlier in this chapter in 
relation to Ondaatje’s final words in Running in the Family, namely that a desire to capture 
memory of place rounds out both the moment of experience and identity. This story is as   230
much a “narrative of identity” as that other text which leaves Ondaatje alone with memories 
that continue to ferment in the quiet of the morning. 
  
However, the shape that the “narrative of identity” takes in this text is somewhat different. I 
suggest that, firstly, the “narrative of identity” manifests itself  in the co-dependency 
Almásy forms with most of the characters with whom he comes into contact and, secondly, 
that this type of reliance replaces his need to belong to a nation or a specific culture. To play 
out this co-dependency, there are a number of fictions Ondaatje creates for Almásy. For 
example, for an unstated space of time, he lives with the Bedouins, “his captors and 
saviours” who dragged him from his burning plane, and who tended his burned body, but 
who in return demanded recompense for these deeds in terms of his knowledge of weaponry 
(21). In the exchange between Almásy and the tribe, there is no question of assimilation, no 
illusion, instead a clear case of co-dependency, a mutual reliance for a period of need. In 
another co-dependent liaison, he becomes Katharine’s lover until she demands more from 
the relationship, at which point he withdraws: “‘What do you hate most?” he asks. “A lie. 
And you?” “Ownership,” he says. “When you leave me, forget me’” (152). But at the same 
time, he cannot leave: “He has been disassembled by her” (155). He can neither be with her 
nor without her. “The minute she turns away from him . . . he is insane. He knows the only 
way he can accept losing her is if he can continue to hold her or be held by her” (156). She 
too cannot let go. Before she dies, she insists, “‘Kiss me and call me by my name’” (173). 
Again there is a mutual dependence, the neediness of one feeding off the other, each identity 
reflecting off, but refusing to be assimilated by, the other. In another instance, Almásy does 
not merely identify with Herodotus, the explorer whom Cicero called ‘the father of history’, 
he depends on him, believing and living the stories within The Histories, keeping the book   231
close to him on every reconnaissance, every expedition. Time and again Herodotus emerges 
in the narrative to provide a tripartite linkage between the explorer, the spy and the lover, 
weaving them tightly to the multi-thematic concerns of the book: “This is the story of how I 
fell in love with a woman, who read me a specific story from Herodotus . . .” ( 233); “What 
you find in him are cul-de-sacs within the sweep of history—how people betray each other 
for the sake of nations . . .” (119); “. . . it was more than a commonplace book” (231). 
Always in his hour of need Almásy returns to Herodotus. As another example, there is the 
scene that follows the plane crash in the desert, when Almásy rescues Katharine and carries 
her to the Cave of Swimmers. He knows she is dying, that he has “her nature tight in his 
fist”, but now it is her beauty he does not want to lose. He calls on traditions from 
Herodotus, locating her for all eternity in the place where he last saw her alive, conferring 
on her a grace that resembles the ritualizing within the last rites and ensures her 
immortality: “He looked up to the one cave painting and stole the colours from it. The ochre 
went into her face, he daubed blue around her eyes. He walked across the cave, his hand 
thick with red, and combed his fingers through her hair. Then all of her skin, so her knee 
that had poked out of the plane that first day was saffron. The pubis. Hoops of colour 
around her legs so she would be immune to the human. There were traditions he had 
discovered in Herodotus in which old warriors celebrated their loved ones by locating and 
holding them in whatever world made them eternal—a colourful fluid, a song, a rock 
drawing” (248). 
  
And later, the last time we hear of him alive¸ his “hand reaches out slowly and touches his 
book and returns to his dark chest” (298). At the hour of his death, Almásy, the displaced, is 
alone with his memories—Rushdie’s “Indias of the mind”—just as Ondaatje is when he   232
leaves Sri Lanka on his “last morning”. Thus the “commonplace book” is vital to this story. 
Woven into every corner of Almásy’s life, Herodotus becomes the link between the English 
patient and everything he has ever held important. The irony is that here is a man savagely 
independent, who eschews the concept of belonging to anyone, anywhere—“We are not 
owned or monogamous in our taste or experience. All I desired was to walk upon such an 
earth that had no maps” (261)—who found a way to belong through his addiction to 
reciprocal dependencies. Just as the insect bite provides a link with Ondaatje’s homeland; so 
Herodotus links Almásy to a life and a woman he loves. Herodotus is Almásy’s passport to 
identity or belonging. 
  
Admittedly, this is a psychoanalytical reading of The English Patient, but the point I made 
earlier in relation to Running in the Family applies here, too. As in Freud’s psychoanalytic 
histories which also avoid the effects of normal historical time, this text falls into a category 
of story-telling where the limiting effect of time is removed and the sociological is 
privileged in its place. Thus drawing again on Steedman’s distinction between history and 
case studies—“the case study is not concerned with what really happened” (49)—it could be 
argued that the fantasy that Almásy carries close to his heart—the fantasy of belonging 
without being labelled or mapped—becomes the “shaping device” for the narrative, 
allowing the dream or “reconstruction” of desire to be presented as evidence. 
  
I suggest that Ondaatje’s representation of his protagonist in this manner becomes a clever 
way of sidestepping the “politics of polarity”. In the final analysis, Almásy emerges as the 
other of himself (The Location of Culture, 38-9).
81 And if indeed, as I have claimed, he acts 
as a metonym for the characters in the villa, the same could be said for his cohabitants.    233
 
Returning to Bhabha, it is conceivable that in this [ostensible] “‘politics of difference’ the 
‘other’ is never outside or beyond us; it emerges forcefully, within cultural discourse, when 
we think we speak most intimately and indigenously ‘between ourselves’”. Thus,  
 
As the discriminated object, the metonym of presence becomes the support 
of an authoritarian voyeurism, all the better to exhibit the eye of power. 
Then, as discrimination turns into the assertion of the hybrid, the insignia of 
authority becomes a mask, a mockery. After our experience of the native 
interrogation it is difficult to agree entirely with Fanon that the psychic 
choice is to ‘turn white or disappear’.
82 There is the more ambivalent, third 
choice: camouflage, mimicry, black skins/white masks. (Bhabha, The 
Location of Culture, 120). 
  
In his camouflaged state, Almásy represents a hybridity which, as I mentioned earlier, 
subverts the narratives of colonial power and dominant cultures and becomes a counter-
narrative, a critique of the canon and its exclusion of other narratives. In a similar manner to 
Running in the Family, which works through the hybridity of the central character of 
Ondaatje, The English Patient becomes a salutary example of the “English book” criticized. 
  
This brings me to a defining moment in my discussion of this writer. At an earlier juncture I 
assigned him a hybridism, which made him concomitantly “exterior” and indigenous, a 
combination of both. But I have yet to establish whether his partial indigenousness gives 
him an intrinsic right to “write the Orient” and in so doing, excuse the incontrovertibly 
exotic within his writing. Or, conversely, whether his “exteriority” allows just enough 
distance to absolve him from the category of native informant? In terms of owning a 
culture, how has Ondaatje used his intellectual authority to locate himself in terms of the 
subject matter and the resulting text? 
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I will begin to answer these questions by suggesting that if I were to insist that this partial 
“exteriority” disallows him the right to write of his birthplace as he wishes, this would 
surely reflect a line of reasoning as narrow as that imposed by Said on the Orientalists. 
Further, it is clear that one of Ondaatje’s own problems with this text was a decision as to 
the position he should take in writing it. Among the solutions to the paradox that he appears 
to struggle with internally—“We own the country we grow up in, or we are aliens or 
invaders”—is that this moment of enunciation takes place in a Third Space and thus eludes 
“the politics of polarity and emerge[s] as the others of our selves” (The Location of Culture, 
38-9).
83 Accordingly, a question posed at the start of this chapter—in respect of where 
Ondaatje locates himself in Running in the Family and the extent to which he is either 
‘informant’ or ‘other’—is answered: in the case of the transnational author, the distinction 
collapses. Ondaatje is both ‘native’ and ‘other’ and carries the double burden this hybridity 
imposes. In his hands, the text reflects this hybridity and becomes writerly lending both the 
Ceylon of the past and the Sri Lanka of the present a simultaneity and continuity that 
encompasses the future. In Frank Kermode’s words, this type of narrative experience 
possesses the authority to “charge the present moment with the intangible powers of past 
and future”.
84 It is in this way that in this text the colonial moment lives on into the 
postcolonial and beyond.  
  
Thus, as reader and critic of these two texts, I propose that through the unstable 
representations of protagonist/author and protagonist in the respective texts I have 
examined, Ondaatje suggests that the diasporic self may live in many places, but belongs 
nowhere. The only belonging takes place in Salman Rushdie’s “Indias of the mind”: the   235
source of the memories and fantasies that Almásy on his death bed, and Ondaatje on his 
“last morning”, hold close.  
  
Clearly, taken as representative sample of the corpus of his writing, these works are not 
“orientalist” in terms of showing a bias towards other nationalities, but nevertheless it is 
equally clear that the language in one text is undeniably exotic and that the plots in both 
texts blatantly depict colonial life. It is plain, too, that in the case of Running in the Family 
that Ondaatje plays the informant in exposing and displaying local knowledge for Western 
consumption.  
 
However, there are, perhaps, two counts on which Ondaatje escapes serious charges of 
“orientalism”. The first is Said’s own defence of Kipling’s Kim in which he claims some 
justification in Kipling’s representation of India partly because Kipling was “of” India (in 
the sense that it was his birthplace and a country to which he returned for seven years as a 
young adult), but mainly because of his use of the aesthetic in this work in particular.
85 Kim 
“is after all a novel in a line of novels” [and, as such, contains] “the irony of a form that 
draws attention to itself as substituting art and its creations for the once-possible synthesis 
of the world empires. . . . Spatiality becomes . . . the characteristic of an aesthetic rather than 
of political domination” (229).
86 And so, because he too is undeniably an artist of note, 
perhaps Ondaatje can be exonerated on the grounds of the aesthetic for his depiction of a 
colonial way of life. 
  
Secondly, there is again that strong sense of self-reflexivity noted earlier in Woolf’s works 
that informs these texts—in the obvious struggle for identity, the quotation of the poetry of   236
Wikkramasinha, the nuances of “High Flowers”, the hatred for the “map makers”—that 
offers absolution from “orientalist” writing. I quote again from Said: “For if Orientalism has 
historically been too smug, too insulated, too positivistically confident in its ways and its 
premises, then one way of opening oneself to what one studies in or about the Orient is 
reflexively to submit one’s methods to critical scrutiny . . . a direct sensitivity to the material 
. . . a continual self-examination . . . a constant attempt to keep . . . [the] work responsive to 
the material and not to a doctrinal preconception” (my emphasis, Orientalism, 326-7). 
  
But finally, although there is, after all, little that could be said to be “smug” about 
Ondaatje’s work, the line is fine. In alluding to that “insignia of colonial authority and 
signifier of colonial desire and discipline” (the English book) in his choice of title (The 
English Patient) for what is, in terms of plot, an unashamedly colonial text, Ondaatje’s work 
stands on the edge of an uncertain cultural precipice: “Kirpal’s left hand swoops down and 
catches the dropped fork an inch from the floor . . .” (302). 
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35 Although, as Barthes claims, the distinction between denotation and connotation is again unstable. See his 
discussion in S/Z, 9. 
36 I have suggested a difference here, but it’s possible that the point I am making with regard to 
misrepresentation could exist alongside Barthes’ own analogy of writing and painting. He says: “Every literary   239
                                                                                                                                                       
description is a view. It could be said that the speaker [the writer, the voice?], before describing, stands at the 
window, not so much to see, but to establish what he sees by its very frame: the window frame creates the 
scene. . . . [Thus] the writer, through this initial rite, first transforms the ‘real’ into a depicted (framed) object; 
have done this, he can take down this object, remove it from his picture: in short: de-depict it (to depict is to 
unroll the carpet of the codes, to refer not from a language to a referent but from one code to another). Thus 
realism (badly named) . . . consists not in copying the real but in copying a (depicted) copy of the real . . .” 
(S/Z, 54-5). 
37 Quoting here from Australian writer Alex Miller, The Sitters (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2003).   
38 Miller is twice winner of the Miles Franklin Award with a number of other highly acclaimed awards and 
accolades among his writing credits.  
39 In The Sublime Object of Ideology (London, New York: Verso, 1989). 
40 In this famous allegory, the human condition is portrayed by a group of men imprisoned in a dimly lit cave. 
They have been there since they were children, their arms and legs chained in such a way that they can only 
look ahead. Behind the prisoners, further back into the cave and higher up, a fire is burning. In between the 
fire and the prisoners there is a road and a curtain. Along the road, both behind and above the curtain, wooden 
men and animals are made to move and talk as in a puppet show. In this way, the part of the cave roof and 
wall immediately in front of the prisoners is alive with moving, talking shadows. Plato suggests that this life of 
shadows is the ‘real’ for the men and that if they were freed and allowed to look behind them, the objects that 
they now saw would resemble ‘so much empty nonsense’, the illusion.  And if they looked into the fire, it 
would dazzle them to such an extent that they would soon turn back to what they were used to and could see 
more clearly. Further, if one of the men were dragged into the sunshine above, at first he would be blinded by 
the sun. But gradually as he became used to the world above and the power of the sun to change the seasons 
and control nature, he would begin to feel sorry for the prisoners and their lack of wisdom in the cave below. 
If, however, he went back down into the darkness, he would at first be similarly blinded. From The Republic, 
tr. Desmond Lee (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974), 316-325. 
41 From Anindyo Roy’s critical essay, “‘Telling brutal things’: colonialism, Bloomsbury and the crisis of 
narration in Leonard Woolf’s ‘A Tale Told by Moonlight’”, Criticism 43.2 (2002): 189-222. This version 
obtained electronically on 28.2.2003.  
42 This edition of Orientalism (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1991). 
43 As usual, Said makes some sound observations, but his line of reasoning is clouded by prejudice. My 
understanding of the principle of his argument is that it is not the act of representation per se to which he 
objects, but the exteriority of the person doing the representing. The crux of the matter is that the power 
dynamic within representation can provide an external force with the opportunity to re-create and re-present in 
any shape or form something of the personal, some thing, some essence of national pride. From then on, there 
is nothing to stop this becoming a power-charged exchange and thus an invasion of privacy, a portrayal 
gratuitous, unwarranted and non-essential, viewed as a betrayal in that the other party possesses no intrinsic 
right of representation over a land, a culture and a people to which he or she does not belong. 
44 Although Said definitely has a point here, I suggest that he goes too far and that the discursive high ground 
he occupies is designed to muffle the outrage he expresses (and obviously feels) at what can be described as a 
moral invasion. To deny this would place my argument in a position difficult to defend: What right, after all, 
does any outsider have to make “the mysteries” of another’s country available to an “exterior” audience? This 
does beg the question, however, as to whether it is the act of invasion itself or the interpretative possibility to 
which he objects. 
45 See my discussion of the exchange between the Tlingits and the Portland Art Museum in Oregon in chapter 
five, or for a more comprehensive account of the dynamics involved in this series of transactions, see James 
Clifford, Routes: travel and translation in the late twentieth century (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1997).                   
46 Quoting from Ajay Heble’s discussion of Mukherjee’s approach to Ondaatje in Towards an Aesthetic of 
Opposition: Essays on Literature Criticism and Cultural Imperialism (Stratford-on-Avon: Williams-Wallace, 
1988), 33-4. Cited here from Heble’s excellent essay, “‘Rumours of Topography’: The Cultural Politics of 
Michael Ondaatje’s Running in the Family”, Essays on Canadian Writing 53.2 (1994): 186-203. 
47 Whether the son/father connection is made in this book is a moot point. I suggest that at the end of the 
narrative one is left with the feeling that however hard he tries, the son cannot quite overcome the emotional 
exclusion of childhood and that the distance remains.  Indeed, there is a search for the father figure, but at the 
end of the day, it becomes a search for self, something much more than the “fictionalized family history” that 
many critics label it. See Catherine Bush, “Michael Ondaatje: An Interview”, Essays on Canadian Writing, 
238.   240
                                                                                                                                                       
48 It should be noted that these writers have used their celebratory status as “immigrant writers” to the full. 
Both Kingston and Tan were born in America of Chinese parents; both have used their Chinese ancestral 
connections to write about their parents’ homeland as if it were their own. 
49 Crusoe’s Footprints: Cultural Studies in Britain and America (New York: Routledge, 1990), 128. 
50 Heble suggests that the critical responses to Ondaatje’s text that accuse him of failing the test of 
referentiality  are “ . . .  perhaps best understood if situated within the context not simply of either mimetic 
realism or even poststructuralism but rather of the emergence of alliances of marginalized or misrepresented 
groups attempting either to reclaim the past or to map out a space for the possibility of resistance to forms of 
cultural domination” (187).  
51 Cleverly, the title Kanaganayakam has chosen for this essay on Ondaatje’s connection with south-east Asia 
is summed up in the title: “A Trick With a Glass”. The glass, of course, is a looking glass, or mirror, and the 
essence of his argument revolve around Ondaatje’s methods of reflection or representation. 
52 Ondaatje redresses what some critics have claimed as a distancing of himself from Sri Lanka’s upheavals in 
Anil’s Ghost, a fictional representation based on an historical crisis from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s that 
involved three separate groups: the government, the anti-government insurgents from the south and the 
separatist guerrillas in the north. 
53Anderson’s definition of nation could also be used here to address the microcosm of the family unit. In that 
they could similarly be bracketed as communities or collectives, both nation and family could be described as 
“an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”. “It is imagined,” 
Anderson claims, “because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-
members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (6).  
In the same way, it could be said that in writing a book, which in part purports to be a family history, but 
which is based as much on hearsay as on ‘fact’ and relies on images constructed within his mind, Ondaatje has 
constructed an image of this “communion”.  
54 Relevant to this discussion of “imagined communities” is Ondaatje’s own language when he talks of his 
book being “imagined” and stresses the fictional component. “And if those listed above disapprove of the 
fictional air I apologise and can only say that in Sri Lanka a well-told lie is worth a thousand facts” (205-6). 
55 As mentioned earlier, she was in fact born and raised in America. 
56 This intellectual authority stems from the position the author holds with regards to the text: how, for 
example, he locates himself within the text and the structure he builds to convey his message to the reader, all 
critical in terms of representation and reader positioning. 
57 Heble claims that this apparent gap or evidence of the failure of referentiality is in itself  “part of a renewed 
struggle for cultural representation” (187). 
58 From “The Sri Lankan Poets in Canada: An Alternative View”, The Toronto South Asian Review 3.2 (1984): 
32-45. Cited in Kanaganayam’s essay, 36. 
59 See Kanaganayakam, 36. 
60 In “Memory, Identity and Empire in Michael Ondaatje’s Running in the Family”, Paul Jay ascribes this 
perceived lack of engagement with empire within Ondaatje’s text to the fact that “as an autobiographical text it 
is dominated by the generic codes of western autobiography. . . . the self that emerges in its pages is a familiar 
one to the western reader: the immigrant returns home, intrigued about his family’s past and the sources of his 
own identity buried in it . . .  Because it follows the forms and conventions of western autobiography it lacks 
an engagement with, let alone a critique of, empire. The subject of the autobiography seems largely a 
construction of the west, and so the text is written as western text”. Retrieved electronically from 
http://home.comcast.net/~jay.paul/ondaatje.htm on 20.1.2004. While Jay makes some valid points here—about 
the basic story line, for instance, and in that the work does appear to be “largely a construction of the west”—
his argument is too simplistic. As I have already argued, while the book ostensibly deals with self, family and 
identity, its liberal use of the dialogic and its writerly open-endedness disallow such neat categorization.  
61 It seems to me that these three short sentences represent Ondaatje’s acknowledgement of an exteriority that 
he dislikes but is forced to accept . . . somewhat in the manner of a tourist complaining that a place is ‘too 
touristy’. 
62 Daniel Defoe used the psychological struggles in Knox’s An Historical Relation as a source for Robinson 
Crusoe (Ondaatje, 82). 
63 Heble (188) attributes the coining of  “ex-centricity” to Linda Hutcheon as a term for “the ‘minoritarian 
discourses’ that have helped to shape postmodern theory and practice (Poetics xi)”.  
64 I suggest that Ondaatje’s relationship with Sri Lanka is one of uneasiness, rather than “tenuousness”. 
Tenuous suggests a fragile ‘holding on’, whereas I think that the boundaries are for Ondaatje more complex.   241
                                                                                                                                                       
65 For contextual purposes, the complete stanza of Wikkramasinha’s poem as quoted in Ondaatje’s text is as 
follows: “Don’t talk to me about Matisse . . ./the European style of 1900, the tradition of the studio/where the 
nude woman reclines forever/on a sheet of blood/Talk to me instead of the culture generally--/how the 
murderers were sustained/by the beauty robbed of savages: to our remote/villages the painters came, and our 
white-washed/mud-huts were splattered with gunfire” (85-6).  The reference to the French painter Henri 
Matisse is significant, both in the instance of Wikkramasinha’s inclusion of the painter in this poem and in 
Ondaatje’s re-representing (or in Barthian terms, “de-depicting”) of the work in his chapter on “foreigners” 
and plunder of the East. Although Matisse used a great deal of Oriental imagery in his art, he did not actually 
visit the Orient. Rather, it is said, that the images he re-presented were copied from the Oriental patterns on his 
wife’s clothes. Thus, it could be said that his work represented cultural appropriation at its most blatant. 
66 The reference to “whitewashing” is in relation to Ondaatje’s description of the 1971 insurgency when 
university students were imprisoned on their own campus. When the university was re-opened, the graffiti on 
walls and ceilings bore witness to methods of torture and suppression. Within days, however, the evidence was 
“covered with whitewash and lye” (84). The “syncretism” (that Heble refers to earlier) in this passage has 
been pointed out by a number of critics. In this instance it is, of course, the re-shaping of Ondaatje’s Dutch 
background into a new “cultural formation” represented by the Burghers. This new cultural group—inevitably 
aligned with the ruling party—became increasingly alienated not on that score alone, but also by reasons of 
culture, language and ethnicity in two clear-cut stages: after independence in 1948 and after Sinhala was 
declared the official language eight years later.  
67 Heble cites Yasmine Gooneratne, “Cultural Interaction in Modern Sri Lankan Poetry Written in English” 
from Only Connect: Literary Perspectives East and West, eds. Guy Amirthanayagam and  
S. C. Harrex, Adelaide: Centre for Research in the New Literatures in English (Honolulu: East-West Center, 
1981), 199, as the source of this valuable quotation, but I have two other points to make here. Firstly, the 
political nature of Wikkramasinha’s poetry, the balance he strikes in the relationship to language and power 
and his anathema to the language of the oppressors leads me to suggest that it fulfills Deleuze and Guattari’s 
criteria of a “minor literature” in Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, tr. Dana Polan (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1986) The main characteristics of “minor literature” are (i) “the impossibility of not 
writing because national consciousness, uncertain or oppressed, necessarily exists by means of literature”; (ii) 
“minor literature is completely different [from major literatures in that] its cramped space forces each 
individual intrigue to connect immediately to politics. The individual concern thus becomes all the more 
necessary, indispensable, magnified, because a whole other story is vibrating within it”; (iii) “the third 
characteristic of minor literature is that in it everything takes on a collective value. Indeed, precisely because 
talent isn’t abundant in a minor literature because of the reduced size of the source), there are no possibilities 
for an individuated enunciation that could be separated from a collective enunciation. Indeed, scarcity of talent 
is in fact beneficial and allows the conception of something other than a literature of masters . . . the political 
domain has contaminated every statement . . . It is literature that produces an active solidarity in spite of 
skepticism . . .  The literary machine  thus becomes the relay for a revolutionary machine-to-come . . . 
literature is the people’s concern” (16-8). Interestingly, just before Ondaatje’s own text acts a “relay” point 
for Wikkramasinha’s message of revolution, he speaks about a revolution of his own, insignificant in act, but 
significantly placed in this text, his writerly display on the page of representative letters of the Sinhalese script 
as he writes of a “communal protest this time, the first of my socialist tendencies” just before his discussion of 
Wikkramasinha (84). The second point I want to make with regard to the specifics of Sri Lankan writing in 
English comes from another early essay of Gooneratne’s entitled “Cultural Independence and the Writer in Sri 
Lanka”, Society and the Writer, eds. Wang Gungwu, M. Guerrero and D. Marr (Canberra: The Australian 
National University, 1981) in which she clearly articulates the problems inherent in writing in English in a 
foreign country. It is worth quoting from Gooneratne at some length for her insights into the practical side of 
writing from the shadowlands, interesting, too, to see how the theory of  “minor literature” fits in the cases of 
Sinhala and Tamil writings respectively. “The sustaining hope of the writer in English must lie in the fact that 
as English ceases to guarantee employment or to symbolize Western cultural dominance in the new Sri Lanka, 
his audience will be reduced to those few unprejudiced and mentally unexploited readers who can regard 
English simply as a language, and an exceptionally rich and flexible literary medium. Until the English 
language comes to be regarded in Sri Lanka as something apart from politics and communal rivalry, as 
something other and more than a colonial legacy, it is unlikely that Sri Lankan writers in English will be 
judged on their merits and defects as writers. . . . Moving to the particular problems of writers in the three 
languages: a writer in Sinhala can reach the great majority of his fellow-Sinhalese (if he is ‘popular’ enough in 
theme and style), but will be read by few Tamil-speakers or English-speakers within Sri Lanka and by no one 
outside the island except in translation, and therefore after a lapse of many years. A writer in Tamil will reach   242
                                                                                                                                                       
a local minority audience in Sri Lanka, and may also enjoy some reputation on the Indian subcontinent. The 
writer in English offers his work to a tiny local audience that resents the changing conditions of its way of life 
and—troubled and uncertain of its own future—fears and despises the mass it does not wish to understand. He 
writes, on the whole, without the active encouragement of publishers, and lacks any but the most misguided 
sympathy and admiration from his ‘public’, who respect him for his proficiency in English and do not imagine 
for a moment that he has any other purpose in writing than the demonstration of that proficiency” (my 
emphasis, 288). 
68 Heble points to the significance of these cultural references physically positioned just off-centre to the 
middle of the text. 
69 See Deleuze and Guattari for more on the significance of what is hidden: “But politically, the important 
things are always taking place elsewhere, in the hallways of the congress, behind the sense of the meeting, 
where people confront the real, immanent problems of desire and of power—the real problem of justice” (my 
emphasis, 50). 
70 The reference here is to the frescoes of Sigiriya, “the rock fortress of a despot king”, on which over the 
centuries anonymous poets have inscribed love poems. Ondaatje’s references to Sigiriya  are contiguous to his 
brief discussion of the Insurgency of 1971 when poems of another sort—“about the struggle, tortures, the 
unbroken spirit”—were written on the walls and ceilings throughout the university campus. Again the 
juxtaposition of the references provides a political comment of its own. 
71 From “Opponents, audiences, constituencies and community”, ed. H. Foster, Postmodern Culture (London: 
Pluto, 1983), 145. 
72 See Julie Beddoes, “Which Side Is It On? Form, Class, and Politics in In the Skin of a Lion”, Essays on 
Canadian Writing 53 (1994): 204-15, for an interesting discussion of the political in the form and content of 
another Ondaatje novel.  
73 The English Patient, London: Bloomsbury, 1992. 
74 In “Destructive Creation: The Politicization of Violence in the Works of Michael Ondaatje”, Canadian 
Literature 132 (1992): 109-24, Christian Bok suggests that the gaps and silences in Ondaatje’s texts represent 
an “ultimate act of violence against society, perhaps because such aphasia represents a deliberate abandonment 
of language, the very means by which socialization is even possible” (112). Thus the very silences, the 
tentative attempts to communicate, are in themselves political acts. What is Ondaatje himself suggesting in 
this respect? That while there are no physical boundaries within the villa, emotional walls between nations are 
more difficult to break down? Thus only when under the influence of morphine can Almásy be persuaded to 
talk. 
75 The significance of maps and boundaries and their relation to empire in this text has been discussed in a 
number of essays and need no repetition here. However, Rufus Cook in his essay, “Being and Representation 
in Michael Ondaatje’s The English Patient”, Ariel 30.4 (1999): 35-49, raises a fresh angle. In suggesting that 
Almásy “regards distinctions of race and class as ‘walls’ or ‘barriers’ (155) . . . [and that] he wants ‘not to 
belong to anyone, to any nation’ (139)”, he draws a comparison between the English patient’s “pure zone” 
(namely, an “embodiment of absence and negation”) and the “‘heterotopian zone of postmodern writing’” 
explored by Brian McHale in Postmodern Fiction. 
76 See D. Mark Simpson, “Minefield Readings: The Postcolonial English Patient”, Essays on Canadian 
Writing, in particular for the parallels he draws between Ondaatje’s intertextual references and the minefield 
of “explosive” possibilities in terms of readings and misreadings of the texts that he suggests this presents 
(216-37). One example is the connection he makes between Kirpal Singh and Kipling’s Kim. In suggesting 
that Kirpal Singh was “nicknamed Kip in a near echo of [Kipling’s] Kim, and an ironical truncation of 
Kipling”, Simpson claims that the “sapper’s plot . . . glosses to provocative and ironical effect crucially 
imperial and orientalizing thrusts in Kipling’s novel. As an Indian in England and then in Italy, Kip must turn 
the (post)colonial tables on the British Kim in India—but in intensely complicated ways, since Kim’s Irishness 
signals a historically racialized difference irritating the colonial suture between England and Ireland. In this 
respect at least, the continual references to Kipling’s Kim suggest that even the ostensibly official cultural and 
literary face of empire is all too often excruciated in its expressions” (220).   
77 See my note 67 in which I cite Gooneratne with regard to Sri Lanka’s attitude towards the English language 
and, by extrapolation, the English. 
78 The irony, of course, lies in that the English patient is not English and that central to the story is the shifting 
identity and concealed nationality of this character. “‘Who are you?’” whispers Hana. “‘I don’t know. You 
keep asking me.” “You said you were English’” (5). “‘Caravaggio thinks he knows who you are’” (169).  
Simpson suggests that the key to Almásy’s ethnic background lies in “Caravaggio’s plea to Kip (‘Of all people   243
                                                                                                                                                       
he is probably on your side’ [286] ), that racially or ethnically the English patient Almásy is by no means 
white, that beneath [the] carbon lies dark, or at least swarthy, skin” (Essays on Canadian Writing, 236). 
79Citing J. Hillis Miller, Fiction and Repetition: Seven English Novels (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1982), in which Ondaatje’s novel is described as  a “self-generated web (25)” of repetitions, re-
enactments and representations of representations, Cook claims that in this text “meaning or identity is always 
deferred or displaced. The English Patient should be regarded, then, not so much as a representation, than as a 
simulacrum: a system of signs which, in Baudrillard’s words, is ‘never exchanged for the real, but exchanged 
for itself, in an uninterrupted circuit without reference or circumference’ (Simulcra 6)” (37). Cook’s quotation 
of  Baudrillard from Simulcra and Simulation, tr. Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1994). The metaphor of spider’s web is a good one because it suggests that the narrative is circular, not 
linear. In this respect, Cook’s comment—that “such a novel takes us into the realm which Edward Said 
associates with ‘demonic artists’ such as Adrian Leverkuhn, a realm in which the ‘beginning and the end are 
finally one’ (184-5)” cited by Cook from Edward Said’s Beginnings: Intention and Method (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1975)—needs some explanation (48). Leverkuhn was a musician—a sickly man 
who was indeed reputed to possess “demonic” drives—and whose musical ‘system’ lacked harmony or 
melody and provided instead a cacophony of sound. Thus the analogy drawn by Cook from Said suggests that 
the English patient “gradually frees himself from his specific time-bound identity  and comes to identify 
instead with the self that narrates, the self that incorporates in one simultaneous space all the cumulative 
experiences of lost time” (Cook, 48). 
80 Significantly, it has no clear beginning, no neat end, no homogeneity, no linearity. 
81 See my earlier quotation from the text: “‘Death means you are in the third person’” (247). 
82 Cited by Bhabha from Fanon, “The Negro and psychopathology”, Black Skin, White Masks, tr. C. Lam 
Markmann (New York: 1967). 
83 Another way of looking at this is to invoke Žižek: “. . . the labour force is not ‘exploited’ in the sense that its 
full value is not remunerated; in principle at least, the exchange between labour and capital is wholly 
equivalent and equitable.The catch is that the labour force [here the country and peoples of Sri Lanka] is a 
peculiar commodity, the use of which—labour itself [writing]—produces a certain surplus-value [a book], and 
it is this surplus over the value of the labour force itself which is appropriated by the capitalist” (22). Although 
this does not exonerate Ondaatje from a form of cultural appropriation, it suggests that he is also robbing 
himself.  
84 From The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 
172.  
85 See Said’s discussion of the aesthetic, Culture and Imperialism (London: Chatto & Windus, 1993), 150-96. 
86 Among a number of points Said makes in his interpretation of Kim in Culture and Imperialism, what stands 
out most clearly is the reasoning that he ignored in Orientalism: the fact that Kipling was a product of the era 
in which he lived which was, of course, the high point of empire when “the division between white and non-
white, in India and elsewhere, was absolute, and [which] is alluded to throughout Kim as well as the rest of 
Kipling’s work: a Sahib is a Sahib, and no amount of friendship or camaraderie can change the rudiments of 
racial difference. Kipling would no more have questioned that difference, and the right of the white European 
to rule, than he would have argued with the Himalayas” (162-3). As I noted earlier, there was an appreciable 
growth in the awareness of the politics of empire in the twenty years or so that separated figures like Browne 
and Kipling from that of Leonard Woolf.   244
Chapter five 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AMITAV GHOSH: WRITING THE ORIENT FROM WITHIN 
 
 
 
 
 
 The ‘I’ that I was, was a mosaic of many countries, 
 a patchwork of others and objects stretching backwards 
 to perhaps the beginning of time.  
What I felt, seeing this was indebtedness. 
 
Charles Johnson
1 
 
 
. . . polyphony requires a plurality of full-valued 
 voices within the bounds of a single work . . . 
 
Mikhail Bakhtin 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Amitav Ghosh appears in the final chapter of my re-reading of “orientalism” partly because 
he is located at the other end of the continuum from Browne in a temporal and geographical 
sense, but more importantly, for the ethnographic perspective he provides in respect of the 
“orientalist” debate under review here. This is a figure who knows the rules of the 
postcolonial discourse in which he writes; one who is self-reflexively aware in his writing 
style; a writer whose text is informed by a dialogism that forms an intrinsic part of his 
discourse; and one who is, after all, an Indian writing—in the main—about his ‘own’ part of 
the world. Taking these factors into consideration—and especially in view of the fact that   245
his works take place in the wake of Said’s Orientalism—one suspects that Ghosh is 
avowedly anti-“orientalist” and that he cannot be condemned for “orientalist” practices. Or 
can he? An examination of In an Antique Land provokes a number of questions.
3 Is even 
Ghosh vulnerable—in the slippages in his text, perhaps, or in his silences, or in his approach 
or choice of subject matter—to similar charges of “orientalism” that appear in the texts of 
the other writers I have been exploring? More specifically, despite his efforts to the contrary 
in this work, does Ghosh function here as a “seeing-man . . . he whose imperial eyes 
passively look out and possess” (Pratt, 7)?
4 Has he absorbed so much from the metropolis, 
that he too has become elitist, an “autoethnographer” involved in “partial collaboration with 
and appropriation of the idioms of the conqueror”? Or does the way he constructs himself as 
James Clifford’s “participant observer”, for example, absolve him from such discriminatory 
practices? 
 
It is precisely because In an Antique Land is a text which deliberately crosses the 
boundaries of race, religion and culture that it provides an ideal focus for exploration 
against which, once again, I invoke the work of a number of theorists and experts in their 
fields to ascertain whether the simple fact of writing about another’s race and culture could 
still be said to constitute a form of cultural pillage. Specifically, I want to use Bakhtin on 
dialogism and James Clifford on ethnography and the ‘native informant’ in this critique of 
Ghosh.
5 
 
But firstly I want to establish where Amitav Ghosh locates himself in respect of his work—
as a writer generally and of this book in particular—since, again, this has implications for 
how he represents the life worlds he writes about. Applying a nationality and a sense of   246
culture to Ghosh is ostensibly a great deal simpler than the difficulties I faced with many of 
the other writers that appear in this thesis. Although over the past few years, he has been 
residing in New York, and despite the fact that his childhood and early adult years were 
considerably more peripatetic than the other figures I have been discussing, Ghosh is 
proudly Indian.
6 Not for this writer, the doubled identity of Rushdie, the hybridity of 
Ondaatje, the universality of Naipaul, the cultural assumption of Browne. Unlike the 
character in “Mera Joota Hai Japani” to whom I now apply an element of tension in the 
form of a confession—a prefacing with a silent ‘but’ in the last line of the stanza that causes 
a certain indeterminacy that I am able to read back into the statement, “My heart’s Indian 
for all that”—Ghosh celebrates his Indianness. He carries his race as nationality. It flutters 
before and above him like a standard, and he writes from that foundation. Of the corpus of 
Ghosh’s work, it is In an Antique Land that appears to scrutinize this identity within 
nationality.
7 Contrary to my declaration in the first paragraph of this chapter, in this instance 
Ghosh is not  writing about his own part of the world—at least not primarily—but 
significantly it is in this very act of dislocation that the fundamental nature of his Indianness 
is found.
8 In other words, this clear sense of nationality comes from the displacement that 
living in the “Antique Land” of Egypt provides. It is in writing about village Egypt that 
Ghosh privileges a cosmopolitan India that in this text acts as the metropolis. 
  
Before looking more deeply into this question of dislocation, let me first explore the 
organization of this text in terms of content and structure. Like Ondaatje’s Running in the 
Family, critics vie to find a way to describe this narrative.
9 And so while it has been 
variously described as an autobiography, a semi-autobiography, a travelogue, an historical 
piece of writing, a work of fiction, a “double helix”, I suggest that it is none of these . . . and   247
yet all. But because this strikes at the heart of what I am going to discuss here, it is worth 
quoting what Ghosh himself has to say about the generic construction of his work:  
Well, essentially, I haven’t written in so many genres. I mean, I’ve written 
novels, and I’ve written nonfiction—my reportage. And frankly, I don’t 
even think of them as different genres in some way. I know that the 
institutional structure of our world presses us to think of fiction and 
nonfiction as being absolutely separate. And in some sense they are. I mean 
with nonfiction there is a domain of fact to which you have to refer and by 
which you are necessarily constrained. But I think the techniques one brings 
to bear upon nonfiction, certainly the techniques that I’ve brought to bear 
on nonfiction, essentially come from my fiction. . . . In the end it’s about 
people’s lives; it’s about people’s history; it’s about people’s destinies. 
When I write nonfiction, I’m really writing about characters and people, 
and when I’m writing fiction, I’m doing the same thing. So that shift isn’t as 
great as it might appear to be.  
 
At one point in my life I was doing anthropology. But I realized very early 
on that anthropology was not of interest to me in the end because it was 
about abstractions, the way you make people into abstractions and make 
them into, as it were, statistical irregularities. 
 
And in the end my real interest is in the predicament of individuals. And in 
this I don’t think there is that much different between fiction and 
nonfiction.
10 (World Literature Today) 
 
However, while Ghosh’s work may well be based on the “predicament of individuals”, In 
an Antique Land is a diagnostic text that takes this interest to another level, that of a social, 
cultural, political and economic analysis of a people and a location. Thus while Ghosh 
appears to claim a liberal humanist approach in this text particularly, this is deceptive as his 
writing is inevitably tempered by an ethnographical training that probes below the surface to 
add the type of cultural complexity that is emphasized by the lengths so many critics go to 
in their attempts to categorize the work. This is no seamless narrative. It is as much about 
social ethnography as it is a disjunctive text, a multi-level discourse, an amalgam of fiction, 
history, anthropological input, manuscript fragments, autobiographical incident and pure 
speculation, the blending and juxtaposition of which highlight the degree of self-reflexivity 
Ghosh has brought to the work.
11 Above all, it is a socially and politically conscious text.
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Accordingly, I think that more important than a debate as to what constitutes fiction or 
nonfiction in this instance is that this is a narrative primarily concerned with the concept of 
dislocation or displacement. In this text, most of the main characters leave their birthplace 
for social, economic or political reasons and while some return, others do not. There is no 
question of assimilation; to the contrary, the narrative works to point up the differences in 
culture and traditions between nations.
13 By setting himself apart from his birthplace—from 
writing about India from the distance of another continent and another time—is how Ghosh 
best emphasizes a commitment to the sense of Indianness that I mentioned earlier.
14 The 
moral of the text seems to be that it is through the act of dislocation that one arrives at a 
truer sense of place and self. 
 
In terms of structure, this is achieved in two ways. On the one hand, his establishment of the 
twelfth-century Indian slave as a parallel protagonist results in a text that is split into two 
narratives which has the effect of constantly relocating reader attention. On the other, as 
controlling narrator, Ghosh places himself—the Ghosh of the text—in a state of permanent 
flux. He re-constructs a picture of his own life as the Indian ethnographic postgraduate 
undertaking field work in an Egyptian village; concomitantly, he is always apart from the 
village. As “participant-observer”, he always remains the outsider, the one who arrives and 
departs.
15 Juxtaposed with the main story, a sub-narrative pieces together a mosaic of the 
existence of the slave who leaves his homeland of India for tenure in Egypt. By forging this 
rather tenuous connection between the slave and himself, Ghosh produces a text, which in 
Clifford’s words, maps “older connections between India and Egypt, trade and travel 
relations which preceded and partly bypassed the world’s violent polarization into West and   249
East, empire and colony, developed and backward” (Routes, 5). The story of the slave 
serves both a literary and political role, which I discuss at length later in this chapter. 
 
Meanwhile if, in its constant shift between cultures, this text could be described as “a 
twentieth-century ‘poetics of displacement’”, a number of questions present themselves 
(Predicament of Culture, 10). For example: How does Ghosh find himself in the eyes of the 
‘other’? On whose “screen” does he place his own “projected desires”?
 16 Does the act of 
viewing himself and his nation from an Arab perspective serve to reinforce his Indian 
identity? In particular, it is significant that while there is repeated reference to both the 
Hindu and Muslim religions throughout the text, it is only in juxtaposition with one another 
that either gains clarity. Ghosh claims that to “write about one’s surrounding is anything but 
natural: to even perceive one’s immediate environment one must somehow distance oneself 
from it; to describe it one must assume a certain posture, a form of address. In other words, 
to locate oneself through prose, one must begin with an act of dislocation”.
17 Thus while in 
Egypt, he researches the story of the slave in the Alexandrian archives; once he has left 
Egypt, he writes his own story into his research. 
 
Since critics often conflate the two, this is the point at which a clear understanding of the 
difference between anthropology and ethnography clarifies and exemplifies what Ghosh is 
trying to achieve with this text. Stating that before the late-nineteenth century, there was a 
definitive division between the ethnographer as a “describer-translater of custom” and the 
anthropologist as “builder of general theories about humanity”, Clifford updates—and re-
inflects—this distinction by claiming that a “clear sense of the tension between ethnography   250
and anthropology is important in correctly perceiving the recent, and perhaps temporary, 
conflation of the two projects” (28). He says:  
 
Modern ethnography appears in several forms, traditional and innovative. 
As an academic practice it cannot be separated from anthropology. Seen 
more generally, it is simply diverse ways of thinking and writing about 
culture from a standpoint of participant observation [my emphasis]. . . . A 
modern ‘ethnography’ of conjunctures, constantly moving between cultures, 
does not, like its Western alter ego ‘anthropology’, aspire to survey the full 
range of human diversity or development. It is perpetually displaced, both 
regionally focused and broadly comparative, a form both of dwelling and of 
travel in a world where the two experiences are less and less distinct. (9)
18  
 
Thus, by situating himself in rural Egypt and his co-protagonist in India, with this text 
Ghosh aptly fulfills Clifford’s ethnographic criteria of  “constantly moving between 
cultures”, of “perpetual” displacement where the acts of “dwelling” and “travel” merge to 
become one. Or, as John Docker puts it, In an Antique Land works precisely because it 
“tests and permits the reversal of the usual relationship between ethnographer and informant 
in the Western anthropological project.” He claims, “In this tradition . . . Western 
anthropologists might confide doubts, lack of knowledge, puzzlement, bafflement, 
difficulties of research, chagrin of incomprehension, sense of defeat, to their private 
notebooks and diaries and in letters home. But in the published scholarly account they will 
strive to appear imperturbably objective, as if their ethnography is the impersonal unfolding 
of the total truth of the observed society, garnered from informants’ data scientifically 
sifted”.
19 This is a far cry from the vulnerability that Ghosh displays in not only locating 
himself as “the object of his informants’ curious gaze” but in transcribing the events and 
emotions that transpire. As an ethnographic venture then—as a project of “participant 
observation” where Ghosh is but one of the characters in his own story—this text works as 
an efficient example of contemporary ethnography. 
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From the perspective of Edward Said’s “orientalist” theories, though, it is not so neat. In 
fact it would seem that Ghosh becomes indicted by all three definitions Said applies to his 
re-fashioning of the term.
21 These are by now well known, but they bear repeating here 
because of their specific application to this text. Said states that: (i) “Anyone who teaches, 
writes about, or researches the Orient—and this applies whether the person is an 
anthropologist, sociologist, historian or philologist—either in its specific or its general 
aspects, is an Orientalist . . .”; (ii) “Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an 
ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the 
time) ‘the Occident’ [most of the time, but note, not exclusively] . . . a very large mass of 
writers . . . have accepted the basic distinction between East and West [or in this case East 
and East] as the starting point for elaborate theories . . . concerning the Orient, its people, 
customs, ‘mind’, destiny . . .”; (iii) “. . . Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the 
corporate institution for dealing with the Orient . . . [B]y making statements about it, 
authorizing views of it . . . European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself 
off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self” (Orientalism, 2-3). 
 
Let me look more closely at these assertions in relation to Ghosh’s text. That Ghosh as 
author fulfills the first definition is obvious and needs no further amplification; it is the way 
in which the author and his text realize themselves in an amalgam of the second and third 
definitions that interests me most here. It is plain that this text, both in the way it is 
structured and in its subject matter, creates a very distinct division between two nations—
Egypt and India—and that one of those nations (the one to which the author happens to 
belong) is structured as dominant.
22 In other words Ghosh, as a representative of India, has   252
constructed himself as educated, knowledgeable, and altogether epistemologically superior 
to the villagers amongst whom he dwells. And note, too, the qualities ascribed to the Indian 
slave who was literate in an era when literacy was uncommon and whose relationship with 
his Jewish “master” could not be said to fit the typical master/slave binary. Contrast this 
with the manner in which the village and the villagers as ‘other’ are portrayed, held back by 
either lack of education or lack of money or both. Consider the words of Zaghloul, the 
weaver, who contrasts the city and the educated (the elite) with the villagers (the subaltern): 
“‘. . . don’t forget you’re a fellah [villager] . . . love is for students and mowazzafeen and 
city people . . . for us it’s different . . .” (In an Antique Land, 217). Although Zaghoul here 
is using the ‘them’ and ‘us’ differentiation to refer to the division between city folk and the 
peasant, the very fact that Ghosh has aligned himself with the elite speaks for itself.
23  
 
In another example, the account of the acquisition of a brand-new diesel water-pump by one 
of the villagers, again illuminates the power dynamic written into this text. This machine is 
one of few to reach the area and a source of great pride to its owner, whom we know only as 
Mabrouk’s father. Significantly, the machine was made in India. Ghosh has been invited to 
inspect and comment on the pump while Mabrouk’s family looks anxiously on. 
 
“Makana hindi!” I said to Mabrouk’s father, with a show of enthusiasm. 
“Congratulations—you’ve bought an ‘Indian machine’!” 
 
Mabrouk’s father’s eyes went misty with pride as he gazed upon the 
machine. “Yes”, he sighed. . . . “You must take a look at it and tell us what 
you think.” 
 
“Me?” I said. I was aghast; I knew nothing at all about water-pumps . . . 
 
“Yes!” Mabrouk’s father clapped me on the back. “It’s from your country, 
isn’t it? I told the dealer in Damanhour, I said, ‘Make sure you give me one 
that works well, we have an Indian living in our hamlet and he’ll be able to 
tell whether we’ve got a good one or not.’” 
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I hesitated . . . [but a] quick look at the anxious, watchful faces around me 
told me that escape was impossible: I would have to pronounce an opinion, 
whether I liked it or not. 
 
A hush fell upon the courtyard . . . a dozen heads craned forward . . . I went 
up to the machine’s spout . . . peered knowledgeably into its inky interior, 
shutting one eye . . . nodding to myself, occasionally tapping parts of it . . . 
Then . . . I fell to my knees and shut my eyes. When I looked up again 
Mabrouk’s father was standing above me, anxiously awaiting the outcome 
of my silent communion with this product of my native soil. 
 
Reaching for his hand I gave it a vigorous shake. “It’s a very good makana 
Hindi . . . 
24 Excellent! ‘Azeem! It’s an excellent machine.” 
 
At once a joyful hubbub broke out . . . (72-3) 
 
 
There are several ways of interpreting what is going on here. A mainstream reading might 
focus on the part the machine plays in the subsequent acceptance of Ghosh by the villagers, 
and imply that it exists purely as a device to move along this narrative of cultural bias. 
However, the tension built into this passage would suggest that there is a greater 
complexity: that the incident of the “makana hindi” describes an encounter between two 
cultures and thus introduces what Mary Pratt would call a “contact zone”.
25 Since “contact 
zones” are by definition circumscribed by notions of power, a more heretical reading would 
suggest that this “zone” is not a neutral area, but the location of a transcultural exchange of 
authority.
 26 The introduction of the notion of a contact zone destroys the ingenuousness of 
the first reading and the scene above now gains a political imperative that offers two 
diametrically opposite interpretations. I have already suggested that it is a site of exchange 
of authority between one culture and another. The question now becomes: In which 
direction is the authority flowing? Who gains in authority from this exchange? Is the 
incident of the “makana hindi” now one of “anti-conquest” where “strategies of innocence 
are constituted in relation to older imperial rhetorics of conquest”? Certainly Ghosh 
constructs himself as the “innocent” in this exchange. If so, does this make him a “seeing-  254
man” who seeks “to secure his innocence” at the same time as he asserts his metropolitan 
hegemony (Pratt, 7)? If this is indeed the case, this interpretation would suggest that by dint 
of elevating the imported machine—and, by extrapolation, his own knowledgeable self 
along with it—Ghosh only increases the gap between the elite and the subaltern. But this 
analysis suggests too complete an innocence on the part of the villagers and this is not 
necessarily the case. As a process of exchange, an act of transculturalism calls on notions of 
“copresence, interaction, interlocking understandings and practices”. It is an interactive 
mode, a transaction, which involves the subaltern just as it does the elite. Invoking Ranajit 
Guha in his discussion of the peasant, Dipesh Chakrabarty writes “that instead of being an 
anachronism in a modernizing colonial world, the peasant was a real contemporary of 
colonialism . . . Theirs was not a ‘backward’ consciousness—a mentality left over from the 
past, a consciousness baffled by modern political economic institutions and yet resistant to 
them. Peasants’ readings of the relations of power that they confronted in the world, Guha 
argued, were by no means unrealistic or backward-looking” (Chakrabarty, 13). This line of 
reasoning gives the power back to the subaltern. Ghosh cannot escape the test to which he is 
put. He is hemmed in by a circle of villagers. Tension mounts . . . we are not aware just how 
much until the releasing words, “At once a joyful hubbub broke out . . .” Thus a further, 
equally acceptable, reading of this scene would suggest that it is Ghosh who is on trial and 
that it is the villagers who act as arbitrators. But because these readings tend to cancel each 
other out in terms of a power relationship, I suggest there is still more to the significance of 
this machine.  
 
Taken out of context as a piece of textual analysis it presents two sides to the relations of 
power, but in its appearance twice more in the narrative, the “makana hindi” offers yet   255
another reading: this time as a symbol of modernity and ultimate destruction.
 It provides the 
means for forward movement in the somewhat contentious thesis of the “uneven 
development” of the subaltern, but in this text the speed of that propulsion leads to 
damaging consequences.
27 For clarification, let me return again to the text. The importance 
of the machine, of modernity, of the power dynamic, only becomes clear once the villagers 
gain these machines in their own right: in a liberal view of this exchange it provides a 
counter-opportunity to impress. In other words, the “thesis of uneven development . . . sees 
these differences as negotiated and contained—though not always overcome—within the 
structure of capital” (Chakrabarty, 47). For a time, with the acquisition of material goods, 
the subordinated ‘other’ draws level: “Following his [Abu-‘Ali’s] instructions, they filed 
obediently through the  guest-room, carrying in turns a TV set, a food processor, a handful 
of calculators, a transistor radio . . .” (298). The villagers’ acquisition of Western goods not 
only provides an excuse to invite Ghosh into their homes and into their community; it also 
offers an opportunity to impress him with their new refrigerators, television sets and 
renovated houses. In “converting differences into sets of preferences”, the levelling effect of 
this show of modernity permits friendship with someone who can now be perceived, and 
treated, as a peer and not as elite (Chakrabarty, 48).
28 The subordinate draws level through 
the attainment of a capitalist lifestyle. But it becomes impossible to discuss any transition to 
capitalism without reference to Marxian thought—thus providing yet another method of 
analysis which can exist in parallel and not necessarily at counter-point with the more 
liberal view expressed above—and there is no clearer way to put this than to refer to 
Chakrabarty’s critique of Marx in which he states:
29  
 
My reading of Marx does not in any way obviate that need for engagement 
with the universal. What I have attempted to do is to produce a reading in 
which the very category ‘capital’ becomes a site where both the universal    256
 
 
history of capital and the politics of human belonging are allowed to 
interrupt each other’s narrative. . . . Capital brings into every history some 
of the universal themes of the European Enlightenment, but on inspection 
the universal turns out to be an empty place holder whose unstable outlines 
become barely visible only when a proxy, a particular, usurps its position in 
a gesture of pretension and domination. And that, it seems to me, is the 
restless and inescapable politics of historical difference to which global 
capital consigns us. (70)
30 
 
 
If I were to apply this reading to the two scenes from the text described above, my 
interpretation of what Ghosh is saying gains yet again in complexity. Signals within the text 
now point to Abu-‘Ali’s capitalistic opportunism in sending his four sons into the inevitable 
danger associated with a war zone to take advantage of the employment prospects in Iraq 
that had become available during the Gulf War. Abu-‘Ali is portrayed as a bloated capitalist 
machine, the “image of an engorged python”, the sons as the “abstract labour” component 
(297).
31 “Capital’s power is autocratic, writes Marx. Resistance is rooted in a process 
through which capital appropriates the will of the worker” (Chakrabarty, 59). 
 
The moral of this text becomes all the more sinister. Indeed, capitalism in the thin disguise 
of money and what money can buy dominates the chapter Ghosh has titled “Going Back” 
which covers his two subsequent returns to Egypt. As he goes from one house to another on 
his second visit, he not only finds Nashawy changed to the point where “it looked as though 
the village had been drawn on to the fringes of a revolution”, but also finds that the change 
in the villagers is as marked: “It was not just that . . . so many of the old adobe houses had 
been torn down and replaced . . . something more important had changed as well, the 
relations between different kinds of people in the village had been upturned and rearranged.    257
Families who at that time had counted amongst the poorest in the community . . . were now 
the very people who had new houses, bank accounts, gadgetry. I could not have begun to 
imagine a change on this scale . . .” (321). That Marx’s oft-quoted dictum—“to each 
according to his needs”—is fast becoming abused by an influx of wealth is often 
illuminated in this chapter just as the insidious nature of greed is foregrounded. For 
example, when the sacrificial Nabeel leaves for work in Iraq, he is initially missed for 
himself alone. But as time goes by, the family becomes dependent on the increasing sums of 
money he sends back home. When, one day, he suggests building his family a house in 
absentia by remitting money for its construction “they called him back immediately” and 
the project was started without delay, but the aid soon gets taken for granted. Nabeel 
quickly becomes a money machine. Although he has avoided the deadening impact of 
“factory” work, per se, he has nevertheless become absorbed rather unhappily into a system 
just as unrelenting. In the last pages of the book, on Ghosh’s third and last visit to the 
village, he again enquires about Nabeel and in this exchange the capitalist implications are 
clear:  
“Why didn’t Nabeel come back with you? What news of him?”  
 
“He wanted to come back. In fact he thought that he would. But then he 
decided to stay  for a few more months, make a little more money, so that 
they could finish building this house.”. . .  
 
“And besides,” said Fawzia, “what would Nabeel do back here? Look at 
Isma’il—just sitting at home, no job, nothing to do . . .”  
 
“But still, he wanted to come back. He’s been there three years. It’s more 
than most, and it’s aged him”. (351-2) 
 
In the last line of the book: “Nabeel had vanished into the anonymity of History” (353).
32 
A genuine sense of unease for the subaltern manifests itself in the narrative, but along with 
this apprehension, can a sense of responsibility also be determined? Although the “makana   258
hindi” fulfills a number of functions—as a sign of respect and knowledge, an icon of 
capitalist desire, a representation of modernity, of ‘progress’, and as a symbol for “the 
world’s most advanced machinery . . . [the] guns and tanks and bombs” of chemical and 
nuclear warfare (350)—and even though it acts as a conduit for a flow of authority back and 
forth in terms of transcultural exchange, in the end it amounts to an indicator of 
metropolitan power. And it would appear that this power, this authority, is consciously held 
by Ghosh. If this statement needs further amplification, it can be found by returning once 
again to the image of Ghosh on his knees in front of the “makana hindi”? Does this not raise 
the machine to the status of idol, suggesting a superstition among the villagers despite their 
strictly Moslem upbringing? And does not this superstitious nature once again return them 
to peasant status? This is illuminated by an argument that takes place at the end of the 
narrative with the Egyptian official’s reply to Ghosh: “In the villages, as you must know, 
there is a lot of ignorance and superstition; the fellaheen talk about miracles for no reason at 
all. You’re an educated man. You should know better than to believe the fellaheen on 
questions of religion” (340). Again there is a contrast between knowledge and ignorance, 
the metropolis and the periphery. Ultimately it is not just the “Indian machine’s” function as 
a symbol of metropolitan power, but Ghosh’s close identification with it that burdens him 
with a sense of responsibility. 
 
This gives rise to a number of questions. By what set of ‘European’ values and standards are 
the Egyptian villagers being judged? What capitalist judgement is encoded in the exchanges 
that take place in the “contact zones”? What of the official’s insistence that village 
superstition will disappear with “development and progress”, those symbols of Western 
authority? As late as 1990, success is measured by moving to the “outside”, a discourse of   259
freedom which becomes, eventually, a trap. The “Western” values and standards that have 
been inscribed upon the villagers show the transculturation taking place as the subjugated 
subjects engage with the “transculturating elements of metropolitan discourses” (Pratt, 143). 
I refer back to my argument earlier in which I claimed that the machine acts as the dominant 
factor in the “contact zone” just as in Pratt’s defining space of “colonial encounters, the 
space in which peoples geographically and historically separated come into contact with 
each other and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions of . . . radical 
inequality . . .  A ‘contact’ perspective emphasizes how subjects are constituted in and by 
their relations to each other. It treats the relations among colonizers and colonized, or 
travelers and ‘travelees,’ not in terms of separateness or apartheid, but in terms of 
copresence, interaction, interlocking understandings and practices, often within radically 
asymmetrical relations of power” (6-7). This, it would appear, is what is happening here. 
Despite a reading that could suggest that the power is returned to the subaltern, at text’s end 
I suggest that Ghosh’s selection of material objectifies the village and its people leaving us 
with an image of backwardness, of not measuring up, with a reductive view of the native 
and the “essentializing discursive power” of what is, still, a metropolitan discourse 
(Pratt,153). In “a parodic, transculturating gesture”, Ghosh returns his discourse to its 
context of origin, the capitalist metropolis. And so, just as Ghosh’s text ‘fits’ Clifford’s 
definition of ethnography, so too does it leave itself open to charges of “orientalism”. 
 
Accordingly, what concerns me at this point is Said’s argument quoted earlier: the clear 
“ontological and epistemological distinction” that Ghosh draws between the elite and the 
subaltern, the theories he puts forward in an admittedly subtle way “concerning the Orient 
[or, more exactly, village Egypt’s interaction with the rest of the world, specifically Iraq],   260
its people, customs . . . destiny”. It concerns me, too, that there is a power relation written 
into an “authorized” view of this nature, which has been compiled by a foreigner who 
carries, after all, the accreditation of an ethnographer.
33 Clifford, for example, claims that 
the “development of ethnographic science cannot ultimately be understood in isolation from 
more general political-epistemological debates about writing and otherness. . . . If 
ethnography produces cultural interpretations through intense research experiences, how is 
unruly experience transformed into an authoritative written account? How, precisely, is a 
garrulous, overdetermined cross-cultural encounter shot through with power relations and 
personal cross-purposes circumscribed as an adequate version of a more or less discrete 
‘other world’ composed by an individual author?” (24-5). 
 
Is this proof that Ghosh is not as ‘avowedly anti-“orientalist”’ as I suggested he might be at 
the beginning of this chapter? That his text is not as innocent of “orientalist” practice as it 
first appears? On the face of it, it would certainly seem so. But it remains unlikely for a 
number of very good reasons that Ghosh would write an “orientalist” text. Quite apart from 
his training in the “new ethnography”, he is fully aware of hegemonic power structures and 
would be highly unlikely to write a text that colluded with any form of Eurocentric 
behaviour. Thus it could be construed that the line of argument I have been following here 
is, in fact, a resistant reading to this text. Certainly, postcolonial discourse would deem it so. 
Otherwise, why would Ranajit Guha select an episode from In an Antique Land for reprint 
in Subaltern Studies?
34 
 
The key may well lie in the historiographical dimension of this text which I have not so far 
discussed.
35 Let me return to one of the reviews of In an Antique Land in which Bruce King   261
claims that In an Antique Land “could be seen as a better-written, reader-friendly, improved 
version of the self-conscious contemporary anthropological study in which the author 
deconstructs his expected story, puts the cards or documents on the table for critical 
inspection, and discusses the dangers of constructing the ‘Other’”.
36 An examination of 
what King is saying in this review provides a good place to challenge my own argument at 
this point. 
 
I need to look first at the somewhat fragile link of the two Indians overseas which not only 
serves as the raison d’etre for the book, but also apparently provides Ghosh with sufficient 
connective tissue to give him the “sense of entitlement” that he needs to sanction his “right” 
to be in Egypt at all (In an Antique Land, 19). In the context of analyzing the motives 
underlying the text, how this relationship works to assuage Ghosh’s conscience on the 
matter is not as important as his recognition—and the voicing of that recognition—of the 
fact that as a non-national he is trespassing on foreign territory. This double link—insofar as 
the slave provides him with a “right” to research the slave’s life in Egypt and that the 
scholarship that enabled him to do so was provided by “a family of expatriate Indians”—is 
mentioned only once in the text and never fully explained. It exists as a partial disclosure. 
But treated as a gap, or silence, it gains stature within the book and becomes intrinsic to the 
meaning and, therefore, the final argument. This provides the first clue that Ghosh is fully 
aware of the difficulties of representation—or “the dangers of constructing the ‘Other’”—
and also points up a nationalist disposition discussed earlier in that he does not choose to 
research or write under a broad Oriental umbrella (as, of course, does Said). Ghosh makes it 
clear that he is Indian, not Egyptian, and in writing about Egypt, he makes obvious his 
understanding that he is as vulnerable to charges of “orientalism” as any other traveller on   262
alien ground. However, the Saidian thesis provides that Ghosh is vulnerable to charges of 
“orientalism” on two counts: both in studying another culture and writing about it. Said’s 
insistence on this point is non-negotiable: “For if it is true that no production of knowledge 
in the human sciences can ever ignore or disclaim its author’s involvement as a human 
subject in his own circumstances, then it must also be true that for a European or American 
studying the Orient there can be no disclaiming the main circumstances of his actuality: that 
he comes up against the Orient as a European or American first, as an individual second. 
And to be a European or an American in such a situation is by no means an inert fact” 
(Orientalism, 11).
37 While it could be argued that Ghosh is an Oriental—which, in this 
instance, overrides his Indianness—and is, after all, writing only about another country 
within that sphere, I think that his words—“I knew nothing then about the Slave of MS H.6 
except that he had given me a right to be there, a sense of entitlement”—foreground his 
need for justification “to be there”(In an Antique Land, 19). This further begs the question 
as to why—if Ghosh feels he needs a reason to provide an “entitlement” to write about 
another area of the Orient—Said deems himself free to use the entire region, in particular 
India, for his study, research and authorial purposes. There is an irony here. But somewhat 
paradoxically, this ‘admission’ on Ghosh’s part only strengthens his position. Thus, what is 
at first perceived as a weakness gives life to the text and becomes its strength. 
 
In the first instance, I suggested that the slave acts as a parallel protagonist in this text. But 
now, in an inversion of this notion, I propose that the reconstructed “Bomma” drives an 
historiographical research project that exists alongside Ghosh’s ethnographic representation 
of the subaltern. As such, for my purposes here, I will assign him an opposite role to that of 
the main character: that of antagonist.
38 In terms of historical or narrative importance, the   263
significance of the slave is doubtful. As Clifford Geertz comments, the slave’s story is 
indeed “a wandering, parabolic tale, derived from searching for incidental references and 
uncertain clues in documents difficult to find, difficult to read and even more difficult to 
interpret”.
39 At the end of the sequence of events we know little about Bomma other than 
his reconstructed name, that he existed as part of the entourage of a Jewish merchant called 
Ben Yiju during the seventeen years Yiju spent in Mangalore (a small port on India’s south-
western coast) and that he then left India for Egypt with his Jewish ‘master’.
40 However, in 
terms of the postcolonial discourse within which I am deconstructing Ghosh’s text, the 
appearance of the slave is politically crucial because he opens up the grand narrative of the 
European archive. By this I mean the “chronicling [of] the shifting relations of domination 
and subordination between Europeans and the rest of the world”, a point I return to later in 
this chapter.
41 
 
My argument is this: If I am correct in my assessment of Ghosh’s élitist representation of 
himself alongside the subaltern, the existence of the slave and the ensuing research 
opportunity provides him with something more than a locative “right to be there”.  I believe 
that the dialectic he sets up between the “two Indians abroad”—the ‘antagonism’ I 
mentioned—provides an opportunity for somewhat more than an “entitlement” to research 
and to write up Bomma’s story, the account of which is slight from any angle. Instead I 
suggest that Ghosh has extended this “sense of entitlement” to his politically sensitive 
representation of Egypt and the villagers amongst whom he resides. In this way, those 
sporadic and seemingly arbitrary segments of text interleaved with, but separate from, the 
main story then gain significance in providing evidence fundamental to the thesis of this   264
chapter: to prove, or disprove, his anti-“orientalism”. It presents Ghosh with the chance I 
have not yet allowed him—to present his side of the “orientalist” story.
42 
 
In this respect, I need to return to the beginning of the text, the start of the slave’s story—
“[T]he slave of MS H.6 first stepped upon the stage of modern history in 1942” (In an 
Antique Land, 13)—in order to examine the methodology Ghosh employs in his research. 
Having just won a scholarship at that time, serendipity plays a part in his choice of research 
subject in that his initial interest is sparked by a letter he came across in “a library in Oxford 
in the winter of 1978” (19).
43 At that stage Ghosh had never heard of the “chamber known 
as the Geniza” in the synagogue of Ben Ezra where he was to spend much of his time 
looking for evidence of Bomma’s existence. And although there are glimpses of discourse 
in the preceding pages, this is the point at which one realizes how implausible the 
imperialist attitude I attributed to Ghosh earlier becomes. I quote from a “History” segment 
that in this text is placed in juxtaposition to the historiography with which Ghosh traces the 
slave’s story: 
In the eighteenth century, a new breed of traveller began to flock into Cairo, 
Europeans with scholarly and antiquarian interests, for whom Masr [Cairo] 
was merely the picturesque but largely incidental location of an older, and 
far more important landscape. By this time Europe was far in advance of 
the rest of the world in armaments and industry, and on the points of those 
weapons the high age of imperialism was about to be ushered in. Masr had 
long since ceased to be the mistress of her own destiny; she had become a 
province of the Ottoman Empire, which was itself enfeebled now, allowed 
to keep its territories only by the consent of the Great Powers. The Indian 
Ocean trade, and the culture that supported it, had long since been destroyed 
by European navies. Transcontinental trade was no longer a shared 
enterprise; the merchant shipping of the high seas was now entirely 
controlled by the naval powers of Europe. It no longer fell to Masr to send 
her traders across the Indian Ocean; instead, the geographical position that 
had once brought her such great riches had now made her the object of the 
Great Powers’ attentions, as a potential bridge to their territories in the 
Indian Ocean. . . . she was also gradually evolving into a new continent of 
riches for the Western scholarly and artistic imagination. From the late 
seventeenth century onwards, Europe was swept by a fever of Egyptomania 
. . . the study of Egyptian antiquities passed from being an esoteric and   265
quasi-mystical pursuit into a freshly-charted field of scholarly enterprise . . . 
(my emphases, 80-1)
44 
 
Let me pause for a moment. Besides describing a number of historical enterprises—naval 
ventures, the diminution of the Ottoman Empire, merchant shipping and a lust for the 
“exotic” in the form of oriental antiques—in which Cairo is located at the centre, the mood 
and intent behind Ghosh’s message of “the high age of imperialism” is made quite clear. 
Words and phrases such as “Egyptomania”, “the Great Powers”, “controlled”, “consent”, 
“Western scholarly and artistic imagination” and the repetition of “Europe” have a strong 
resonance with the terms used by Edward Said in particular and the postcolonial canon in 
general. What Ghosh is describing is an unremitting exercise of power in the “contact 
zones” within which the games of supremacy—Pratt’s “asymmetrical relations of power”—
are played out. It is textual segments of this nature, admittedly brief and comparatively few, 
that allow Ghosh to state quite clearly where he is located in terms of metropolitan 
authority. There is a centrality to this rendition of the imperial vision that is presented in 
quite a different way in the story of village Egypt. 
 
Thus, it is the presence of the slave that opens the text up to the articulation of events that 
takes place in the Geniza, the small and circumscribed, but significant, example of a 
“contact zone” in which this conflict is acted out, and which—standing as it does as a 
symbol of scholarly “Egyptomania”—achieves the status of a major player in this text. 
Attached to the Synagogue of Ben Ezra—the centre of the Jewish diaspora in the Fustat 
quarter of Old Cairo—from its completion in 882 it was used as a storehouse for all manner 
of documents both printed and written which included sacred texts, scrolls and books as 
well as “letters, bills, contracts, poems, marriage deeds and so on” (94). When the Ben Ezra 
was demolished in 1890 and a new synagogue erected in its place, a cooperative effort   266
between the officials of the synagogue and the antiquity dealers of Cairo resulted in the sale 
of the remaining rabbinic documents to libraries all over the world.
45 But the “freshly-
charted field of scholarly enterprise” to which Ghosh refers starts in earnest, in respect of 
the Geniza of Ben Ezra, around 1854 with the first of a number of visits by Jewish scholars 
who evidently displayed various levels of unscrupulousness in their rapacious gathering of 
the contents which were progressively sold to libraries and museums around the world. By 
World War I, the Geniza had been totally emptied of all documents (87). Today, these 
collections—some private—exist throughout Europe, the USA and Canada, notably as the 
Taylor-Schechter Collection at Cambridge University, in the Bodleian Library at Oxford 
University and throughout the Jewish diaspora. 
 
Before commenting on Ghosh’s representation of the Jewish plunder of the contents of the 
Geniza, I would like to quote from James Clifford’s account of an incident which took place 
in a “contact zone” on the other side of the world. Clifford describes an occasion in 1989 
when he was invited by the Portland Museum of Art in Oregon to participate in a discussion 
concerning the updating of the museum’s Rasmussen Collection which had been originally 
assembled in 1920. This collection consisted of objects relating to the Tlingit tribe and the 
director of the Institute “had taken the unusual step of inviting a representative group of 
Tlingit authorities” to the meeting (Routes, 188).  
 
During this meeting, selected objects from the collection—“a raven mask, an abalone-inlaid 
headdress, a carved rattle”—were brought out and presented to the elders for comment. 
Clifford’s remarks are significant: “The curatorial staff seems to have expected the 
discussions to focus on the objects of the collection. I, at any rate, anticipated that the elders   267
would comment on them in a detailed way, telling us, for example: this is how the mask was 
used; it was made by so-and-so; this is its power in terms of the clan, our traditions, and so 
forth. [But] In fact, the objects were not the subject of much direct commentary by the 
elders, who had their own agenda for the meeting. They referred to the regalia with 
appreciation and respect, but they seemed only to use them as aides-mémoires, occasions 
for the telling of stories and the singing of songs” (188-9).  
 
At no time did the elders address the objects directly. To the Tlingits, these objects were not 
“primarily ‘art’. They were referred to as ‘records,’ ‘history,’ and ‘law’, inseparable from 
the myths and stories expressing ongoing moral lessons with current political force” with an 
overall emphasis on Tlingit land rights, a current, highly controversial, issue (191). The 
objects were left at the margin, decentred, becoming instead a narrative of tribal history, 
inextricable from the history of the tribe. This consultative experience lasted three days, 
leaving the staff of the Portland Art Museum with a dilemma. The Tlingits were but one of 
a number of tribal groups with a claim to different objects within the collection. To address, 
consult with and present the stories of each in a fair and like-minded manner would be 
unwieldy and beyond the capacity of museum staff. It was clear that the collection could not 
be updated quite as simply as anticipated. It was also obvious that the objects could no 
longer be viewed in isolation purely as museum pieces with a past tribal “context”, but 
instead were part of the forging of a relationship that gave voice to the tribe’s “ongoing 
stories of struggle” (193). Clifford makes the point, however, that the Tlingit’s demands 
were not in the shape of a commercial transaction, but as a bid for reciprocity with the 
“intent to challenge and rework a relationship. The objects of the Rasmussen Collection, 
however fairly or freely bought and sold, could never be entirely possessed by the museum. 
They were sites of a historical negotiation, occasions for an ongoing contact” (194). What   268
Clifford is establishing here is the Tlingits’ imperative: their concern was not in establishing 
an identity, nor were the objêts d’arts in themselves of any great importance in their agenda. 
The fundamental issue lay in being heard, in asserting a value for their community with its 
current concerns and issues that was placed above and beyond a collection of tribal artifacts 
from the past. Thus, for a space of time, the place of meeting at the Portland Art Museum 
becomes more than an area for discussion, it becomes a “contact zone” in which Pratt’s 
“asymmetrical relations of power” are at work, and where the “organizing structure as a 
collection becomes an ongoing historical, political, moral relationship—a power-charged set 
of exchanges, of push and pull. The organizing structure of the museum-as-collection 
functions like Pratt’s frontier. A center and a periphery are assumed: the center a point of 
gathering, the periphery an area of discovery” (192-3). 
 
If I apply this rationale of “contact zone” to the contents of the Geniza, viewing it now in 
the light of “museum-as-collection” so that the documents are reduced to the chamber in 
which they were stored, the accusation of stealing that underlies Ghosh’s part-
personification of the Egyptian capital—“Now it was Masr, which had sustained the Geniza 
for almost a millennium, that was left with no trace of its riches: not a single scrap or shred 
of paper to remind her of that aspect of her past”—sustains his argument (95).
46 But it is a 
weak argument. Of his own admission, the documents lay unrecognized for most of the 
eight centuries they lay in the chamber and the chances of their survival at the time Ben 
Ezra was torn down and rebuilt were slim. While it could be argued that the accountability 
for what would have been, after all, a hypothetical loss of documentation lies with the 
nation in whose care they are placed, how far should that responsibility be taken? By 
Ghosh’s own admission, the collection was left in total neglect and in “its home country . . .   269
nobody took the slightest notice of its dispersal” (95). Should the headless “Masr” that 
Ghosh attempts to personify have assumed a higher sense of responsibility and greater 
control over the material? And in the absence of a national curatorial body, if that 
responsibility were to devolve from the state to the individual, would it anyway have been 
returned to the cosmopolitan community that populated Cairo at that time—the Jewish 
leaders of the community, the rabbis, the Cairene antiquity dealers, Egyptian officials, 
sentries and curators—some, perhaps many, of whom, it would appear, benefited in any 
case from the transactions?  
 
But there is a more important issue that needs to be decided here. Is it enough to assume 
Cairo, or Egypt, as the owner of the material?
47 Surely the question—To whom do these 
documents actually belong?—begs reflection? Do they belong to Cairo? Or do they belong 
to the Jewish diaspora? It is, after all, well documented that the majority of Jews living in 
Egypt by the end of the nineteenth century were immigrants from other lands, that there was 
only ever a small number of indigenous Jews in Cairo and that, by the end of World War II, 
there were few if any left in the city at all. The word ‘diaspora’ itself was, after all, coined 
to describe the scattered colonies of Jews after the Babylonian exile. Since these documents 
were all purportedly written in Hebrew, a case could surely be made for their return to the 
diaspora? Ghosh’s claim that in “steal[ing the] manuscripts from his fellow Jews in 
Palestine” the Jewish collector “was merely practising on his co-religionists the methods 
that Western scholarship used, as a normal part of its functioning, throughout the colonial 
world” produces a worn polemic that reverberates with that of Said, but which as an 
argument damages his defence (In an Antique Land, 84). For the most part, if not  
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exclusively, it would appear that the documents did indeed find their respective resting 
places in the metropolitan museum, “the historical destination for the cultural productions 
lovingly and authoritatively salvages, cares for, and interprets” (Routes, 193). Not, indeed, 
in specific Jewish collections, nor in Israel, but in the diaspora. 
 
However, the purpose behind my discussion of “museums as contact zones” is to illuminate 
how Ghosh uses this way of thinking as a device to position himself in the anti-“orientalist” 
debate. Thus, somewhat ironically, my point lies not in the strength of Ghosh’s argument, 
but in the fact that the argument exists in the first place. The point at issue with which I 
started this portion of my debate was an elitism on Ghosh’s part that I read into certain 
segments of the text. I would suggest that the very fact that Ghosh uses with such passion—
in a text that is comparatively mild—a similar argument to that of Said proves quite 
conclusively his attitude towards Western power structures. Against this reading, Ghosh’s 
several and somewhat arbitrary demonstrations of what could be construed as superiority 
provide instead opportunities for a candor that gives the text its seminal integrity. 
 
Dialogic encounters 
But there is another device that Ghosh calls on in his shaping of this book—a literary 
technique which has become equally at home among the more recent ethnographic 
methodology—and something that the Russian theorist Bakhtin terms the “artistic key” of 
polyphony (Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 13).
48 Although I discussed Bakhtin more 
broadly at an earlier stage, some of the principles bear revisiting here for their pertinence to 
the way in which Amitav Ghosh represents his “heroes”. In his discussion of Dostoevsky’s 
work, Bakhtin claims the Russian writer was responsible for creating a totally new   271
novelistic genre by destroying the established forms of the basically monological European 
novel and replacing it with a polyphonic counterpart in which the characters’ “astonishing 
inner-independence . . . is achieved above all through . . . freedom and independence vis-à-
vis the author in the very structure of the novel, or, more precisely, through their freedom 
and independence in relation to the usual externalizing and finalizing authorial definitions” 
(9-10). He argues that critics reduced the voices of Dostoevsky’s heroes to “a systematic 
monological whole, ignoring the essential plurality of unmerged consciousnesses, a 
deliberate part of the author’s intention” (4). They fail completely, he says, to understand 
that the characters are not mere instruments or vehicles for the author’s own philosophies 
and ideas, but instead are constructed as “free people who are capable of standing beside 
their creator, of disagreeing with him, and even of rebelling against him” and even 
responsible for, sometimes, causing a collision of wills. Critical interpretation of 
Dostoevsky’s work failed in that it was based upon “a single word, a single voice, a single 
accent” instead of being observed as part of an artistic whole and an important step forward 
in the tradition of the novel (37). Bakhtin actually says (or, more correctly, Emerson and 
Holquist’s translation, The Dialogic Imagination, says): “Everyone interprets Dostoevsky’s 
final word in his own way, but they all interpret it as a single word, a single voice, a single 
accent, and therein lies their basic mistake. The unity of the polyphonic novel which stands 
above the word, above the voice, above the accent remains undiscovered” (37). The way 
these characters celebrate their freedom is through language: they are given voices in a 
plurality of registers that sit alongside, and sometimes in contention with, that of the author.  
 
James Clifford draws this notion of the dialogic forward from when it was coined in the 
1920s to the anthropological present and suggests that what Bakhtin says of language can be   272
applied equally to cultures and subcultures in that the history of the novel has a relevance to 
the process of evolution in ethnographic practices. In a “process complicated by the action 
of multiple subjectivities and political constraints beyond the control of the writer . . . one 
must bear in mind the fact that ethnography is, from beginning to end, enmeshed in writing. 
This writing includes, minimally, a translation of experience into textual form” (The 
Predicament of Culture, 25). Thus, the freedom and independence given to the characters in 
written works does not mean the disappearance of the hero from the author’s plan, but 
rather “introduces him as a free man into the strict and calculated plan of the whole” and 
can be applied equally to fieldwork where a group of indigenous people are being 
interviewed or asked for their opinions.  
 
In this respect, Clifford suggests a “utopia of plural authorship that accords to collaborators 
not merely the status of independent enunciators but that of writers [too]”, but 
acknowledges that in practical application that this has its difficulties and that such sharing, 
while desirable, may be designed to remain utopian. With no clear indicators of leadership, 
sense of ownership or responsibility, plural authorship can lead to problems with intellectual 
property and of professional jealousy. In practice, it was discovered the attempt at a multi-
faceted authorship brought up questions of authority that were difficult to resolve. Without a 
leader, projects quickly faltered (51). Therefore, although ethnography is becoming 
increasingly an area in which “authenticity, both personal and cultural, is seen as something 
constructed vis-à-vis others” and while the way in which opinions, experience and 
information is translated and transcribed in ethnography today differs markedly from the 
practices of twenty years ago, in reality a certain amount of “indirect style” is inevitable 
(274). In what I have quoted above, it is easy enough to overlook the tone—and thus the   273
significance—of the word “minimally” and yet the point that Clifford is making—that the 
“experience” component of what is actually written down is but one small constituent of 
something much larger—is significant. And that something “beyond the control of the 
writer” includes not only the cultural and religious sensitivities of the subjects, not only the 
ideological proclivities or political sympathies of the author, the discursive restraints of the 
age in which he or she writes, the methodological affiliations of the academic or publishing 
institution, but a whole host of other probabilities and potentialities. And that is before we 
have arrived at the process of interpretation at the text’s final destination: the reader. To 
circumvent these separate issues without losing the integrity of the text is a challenge. 
Clifford uses the word “enmeshed” advisedly.   
 
How then does this “plurality of equal consciousnesses” work in Ghosh’s text? In other 
words, in what way and for what purpose does Ghosh bring this “genuine polyphony of full-
valued voices” to his text? 
 
I suggest that this technique works for Ghosh in a number of ways. Firstly, we have to 
remember that Ghosh was an ethnographic research student at the time this text was 
conceived. He was living and working in a land and among a religious and cultural group 
alien to him. He was also fully aware of the ideological consequences of representing that 
group in any written form. In the writing of this text, Ghosh closely follows the principles 
celebrated in modern ethnographic practice by allowing his characters a set of strong 
discourses juxtaposed with his own which are deliberately designed to present self-
consciously by contrast. From a stylistic aspect, in this work particularly, the deliberate use 
of polyphony in this manner appears at times heavy-handed and awkward. But the   274
underlying effect is somewhat more subtle because it is what Ghosh actually achieves that is 
important here. Accordingly, this is where the device succeeds: not simply to “write” the 
life of village Egypt, but to allow the villagers “the plurality of full-valued voices”. Three 
short excerpts, all of which show a defensive Ghosh under local verbal fire, are typical of 
the exchanges that take place between Muslim and Hindu in this text and serve to clarify the 
point I am making here. The first is part of an exchange that takes place on a doorstep and 
portrays a hesitant Ghosh arriving at the house of a teacher he has been asked to visit only 
to find the person he seeks is absent. 
Then, all of a sudden her eyes focused brightly on me, and she stretched out 
a thin, bony finger and tapped me on the shoulder. “Tell me,” she said. “Is it 
true what they say about you? That in your country people burn their 
dead?” 
 
“Some people do,” I said. “It depends.” 
 
“Why do they do it?” she cried. “Don’t they know it’s wrong? You can’t 
cheat the Day of Judgement by burning your dead. . . . You should try to 
civilize your people. You should tell them to stop praying to cows and 
burning their dead.” (125-6) 
 
In the following excerpt, Ghosh is juxtaposed with the Imam: 
 
I repeated again that I was greatly interested in learning about folk remedies 
and herbal medicines, and I had heard that no one knew more about the 
subject than he. I had thought that he might perhaps be flattered . . . 
 
“Who told you those things? He demanded to know, as though I had relayed 
an unfounded and slanderous accusation. “Who was it. Tell me.” 
 
“Why, everyone,” I stammered. “So many people say that you know a great 
deal about remedies; that is why I came to you . . .” 
 
“Why do you want to hear about my herbs?” he retorted. “Why don’t you 
go back to your country and find out about your own?” (191-2) 
 
 
And in a third example, again Ghosh places himself in confrontation with the Imam. Again 
he portrays himself as tentative and defensive. Yet again the Imam’s voice is crisp and 
clear. Once more, Ghosh vests the authority in his adversary: 
“Tell me,” he [the Imam] said, “why do you worship cows?”   275
 
Taken by surprise I began to stammer, and he cut me short by turning his 
shoulder on me.  
 
“That’s what they do in his country,” he said to the old shopkeeper. “Did 
you know? They worship cows.” . . . 
 
“And shall I tell you what else they do?” he said. . . . “They burn their 
dead.” 
 
Then suddenly he spun around to face me and cried: “Why do you allow it? 
Can’t you see it’s a primitive and backward custom? Are you savages that 
you permit something like that? Look at you: you’ve had some education; 
you should know better. How will your country ever progress if you carry 
on doing these things? You’ve even been to Europe; you’ve seen how 
advanced they are. Now tell me: have you ever seen them burning their 
dead?” 
 
. . . I found myself becoming increasingly tongue-tied. 
 
“Yes they do burn their dead in Europe,” I managed to say . . .  
 
The Imam turned away and laughed scornfully. “He’s lying,” he said to the 
crowd. “They don’t burn their dead in the West. They’re not an ignorant 
people. They’re advanced, they’re educated, they have science, they have 
guns and tanks and bombs.” (235) 
 
I have chosen examples that include a religious refrain deliberately because that this is an 
argument that occurs repeatedly throughout the text with only subtle variations and, 
accordingly, its analysis provides scope for added hermeneutic possibilities.
49 Meanwhile, 
there are two points that I want to make at this juncture. The first is to address the 
unarguable “plurality” of voices illuminated in the examples above. Ghosh the author 
achieves a democratic ‘right to be heard’ by juxtaposing his Muslim characters with Ghosh 
the Hindu student ethnographer—sometimes in a jocular context, at others in a mocking or 
confrontational mode—the scenes themselves lending a particular and “full-valued” 
cadence to the tones his adversaries adopt. This, for Clifford, is the “new ethnography”—
the voice returned to the native, the site of negotiation. The new ethnography allows the 
community speaks for itself. It is no longer spoken for. The existing presuppositions and 
assumptions of indigenous identities have given way to processes of negotiating between   276
often-conflicting demands for collective self-representation. This way of approaching 
anthropology resonates in the theories of Homi Bhabha whose redefinition of culture 
similarly returns the power to the ‘native informant’. Ghosh takes on the dual role of a 
participant in village life and observer-recorder of that particular life world. 
 
In this way, although Ghosh is still the protagonist of this text, he constructs himself to 
appear as but one part of the “calculated plan of the whole”. As a consequence, his use of 
the Bakhtinian principles of the dialogic is a balancing gesture that allows him to appear 
disadvantaged beside his characters in what Said would call a “contrapuntal" shift to the 
‘elitism’ I foregrounded in an earlier portion of this discussion. This without doubt 
strengthens Ghosh’s position. Although his description of village life unquestionably 
provides an “authorizing view” of what one might expect from a location in rural Egypt, he 
is not just the ethnographer writing up his observations, he participates, too, in the text. 
Secondly, by using such terminology as “tongue-tied” and “stammered”, Ghosh guarantees 
that the defense of his own (Hindu) position presents weakly in contrast to that of Islam. In 
this respect, in spite of its repetition of certain key themes in the Hindu and Muslim 
religions, Ghosh’s arms-length approach in this book appears to be one of denial, when 
nothing could be further from the truth. For example, in discussing the controversial Lojja 
(Taslima Nasrin) in another essay, Ghosh says: “I . . . read Lojja not as a book about Hindus 
in Bangladesh but rather as a book about Muslims in India. It helped me feel on my own 
fingertips the texture of the fears that have prompted Muslim friends of mine to rent houses 
under false pretenses or to buy train tickets under Hindu names. In short, it has helped me 
understand what it means to live under the threat of supremacist terror” (“The 
Fundamentalist Challenge”, 26). But in In an Antique Land, the repetition of the Hindu   277
versus Muslim argument is a means to that end only and thus becomes important only for its 
dialectic qualities. The debate—appropriately in this context—never reaches a conclusion. 
 
Therefore, it would seem safe to conclude—in that it provides a way around ‘writing village 
Egypt’—that Ghosh’s use of multiple voices provides another way of escaping the 
“orientalist” trap. The “multiple subjectivities and political constraints” beyond the control 
of the writer are in fact ‘controlled’ in that their voices separate out and are given value and 
recognition in the clamour of the whole. 
 
In this text, however, there is what could be termed an extension of the principles of the 
dialogic and I return now to my earlier reference to the Geniza as a ‘major player’ in this 
text where I was foreshadowing an even more important theoretical stage than that of the 
“contact zone”. Clearly inert, the Geniza becomes a ‘player’ or character by virtue of being 
given a voice. The documents that it contained become one issue, the treatment of the 
chamber itself another. It is important to point out a subtlety here in terms of the use of 
literary devices. By refraining from any attempt at personification in giving the Geniza a 
voice, Ghosh avoids sentimentalizing or romanticizing his subject.
50 The Geniza simply 
becomes another significant participant in its own drama. 
 
But this again presents difficulties. While in itself the long-overdue acknowledgement of a 
site which has been overlooked by history in much the same way as the slave is a worthy 
act, there is an element of sanctimonious self-righteousness evident. After all, in charting 
the historiography of the Geniza, in taking advantage of the preserved and sorted documents 
that were virtually inaccessible for centuries, is not Ghosh reaping the rewards for the very   278
actions he has condemned? If this is so, there would appear to be a degree of hypocrisy 
emerging in Ghosh’s account. The question then becomes: In whose currency is charting the 
life of the Geniza less invasive than the removal of its contents? Does the view of 
backwardness that Ghosh encounters in Egypt lead him to “radically ‘dialogue’ possibilities 
of knowledge and cognition, that is, in-mix self-centered perceptions with other-oriented 
perceptions to actualize a different world, script a different historiography” (Radhakrishnan, 
8)?
51 While Ghosh’s anti-colonial motive is clear, the result can be diametrically opposite. 
The point is that giving a voice to the subaltern does not in itself change either the rhetoric 
or the actuality. In this construction the periphery still looks up to the metropolis with its 
“guns and tanks and bombs”. By contrasting East with West in this way, Ghosh keeps alive 
images of a powerful and progressive West.
52 Despite his efforts to construct it to the 
contrary, is Ghosh’s book still a victim of the grand narrative? 
 
One way of answering this question is to invoke some of the reasoning of Dipesh 
Chakrabarty in his discussion of “minority histories”.
53 Although Chakrabarty makes a 
distinction between Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the word “minor” and his own 
interpretation of that word, in the end the nuances of the term as it applies in the literary 
world and as Chakrabarty relates it to history amount to the same thing, that is “plural ways 
of being in the world” (101). Thus, by staying with “the heterogeneity of the moment when 
the historian meets with the peasant” Ghosh is staying with the difference between two 
gestures (108). On the one hand he historicizes a short, but telling, period in the life world 
of an Egyptian village in which the alterity of the peasants is foregrounded. On the other 
hand, his historiography of the slave brings the past into the present to the point where 
manuscript H.6 becomes part of the historicity of Ghosh’s stay in Egypt. “[T]aken together,   279
the two gestures put us in touch with the plural ways of being that make up our own 
present”.  In other words, the presence of the archives in the form of the slave in the world 
of the village “help bring to view the disjointed nature of any particular ‘now’ one may 
inhabit . . . a disjuncture of the present with itself” (108-9). Thus the Bomma I described 
earlier as being on a similar elite level to that of Ghosh  resists historicizing in that he also 
becomes subordinated, in this case to the grand narratives that belong to the world of 
archival and academic institutions. 
 
And so while Clifford Geertz arrives at an essentialist reason for Ghosh’s sketchy 
representation of Bomma, ascribing it to “his natural reticence, his wish to stay apart and 
self-possessed” which lends his book “a sense of incompletion”, I suggest that the story of 
the slave is a deliberate attempt to subvert the main story line, to provide yet another 
subaltern who, this time, is a fellow Indian (“A Passage to India—Amitav Ghosh in an 
Antique Land”). Among my suggestions for Bomma’s role in this text—parallel 
protagonist, antagonist—I now offer another theoretical possibility and suggest that the 
shadowy presence of the slave functions as Ghosh’s literary alter ego placing him between 
worlds, in neither the world of the village Egyptian nor of the cosmopolitan Indian, but 
some place apart. The “sense of incompletion” Geertz perceives further supports my claim 
that this book is concerned with disjunctures and indeterminancies, of “plural ways of 
being”, of human difference. But this “sense of incompleteness” is also a feature of history 
writing as opposed to autobiography. For example, in “History and Autobiography”, 
Carolyn Steedman claims: “The practice of historical inquiry and historical writing is a 
recognition of temporariness and impermanence, and in this way is quite a different literary 
form from that of autobiography, which presents momentarily a completeness . . . which lies   280
in the figure of the writer or the teller, in the here and now, saying: that’s how it was; or, 
that’s how I believe it to have been” (48).
54 The introduction of the slave provides Ghosh 
with von Humboldt’s tentative “bridge of understanding” over the gap between the cultures 
of the Hindu and the Moslems. It places him, too, in Homi Bhabha’s “third space”, the 
borderland which has become “a zone of contacts—blocked and permitted, policed and 
transgressive” (Routes, 8).  Thus the incompleteness that Geertz senses becomes what 
Clifford would call a “crucial site for an unfinished modernity . . . a view of human location 
as constituted by displacement as much as by stasis” (Routes, 2).  
 
To look more deeply at this notion of displacement, I return at this stage to the confrontation 
between the Imam and Ghosh at a point midway through the text which, in context, takes 
place within a growing crowd just as in the earlier scene of the “makani hindi”. An 
extension of the quote excerpted earlier ends, “At that moment, despite the vast gap that lay 
between us, we understood each other perfectly. We were both travelling, he and I, we were 
travelling in the West . . . in the end, for millions and millions of people on the landmasses 
around us, the West meant only this—science and tanks and guns and bombs” (236). For 
me, this is a critical passage in In an Antique Land, one that surely is more alarming than 
“depressing”. Clifford’s comment on this scene—that the fact that the only common ground 
Ghosh can find with the Imam is that “‘they are both traveling in the West’ . . . [is a] 
depressing revelation for the anticolonial anthropologist” (Routes, 5)—strikes at the heart of 
the matter but does not go quite far enough. What is the purpose behind this exchange in an 
Egyptian village square? Why this example of power play that is posited on points of 
religious difference, but ends somewhere “in the West”? And why use this scene as such an 
early climax? Its location midway through the text belies its function as a climax, but the   281
narrative never regains its tension. The next two segments of the book—Ghosh’s return to 
his comfort zone in Mangalore and his eventual return to Nashawy—have their high points, 
but more in the nature of a lengthy conclusion than anything else. What happens when 
discrete differences in culture disappear into the category of European thought or when 
cultural practices are naturalized in the name of social science? Have both Ghosh and the 
Imam absorbed the “idioms of the conqueror”? It would appear to be so, but since this 
contradicts many of my claims so far, let me strive for another interpretation that will 
provide a rationale for what appears such an early climax. 
 
The key I think lies in a longish sentence a little further down the page which becomes 
crucial in deconstructing this text. Pondering the heated exchange, Ghosh walks away:  “We 
had acknowledged that it was no longer possible to speak, as Ben Yiju or his Slave . . . 
might have done: of things that were right, or good, or willed by God; it would have been 
merely absurd for either of us to use those words, for they belonged to a dismantled rung on 
the ascending ladder of Development” (237).  In this thought process, it is the notion of the 
“dismantled rung” that most interests me. It seems to me here that Ghosh’s hypothesis 
claims that but for that “rung”, that step that no longer exists, the understanding between 
men of different cultures would have been forged in a different space, a different language, 
from that of the language of power. The West’s insistence on “Development”, on 
materialism, on reaching ever upwards towards the metaphor of war, has destroyed the 
means whereby an “Imam and an Indian”—two people in the maelstrom of humanity—may 
once have connected and communicated. “God” as metaphor for righteousness is placed in 
binary with the Western “Development” of authority and relentless control.
55 A ladder 
allows for no lateral movement of thought or body: the choices are restricted to up or down,   282
in or out.  The “understanding” that Ghosh and the Imam arrive at is prescribed by language 
and delineated by a Western set of values which are the symbols of an imperialistic mindset 
not yet dead.
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If the passage is read in this way, it does indeed become a metaphor for “unfinished 
modernity”. In a literary sense it is deflected from its status of climax and becomes one of 
the sites of conflict within the narrative which leads naturally to the scene discussed earlier 
where the inhabitants of Nashawy filed proudly and “obediently through the  guest-room, 
carrying in turns a TV set, a food processor, a handful of calculators, a transistor radio”. 
 
It is clear what Ghosh is trying to do in this work. His own anti-imperialist position is not in 
question. He comes from a solid understanding of the problems inherent in representation 
and is certainly no “seeing-man” despite his travel within, and subsequent representation of, 
foreign lands. To the contrary, he makes every effort within the obvious restrictions of a 
narrative medium to reduce his status as author to that of fellow character so at least the 
appearance of authorial power contained in what is still a master discourse is minimized. 
While there is an honesty akin to that of Browne in his rendition of the villagers and village 
life, Ghosh is fully aware of the ideological processes that underpin his text in terms of 
psychological engagements and linguistic registers. That much is patently obvious. But in 
terms of the controlling argument of this thesis—the impossibility of representing another 
culture without incurring charges of “orientalist” practice—it would appear to be equally 
apparent that despite the unarguably high level of self-reflexivity he brings to the text, in 
spite of his awareness of contemporary ethnographic sensitivities and his use of the 
dialogic, and although he attempts to use the slave as a link back to a world as yet unfettered   283
by capitalist demands, his frame of reference remains the West. This may be a realist text 
that claims to be mimetic, but deconstruction finds ruptures that imply other than realism.  
 
Take for example this statement that follows his impassioned exchange with the Imam 
quoted earlier: “I felt myself a conspirator in the betrayal of the history that had led me to 
Nashawy” (my emphases, 237). Placed only two-thirds through the book, it is not 
immediately clear, even in context, exactly what Ghosh means by this statement. A 
deconstruction returns us again to Bomma, the search for whose history provides the “sense 
of entitlement” in terms of Ghosh’s stay in Nashawy, and the genuine sense of guilt that 
Ghosh feels in aligning himself with the West in the East/West binary that stands at the core 
of his argument with the town’s holy man. As conspirator, Ghosh is colluding with the 
power-base; as slave, the Bomma with whom he has formed a connection remains a part of 
the disempowered East. The implication embedded in this statement is that through Bomma, 
Ghosh has ‘betrayed’ the greater cause. In invoking the discourse of power earlier in the 
argument, he has become complicit with the master race. As I have already discussed, to be 
a slave in the twelfth century was something quite different from entrapment in the 
pernicious slave trade of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and thus it has to be 
admitted that the link Ghosh makes between Bomma and the subordinated races that the 
slave symbolises is fragile. But nonetheless the connection in the connotation of a relative 
lack of power resides in the fact that Bomma’s status, for all their friendship, was obviously 
lower than that of his master. Certainly the intention overrides such essentialism and 
resonates with earlier passages containing descriptions of the European mercantile trade and 
the possession of the “high seas” by the “Great Powers” (80).
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   284
Thus, taken in spirit rather than in essence, I suggest that this sense of ‘betrayal’ becomes 
closely aligned to the “sense of entitlement” that Ghosh feels so strongly. The  linkage gains 
clarity if I quote more fully from the epigraph from Charles Johnson’s Middle Passage that 
heads this chapter: “The ‘I’ that I was, was a mosaic of many countries, a patchwork of 
others and objects stretching backwards to perhaps the beginning of time. What I felt, 
seeing this was indebtedness. What I felt, plainly, was a transmission to those on deck of all 
I had pilfered, as though I was but a conduit or window through which my pillage and booty 
of ‘experience’ passed” (162).
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I use this passage merely to emphasize the emotions and depth of Ghosh’s reaction when he 
is forced to realize that he is still “travelling in the West”. The emotion of Johnson’s 
protagonist captures Ghosh’s endeavours in reaching backwards through history, his “sense 
of entitlement” or “indebtedness” to the slave for his experience in Egypt, and the 
realization that once this experience is ruptured by the introduction of the East/West binary 
that he too has colluded with the dominant outlook of the West. In other words, his 
reconstructive twelfth-century study is only feasible because of the earlier scattering, 
collecting and preserving of the documents from the Cairo Geniza, the “pillage” he so 
soundly condemns.  
 
I suggest that along with the anger of the young ethnographer is a measure of 
disappointment in himself when he realizes that he is the beneficiary of an earlier Western 
greed, that his “sense of entitlement” rests on the information he is obtaining from the 
documents retrieved from the chamber, that by making use of stolen goods, he has betrayed 
Bomma and, it follows, all others at the margin. Despite Ghosh’s self-conscious dialogism,   285
despite his position of “writing the Orient” from his location as an Oriental, there proves to 
be no escape from the “orientalist” gaze.
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Notes 
                                                 
1 From Middle Passage (New York: Atheneum, 1990), 162. Cited in Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), 251.  
2 Bakhtin discussing the appearance of “certain germs of polyphony” in the works of some of the great 
European writers (Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, tr. R. W. Rotsel (Np: Ardis, 1973), 28. With regard to 
Shakespeare’s plays, for example, he asserts that the essence of polyphony—the “plurality of full-valued 
voices”—applies “only in relation to his work as a whole, and not in relation to the individual plays”. In each 
play the hero’s voice still dominates.  
3 This edition of In an Antique Land (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993). 
4 From Imperial Eyes (London and New York: Routledge, 1992). 
5 Although Clifford uses this term freely, I continue to find this an unfortunate combination of words. Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak is characteristically forthright: “I think of the ‘native informant’ as a name for that mark 
of expulsion from the name of Man—a mark crossing out the impossibility of the ethical relation” (A Critique 
of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present, Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 6. 
6 Ghosh was born in Calcutta in 1956 and grew up in Bangladesh (then East Pakistan), Sri Lanka, Iran and 
India. He graduated from the University of Delhi before studying anthropology at Oxford for which he 
received a PhD in 1982. 
7 I used this term advisedly, not in the sense of imparting an essentialism to Ghosh, but rather as descriptive of 
the cultural identity he places in juxtaposition to the Egyptian world of this text. Or as Edward Said puts it in 
Culture and Imperialism (London: Chatto & Windus, 1993), “. . .  we are dealing with the formation of 
cultural identities understood not as essentializations (although part of their enduring appeal is that they seem 
and are considered to be like essentializations) but as contrapuntal ensembles, for it is the case that no identity 
can ever exist by itself and without an array of opposites, negatives, oppositions . . .” (60). Or for another 
interesting opinion on Indian nationality, see Spivak, “Strategy, Identity, Writing”, The Post-colonial Critic, 
ed. Sarah Harasym (New York and London: Routledge, 1990). In particular: “‘India’, for people like me, is 
not really a place with which they can form a national identity because it has always been an artificial 
construct. ‘India’ is a bit like saying ‘Europe’. When one is talking about a European identity, for example, 
one is obviously reacting against the United States. . . . ‘Indian-ness’ is not a thing that exists. . . . The name 
India was given by Alexander the Great by mistake. The name Hindustan was given by the Islamic 
conquerors. The name Bharat, which is on the passport, is in fact a name that hardly anyone uses, which 
commemorates a mythic king. So it isn’t a place that we Indians can think of as anything, unless we are trying 
to present a reactive front, against another kind of argument” (39). 
8 See my earlier discussion of Žižek and of the essence existing in the mask itself. 
9 Although texts that defy easy categorization into fiction and non-fiction have become not only acceptable 
but, dare I say,  ‘trendy’ over the last ten years, in the early 90s when most of the reviews of In an Antique 
Land appeared, critics and publishers were more comfortable with the idea of genre-specific texts. In this 
period, one of my own novels was declined by a major publishing house because an otherwise favourable 
review from one of its readers suggested that the book might be “hard to place because it falls between 
genres”. 
10 From an interview between Ghosh and Frederick Aldama in World Literature Today 76.2 (2002): 84. 
11 In his discussion of reader responsibility in “The Fundamentalist Challenge”, The Wilson Quarterly (Spring 
1995): 19-27, Ghosh claims that the only way an author can “protect” the interpretation of political matters in 
his book “is not to write about such matters at all. We who write fiction, even when we deal with matters of 
public significance, have no choice . . . but to represent events as they are refracted through our characters. . . . 
It must be in some part the reader’s responsibility to situate the event within broader contexts, to populate the 
scene with the products of his or her experience and learning. A reader who reads the scene literally or mean-
spiritedly must surely bear some part of the blame for that reading” (26). 
12 In “Trapped by Language: On Amitav Ghosh’s In an Antique Land”, Brian Kiteley suggests that the “reason 
Ghosh has to bust genres, has to violate the traditions of several genres, is political, at heart. Anthropology and 
field work, would not allow him to include the sweeping historical research so necessary to this book . . . 
necessary because it is personally so important to Ghosh himself, as he tries to find some ancient analogue to 
his own sometimes bewildering experience. A straight historical text would also not allow for the field notes   287
                                                                                                                                                       
or the soul-searching . . . And a travel book would force Ghosh to ask the question: who is he writing this book 
for? Travel narratives have a target audience of home, back home, implicitly the hordes of imperial colonizers 
or, in modern times, the equivalent, tourists . . . temporary homesteaders”. This essay retrieved electronically 
on 28.4.2004 from http://www.du.edu/~bkiteley/ghoshtalk.html 
13 I do, however, take Spivak’s point here: “We must know the limits of the narratives, rather than establish the 
narratives as solutions for the future, for the arrival of social justice, so that to an extent they’re working 
within an understanding of what they cannot do, rather than declaring war”. From The Post-colonial Critic, 
19.  
14 “Decentered consciousness” is the term Shirley Chew applies to Ghosh here, “Texts and Worlds in Amitav 
Ghosh’s In an Antique Land” from Re-constructing the Book, eds. Maureen Bell et al, (Aldershot, Hampshire: 
Ashgate, 2001), 198. 
15 I suggest that while the communities may be “imagined” (see my earlier discussion of Benedict Anderson), 
Ghosh uses the two main settings of Egypt and India as a geographical reality. 
16 James Clifford’s essay on Victor Segalen, “A Poetics of Displacement”, The Predicament of Culture 
(Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1988) makes interesting reading for its discussion 
of the ‘other’, exoticism and projection generally (152-63). See particularly, “The onlooker sees only what is 
already in his own eyes, and the other becomes a screen for projected desires. . . . If we look intimately into 
this face, what disturbances appear behind? (Don’t turn around.)” (162-3). 
17 Quoted from “The March of the Novel Through History: The Testimony of my Grandmother’s Bookcase” 
originally printed in The Kenyon Review 20.2 (1998). This version retrieved on 10.1.2002 from Proquest 
Humanities from http://0-proquest.umi.com.prospero.murdoch.edu.au/login 
18 Clifford expands on this theme of perpetual displacement in a later text: Routes: Travel and Translation in 
the Late Twentieth Century. For the sake not only of consistency but because the methodology Ghosh employs 
here is ethnographic rather than anthropological, I have used the term ethnography throughout this chapter in 
all instances except when quoting directly. 
19 From 1492 (London and New York: Continuum, 2001), 3-4. 
20 Although Ghosh did not go on to make it his profession, his studies, thesis and field work in ethnography 
suggest that this text is written with full knowledge of twentieth-century ethnographic practices. This progress 
notwithstanding, one is forced to question how far ethnography has really progressed in terms of its 
representation of another culture? 
21 I am re-quoting Said here for purposes of clarity. 
22 For elucidation of my argument, I extrapolate from Chakrabarty’s proposition—“For capital or bourgeois, I 
submit, read Europe or European”—by re-casting Egypt as the East and India as Europe. See Provincializing 
Europe (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), 30. 
23 Ghosh has inverted part of the old imperialist narrative where “the ‘Indian’ was always a figure of lack” 
(Chakrabarty, 32).  
24 In the excerpt quoted, note the change in capitalization in the word “Hindi”, used I suggest to denote the 
acceptance of the “Indian machine” into the Egyptian community. 
25 Pratt uses the term “contact zone” in “an attempt to invoke the spatial and temporal copresence of subjects 
previously separated by geographic and historical disjunctures, and whose trajectories now intersect” (7). 
26 Pratt claims that “transculturation . . . [a term first used in the 1940s by Cuban sociologist Fernando Ortiz to 
describe Anglo-Cuban culture, incorporated in literary studies in the 1970s by Uruguayan critic Angel Roma, 
and now used to] describe[s] how subordinated or marginal groups select and invent from materials 
transmitted to them by a dominant or metropolitan culture. While subjugated peoples cannot readily control 
what emanates from the dominant culture, they do determine to varying extents what they absorb into their 
own, and what they use it for. Transculturation is a phenomenon of the contact zone” (6). We see this in our 
own nation where indigenous people re-fashion or appropriate Western goods and artifacts to fulfill their own 
requirements. The “makana hindi” serves a dual purpose here. Not only does it illuminate the gap between the 
metropolis and the periphery, but it also acts as a symbol of modernity and herein gains another reading. 
27 See Chakrabarty’s description of the origins of the concept of “uneven development”, the genesis of which 
he claims comes from “Marx’s use of the idea of ‘uneven rates of development’ in his Critique of Political 
Economy (1859)” (12). 
28 In one way, this fulfills the traditional novelistic convention of man rising to and overcoming the challenges 
presented; in another, Ghosh’s rather abrupt discarding of the crippling of spirit he demonstrated so often in 
the first half of the text does tend to jar somewhat.    288
                                                                                                                                                       
29 Chakrabarty claims that Marxist philosophies “constitute one of the founding moments of historical thought. 
To revisit them is to rework the relationship between postcolonial thinking and the intellectual legacies of 
post-Enlightenment rationalism, humanism, and historicism” (47).  
30 It is a disquieting manifestation of metropolitan discourse that material possessions are so validated and 
imbued with such power. It brings to mind a newspaper report of some fifteen or so years ago prior to the 
Tiananmen Square massacre when China was going through the Four Modernizations. The report took the 
shape of a small paragraph in a Hong Kong English-language newspaper describing the ferocious mobbing by 
Chinese peasant women of a streetside sales stall. The merchandise? That age-old symbol of wealth and 
allure—lip colour—in its Western capitalist guise as cylinders of lipstick. 
31 See Chakrabarty’s discussion of  “abstract labour” in Provincializing Europe, 51-62.  
32 In drawing our attention to the difference between “History and history” in this text (198), Chew (citing 
Young 1990, 3) claims that the capitalized History provides for “the construction of knowledges which all 
operate through forms of expropriation and incorporation of the other” (207). An extrapolation of this theory 
can be applied to the “makana Hindi”. See my note 24 .  
33 See Clifford’s discussion of the conventions in the development of ethnographic principles (The 
Predicament of Culture, 21-54). 
34 Volume VII, eds. R. Guha, R and G. Spivak  (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
35 What Guha actually says is: “The dominant groups will therefore receive in these volumes the consideration 
they deserve without, however, being endowed with that spurious primacy assigned to them by the long-
standing tradition of elitism in South Asian studies. Indeed, it will be very much a part of our endeavour to 
make sure that our emphasis on the subaltern functions both as a measure of objective assessment of the role 
of the elite and as a critique of elitist interpretations of that role” (Selected Subaltern Studies, 1988, 35-36).  
36 From a review by Bruce King in World Literature Today 68.2 (1994): 430. 
37 As I have explained earlier, I follow Chakrabarty’s principles of extrapolating from specific centres of 
dominance to a more general elitism. 
38 I do not use the term ‘antagonist’ here to mean “anti-hero” so much as to illuminate the balance the slave’s 
story brings to the narrative. 
39 From a review published in The New Republic, Washington, August 23, 1993, 38-40 titled: “A Passage to 
India—In an Antique Land by Amitav Ghosh”. This version retrieved on May 3, 2004 from 
http://gateway.proquest.com 
40 Ghosh’s explanation of the term ‘slavery’ in medieval times is of interest: “. . . the terms under which 
Bomma entered Ben Yiju’s service were probably entirely different from those suggested by the world 
‘slavery’ today: their arrangement was probably more that of patron and client than master and slave, as that 
relationship is now understood. . . . In the Middle Ages institutions of servitude took many forms, and they all 
differed from ‘slavery’ as it came to be practiced after the European colonial expansion of the sixteenth 
century. In the lifetimes of Bomma and Ben Yiju, servitude was a part of a very flexible set of hierarchies and 
it often followed a logic completely contrary to that which modern expectations suggest (260). S. D. Goitein 
claims, “As far as our actual information from the Geniza records is concerned, the male slaves, who normally 
acted as business representatives, are referred to . . . as respected merchants and, in case they served also as 
personal factotums, were greeted in letters as other members of the household, sometimes with the honourable 
epithet ‘the elder’” (A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the 
Documents of the Cairo Geniza 142). Cited in 1492, 1. See also Jack Goody’s essay “Slavery in Time and 
Space”, ed. James Watson, Asian and African Systems of Slavery (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1980).  
41 See Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic (Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard University Press, 1994), 44. 
42 Although it is not immediately obvious since there are no notations in the text, it is significant that the 
slave’s story represents the scholarly segment of this work as the extensive notes at the rear of the volume 
attest. It is only fair to note, too, that Ghosh was very young at this point, twenty-two years of age and “a little 
more befuddled by my situation [the rapid succession of events in leaving India, winning a scholarship and 
finding himself on the way to Egypt] than students usually are” (19).  
43 Included in a collection translated and edited by Professor S. D. Goitein, Letters of Medieval Jewish 
Traders, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973. 
44 Interesting is Ghosh’s research on the etymology of the word Egypt in which he says “Like English, every 
major European language derives its name for Egypt from the Greek Ægyptos, a term that is related to the 
word ‘Copt’, the name generally used for Egypt’s indigenous Christians” (32). Interesting, too, are the biblical 
and imperialist connotations he attaches to the word. Although Ghosh uses the word Masr for Egypt, in a 
somewhat cryptic note to his chapter “Lataifa”, he states: “The name is Misr, properly speaking” (359).    289
                                                                                                                                                       
45 An interesting point that Ghosh fails to raise in his fairly detailed exposition on Ben Ezra is the number of 
names affixed to this site. While Ghosh claims it was also known as the “Synagogue of the Palestinians” 
(54)—perhaps a less overtly Jewish name in terms of this discourse—the Jewish community asserts that it was 
originally called “the synagogue of ‘the men of Israel’ and that it subsequently became known as the 
Synagogue of Elijah the Prophet and then the Ben Ezra. Later still it attracted the name of the Maimonides 
Synagogue after one of the most famous Jews of the Middle Ages, the physician-philosopher Moses 
Maimonides” (Museum of the Jewish Diaspora, http://www.bh.org.il/Communities/Synagogue/cairo.asp). 
Various sources cite different building dates for the synagogue from the ninth to eleventh centuries, the more 
definitive date of 882 being placed on it by the Nahmum Goldmann Museum. Evidently it was built on the 
remains of the basilica of a Coptic church that had been sold to Jews. A Jewish place of worship it may have 
been—although Ghosh is at pains to point out the religious diversity of the congregation—but that its 
architecture remained true to its Coptic roots is borne out by its description in 1884 by “British historian and 
archaeologist, A. J. Butler, as a small and somewhat simplified version of a Coptic basilica” (In an Antique 
Land, 54). Although this point, too, is contested. See In an Antique Land, n. 54, 361-2. 
46 That the documents no longer exist in Cairo is one argument. Another pertains to the physical remains of the 
Ben Ezra built c. 1025 now in museums in Cairo, Paris and Jerusalem (In an Antique Land, 54). 
47 Ghosh makes much of removing the distinction between Masr and Egypt, 32-3. 
48 Although I discussed Bakhtin’s theory of the novel at some length in chapter one, his understanding of 
dialogism bears revisiting here for its relevance to the way in which Ghosh represents his characters in this 
book. In Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, Bakhtin examines the responses of a number of critics in relation 
to the some of the main characters that people Dostoevsky’s novels, critics who have been doing much as I 
have here, analysing certain parts of the book, certain characters, certain words, without considering the text as 
a whole. 
49 I refer here to a religious “debate” that is never realized in this text. In each of the many instances in which 
religion is mentioned, the references are superficial and brief. By this I in no way suggest that the subject of 
religion is not important to Ghosh. His lack of defence only underscores the futility or inappropriateness of 
addressing the intricacy of such essentials in a work of this nature. In a significant article titled “The 
Fundamentalist Challenge” he examines the state of religious extremism in global society and sees it as 
endemic across all major religions. He concludes “that religious extremism today has very little to do with 
matters of doctrine and faith . . . its real texts are borrowed from sociology, demography, political science, and 
so on” (26). 
50 He does not, however, apply the same control when it comes to Masr. 
51 R. Radhakrishnan makes a good point in “Globalization, desire, and the politics of representation” published 
in Comparative Literature 53.4 (2001): 325-33: “. . . in a world structured hierarchically between East and 
West, developing and undeveloped nations, is the longing of the West for completion from the East somehow 
considered not as drastic as the longing of the East for completion by the West? . . .  [If] the West is looking to 
the East for spiritual enhancement and enrichment and the East is looking to the West for technological 
advance . . . [W]hich of these two needs for completion would be considered more dire? In a world-historical 
situation where materialism and technology are valorized more than spirituality and matters ‘interior’, it is 
inevitable that oriental dependency would position itself in a weaker position within the global structure”.  
This version retrieved on February 5, 2004 from http://0-proquest.umi.com.prospero.murdoch.edu.au/login 
52 Chakrabarty would disagree here and claim that, taken together, the way in which Ghosh has refused to 
“historicize” the villagers and his way of treating them as figures “illuminating a life possibility for the present 
. . . put[s] us in touch with the plural ways of being that make up our own present. The archives thus help bring 
to view the disjointed nature of any particular ‘now’ one may inhabit; that is the function of subaltern pasts”. 
From  Provincializing Europe, 108. In his discussion of writing the histories of “suppressed groups”, 
Chakrabarty also makes the incontrovertible point that “History has not been the same since Thompson and 
Hobsbawm took up their pens to make the working classes look like major actors in society” (98). 
53 See my earlier discussions of the way in which Deleuze and Guattari have applied the term “minor” to a 
certain kind of literature. Chakrabarty’s use of the word as he relates it to history has both similarities and 
differences with the former, in particular: “Just as the ‘minor’ in literature implies a ‘critique of narratives of 
identity’ and refuses to ‘represent the attainment of autonomous subjectivity that is the ultimate aim of the 
major narrative’, the ‘minor’ in my use similarly function to cast doubt on the ‘major’” (101). 
54 See Past Tenses: Essays on Writing, Autobiography and History (London: River Oram, 1992). Contrast this 
with my discussion of the difference between history and case-history in chapter four. 
55 The capitalized D of “Development” signals the appropriateness of a Marxian reading of this passage which 
would re-cast this argument in an economic mode. In her discussion of the brief appearance of the phrase “The   290
                                                                                                                                                       
Asiatic Mode of Production” in Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, tr. S. W. 
Ryazanskaya (New York: International Publishers, 1970), 21, Spivak argues that this phrase is the “imaginary 
fleshing out of a difference in terms that are consonant with the development of capitalism and the resistance 
appropriate to it as ‘the same’. . . . It operates both Eurocentric economic migration as well as the 
financialization of the globe through “Development” and economic restructuring. The fact that this crucial 
item could not just be foreclosed as unimportant but took on a special kind of importance when ‘the different’ 
wanted to become agents within ‘the same’ richly testifies to this”. From A Critique of Postcolonial Reason, 
79. 
56 But possibly we ask too much of narrative. It may be that we try to seek answers where there are none. 
Perhaps instead the subtlety that Ghosh achieves—the “pointing to an absence”, to the missing “rung”, rather 
than presenting a solution—is what Gayatri Spivak would applaud as a method of asserting that there is a 
“need rather than the way to tell the truth  . . . [which] really asks for . . . a transformation of consciousness—a 
changing mind set. It’s in that sense [an] . . . ideological project. To develop a mind set which allows one not 
to be nervous about the fact that what one is saying is undermined by the way one says it, radically. Not just 
make that apology and then business as usual, but actually to present us with that problem which is the 
familiar problem of every practice, and say the point is not to produce such an analysis that you will make a 
nice solution and everything else will be excluded, but to forge a practice which takes this into account” (my 
emphases).
56 It is interesting to speculate as to how Edward Said would have handled the scene I have been 
discussing. Less subtly than Ghosh, one suspects, but at the end, does it matter? As I will be arguing in my 
concluding chapter, whatever the shortcomings of Orientalism, its importance lies in that this picture of an 
overarching West—a message of hegemony long-suppressed and with a “need” to be expressed—is presented. 
Perhaps, as Spivak suggests, what is important is that one’s “truth” is out there; beyond that it is the task of the 
“responsible reader” to imbue that “truth” with the interpretation it deserves. 
57 See Gilroy for the notion of “The Black Atlantic” where the mercantile sea was one of free movement for all 
except the black slaves, but here provides “the opportunity to reconceptualise so that capitalist, racial slavery 
becomes internal to modernity and intrinsically modern” (220). 
58 Cited in The Black Atlantic, n. 92, 251. I am of course aware that Johnson is referring specifically to the 
“‘creolised’ double conciousnesses” of African Americans in the quoted passage and that Ghosh’s past in no 
way replicates the “mosaic” Johnson describes (The Black Atlantic, 221). 
59 In this case the “orientalist gaze” becomes a question of accountability. As Radhakrishnan suggests in his 
discussion of Ghosh’s The Shadow Lines: “It is in the context of a creative and diasporan rethinking of the 
politics of proximity and distance that Ghosh uses the phrase ‘imagine with precision’. The phrase dramatizes 
a valuable tension between the rigor invoked by the term ‘precision’, which denotes a certain representational 
fidelity as well as accountability. . . . Precision operates as a form of global accountability as well as 
connectedness that functions as the ethical a priori that sanctions the attempt of every location to name and 
understand itself. Precision becomes the ethic as well as the narrative aesthetic whereby the story of every self 
is committed not to violate the story of the other. Precision is honored as that radical alterity without which the 
narrative of humanity degenerates into the history of warring nations, militarized boundaries, and homes that 
reek with hatred of the other”.   291
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
HOW ANDREA LEVY “WRITES” THE WEST 
 
 
 
 
 
        This [fictional] representation must be  
 such that it induces the proper sense of horror  
at the utter difference, the utter shapelessness, and  
the utter inhumanity of what must be humanized.  
 
Frank Kermode 
1 
 
 
. . . a questioning of the colonial past is  
intractably tied to the crisis of securing identity 
 in an age of collapsing boundaries. 
 
Simon Gikandi 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For a discussion that will draw together much of what I have said in preceding chapters, I 
turn now to writer Andrea Levy whose latest novel, Small Island, is a recent winner of the 
Orange Prize for Fiction and, as a work of art, highly deserving of a place among the works 
listed in this thesis.
3 However, the pre-eminent merit of both Levy and her book to this 
study lies in her twenty-first-century interest in the tensions of “empire”, tensions that not 
only provide the thematic focus for this novel, but which, to borrow a phrase from Simon   292
Gikandi, are “intractably tied” to the issue of identifying critical relationships between self 
and place.  
 
Andrea Levy was born in London of Jamaican parents who immigrated to Britain on the SS 
Empire Windrush in 1948 and who were among the first West Indians to respond to 
Britain’s call for help to re-build England after the war. Small Island functions as a tribute 
to those men and women who took every sort of post-war menial job available, from street 
sweepers to porters, cleaners, drivers and, later, nurses.
4 Many of the migrants were ex-
servicemen who had already fought on behalf of Britain who were attracted to England 
primarily because of high unemployment in the Caribbean. However, as Levy emphasizes 
in her novel, England was so different from their homeland that it held an almost dreamlike 
allure. That this attraction was fundamentally based on illusion is demonstrated in the desire 
expressed by her protagonist in Small Island: “I did not dare to dream that it would one day 
be I who would go to England. It would one day be I who would sail on a ship as big as a 
world and feel the sun’s heat on my face gradually change from roasting to caressing” (9). 
Thus, like all migrant experiences, the readjustment had its difficulties and Small Island is 
about the hurdles its characters progressively face and largely overcome. 
 
However, this theme is not new for Levy. The issue of being black in a country where 
people still harboured a seventeenth-century fear of people of different races is so strong 
that it has provided the subject matter she grapples with in most of her earlier semi-
autobiographical books. She has been described as a “literary pioneer” in that when she first 
approached mainstream publishers, they were hesitant or disinterested in her work because 
“there weren’t many black people writing”.
5 Now, four novels later—all of which have been   293
critically acclaimed—she not only locates herself as a black British writer, but revels in both 
parts of her identity—the black and the British, reflecting the confidence she has gained in 
the process. She calls herself “the bastard child of Empire. I’m the bastard child Britain 
doesn’t want to acknowledge”. Since her clearly stated “black British” identity holds an 
element of challenge, this is the point at which I want to start my own process of 
exploration of this writer and her latest book.
6 
 
The first point to make, then, is that Small Island, too, is a book about identity, but that it 
illuminates an identity inextricably tied to politics. The second is that since she lives in one 
country, but acknowledges her roots in another, she has a lot in common with several 
figures in this study, not the least of whom is Said himself. However, unlike many of the 
other writers I have discussed, there is no ambiguity of identity in either her latest work or 
in her own assertions. I suggest that Levy’s celebration of her “black British” identity is not 
based on an assertion of “doubled identity” as is Rushdie’s “British Indian” for example. 
Where I maintained that Rushdie’s claim to a British nationality was in part a move for 
‘political correctness’ and that while he was comfortable in a British role, his heart lay in his 
homeland, one does not get that feeling from Levy.
7 Not for her are the “Indias of the 
mind”. Neither is the essence of what Levy means by “black British” found in Ghosh’s 
Indianness, nor in Browne’s Englishness for that matter. Although she writes of Jamaica 
with empathy, her descriptive passages of the island and its people are distanced; Rushdie’s 
“sense of loss, some urge to reclaim, to look back, even at the risk of being mutated into 
pillars of salt” is almost completely missing.
8  
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But neither is being British a cause for pride. She is forthright in interview. “All my books 
have been about trying to understand who I am and the position I’m in,” Levy says. “When 
I say I’m English, its [sic] not an act of patriotism, its [sic] almost an act of defiance” (The 
West Australian, May 1, 2004). This sense of rebellion and unwillingness to compromise 
that comes through so clearly in her work lies at the base, I think, of what makes her a great 
writer. However, it again illuminates the importance of identity in determining authorial 
agency. 
 
Writing for Levy is a self-avowedly political act and the emotions that underpin these words 
are those that emerge in Small Island. It is clear that Levy’s quip of “bastard child” is no 
joke, and that it is not by chance that her first three books have been about “trying to 
understand who I am” (The West Australian). But although Small Island has this placement 
of self in a diasporic setting as one of its major themes, central to this novel is the confusion 
faced by both black and white against the setting of a fading empire.
9 In post-war 1948, a 
‘shadow’ of itself the once-powerful British Empire may have been, but the bewilderment 
caused by issues of race and prejudice lingered on. That this ‘bewilderment’ manifests in a 
fictional polemic every bit as uncompromising as that of Edward Said is what I want to 
examine here. 
 
This is a novel that openly explores, and exploits, issues of race and so it is appropriate that 
the characters are drawn from the small islands of England and Jamaica. In this 
representation of the metropolis and its periphery, Small Island links the lives of four main 
characters, each of whom alternates as protagonist, thus foregrounding four different points 
of view. The novel opens with the world view of an Englishwoman, appropriately named    295
 
Queenie
10, and closes with the observations of the Jamaican Hortense. The contrasted 
experiences of these two women and their husbands, Bernard and Gilbert, English and 
Jamaican respectively, provide both theme and plot.   
 
I look first at the prologue since this constitutes the first of several important chapters 
clearly grounding the novel in a setting that celebrates empire in a flashback that shows a 
young Queenie on a visit to the Empire Exhibition.
11 It is not by chance that such a marked 
symbol of nationalism, in this case the British flag, is privileged in the opening paragraph 
when Queenie states:  
 
I thought I’d been to Africa. Told all my class I had. Early Bird, our 
teacher, stood me in front of the British flag—she would let no one call it 
the common Union Jack: ‘It’s the flag of Empire not a musical turn.’ And I 
stood there bold as brass and said, ‘I went to Africa when it came to 
Wembley.’ It was then that Early Bird informed me that Africa was a 
country. ‘You’re not usually a silly girl, Queenie Buxton,’ she went on, ‘but 
you did not go to Africa, you merely went to the British Empire Exhibition, 
as thousands of others did.’ (Small Island, 1)
12  
 
The introduction to Britain’s colonies continues over these first few pages as Queenie 
describes her visit to the “Empire in little”, the different exhibits each offering a typically 
clichéd précis of the country it represents.
13 The climax to this outing is a ride on the 
“scenic railway” where Queenie’s father gives his daughter her first lesson on empire as she 
looks down on the ‘colonies’. “As we hung right at the top—the twinkling electric lights 
below mingling with the stars—Father said something I will never forget. He said, ‘See 
here, Queenie. Look around. You’ve got the whole world at your feet, lass’”(6). 
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The main narrative continues this investigation into the politics of power by progressively 
introducing the other three main characters to the drama and switching back and forth 
between two temporal frames. There is the time “before” which places characters in roles 
either in homeland Jamaica or in scenes from World War II both overseas and in Britain, 
and in a post-war “1948” during which much of the novel’s current action takes place. 
When her husband Bernard signs up as an RAF serviceman and does not return at war’s 
end, Queenie takes in lodgers, one of whom is Gilbert with whom she had shared a wartime 
friendship. The lives of the two couples are further entwined when Gilbert brings his new 
Jamaican wife, Hortense, to England. As for many migrants of that era, the reality of her 
new country for Hortense is a life that consists of eating, sleeping, bathing and eating in one 
small room at the top of Queenie’s house, a far cry from her idealized childhood imaginings 
of “a big house with a bell at the front door” (9). 
 
That this novel succeeds so well is due to a number of different reasons, not least the three-
dimensionality of the characters, in particular the Jamaicans, which is a point I will return to 
later this chapter. But in the context of this thesis, two techniques stand above the rest. 
Firstly, it is the underpinning of warfare, in its many forms, that lends the narrative the 
tension it maintains to the last page.
14 Secondly, as reviewers have noted, Levy’s 
phenomenal mastery of dialect, both British and West Indian, turns this book from what 
could be read as a dark story of different levels of endurance into a story that makes one 
laugh out loud. Entertaining it certainly is. But as I have mentioned, and more importantly 
for my purposes here, Levy’s stated passion is an illumination of the inequities of empire 
and her use of dialect is but a tool in this respect. The different ‘languages’ are designed to 
interconnect with the hierarchies of war, whether these battles are fought on racial,   297
domestic, social or military fronts. Hence, notions on the politicality of language discussed 
in earlier chapters bear repeating: “Language is never neutral, always politically charged 
and packed with the intentions of others.” In this novel, the disjunctions that occur as a 
result of these interconnections between the different war zones and language operate as 
signposts to a colonialism which, in the time warp of the novel, is not yet post- and yet 
stands sentry at the gates of a threatening neo-colonialism. I return to my earlier discussions 
of Bakhtinian dialogism at this point where the “hero” or, in this case, several heroes are 
introduced as free spirits “into the strict and calculated plan of the whole” while the author 
stands back from a totalizing role.
15 
 
In other words, in order to represent her own political anxieties, Levy allows this polyphony 
of “full-valued voices” to disagree, argue or fight. The characters, ostensibly at least, are 
free to present their own opinions in a similar manner to Ghosh’s alter ego and the Imam in 
chapter four of this thesis and in line with the “unmerged consciousnesses” in Dostoevsky’s 
novels (6).  
 
In this way, this novel provides an excellent example of a number of discourses that 
combine to operate as an “aesthetic object . . . an internal dialogization [that] becomes one 
of the most fundamental aspects of prose style and undergoes a specific artistic elaboration” 
(The Dialogic Imagination, 284). According to Bakhtin: 
. . . internal dialogization can become such a crucial force for creating form 
only where individual differences and contradictions are enriched by social 
heteroglossia, where dialogic reverberations do not sound in the semantic 
heights of discourse (as happens in the rhetorical genres) but penetrate the 
deep strata of discourse, dialogize language itself and the world view a 
particular language has (the internal form of discourse)—where the 
dialogue of voices arises directly out of a social dialogue of ‘languages,’ 
where an alien utterance begins to sound like a socially alien language, 
where the orientation of the word among alien utterances changes into an   298
orientation of a word among socially alien languages within the boundaries 
of one and the same national language. (285) 
 
 
In her essay on the uneasiness of colonialist engagement with the other, Elleke Boehmer 
suggests that these different discourses have a correspondence with Bakhtin’s notions of 
“intentional” language.
16 In this way, they  provide “a helpful model for thinking about how 
the voice of colonial authority may open out to other voices, and begin to question itself” 
(98).  
At the height of empire . . . the colonial world word-view, its conviction of 
European superiority and leadership over other races, in many ways 
corresponds to Bakhtin’s description of the monologic utterance, sufficient 
to itself, aware of other utterances, if at all, only as ‘objects’ exterior to its 
internal commitments and concerns [The Dialogic Imagination, 285-6]. 
However, where this closed and self-sufficient ‘voice’ is confronted by 
another world of meaning, in such a way that the other world cannot be 
ignored . . . what results can be described as that Bakhtinian disturbance 
which comes about when an utterance addresses itself to others. A 
‘qualified relationship to one’s own language’ emerges; the authoritative 
language begins to regard itself, often with disruptive effect, as if from 
elsewhere or ‘through the eyes of another language’ [355-62].
17 
 
 
As an example of such a “Bakhtinian disturbance”, note the tension generated between two 
early scenes from Small Island. In the first, we are privy to Hortense’s thoughts as she 
unpacks on her first morning in England: “So cheerless. Determined, I held my breath but 
still I could hear no birdsong. The room was pitiful in the grey morning light. . . . I opened 
my trunk. The bright Caribbean colours of the blanket . . . leaped from the case. The yellow 
with the red, the blue with the green commenced dancing in this dreary room. I took the far-
from-home blanket and spread it on the bed. Miraculous—it was then I heard a bird sing. 
Oh, so joyful. Finding colour through a window its spirit rose to chirrup and warble” (187). 
A little later, Queenie, the landlady, knocks and after a number of mutually ineffective 
attempts at communication, spies the blanket: “‘Where did you get that thing?’ she said, 
pointing at my blanket. ‘It’s so bright. You need dark glasses for that.’ It obviously amused   299
her. She began to giggle. ‘Did you bring it over with you?’”. And a little later, Queenie 
asks, “‘So how long have you and Gilbert been married, then?’ The barefaced cheek of the 
question sucked all the breath from me. Did she want to know all my business? I just look 
on her and wait. Soon this white Englishwoman must realize she is talking ill-mannered to 
me. But she say it again. This time in that slow way, as if I did not grasp her meaning the 
first time. But she tricked me. If this woman was to realize that I am an educated person 
then surely I would have to answer her enquiry. Cha”  (188-9).  
 
In order to juxtapose the differing world views of the Jamaican and the Englishwoman, I 
have passed over a number of exchanges by both parties as they endeavour to understand 
each other, but nonetheless there is enough quoted here to show that these “utterances” aptly 
demonstrate what Boehmer has called “Bakhtinian disturbance”. Queenie and Hortense are 
speaking, they both think, the same language.
18 However, this “language” not only 
highlights the differences between each, but includes the reader, too, in its “double-
languageness”. Within a few pages, two clichés are compared and contrasted. Hortense’s 
native love of colour and song sits alongside Queenie’s English mind, symbolizing an 
anxious (and in its reference to “dark glasses”, blind) imperialism, which is further 
represented as grey and drear as the gloomy room and the wintry day outside.  
 
It is the questioning of this nature which filters through this book that makes the narrative so 
solidly postcolonial. It is as if Levy has taken the work of the figures in this thesis—of 
people like Woolf and Ghosh and Ondaatje—and edited out any tendency to “orientalist” 
failings. Queenie’s voice becomes objectified, her character distanced. Bakhtin’s “double-  300
languageness” works to highlight her ineffectualness. By entering the room of her lodger, 
Queenie becomes displaced, alienated in her own house and in her own country. 
 
Scenes like this appositely foreshadow the ending to this story. Queenie’s loneliness during 
her husband’s prolonged absence in the years that follow the war’s end results in her 
pregnancy to a Jamaican airman, a charismatic character who enters, and exits, the narrative 
in the guise of a philanderer. While Queenie clearly worships her new baby, a growing 
concern as to the difficulties of white parents bringing up a black child in a British country 
start to surface. Although her husband, on his eventual return, comes to terms with the 
complexities inherent in rearing another man’s son, Queenie looks beyond this difficulty to 
those that her son will face as he grows older and here social mores become difficult to 
distinguish from racial issues.  
“You might think you can do it now,” I told him [Bernard], “while he’s a 
little baby saying nothing. But what about when he grows up? A big, 
strapping coloured lad. And people snigger at you in the street and ask you 
all sorts of awkward questions. Are you going to fight for him? All those 
neighbours . . . those proper decent neighbours out in the suburbs, are you 
going to tell them to mind their own business? Are you going [to] punch 
other dads ’cause their kids called him names? Are you going to be proud of 
him? Glad that he’s your son?” 
 
“Adopted, that’s what we can say,” he said, so softly. . . . 
 
“Bernard. One day he’ll do something naughty and you’ll look at him and 
think, The little black bastard, because you’ll be angry. . . . You’ll be angry 
with him not only for that. But because the neighbours never invited you 
round. Because they whispered about you . . . Because they never thought 
you were as good as them. . . . And all because you had a coloured child.” 
(431) 
 
 
In retrospect, from a distance of over fifty years, it is easy to forget—or, as I suggested in 
my introduction, for many of us never to know—quite what discrimination of this particular 
nature entails. Hence, I quote from a review of Small Island by coloured British M. P. Paul   301
Boateng: “It is . . . [post-war Britain] of which I have some childhood recollection. The 
wonder with which complete strangers would pat my curly hair in the streets of fifties 
London. The repeated questions to my white mother ‘Is he yours?’ The defiance, born of 
sometimes bitter experience, of her reply ‘Of course he is!’ Just daring them to say what 
some certainly thought. How could she?”
19 
 
Without detracting from the sincerity of Boateng’s recollections and experiences, the 
problem, as I have discussed at some length elsewhere in this thesis, is of course that what is 
under discussion here is a work of fiction. To empathize with characters in a novel is part of 
a search for harmony and accord, for reassurance in the experiences of the other, a hunt for 
proof that there is such a thing as “solidarity of trial”.
20 When we find satisfaction in what 
we search for, we announce that what we have read or witnessed or experienced is ‘the 
truth’, instead of realizing that this metaphorical representation is part of the author’s 
overall plan.
21 Levy’s work may contain elements that have the appearance or the resonance 
of reality, but neither are these individual episodes real, nor is the story—by virtue of its 
being a story—true. Terry Eagleton offers this example: “In his novel Doctor Faustus, 
Thomas Mann pauses to pay homage to a real-life individual, a man whose actual existence 
we might well take his word for. But there is still nothing to stop us from choosing to take 
this reference fictionally. Even if a novel states actual facts, it does not somehow become 
truer. Once again, the fact that we know this is a novel ensures that we do not scrutinize 
these statements for their truth-value, but take them as part of some overall rhetorical 
design”.
22  
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It is timely to repeat my earlier arguments on fictional representation in a different way, this 
time drawing on the theoretical positioning of Frank Kermode.
23 As Kermode so rightly 
claims: “What makes the triumph [of believing we have found ‘reality’] difficult is that it 
has to take account of the world as we experience it; we have such a loving-hating affair 
with reality, we ‘keep coming back to the real’; and this continually impoverishes us 
because it is at odds with such concords as we have achieved” (166). What interests me in 
particular is his discussion of British agent Christopher Burney’s Solitary Confinement 
which begins when Burney is first captured in occupied France but continues as “a study of 
those notions [of solitude and confinement] as they become real” (156). “‘Down on the 
bedrock,’ he [Burney] writes, ‘life becomes a love affair of the mind, and reality merely the 
eternally mysterious beloved’” (157). Thus, Burney has to invent everything, even time 
itself: “‘One does not suffer the passing of empty time, but rather the slowness of the 
expected event which is to end it’” (160). Without time, the passage between life and death 
ceases to have meaning. So Burney invents a clock from “the shadow cast by a gable on a 
wall which he can see through the fretted glass of his high window. Time cannot be faced as 
coarse and actual, as a repository of the contingent; one humanizes it by fictions of orderly 
succession and end” (160). This inventiveness gives shape, and thus, meaning to days which 
otherwise would have none. In those extreme circumstances, too, I suppose when one has 
only one’s mind for company, the notion of a time span that is circular and not linear 
provides some measure of comfort in its reminder of the cyclical nature of life, of the bigger 
picture, as it were.  
 
To return to the epigraph that heads this chapter, while events based in the real—the shadow 
cast by the gable on the prison wall, for example—can provide the substance for the   303
representation, the art of the novelist lies in the shaping and honing of these events so that 
they represent more than they do, so that they move a fictional narrative—as the imagined 
clock moves a life—in a circle from beginning to ending and back again.  
 
How does Levy create this circle? Let us revisit for a moment the last line of the final scene 
of the prologue when Queenie’s father provides the young girl with a paradigmatic view of 
Britain’s “empire” from the top of the big dipper at the Wembley exhibition grounds, at the 
point when he murmurs: “‘You’ve got the whole world at your feet, lass’”. We are told that 
until disabused some years later, Queenie believed that she had indeed visited the colonies. 
In between the story turns and turns, but in an impassioned penultimate chapter, the 
situation is soundly reversed. The adult Queenie—named, we remember, for Queen 
Victoria—gets down on her knees in front of Hortense and Gilbert: “I pleaded to Hortense, 
turned to her. I was on both my knees now. ‘Take him and bring him up as if he was your 
son. Would you, would you, please?’” (430). In the tension between metropolis and margin, 
the position is now inverted. The power play in the “Game” has been overturned. The final 
chapter is given to Hortense who knocks on Queenie’s door to say goodbye, and knows she 
is there, waiting, behind the door, but unable to speak. Queenie is effectively silenced. 
 
This is a superbly crafted work of fiction. But it is fiction. The scenes are constructed from a 
word here, a sight there, and their relevance to reality is in a “free imagination [that] makes 
endless plots on reality” (Kermode, 164). In what she writes, Levy does not represent the 
real, but it is a sign of her high art that she makes it appear as if she does so. In this respect, 
Kermode relates an anecdotal description of Wordsworth’s conversation with a poor leech-
gatherer. The landscape, the light and the general surroundings in which this meeting took   304
place, led naturally to Wordsworth’s wish to capture this “scarecrow figure” in a poem, not 
only as a figure but for his wordiness, too, much of which was “tedious” but necessary 
(170). How then to arrest this scene in fictional representation and hold the audience, make 
the poem work? Wordsworth’s way around this dilemma of representing the real—getting 
the message across—was to construct the persona as a young poet. The old man “appears at 
a dream-like moment when the poet’s mind and the morning landscape suddenly darken. 
His tedious talk is not attended to, although it is reported in the poem, until a movement of 
the poet’s mind convinces him that this may be a peculiar grace, a leading from above” 
(171).
24 
 
The point that I am making here is that the empire that Levy creates in the pages of Small 
Island is not in either shape or form the empire that was. The shape the fiction takes, 
however, is strong enough “to stir up fearfulness [that we] continue to live our lives locked 
in the legacy of Empire” (Boateng). Therefore, I need to move from an analysis of content 
to a discussion of form in order to unpack how Levy delivers and structures the narrative to 
create this effect. As I have mentioned, the four separate points of view that make up the 
narrative ostensibly constitute a dialogic approach; in this case four heroes or anti-heroes 
are each given ample opportunity to present their individual viewpoints. If I were to follow 
through on the principles of dialogism as discussed in my chapter on Ghosh, it could be 
argued that the characters that sit on either side of this black and white binary each have 
ample opportunity to present their point of view. Which, in the course of the narrative, they 
do. This does not, however, prevent the narrative from being “angled”.
25 By this I mean, 
that although each of the four is given a place in the narrative from which to speak, the 
novel is not only more “inward” in its treatment of the Jamaicans, Gilbert and Hortense, but   305
there is also more collusion between the narratives of these two; they are linked in a way 
that creates a synergy not present in the voices of the others which are designed to present 
singly and coldly in contrast. Although there are aspects of individual character construction 
that demand this treatment—Bernard, for example, is presented as a silent character from 
the start, a somewhat clichéd Englishman whose ability to communicate is not improved by 
his war experience—this silence effectively alienates us. Nor, for that matter, do we ever 
really feel close to Queenie. While I acknowledge that this is to some extent part of the 
characterization, at the same time, the fact that one set of characters is designed to appear 
weakly against the other results in “angled” presentation. This type of bias is still, in the 
context of what I have been discussing here, “orientalism”. 
 
Andrea Levy—from the location of her defiantly black British status—not only “writes 
back” to empire, she constructs “empire”. She writes England. In Levy’s case, “black” is 
both qualifier and signifier. The feelings of being “out of place” in Small Island are without 
nostalgia and countered by a stony determination to belong. I repeat a criticism by Arun 
Mukherjee quoted earlier: “Ondaatje, coming from a Third World country with a colonial 
past, does not write about his otherness. . . . [T]here is no trauma of uprooting evident in his 
poetry; nor is there a need for redefinition in a new context; the subjects that preoccupy so 
many immigrant writers”.
26 Unlike Ondaatje, Levy does not fall into these traps. To the 
contrary, her books explore the issues of uprooting and the trauma of migration. But the 
identity she so clearly claims, too, is of a different nature. I suggested of Ondaatje’s work 
that the diasporic self might live in many places, but belong nowhere. The same could be 
said of many of the writers discussed in this thesis. We can hypothesise that even Browne, 
so comfortable with his Englishness once safely back in England, may have had to re-  306
examine his identity had he decided to remain in Persia. And Edward Said, until almost the 
end of his life, confessed ambivalence with regard to identity. Levy is different in that she 
unquestionably  belongs. In fact, in complete contradiction to these other figures, the 
strength and clarity of purpose that informs Levy’s work asserts an absolute and 
uncontroversial right to belong.
27 Levy is less subtle than Ondaatje, but politically, her story 
is more powerful. However, even Levy’s clear-cut sense of belonging to the culture she 
represents does not, finally, save her from charges of “orientalism”. In using the “highly 
organized and encoded system” of language she has re-written the story of “empire”.
28 
 
To return to Boateng’s review: One can understand and empathize with his sentiments of 
fear, just as he has in turn identified with the events represented in the novel. One can see 
here, too, the current postcolonialist apprehension of a return to colonial practices in the 
guise of neo-colonialism. There is only one question that remains and perhaps it has no 
answer. How helpful is this stirring up of fearfulness of an empire, which in the way of all 
empires, has come and gone? This is the question that postcolonialism needs to examine. 
While admitting that it provides the conflict that makes a good story, my own fear is that a 
keeping alive of difference in this manner promotes hate and division where there could be 
support. Simon Gikandi asks, “Shouldn’t narrative function as the mechanism that 
transcends ugly histories and realitites? Must a narrative of postcolonial futures realize its 
authority by confronting the colonial archive?” (200). 
 
. . . 
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In this study, I have examined selected works of a number of theorists, scholars and literary 
figures in an endeavour to challenge those of Said’s claims and definitions that have proven 
to be the most compelling and influential. The works I have included are drawn from two 
separate timeframes: that of the high empire Said so directly attacks and of an early 
postcolonial period that confirms an emerging awareness of power politics in race relations. 
While I would still argue that the key definitions of Said’s brand of “orientalism” are too 
severe in that it is hard to support a serious claim that people like Browne, Woolf, Ondaatje 
or Ghosh fit the separate elements of these descriptions, ultimately, as I have shown, there 
remains the impossible bind of extricating any of these individuals, Levy included, from 
charges of “orientalism”. This only illuminates, I think, the incongruity of his argument. 
 
On the face of it, then, Said’s hypothesis would appear to be so cleverly constructed that it 
provides a catch-all for any attempt at cross-cultural representation. But, paradoxically, it is 
in the very audacity of this thesis that Said’s own argument becomes entangled. In one of 
his statements quoted earlier, he maintains, “I grew up as an Arab with a Western education. 
Ever since I can remember I have felt that I belonged to both worlds, without being 
completely of either one or the other”.
29 In belonging to neither, whatever Said writes, he 
writes about the other. Thus, I contend that everything that Said writes about “one or the 
other” is “orientalist”. The discourse that appears to serve his argument so well finally 
undermines itself. 
 
Ironically, Said’s “orientalism” belies the apparently rigid parameters that enclose it and 
which would appear to restrict it, and in fact the converse holds. To wit, the discourse 
proves so expansive, so inclusive, that the definition does indeed reflect back to his very   308
first classification: “Anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient . . .  either in 
its specific or its general aspects, is an Orientalist”.
30 Accordingly, in their process of 
attempting to represent another culture, the figures that appear in this thesis—whether 
writing from their different locative positions of academia or the diaspora, from their own 
heartlands, or orientals writing about other orientals—are all “orientalists”. In other words, 
it is impossible to research or write about a culture other than one’s own without becoming 
a part of the “orientalist” drama. And even if one promotes one part of an identity at the 
expense of the other as I have demonstrated in the case of Levy, if there are slippages in the 
narratorial discourse which suggest bias, this too constitutes a type of “orientalism”. 
Significantly, this reading of “orientalism” clearly separates the term from those of 
“colonialism” and “imperialism” with which it still tends to be used synonymously. 
 
However, my concerns with Said go beyond the pages of this thesis to a sense of unease 
with regard to the discursive power structures that he himself has put in place. I return to 
questions raised in chapter one and my earlier speculation as to whether his dialectic of ‘me 
and them’ and his repeated insistence of the Western manipulation of the East only 
increases the gap he calls “the imperial divide”. It cannot be denied that Said has 
illuminated areas of power play that were previously glossed, suppressed or even hidden. It 
is to be applauded that he has indubitably raised awareness of the dangers of such political 
and socially biased game-playing. But, nevertheless, it is also clear that the power behind 
the rhetoric of Said’s “orientalism” is such that it contributes to a “divide” between the 
descendants of colonizer and colonized that may not otherwise have been so marked.  
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Thus, as this study draws to a close, I suggest that the somewhat muddled agendas of the 
“imperial divide” of the past have given way to a more deliberately constructed racial divide 
of the present. The lessons of the past must not be forgotten, but nor must the power of 
literature be underestimated. I confess to being troubled by the broad-brush assertions that 
Said makes because I see them as retrogressive. His theories are rooted in a looking back at 
the past instead of moving towards the sort of future envisaged by theorists like Bhabha, 
Chakrabarty and Gikandi and historians like MacKenzie and Amanat. If Said’s theories are 
recycled in the form of popular fiction of this nature with its capacity for widespread 
dissemination, the possibilities exist for a continuing racism as dangerous and unwelcome 
as that acted out by the imperialist practices of empire. This type of literature emanating 
from the shadowlands of cross-cultural writing is, I believe, the legacy of Edward Said to 
literature.  
 
Finally, there is an addendum to what I have written here in the form of a book review 
stumbled upon in an airline lounge at Changi airport in Singapore.
31 The book under review 
is titled Japan’s Cultural Code Words: 233 Key Terms That Explain the Attitudes and 
Behaviour of the Japanese. It is compiled by a Frenchman, Boyé Lafayette de Mente, and I 
quote from the second paragraph by Asian reviewer Siswati Samad:  
 
To western eyes, De Mente writes, the Japanese are initially perceived as 
being exquisitely mannered, accommodating, gentle and even cute, but ‘can 
only be described as barbaric a short time later’. This behaviour is in part 
due to the traditional dual character of some Asian cultures that denied 
‘them the inherent human aspirations for individuality and personal 
freedom, and forced them to think and behave in ways that were unnatural’. 
This results in an internal conflict between their natural instincts as they 
cope with the demands of their society. (20) 
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That such condescension still exists in the form of “the West writing the East”—in this case, 
a work implicitly endorsed by the Asian reviewer—again illustrates the difficulties inherent 
in cross-cultural representation. It only serves to emphasize my argument that, under the 
terms of Said’s discourse, it is impossible to write across cultures without being   
“orientalist”.  
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 The Sense of an Ending (London, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 145. 
2 Maps of Englishness (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 229. 
3 Small Island (London: Review, 2004). 
4 See Levy’s use of Winston Churchill’s famous line—“Never in the field of human conflict has so much been 
owed by so many to so few”—as the final epigraph of this novel. 
5 In interview with Bron Sibree, The West Australian (1.5.2004). 
6 Levy’s adamancy that her British identity is not in any shape or form allied to feelings of  “patriotism” can 
be admired for its lack of hypocrisy, but it makes me hesitate to suggest she is of British nationality. 
7 She writes of Jamaica, but her emotions are saved for the country of her own birth. 
8 Salman Rushdie, Imaginary Homelands (London: Granta Books, 1981), 10. 
9 Small Island is exemplary for my purposes in that its central themes, which revolve around notions of race, 
identity and empire, are those examined throughout this work. 
10 Christened Victoria, but always called Queenie (195). 
11 See my note 16 in chapter two. 
12 Discussion of flags, whether in fact or fiction, is rarely innocent. See, as one example, the flag-raising 
ceremony in aboriginal playwright Jack Davis’ No Sugar. Or, as another, the ongoing controversy with regard 
to Australia’s national flag. Or see Paul Gilroy, There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack (London: Hutchinson, 
1987). 
13 What stands out most in a twenty-first-century reading of this scene is the sheer number and variety of 
colonies that constituted the British Empire. 
14 By ‘warfare in its many forms’, I mean the separate microcosms of racial insults, marital arguments as well 
as the larger picture of world war. It should, however, be noted that there is also a great deal of class-based 
warfare identified in this novel, glossed over for my purposes here. 
15 See Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, tr. R. W. Rotsel (np. Ardis, 1973). For more on the 
dialogic, see Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel”, tr. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University 
of Texas Press, 1981), 257-422. 
16 The observations of Elleke Boehmer were made in regard to Leonard Woolf and Yeats, but they have as 
much pertinency here. See Elleke Boehmer, “‘Immeasurable Strangeness’ in Imperial Times: Leonard Woolf 
and W. B. Yeats”, Modernism and Empire, eds. Howard J.  Booth and Nigel Rigby  (New York: Manchester 
University Press, 2000), 93-111. 
17 See Boehmer’s gloss of Bakhtin’s notion of “‘double-languagedness’ in novelistic discourse—that is, 
utterance which is intentionally hybrid because it both takes into account and is directed towards a listener” 
(“Immeasurable Strangeness, n. 23). 
18 See my discussion of Ghosh’s disappointment, in himself as much as the Imam, in chapter five when he 
realizes that they are both conforming to a set of Western values, that they are both “travelling in the West”. 
Amitav Ghosh, In an Antique Land (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 236. 
19 Although Paul Boateng was born in London, he spent much of his childhood in Ghana where his father was 
first a lawyer then a member of Nkrumah’s government. After the military coup of 1966, Paul returned to the 
UK in his mid-teens. He was the first person of African descent to be elected to the British Parliament and 
appointed to the Cabinet as Chief Secretary to the Treasury in 2002. This web-based review titled “Oi darkie, 
show us your tail” was written by the Rt. Hon. Paul Boateng and was retrieved electronically from 
http://www.orangeprize.co.uk/2004prize/winner/review.html on 25.6.2004. The Race Relations Act was 
passed in Britain in 1976. It outlawed racial discrimination across a number of critical fields—among which 
housing, employment, training, education ranked highly—and while there have been a number of amendments 
since, the original Act stands as a pioneering effort to improve race relations in Great Britain. This information 
http://www.britainusa.com/sections/other/_show.asp?Sarticletype=2&other_ID=442&i=151 
20 I am indebted to Frank Kermode for this phrase. 
21 See Bakhtin. 
22 After Theory (London: Allen Lane, 2003), 90. 
23 From The Sense of an Ending.  See in particular the last two chapters, “Literary Fiction and Reality” and 
“Solitary Confinement”, 127-80.  
24 This particular poem was titled “Resolution and Independence”. For interesting detail on how Wordsworth 
came to write this poem, see Kermode, 169-72.   312
                                                                                                                                                       
25 My acknowledgement to Terry Eagleton for this term. See his discussion of a psychoanalytical reading of a 
novel, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 176-7. 
26 Arun Mukherjee, Towards an Aesthetic of Opposition: Essays on Literature Criticism and Cultural 
Imperialism (Stratford-on-Avon: Williams-Wallace, 1988), 33-4. Cited here from Ajay Heble, “‘Rumours of 
Topography’: The Cultural Politics of Michael Ondaatje’s Running in the Family”, Essays on Canadian 
Writing 53.2 (1994): 187. 
27 See Simon Gikandi’s discussion of Joan Riley’s The Unbelonging in Maps of Englishness, 196-8. 
28 A phrase used by Said, Orientalism (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1991), 21.  
29 Culture and Imperialism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), xviii. 
30 My emphasis, Orientalism. 
31 Book review by Siswati Samad, “Go East”, Prestige (July 2004): 20-2.   313
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Archival material 
 
Cambridge University Library. “Browne Papers”. Boxes 2 (Pembroke), 8, 9, 12, 13, 14. 
 
University of Sussex Library. “Leonard Woolf Papers”. Files 1A 3 b, c, f; 1L 13 b, d, e; 
  1L 16 c, d and 1L 19 a. 
 
 
Books and Articles 
 
Abrams, M. H. The Mirror and the Lamp. London: Oxford University Press, 1971. 
 
Achebe, Chinua. “An Image of Africa: Racism in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness”. In 
 Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness. Ed. Robert Kimbrough, 251-62. 
 New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1988.  
 
- - - .  Home and Exile. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.  
 
- - - .  Things Fall Apart. Oxford: Heinemann AWS, 1986. 
 
Ahmad, Aijaz. “Between Orientalism and Historicism”. In Orientalism: A Reader. Ed.  
A. L. Macfie, 285-97. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000.  
 
- - - .  In Theory: Classes, nations, literatures. Verso: London, 1992. 
 
Al-‘Azm, Sadik Jalal. “Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse”. Macfie, 217-38.  
 
Aldama, Frederick Luis. “An interview with Amitav Ghosh”. World Literature Today 
  76.2 (2002): 84. Proquest Humanities.  
  http://0-proquest.umi.com.prospero.murdoch.edu.au/login        
  (accessed February 5, 2004). 
 
Ali, Muhsin Jassim. “The Growth of Scholarly Interest in Arabian Nights”. Muslim 
 World 70 (1980): 196-212. 
   314
Althusser, Louis. “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses”. In Contemporary 
 Criticial Theory. Ed. Dan Latimer, 60-102. San Diego: Harcourt Brace 
 Jovanovich, 1989. 
 
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. London: Verso, 1983. 
 
Anderson, John. Art and Reality: John Anderson on Literature and Aesthetics. Eds. Janet 
 Anderson, G. Cullum, K. Lycos. Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, c. 1982.  
 
Appadurai, Arjun, ed. Globalization. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000. 
 
- - - .   “Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy”. Public Culture 2.2 
(Spring 1990): 1-24. 
 
Appiah, Anthony. “Is the post- in postmodernism the post- in postcolonial?” Critical  
 Inquiry 17 (Winter 1991): 336-57. 
 
Arberry, A. J. Oriental Essays. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1960. 
 
Ashcroft, Bill, Griffiths, Gareth, and Tiffin, Helen. The Empire Writes Back: Theory and  
  practice in post-colonial literatures. Routledge: London, 1989. 
 
Bakhtin, Mikhail. Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics. Ed. R. W. Rotsel. Np: Ardis, 1973. 
 
- - - .  The Dialogic Imagination. Trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin 
  and London: University of Texas Press, 1981. 
 
Barthes, Roland. Critical Essays. Trans. Richard Howard. Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press. 
 
- - - . S/Z.  Trans. Richard Miller. New York: Hill and Wang, 1974. 
 
- - - .  The Pleasure of the Text. Trans. Richard Howard. London: Cape, 1976. 
 
Beddoes, Julie. “Which Side Is It On? Form, Class, and Politics in In the Skin of a Lion”. 
  Essays on Canadian Writing 53 (1994): 204-15.  
 
Bhabha, Homi, ed. Nation and Narration. London: Routledge, 1990. 
 
- - - .   The Location of Culture. London and New York: Routledge, 1994. 
 
- - - .  “Minority Culture and Creative Anxiety 1”. “Re-inventing Britain”. The British 
 Council  homepage.  www.britishcouncil.org  (accessed May 9, 2002).  
 
Bhagavadgītā. English facsimile. Trans. Charles Wilkins. London: C. Nourse & Co., 
 1785. 
   315
Biriotti, Maurice and Nicola Miller, eds. What is an Author? Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1993. 
 
Boehmer, Elleke, ed. Empire Writing: An Anthology of Colonial Literature, 1870-1918. 
 Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
 
- - - .    “‘Immeasurable Strangeness’ in Imperial Times: Leonard Woolf and 
W. B. Yeats”. In Modernism and Empire. Eds. Howard J. Booth and Nigel Rigby, 
93-111. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2000.     
 
Bok, Christian. “Destructive Creation: The Politicization of Violence in the Works of 
Michael Ondaatje”. Canadian Literature 132 (1992): 109-24.  
 
Bonakdarian, Mansour. “Selected Correspondence of E. G. Browne and Contemporary 
Reviews of The Persian Revolution 1905-1909”. In The Persian Revolution of 
1905-1909. Ed. Abbas Amanat, XXIX-LVII. 
 
Bongie, Chris. “Exotic Nostalgia: Conrad and the New Imperialism”. In Macropolitics of 
Nineteenth Century Literature: Nationalism, Exoticism, Imperialism. Eds.  Jonathan 
  Arac and Harriet Ritvo, 268-85. Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia, c. 1991. 
 
Booth, Howard and Rigby, Nigel, eds. Modernism and Empire. Manchester and New 
York: Manchester University Press, 2000. 
 
Booth, Wayne C. The Rhetoric of Fiction. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Brantlinger, Patrick. Crusoe’s Footprints: Cultural Studies in Britain and America. New 
 York: Routledge, 1990. 
 
- - - .   Rule of Darkness: British literature and imperialism, 1830-1914. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1988. 
 
Brennan, Timothy. Salman Rushdie and the Third World. London: Macmillan, 1989.  
 
Browne, E. G. A Year Amongst the Persians: Impressions as to the life, character and 
 thought of the people of Persia. London: Century Publishing and New York: 
 Hippocrene Books Inc, 1984. First published A. & C. Black, 1893. 
 
- - - .  The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909. Ed. Abbas Amanat. Washington DC: Mage 
 Publishers, 1995. First published 1910. 
 
- - - .   A Literary History of Persia, Vols. I, II, III, IV. London: Cambridge University 
 Press,  1956-9. 
 
Burke, Seán. The Death and Return of the Author. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
 Press, 1998. 
   316
- - - .  Authorship. From Plato to the Postmodern. A Reader. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1995. 
 
Bush, Catherine. “Michael Ondaatje: An Interview”. Essays on Canadian Writing 53 
 (1994): 238-49. 
 
Chakrabarty, Dipesh. Provincializing Europe. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
  University Press, 2000. 
 
Chambers, Iain. Migrancy, Culture, Identity. London and New York: Routledge, 1994.  
 
Chelkowski, Peter. “Edward G. Browne’s Turkish Connexion”. Bulletin of the School of 
 Oriental Studies 49 (1986): 25-34. 
 
Chew, Shirley. “Texts and Worlds in Amitav Ghosh’s In an Antique Land”. In 
  Reconstructing the Book. Eds. Maureen Bell et al, 197-209. Aldershot, 
 Hampshire: Ashgate, 2001. 
 
Chrisman: Laura. “The imperial unconscious? Representations of imperial discourse”. 
Critical Quarterly 32.3 (1990): 38-58. 
 
Clifford, James. Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century. 
  Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1997.                   
 
- - - .  The Predicament of Culture. Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University 
 Press, 1988. 
 
Clifford, James and Marcus, George, eds. Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of 
 Ethnography. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. 
 
Colls, Robert and Philip Dodd, eds. Englishness: Politics and Culture 1880-1920. 
London: Croom Helm, 1986. 
 
Connolly, William. Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox. 
  Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. 
 
Conrad, Joseph. Heart of Darkness in Youth and Two Other Stories. Garden City, New     
  York: Doubleday, Page, 1925. 
 
Cook, Rufus. “Being and Representation in Michael Ondaatje’s The English Patient”. 
 Ariel 30.4 (1999): 35-49. 
 
Curzon, G. N. Persia and the Persian Question. London: Longmans, Green. 1894.  
 
- - - .  Problems of the Far East: Japan, Korea, China. London: Longmans, Green, 
            1894. 
   317
Davis, Rocío G. “Imaginary Homelands Revisited in Michael Ondaatje’s Running in the 
 Family”. English Studies 77.3 (1996): 266-74. 
 
De Man, Paul. The Rhetoric of Romanticism. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1984. 
 
De Mente, Boyé Lafayette. Japan’s Cultural Code Words: 233 Key Terms That Explain 
   the Attitudes and Behaviour of the Japanese. Boston and Tokyo: Tuttle 
   Publishing,  2004. 
 
De Silva, Lilamani Chandra.  “Imperialist discourse: Critical limits of liberalism in 
 selected texts of Leonard Woolf and E. M. Forster”. PhD thesis, University of 
 North Texas, 1991. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Félix. Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature. Trans. Dana 
 Polan. Minneapolis and Oxford: University of Minnesota Press, 1986. 
 
Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: 
  Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. 
 
- - - .  Writing and Difference. Trans. Alan Bass. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
 1981. 
 
Docker, John. 1492: The Poetics of Diaspora. London and New York: Continuum, 2001. 
 
Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Rabinow, Paul. Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982. 
 
Drouart, Michèle.  Into the Wadi. Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press, 2000. 
 
Eagleton, Terry.  Literary Theory. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983. 
 
- - - .  After Theory. London: Allen Lane, 2003. 
 
- - - .  “The Idea of a Common Culture”. In Literary Taste, Culture and Mass 
  Communication 1: Culture and Mass Culture. Eds. Peter Davison, Rolf 
  Meyersohn and Edward Shils, 1-25. Cambridge: Chadwyck-Healey, 1978.  
 
Eagleton, Terry, Jameson, Fredric and Said, Edward. Nationalism, Colonialism, and 
Literature. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990.  
 
Eco, Umberto. A Theory of Semiotics. Bloomington and London: Indiana University 
 Press,  1976. 
 
Elkin, Peter. “Leonard Woolf’s Masterpiece”.  AUMLA: Journal of the Australasian 
 Universities Language and Literature Association 13 (1960): 46-54.  
   318
Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. Trans. Constance Farrington. New York: 
  Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, c. 1963. 
 
- - - .   Black Skin, White Masks. London: Pluto Press, 1986. 
 
- - - .  Studies in a Dying Colonialism. London: Earthscan, 1988. 
 
Forster, E. M.  A Passage to India. Ed. Oliver Stallybrass. London: Penguin Books, 1979. 
 
Foster, Hal, ed. Postmodern Culture. London: Pluto Press; Sydney, 1985. 
 
Foucault, Michel. The Archaeology of Knowledge. Trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith. 
London: Tavistock, 1972. 
 
- - - .  “What is an Author?” Trans. Josué V. Harari. In Textual Strategies: Perspectives 
   in Post-Structuralist Criticism. Ed. Josué V. Harari, 141-60. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1979. 
 
Freud, Sigmund. Civilization and its Discontents. Ed. M. Masud R. Khan. Trans. Joan 
 Riviere. London: The Hogarth Press, 1975.  First published in English in 1930. 
 
Fryer, Peter. Black People in the British Empire. London: Pluto, 1987. 
 
Gardner, Katy. “Identity, Age and Masculinity amongst Bengali Elders in East 
London”. In A Question of Identity. Ed. Anne J. Kershen,160-78. Aldershot, 
 Hampshire:  Ashgate,  1998. 
 
Geertz, Clifford. Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author. Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1988. 
 
Gerges, Fawaz A. “The Study of Middle East International Relations: A Critique”, 
 British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 18 (1991): 206-20. 
 
Ghosh,  Amitav. In an Antique Land. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993. 
 
- - - .   “The March of the Novel Through History: The Testimony of my Grandmother’s 
 Bookcase”.  The Kenyon Review 20.2 (1998). Proquest Humanities.    
  http://0-proquest.umi.com.prospero.murdoch.edu.au/login  
  (accessed January 10,  2002). 
 
- - - .  “The Fundamentalist Challenge”. The Wilson Quarterly 19.2 (1995): 19. Proquest 
 Humanities. http://0-proquest.umi.com.prospero.murdoch.edu.au/login    
  (accessed March 24, 2004). 
 
- - - .   The Glass Palace. London: Harper Collins, 2001. 
 
Gikandi, Simon. Maps of Englishness. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.   319
 
Gilmour, David. The Long Recessional: The Imperial Life of Rudyard Kipling. London: J. 
 Murray, 2002.  
 
Gilroy, Paul. The Black Atlantic. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994. 
 
- - - .   There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack. London: Hutchinson, 1987. 
 
Goody, Jack. “Slavery in Time and Space”. In Asian and African Systems of Slavery. Ed. 
  James Watson. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.  
 
Gooneratne, Yasmine. “Cultural Independence and the Writer in Sri Lanka”. In Society 
 and the Writer: Essays on Literature in Modern Asia. Eds. Wang Gungwu, M. 
 Guerrero and D. Marr, 281-93. Canberra: The Australian National University, 
 1981.  
 
- - - .   “Leonard Woolf’s ‘Waste Land’: The Village in the Jungle”, The Journal of 
  Commonweath Literature 7.1 (June 1972): 22-34. 
 
Goonetilleke, D. C. R. A. Images of the Raj: South Asia in the Literature of Empire. New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988.  
 
- - - .   “Leonard Woolf’s The Village in the Jungle”. Journal of Commonwealth 
 Literature 9.3 (1975): 72-5. 
 
Graves, Benjamin. “Home page”. 
<http://www.stg.brown.edu/projects/hypertext/landow/post/poldiscourse/bhabha/bha
bhabhal.html (accessed April 24, 2002). 
  
Green, Martin. Dreams of Adventure, Deeds of Empire. New York: Basic Books, 1979. 
 
Greenberger, Allen J. The British Image of India: A Study in the Literature of 
 Imperialism 1880-1960. London: Oxford University Press, 1969.  
 
Guha, R. and Spivak, G., eds. Subaltern Studies Volume VII. New York and Oxford:  
  Oxford University Press, 1992. 
 
Gungwu, Wang et al., eds. Society and the Writer: Essays on Literature in Modern Asia. 
  Canberra: Australia National University Press, 1981. 
 
Haddawy, Husain. “Oriental Imitations”. [An excerpt from English Arabesque: 
 Orientalism and the Oriental Mode in Eighteenth Century English 
 Literature”.] Ur 3 (1984): 19-25. 
 
Hall, Stuart. “Cultural identity and diaspora”. In Identity: Community, culture, difference. 
  Ed. J. Rutherford, 222-37. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1990. 
   320
Halliday, Fred. “‘Orientalism’ and its Critics”. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 
 20.2 (1993): 145-63. 
 
Harari, Josué V., ed. Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism. 
 London: Methuen, 1980. 
 
Hardt, Michael. Empire. Eds. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Cambridge, Mass. and 
 London: Harvard University Press, 2000. 
 
Harmon, W. and Holman, C., eds.  A Handbook to Literature, 7
th edition. Englewood 
  Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1996. 
 
Hartman, Geoffrey H. Beyond Formalism: Literary Essays 1958-1970. New Haven: Yale 
  University Press, 1980.         
 
- - - .   The Fateful Question of Culture. New York: Columbia University Press, c. 1997. 
 
Heble, Ajay. “‘Rumours of Topography’: The Cultural Politics of Michael Ondaatje’s 
 Running in the Family”. Essays on Canadian Writing 53 (1994): 186-203. 
 
Hirsch, E. D. Validity in Interpretation. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. 
 
- - - .  The Aims of Interpretation. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976. 
 
Hobsbawm, E. J. The Age of Empire. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987. 
 
Hodge, Bob and Mishra, Vijay. Dark Side of the Dream: Australian Literature and the 
 Postcolonial Mind. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1991. 
 
hooks, bell. “Representing whiteness in the black imagination”. In Cultural Studies. Eds. 
  L. Grossberg, C. Nelson and P. Treichler, 338-46. London: Routledge, 1992.  
 
Hussain, N. M. M. I. “Western Response to Village in the Jungle”. Lanka Guardian 4.3 
(1981): 12-6. 
 
Inayatulah. “E. G. Browne: Friend of the Muslim East”. Hamdard 14.1 (1971): 19-22, 33.  
 
Israel, Nico. Outlandish: Writing Between Exile and Diaspora. Stanford: Stanford 
 University Press, 2000. 
 
Jackson, Leonard. The Poverty of Structuralism: Literature and Structuralist Theory. 
London: Longman, 1991. 
 
JanMohamed, Abdul R. “The Economy of Manichean Allegory: The Function of Racial 
 Difference in Colonialist Literature”. In “Race”, Writing and Difference. 
 Ed. Henry Louis Gates, 78-106. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985-6.   321
 
Jauss, Hans Robert. Toward an Aesthetic of Reception. Trans. Timothy Bahti. 
 Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, c. 1982.   
 
Jay, Paul. “Home page”. “Memory, Identity and Empire in Michael Ondaatje’s Running     
    in the Family”. http://home.comcast.net/~jay.paul/ondaatje.htm  
   (accessed January 20, 2004). 
 
Jayawardena, Kumari. The White Woman’s Other Burden: Western Women and South 
 Asia During British Colonial Rule. New York: Routledge, 1995. 
 
Jefferson, Ann and David Robey. Modern Literary Theory: A Comparative Introduction. 
London: Batsford, 1984. 
 
Johnson, Charles. Middle Passage. New York: Atheneum, 1990. 
 
Johnson, Clare.  “Travelling Identities: Interrogating the subject of (post)colonial 
 discourse in contemporary travel writing”. Murdoch University, MA thesis, 1997.   
 
Kanaganayakam, Chelva. “A Trick with a Glass”. Canadian Literature 132 (Spring 
 1992): 33-42.  
 
Kant, Immanuel. A Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Norman Kemp Smith. London: 
Macmillan, 1933. 
 
Kermode, Frank. The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction. London: 
 Oxford University Press, 1966.  
 
Kerr, Douglas.  “Stories of the East”. English Literature in Transition 1880-1920, 41.3 
 (1998): 261-79. Literature Online. http://lion.chadwyck.co.uk  
 (accessed June 26, 2003). 
 
Kimbrough, Robert, ed. Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness. New York: W. W. Norton  
  and Company, 1988. 
 
King, Bruce. “Amitav Ghosh. In an Antique Land”. World Literature Today 68.2 (1994): 
 430.  Proquest Humanities. 
  http://0-proquest.umi.com.prospero.murdoch.edu.au/login  
  (accessed February 5,  2004). 
 
Kiteley, Brian.”Home page”. “Trapped by Language: On Amitav Ghosh’s In an Antique 
 Land”. http://www.du.edu/~bkiteley/ghoshtalk.html  
  (accessed April 28, 2004). 
 
Kristeva, Julia. Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art. Ed. L. S. 
Roudiez. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980. 
   322
- - - .   The Kristeva Reader. Ed. Toril Moi. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986. 
 
Kopf, David. British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance: The Dynamics of Indian 
 Modernisation, 1773-1835. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. 
 
- - - .  “Hermeneutics versus History”. In Orientalism: A Reader. Ed. Macfie, 194-207. 
 
Lacan, Jacques. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis. Trans. Alan 
Sheridan. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977. 
 
Lee, Jonathan Scott. Jacques Lacan. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990.  
   
Levy, Andrea. Small Island. London: Review, 2004. 
 
Lévi-Strauss, Claude. Structural Anthropology. Trans. Clare Jacobson and Brooke 
Grundfest Schoept. London: Allen Lane, 1967. 
 
Llewelyn, John. Derrida on the Threshold of Sense. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986. 
 
Lewis, Bernard. “The Question of Orientalism”. In Orientalism: A Reader. Ed. Macfie, 
 249-70. 
 
Lowe,  Lisa. Critical Terrains: French and British Orientalism. Ithaca: Cornell 
 University Press, 1991. 
 
- - - .  “Rereadings in Orientalism: Oriental inventions and inventions of the Orient in 
 Montesquieu’s  Lettres Pesanes”. Cultural Critique 15 (Spring 1990): 115-44. 
 
Lucy, Niall, ed. Postmodern Literary Theory: An Anthology. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 
 2000. 
 
Lukács, Georg. The Theory of the Novel. Trans. Anna Bostock. Cambridge, Mass.:  
 M. I. T. Press, 1971. 
 
Lyotard, Jean-François. The Postmodern Condition. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1985. 
 
Macaulay, Thomas Babington. Thomas Babington Macaulay: Selected Writings. Eds. 
John Clive and Thomas Pinney. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972. 
 
Macfie, A. L., ed. Orientalism: A Reader. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000.  
 
MacKenzie, John M. Orientalism: History, theory and the arts. Manchester and New 
 York: Manchester University Press, 1995. 
 
- - - .   Propaganda and Empire. The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880- 
 1960.  Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984.   323
 
Massie, Allan. The Novel Today: A Critical Guide to the British Novel 1970-1989. 
London: Longman, 1990. 
 
McClintock, Anne. “The angel of progress: pitfalls of the term ‘post-colonialism’”. 
  Social Text (Spring 1992): 1-15. 
 
McHale, Brian. Postermodern Fiction. New York: Methuen, 1987. 
 
Memmi, Albert. The Colonizer and the Colonized. London: Earthscan, 1990. 
 
Meyerowitz, Selma, S. Leonard Woolf. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1982.  
 
Miller, Alex. The Sitters. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2003.   
 
Miller, Christopher. Theories of Africans: Francophone Literature and Anthropology in 
 Africa. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. 
 
Miller, J. Hillis. Fiction and Repetitition: Seven English Novels. Cambridge, Mass.: 
  Harvard University Press, 1982.  
 
Mills, Sara. Discourses of Difference:  An Analysis of Women’s Travel Writing and 
 Colonialism. London: Routledge, 1991. 
 
Mishra, Vijay. Bollywood Cinema: Temples of Desire. New York and London: 
  Routledge, 2002.  
 
Mitchell, W. J. T., ed. Against Theory: Literary Studies and the New Pragmatism. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985. 
  
- - - .   “Translator Translated”.  
File://C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\Interview with Homi Bhabha.html  
(accessed May 9, 2002). 
 
Morrison, Toni. Beloved: A Novel. New York: Knopf, 1987. 
 
- - - .   Playing in the Dark. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992. 
 
Mukherjee, Arun. Towards an Aesthetic of Opposition: Essays on Literature Criticism and  
 Cultural  Imperialism. Stratford-on-Avon: Williams-Wallace, 1988. 
 
Musaka, Ham. Sir Apolo Kagwa Discovers Britain. Ed. Taban lo Liyon. London: 
  Heinemann AWS, 1975. First published Hutchinson, 1904, as Uganda’s Katikiro  in  
 England. 
 
Nadel, Ira Bruce. Biography: Fiction, Fact and Form. London and Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1984.   324
 
Naipaul, V. S. The Writer and the World. Ed. Pankaj Mishra. London: Picador, 2002. 
 
Newby, P. H. ed. The Book of the Thousand and One Nights. Trans. Richard Burton. 
  London: Panther Books, 1965. 
 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Joyful Wisdom. Trans. Thomas Common. Edinburgh: Foulis, 
1910. 
 
Norris, Christopher. Deconstruction: Theory and Practice. London and New York: 
Methuen, 1982. 
 
- - - .  Derrida. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987. 
 
Noyes, J. K. Colonial Space. Chur, Switz.: Harwood Academic, 1992. 
 
Omotoso, Kole. Achebe or Soyinka: A Study in Contrasts. London: Hans Zell Publishers,  
 1996. 
 
Ondaatje, Michael. Anil’s Ghost. London: Picador, 2000. 
 
- - - .  Running in the Family. London: Picador, 1982. 
 
- - - .  The English Patient.  London: Bloomsbury, 1992. 
 
Parry, Benita. “Resistance theory/theorizing resistance or two cheers for nativism”. In 
  Post-Colonial Theory and Colonial Discourse. Ed. Peter Hulme. Manchester: 
  Manchester University Press, 1993. 
 
- - - .   “Signs of Our Times”. Third Text 28/29 (1994): 5-24. 
 
Paul, James. “Orientalism Revisited”. Middle East Report January/February (1988): 
 32-6. 
 
Plato. The Republic. Trans. Desmond Lee. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974. 
 
Pratt, Mary. Imperial Eyes: Travel writing and transculturation. London and New York: 
 Routledge,  1992. 
       
Radhakrishnan, R. “Globalization, desire, and the politics of representation”. 
  Comparative Literature 53.4 (2001): 315. Proquest Humanities.  
  http://0-proquest.umi.com.prospero.murdoch.edu.au/login  
  (accessed February 5,  2004). 
 
Richardson, Michael. “Enough Said: Reflections on Orientalism”. Anthropology Today 
  6.4 (1990): 16-9. 
   325
Rodinson, Maxime.  Europe and the Mystique of Islam. Trans. Roger Veinus. London: I. 
 B.  Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1988. 
 
Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1979. 
 
Roy, Anindyo.  ‘“Telling Brutal Things”: Colonialism, Bloomsbury and the Crisis of 
 Narration in Leonard Woolf’s “A Tale Told by Moonlight.”’ Criticism 43.2 
 (2001): 189-222. Proquest Humanities. 
http://0-proquest.umi.com.prospero.murdoch.edu.au/login  
(accessed February 28, 2003).  
 
Rushdie, Salman. East, West. London: Jonathon Cape, 1994. 
 
- - - .  Grimus. London: Vintage, 1996. 
 
- - - .   Imaginary Homelands. London: Granta Books, 1981. 
 
- - - .   Midnight’s Children. London: Jonathon Cape, 1981. 
 
- - - .  The Satanic Verses. New York: Viking, 1988. 
 
Said, Edward W. Beginnings:  Intention and Method. New York: Columbia University 
 Press,  1975.   
 
- - - .   Culture and Imperialism. London: Chatto & Windus, 1993. 
 
- - - .   Orientalism. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1991. 
 
- - - .  “Orientalism Reconsidered”.  In Orientalism: A Reader. Ed. Macfie, 
 345-61. 
 
- - - .   Out of Place: A Memoir. New York: Knopf, 2000.  
 
- - - .   Reflections on Exile and Other Literary and Cultural Essays. London: Granta, 
 2001. 
 
- - - .   “Representing  the  colonized:  Anthropology’s  interlocutors”.  Critical Inquiry 15 
  (Winter 1989): 205-25. 
 
- - - .  The World, the Text, and the Critic. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
 1983. 
 
Samad, Siswati. “Go East”. Prestige (July 2004): 20-22. 
 
Sartre, Jean-Paul. What is Literature? Trans. Bernard Frechtman. London: Methuen, 
1950.   326
 
Saussure, Ferdinand de. A Course in General Linguistics. Trans. W. Baskin. London: 
Fontana, 1974.  
 
Siebers, Tobin. The Ethics of Criticism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. 
 
Simpson, D. Mark. “Minefield Readings: The Postcolonial English Patient”. Essays on 
 Canadian Writing, 216-37. 
 
Sivan, Emmanuel. “Edward Said and his Arab Reviewers”. The Jerusalem Quarterly 35 
 (Spring 1985): 11-23.  
 
Slemon, Stephen. “Post-Colonial Allegory and the Transformation of History”. Journal of  
 Commonwealth  Literature  18.1  (1988):  157-68.      
 
- - - .  “Monuments of Empire: Allegory/counter-discourse/post-colonial writing”. 
  Kunapipi 9.3 (1987): 1-16. 
 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the 
 Vanishing  Present. Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 
  1999. 
 
- - - .   “Strategy, Identity, Writing”. In The Post-colonial Critic. Ed. Sarah Harasym. 
  New York and London: Routledge, 1990. 
 
- - - .  “The Politics of Interpretation”. In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics. 
  118-33. New York: Methuen, 1987.  
 
Spotts, Frederic, ed. Letters of Leonard Woolf. New York: Harcourt, 1989. 
 
Stam, Robert, and Spence, Louise. “Colonialism, racism and representation”. Screen 24.2 
 (1983):  2-20. 
 
Steedman, Carolyn. Past Tenses: Essays on Writing, Autobiography and History. 
 London: River Oram Press, 1992. 
 
Strachey, John. The End of Empire. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. 
 
Suleri, Sara. The Rhetoric of English India. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. 
 
- - - .  “Woman skin deep: feminism and the postcolonial condition”. Critical Inquiry 18 
  (Summer 1992): 756-69. 
 
Sykes, Percy. A History of Persia, Vol. II. London: Barnes & Noble, 1969. 
 
Tiffin, Helen. “Post-Colonial Literatures and Counter-Discourse”. Kunapipi 9.2 (1987): 
17-34.   327
 
Tomlinson, John. Cultural Imperialism. London: Pinter, 1991.  
 
Toynbee, Arnold Joseph. A Study of History. London: Oxford University Press, 1935- 
 61. 
 
Trautmann, Thomas R. Aryans and British India. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: 
 University of California Press, 1997. 
 
Turner, Bryan S. Marx and the End of Orientalism. London: George Allen & Unwin, 
 1978. 
 
Viswanathan, Gauri. Masks of Conquest: Literary study and British rule in India. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1989. 
 
Wadham-Smith, N. British Council website. “Re-inventing Britain”.  
<http://www.britishcouncil.org/studies/reinventing_britain/manifesto.htm  
(accessed April 24, 2002). 
 
Wahba, Magdi. “An Anger Observed”. Journal of Arabic Literature 20 (1989): 187-99. 
 
Waldman, Marilyn. Toward a Theory of Historical Narrative. Columbus: Ohio State 
 University Press, 1980. 
 
Wallerstein, Immanuel. Historical Capitalism. London: Verso, 1983.  
 
Wasserman, George R. Roland Barthes. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1981. 
 
Watt, Ian. The Rise of the Novel. Harmondsworth and Ringwood, Victoria: 
 Penguin Books, 1966.  
 
Wickens, G. Michael. “Browne, Edward Granville”. Encyclopaedia Iranica IV, 483-8. 
 
Williams, Patrick and Chrisman, Laura, eds. Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial 
 Theory. Hemel Hempstead, Sussex: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993. 
 
Wilson, Duncan. Leonard Woolf: A Political Biography. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1978.  
 
Wilson, Ernest J. “Orientalism: A Black Perspective”. Macfie: 239-48. 
 
Woolf, Leonard. Diaries in Ceylon 1908-1911 and Stories From the East. London: The 
Hogarth Press, 1963. First published Colombo: The Ceylon Historical Journal, 
1962. 
 
- - - .   Empire and Commerce in Africa. London: Routledge/Thoemmes Press, 1998.   328
 
- - - .   Growing. London: The Hogarth Press, 1970. 
 
- - - .    “Joseph Conrad” in Woolf’s Essays on Literature, History, Politics, etc. 
 London: The Hogarth Press, 1927.  
 
- - - .   Sowing: An Autobiography of the Years 1880-1904. Oxford: Oxford University 
 Press, 1980. 
 
- - - .   The Village in the Jungle. London: The Hogarth Press, 1961. First published 
 1913. 
 
Young, Robert. White Mythologies: Writing History and the West. London: Routledge, 
 1990. 
 
Žižek, Slavoj. The Sublime Object of Ideology. London and New York: Verso, 1989. 
 
 